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ABSTRACT 
 
The main idea of IRISS WP 4 was to analyse surveillance as an element of everyday life of 
citizens. The starting point was a broad understanding of surveillance, reaching beyond the 
narrowly defined and targeted (nonetheless encompassing) surveillance practices of state 
authorities, justified with the need to combat and prevent crime and terrorism. We were 
interested in the mundane effects of surveillance practices emerging in the sectors of 
electronic commerce, telecommunication, social media and other areas. The basic assumption 
of WP 4 was that being a citizen in modern surveillance societies amounts to being 
transformed into a techno-social hybrid, i.e. a human being inexorably linked with data 
producing technologies, becoming a data-leaking container. While this “ontological shift” is 
not necessarily reflected in citizens’ understanding of who they are, it nonetheless affects their 
daily lives in many different ways. Citizens may entertain ideas of privacy, autonomy and 
selfhood rooted in pre-electronic times while at the same time acting under a regime of 
“mundane governance”. We started to enquire about the use of modern technologies and in 
the course of the interviews focussed on issues of surveillance in a more explicit manner. 
Over 200 qualitative interviews were conducted in a way that produced narratives (stories) of 
individual experiences with different kinds of technologies and/or surveillance practices. 
These stories then were analysed against the background of theoretical hypotheses of what it 
means in objective terms to live in a surveillance society. We assume that privacy no longer is 
the default state of mundane living, but has to be actively created. We captured this with the 
term privacy labour. Furthermore we construed a number of dilemmas or trade-off situations 
to guide our analysis. These dilemmas address the issue of privacy as a state or “good” which 
is traded in for convenience (in electronic commerce), security (in law enforcement 
surveillance contexts), sociality (when using social media), mutual trust (in social relations at 
the workplace as well as in the relationship between citizens and the state), and engagement 
(in horizontal, neighbourhood watch-type surveillance relations). For each of these dilemmas 
we identified a number of stories demonstrating how our respondents as “heroes” in the 
narrative solved the problems they encountered, strived for the goals they were pursuing or 
simply handled a dilemmatic situation. This created a comprehensive and multi-dimensional 
account of the effects of surveillance in everyday life.  
Each of the main chapters does focus on one of these different dilemmas.  
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR WP4  
Reinhard Kreissl 
 
What makes the IRISS project different from many other FP7 consortia investigating citizens’ 
view of surveillance is the theoretical and methodological approach. The overall idea 
informing the work in IRISS is a dual perspective on the topics under investigation. 
Surveillance, privacy, data protection and resilience can be analysed from the perspective of 
an outside, detached observer. When taking this perspective, a concept like privacy is put into 
a larger theoretical and disciplinary context, normative questions of adequate and reasonable 
solutions for given problems are addressed and meticulously analysed. The analysis strives 
for logical clarity of definitions and generalized arguments for or against solutions to 
problems defined in a more or less abstract way (this strategy is pursued primarily in WP 1, 2 
and 6).  
As opposed to the external observer’s point of view the participants’ perspective looks at the 
phenomena under investigation so to speak from the inside, through the eyes of the actors 
involved. This perspective from within pursues a reconstructive strategy, trying to understand 
how citizens conceive of surveillance; how they organize their daily lives vis-à-vis mundane 
everyday problems while living in what can be termed from the observer’s perspective a 
“surveillance society”. Here a different kind of logic may be in operation. Citizens may have 
an idiosyncratic view on issues like data protection, privacy and surveillance. They may 
entertain strong normative biases towards crime fight and surveillance; they may consider 
data protection as completely irrelevant or extremely important. All this has to be taken at 
face value and then integrated in a larger theoretical frame of interpretation. While there may 
be informed and uninformed citizens, they all have to handle their techno-social way of 
existence in a surveillance society individually. These different strategies of coping with 
surveillance can be reconstructed when taking the position of the participants’ perspective. 
This is what WP 4 is aiming for. 
 
The difference of observer and participant perspective has been elaborated by Jürgen 
Habermas in his Theory of communicative action to account for two different ways of 
analysing social phenomena.1 Habermas introduces the two complementary concepts of 
system and life world linked to the two complementary perspectives of analysis: taking an 
observer’s perspective fosters a type of analysis conceiving of society as a more or less robust 
system to which individual actors have to adapt, whilst from the participants perspective 
society emerges as a context of social interaction sustained and continuously reproduced by 
individual social actors.  Both perspectives taken together produce a complex account of 
modern society. A similar analytical difference has been used by Anthony Giddens in his 
theory of structuration, analysing the interplay between agency and structure.2  
 
In the context of WP 4 we are mainly drawing on the methodological aspects of this double 
perspective by focussing on the participants’ perspective in the way citizens describe their 
everyday use of modern (surveillance) technologies. Using the dual perspective of system and 
life world these technologies can be seen as systemic elements operating on the everyday or 
                                               
1 Habermas, Jürgen, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Band 1 und 2), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2011. 
2 Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society, Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge, Polity Press 1984. 
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life world of the actors. They may be constraining the range of actions or extend the realm of 
communicative reach, their existence may be perceived as problematic by citizens or not. But 
although these technologies do have an effect on the life world of citizens, these effects are 
not deterministic. Being exposed to and using modern technologies always entails a creative 
or active element of appropriation and/or interpretation. At the same time technology has 
become a highly pervasive element of mundane life in Western society and this changes the 
lives of citizens in manifold and fundamental ways.  
In WP 4 we chose a strategic approach to better understand how citizens organize their daily 
lives in a surveillance society, and if and how they develop resilient reactions. We start from 
the assumption that modern information and communication technology, as the basis for all 
kinds of surveillance activities, has a number of effects. These effects can be overt or covert. 
They can affect citizens’ lives in a more or less subtle way. Many surveillance effects (such as 
e.g. social sorting in data bases) go largely unnoticed. Others, such as e.g. access controls at 
airports, are obvious, visible, and citizens are aware of their being subject to surveillance and 
control measures.   
 
WP 4 takes its starting point from the everyday experience of European citizens, trying to 
understand how the pervasive use of modern technology shapes their lives and how they 
perceive their status as being surveilled data subjects (or techno-social hybrids).  
 
In this introductory chapter we will first elaborate the methodological approach followed in 
our data gathering and analysis and then lay out some of the theoretical ideas informing this 
analysis. The chapter ends with a brief description of our sample and the findings of the 
country reports on surveillance conducted in this work package in five countries: Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Slovakia and the UK. 
 
 
1.1 METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS ON INTERVIEWS IN WP4 
 
The qualitative approach 
In order to go beyond the level of findings produced by survey research on citizens’ attitudes 
towards surveillance and also to better understand what resilience could mean in real world 
settings, we developed a specific approach to conduct interviews and analyse and interpret the 
data obtained. While survey research typically confronts respondents with a set of clear-cut 
alternatives and provides a specific cognitive frame by asking explicit questions, the approach 
we chose avoids this. In WP 4 we used a very general stimulus to start the interviews with our 
respondents by asking them about their use of IC-technology (from mobile phones and 
laptops to credit- and loyalty cards) and the different ways they were applying this technology 
(from peer-to-peer communication to online shopping to searching for information via search 
engines). We avoided the term “surveillance” as an explicit stimulus to give our respondents 
the opportunity to develop their personal understanding, and also to find out whether they had 
second (critical) thoughts about the use of these technologies. In later stages of the interview 
respondents were asked whether they had any thoughts about the effects of technology use 
and whether they had thought about what happened to the data they were leaking while using 
the various technologies they had talked about, e.g. their mobile phone. In many cases this 
opened up the explicit problem of surveillance and provided an opportunity to elaborate on 
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the different dimensions of this topic. Again, we were not working along a list of questions to 
be asked, but left it to our respondents to bring up whatever they thought would be relevant. 
Nevertheless, a guiding code of practise was used by the interviewers to ensure that a few, 
main topics were at least raised in the course of the interview.  
 
Interviews are always communicative events. Narrative interviews give the interviewers an 
active role in a dyadic situation. These interviews are not modelled after the standard 
quantitative survey methodology where it is assumed that all interfering influences should be 
eliminated to elicit an uncontaminated, unbiased “true” response from the respondents to then 
be written down or recorded by the interviewer. Interviewers take the important role of the 
listener or audience. In a narrative setting it is the task of the respondent to tell a story in such 
a way that the interviewer can understand the overall plot. This includes an elaboration of 
desires, plans, strategies and goals, motivating the actions of the narrator. (And interviewers 
can ask for clarification and explication should one of these elements be missing in the 
account produced by the interviewee.)  
 
Some remarks on the pros and cons of the chosen approach  
Opting for such an open and qualitative approach to empirical research has a number of 
consequences. It helps to produce accounts of relatively high ecological validity. Respondents 
can use their own words and schema of relevance to talk about the use of technology. While 
interviews of this kind tend to display a certain internal narrative coherence, it can be difficult 
to compare statements and generalize across several individual cases. It is however, important 
to note that the type of findings and insights produced in the tradition of qualitative research 
methods are different from the knowledge produced by quantitative survey research. While 
survey research typically looks at the overall distribution of pre-defined characteristics in a 
population, qualitative data can be used to demonstrate how individuals understand, interpret 
or solve a (general) problem in a unique, but nonetheless instructive way. Giving respondents 
the floor to develop their views on a given topic produces a wide array of complex 
interpretations that should not be reduced post-hoc to a set of standard categories. Nonetheless 
a theoretical strategy to synthesise the findings is necessary to come to conclusions beyond 
the presentation of interesting but idiosyncratic single cases. 
In our research we had a further problem to address since interviews were conducted in 
different countries and different languages, which poses issues of translation. Extended 
narratives have to be translated to make them accessible to the researchers in other countries. 
This makes a hermeneutic analysis, based on subtle differences in linguistic meaning 
extremely difficult.  
Both points – the thematic openness of the interviews and the problem of translation into a 
common language to make the data accessible to all involved researchers – led us to adopt a 
more structural and theory-driven approach for the analysis of interviews. We chose the 
model of a story grammar to analyse our interviews (see below for more details). 
 
The unit of analysis 
Taking stories as the primary unit of analysis has an advantage when working across different 
cultures and languages. It is easier to “translate” and compare stories/events between different 
cultural and linguistic settings than to identify attitudes or beliefs on the basis of translating 
whole interviews. When reconstructing beliefs and attitudes as stable mental constructs of 
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individuals on the basis of interview data one has to start from the linguistic surface structure. 
To understand an attitude or belief one has to consider subtle semantic differences. Indexical 
expressions as well as the complex meaning in spoken language can easily get lost when 
utterances of respondents in interviews are translated into a common, third language. Stories 
or events as larger grammatical units on the other hand, display a rather straightforward 
syntactic and semantic structure. When looking at narrative structures of stories it is not 
necessary to stick to a precise transcript of the spoken language, but rather to operate with a 
set of structural elements that are invariant across individual languages.  
 
The role of the storyteller 
The research strategy applied here could also be labelled “event research”, i.e. it is not 
primarily the individual, her/his mental states and cultural attitudes we are looking at. The 
focus is on the individual as being actively involved in some sort of societal action (“event”) 
and the way s/he handles or understands this situation. We perceive the individuals we 
interviewed primarily as problem solvers, i.e. as persons acting in a given environment to 
achieve a goal or solve a problem. As mentioned above we used a simple stimulus to start the 
interviews by asking about the daily use of technology. When exposed to this question, 
subjects tend to respond with stories about their way of using mobile phones, computers, 
tablets, etc. Often our subjects produced stories where they took the position of the main 
actor, i.e. they acted or were acted upon in a situation and technology was in one way or 
another involved in the course of events. In the interviews we tried to elicit these kinds of 
stories (“What happened to you?” “What did you do?”). So while there was no narrow focus 
on specific topics to be addressed, respondents were urged to use an active mode of narration 
to the extent possible, telling what they did, what happened to them and how they managed to 
solve a problem or make decision about the proper course of action. 
 
Narrative interviews of this kind are not primarily aiming at attitudes or other constructs 
(what do respondents think, which decontextualized general beliefs do they hold about a 
certain object, etc.) but rather the focus is on the re-construction of events and situations 
(hereafter referred to as “stories”) where our interviewees have been involved in one way or 
another. Focussing on these kinds of stories creates a different set of data, compared to 
classical questionnaire type research. Synthesizing typified constellations of attitudes and 
beliefs along the line of standard methodology may nonetheless occur at a later stage. 
 
Stories elicited in interviews describe events. A good story is one, where a person can take 
one of three pragmatic roles as hero, narrator or listener.3 Typically the interviewer takes the 
role of the listener whereas the interviewees act as narrator and often also as the hero of the 
story. 
 
Being involved in an event, respondents as storytellers can take each of these different roles: 
they can present events (or “changes in states of the world”) from a third person’s perspective. 
An example from our interviews would be: 
 
                                               
3 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The post-modern condition. A report on knowledge. Manchester University Press, 1979:20 passim. 
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“When you think about all these video cameras mounted on public buildings, you 
wonder how this affects individual rights …” 
 
Here the respondent reports a situation where s/he was not immediately involved, but holds a 
position to the issue at hand. Following up on a statement like this we usually asked for 
personal experience to probably elicit a more personal story of the respondent in the role of 
the subject being captured on video, putting him in the position of the hero. 
 
The perspective of the storyteller 
With regard to the topics addressed in IRISS two other principal perspectives have to be 
envisaged: when discussing the problems of surveillance in the later stages of the interview, 
stories can be told from the perspective of the watcher or the watched. A surveillant relation 
is typically comprised of these two roles and depending at which end of this relation the hero 
stands, the stories will be different. 
An example from a story told from the perspective of the watched could read like this: 
 
“The boss of this company set up video cameras to control access to the premises but 
what he actually did was controlling the workers…” 
 
In this sequence the respondent who worked in this company for some time is in the position 
of the watched and elaborates on the consequences and the lack of counter strategies (the 
“boss” was the local tycoon and only employer in a small village and no one dared to 
approach him or criticise him for putting up the video cameras, though everybody was against 
it.) 
 
Stories from the perspective of the watchers occur in our sample as well though not as often 
as stories from the perspective of the watched. How such a story from the watcher’s 
perspective looks, can be demonstrated in an interview with a young man working in a winter 
resort at a ski lift in Austria, controlling the tickets of the skiers, who have to produce a 
machine-readable ticket (swipe card) with a digitalized photo to pass through the barrier. The 
photo stored on the ticket appears on the screen in the control room and our respondent in 
principle had the opportunity to check the identity of the person using this ticket. He was 
elaborating on this situation and why and how one should stop certain individuals using 
another person’s ticket or not. (i.e. when the person presenting the swipe card ticket is not 
identical with the digital photo stored on the ticket presented). Such stories from the watcher’s 
perspective create completely different social dynamics as compared to stories told from the 
position of the watched. 
 
Focussing on events/stories elicited in the interviews yields a number of complex accounts. 
These accounts demonstrate a wide array of different ways to handle surveillance (as watcher 
or watched). The interviews produce different scenarios, presenting the respondents in 
different roles as watchers and watched, in public space and private relations, as active agents 
or passive victims. 
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The (re-)actions of the storyteller 
The types of interviews conducted in WP 4 primarily demonstrate how respondents solve the 
problems they encounter. Human behaviour (as presented in narratives about events and 
actions) can be understood as goal seeking or problem solving activity, or more generally as 
“motivated”. People do things for a reason and when they are telling stories these reasons 
either have to be made explicit or they can be inferred using cultural knowledge (“what every 
school child should know…”). As competent members of a culture we assume that 
individuals have intentions, follow plans, adopt strategies, that they can cheat, can address a 
problem straightforward etc. It is part of the cultural competence of members of society to 
read and comprehend the actions of the heroes in the stories they tell (or are told) in such a 
way that they infer plans or ascribe motives to the actors involved. 
 
Taking this perspective opens up a number of options for the analysis of interview data. We 
can investigate how respondents “solve” or handle the problems they encounter. Hence we 
take interconnected events as presented in the format of a story as the basic unit of analysis. 
Identifying such stories/events is the first analytical step in the processing of the data obtained 
from our interviews.  
Story or event are more complex units than attitudes and beliefs and most probably allow for a 
greater ecological validity of the field under investigation than abstract concepts.  
Collecting individual stories from the interviews, one can work towards a typology of such 
stories. Having constructed such a typology of stories a second orthogonal step would be to 
develop a typology of actors. The chart below shows the logic of these different approaches to 
analyse the data. 
 
Data analysis 
 
(a) Analysing interviews at the level of stories (S) 
… 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Comparing interviews to identify types of actors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 2 S 3 S n 
Type A Type B 
S 1 Interview 1 
Story type 
Interview 1 (S1,2..) Interview 2 (S1,2..) Interview 3 (S1,2..) 
Actor type A Actor type B 
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Stories, as understood here, are cognitive cultural schemata used to summarize and process 
information about the world. Imagine a novel like Tolstoy’s War and Peace. A person having 
read this book is asked to give a synopsis or summary of what this novel is all about. The 
average reader will be able to do this without memorizing the tens of thousands of words but 
simply by applying a cultural schema like the one we are suggesting for the analysis of our 
interviews. Applying the cognitive schema of a story, the reader will be able to identify the 
main characters, their intentions, desires and the actions that flow from these intentions. S/he 
will also be able to take into account the contextual aspects of the story.  
 
Another example can be taken from autobiographical accounts. Telling your life history you 
will do so by presenting your actions as motivated; things happen to you, you try to make 
sense of them (develop an internal response to the world), then you act upon the world 
(producing an external response), which in turn again changes the state of the world you act 
upon, and so on.  
Taking these elements (episode, event, reaction, change of state, internal and external 
responses) allows for the construction of a kind of generative grammar to identify stories in 
interviews and to parse large chunks of text into meaningful typified units. As mentioned 
above, one of the main advantages of this approach is that we do not have to stick to the literal 
transcripts (or the linguistic surface structure), but can look for the elements of episodes in the 
interviews. These elements can be expressed in different languages. Nevertheless, the 
interviewers were instructed to mark and respectively transfer important specifics like irony 
and country-specific references whenever applicable. 
 
Producing these kinds of stories also requires a specific elicitation strategy when conducting 
the interviews, motivating respondents to report what happened to them, and how they 
encountered real world situations. Even when respondents do not report about their own 
experiences of relevant situations but remain at the level of general statements about the state 
of the world, these statements can often be read as stories in the sense of the model.  
 
Using this approach one can develop a “pragmatic” (in the linguistic sense) understanding of 
interviews. The respondent always performs as a communicating agent, informing the 
interviewer and trying to make him- or her-self understood in the social situation of the 
interview, giving information about the world and linking this with personal motives, plans 
and attitudes. The key point here is that these attitudes are not stand-alone constructs but tied 
into the communicative pragmatic course of the interview unfolding in time. 
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The graphical representation below gives an idea how stories can be parsed into their 
constituent parts: 
 
(From Rummelhart, 1975)4 
 
Consider the following paraphrase of an interview: 
 
(1) Sometimes I do shopping on the Internet (= setting) 
(2) I buy a product using an online shop (= event) 
(3) They ask for my data and I give them the information (= event)  
(4) They send me a voucher for another Internet shop (= change of state) 
(6) I have the opportunity to save money. I think this is a treat (= internal response) 
(7) I order a product from the new shop using this voucher. (= overt response) 
 
The story goes on and the respondent complains about all the advertisement mails being 
dumped into her mailbox from the new shop and from others offering similar goods (although 
no transaction took place with these other shops). This further course of events could also be 
parsed in a similar way. 
Such individual stories can be made comparable, documenting different scenarios and the 
reactions of the respondents. In the brief example above, the story could be typified as a story 
of “consumer seduction” (lines 1-7), and then in the text below as a story about the nuisance, 
which is the price for using the “special discount offer” (being dumped with spam offers). In 
the course of the interview the respondent answers that she does not know exactly whether 
these practices are legal, and she also does not know what she can do to stop it.  
Parsing the interview in this way yields a sequence of nested stories, creating the image of an 
actor involved in different events, struggling with competing desires and needs, surrendering 
to the constraints and demands of the Internet (or developing strategies of resistance and 
resilience). Attitudes and beliefs do come into play here, but they are contextualized, 
embedded in practical everyday life actions 
 
                                               
4 Rummelhart, David, Notes on a schema for stories, In: Daniel Bobrow and Allan Collins, Representation and 
Understanding, Studies in cognitive science, Berkeley, University of California, 1975, p. 211-236.  
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1.2 THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS INFORMING THE WORK IN WP4 
 
The sampling method 
Interviews were conducted in five countries, using different entry points for the selection of 
interview partners. These different entry points were chosen to cover a number of social 
settings that seemed of specific relevance for our theoretical questions. In each of the five 
countries – Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovakia and United Kingdom – we attempted to recruit 
citizens specifically interested in one of the four areas that were chosen as entry points. These 
fields of recruitment were: crime prevention, e.g. individuals who were active in 
Neighbourhood Watch groups; consumer protection; workplace surveillance (e.g. active 
members of labour unions); and individuals from NGOs active in the field of data-protection. 
Furthermore in each country interviews with randomly selected citizens (control group) were 
conducted. This selection strategy was informed by the idea that citizens active in one of the 
above mentioned fields would have a specific understanding of different dimensions of 
surveillance. With around 45 contacts in each of the five countries we collected far more than 
200 interviews. These interviews were parsed into 1000 stories addressing different topics. (A 
detailed description of the sample can be found below at the end of this introduction). 
 
The conceptual framework 
Surveillance and resilience, as the key concepts of our research, cannot be considered as 
household words for the average European citizen. Despite the recent public debate in the 
wake of the Snowden revelations we assume that only few people organize their daily lives on 
the basis of the fact they are (or could be) constantly surveilled. Although survey research 
suggests that many citizens do not approve of mass surveillance, one should not jump to 
conclusions about everyday behaviour on the basis of answers to explicit survey questions. 
Being tied into a dense net of data gathering in the most mundane of daily endeavours it 
would most probably foster a paranoid attitude to constantly consider the surveillance 
potential of every move one makes. Citizens use mobile phones, loyalty and credit cards; they 
register via e-government portals, make transactions through online shops and pass under 
CCTV cameras. It would be easy and inexpensive to monitor an individual in a society of 
electronic mass surveillance. As Bankston and Soltani have calculated, to monitor a person 
electronically costs 6.5 cents per hour, as compared to 275 $ when doing a covert operation 
with police officers.5 What this demonstrates is not only the pervasiveness of surveillance but 
at the same time a quasi-ontological shift in human existence. Human beings, at least in 
Western societies, have become data subjects, continuously leaking information collected and 
stored by anonymous institutions or corporations. 
 
Hence, from a theoretical perspective we suggest to give up the crisp distinction between the 
social and the technical. Whereas much of the surveillance studies literature operates with the 
(mostly implicit) categorical distinction between a social world and technical systems or 
assemblages operating on the social,6 we suggest concepts like techno-social hybrid and 
                                               
5 Bankston, Kevin and Ashkan Soltani, Tiny constables and the cost of surveillance: Making cents out of United States vs. 
Jones, The Yale Law Journal online, 2014.     
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/tiny-constables-and-the-cost-of-surveillance-making-cents-out-of-united-states-v-jones 
6 Haggerty, Kevin D. and S. Ericson, ‘The surveillant assemblage’, The British Journal of Sociology, 51, No. 4 2000, pp. 
701–717. 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
15
socially mediated technology.7 Whereas it is common understanding among social scientists 
working in the field of surveillance studies that technologies incorporate a certain 
social/cultural concept of order (e.g. an algorithm for the detection of “uncooperative” 
individuals reflects and incorporates an idea of socially normal behaviour), the idea of a 
human as a composite techno-social hybrid unit is not as common in social theory and 
research. Gregory Bateson once used the nice example of a blind man and his stick, asking 
where the organism ends – at the hand or at the end of the stick?8 The same case could be 
made for glasses (even before the age of “Google Glasses”), hip implants or cardiac 
pacemakers; but also for mobile phones or laptops.9 The core point is to understand the 
“modern Human” as a technologically mediated and supported form of existence.  
 
This has consequences for the conceptualization of surveillance since it points to surveillance 
practices outside the narrow realm of law enforcement and crime fighting. Often surveillance 
is perceived primarily as a police practice, applied to prevent or apprehend suspected 
criminals. A central issue in the public debate about surveillance is the idea of a trade-off or 
balance between security and privacy. A standard argument in dominant discourse claims that 
an increase in security (through surveillance) can be achieved when giving up “some” privacy 
rights. Citizens are asked to trade-in their privacy, provide personal data and accept highly 
intrusive surveillance measures to prevent criminal or terrorist attacks. While the evidence for 
this claim is shaky and the balancing metaphor is flawed10 it nonetheless shapes and narrows 
the debate about surveillance to practices originating in the domain of public authorities (from 
secret services to the police). Although the public interest has shifted in the recent past the 
main focus of critical debates about surveillance is still on the citizen-state relationship. The 
loosening of legal constraints, the extension of state powers are objects of continuous critique.  
 
Background information and theoretical remarks  
At the same time processes of datafication in the realm of civil society, transforming citizens 
into leaking data containers and fostering the growth of hitherto unprecedented collections of 
person related data, go comparatively unnoticed in public debates. Considering these 
mundane processes of data-leaking and data collection, traditional surveillance measures in 
the context of state practices are dwarfed. Modern communication technologies integrated 
into everyday life in contemporary Western societies have seduced citizens into a kind of 
cyber-exhibitionism. Whereas requests from public authorities to provide person related 
information often encounter critical resistance, users willingly give away such information in 
other contexts. The most prominent examples are social media services like Facebook, 
providing a low threshold and free of charge platform for the presentation of self in cyber 
space. The often rehearsed critical phrase “If you don’t pay for a service you are the product” 
                                               
7 Comp. Brown, Sheila, Criminology of hybrids: Rethinking crime and law in technosocial networks, Theoretical 
Criminology, Vol. 10, 2, 2006, pp. 223 – 244. 
8 Bateson, Gregory, Mind and nature - a necessary unity. Cresskill, N.J., Hampton Press, 1979. 
9 Comp.: United States: Supreme Court of the United States: Riley versus California, 2013. 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-132_8l9c.pdf 
It states:“A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on 
privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital 
data has to rest on its own bottom.” p.15. 
10 Comp. Berglez, Regina and Reinhard Kreissl, Report on security enhancing options that are not based on surveillance 
technologies, SurPRISE Deliverable 3.3, 2013. 
http://surprise-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SurPRISE_D-3.3-Report-on-security-enhancing-options-that-are-not-
based-on-surveillance-technologies_v069.pdf 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
16
highlights the logic of the new data-economy underlying this development. Users pay for the 
services they use with personal information produced while using the service and harvested 
for further processing by the provider.  
The ‘traditional’ business model of commercial providers in the domain of social media is 
based on the idea of targeted marketing and advertisement. Selling third parties, i.e. other 
companies, the service to target potential customers and placing banners popping up on the 
screen of the target group creates the main revenue of Facebook, Google and the like. The 
service is “free” for the users (who pay with their data) and the provider creates highly 
sophisticated profiles from individual users’ data, providing not only the basis for targeted 
marketing but also creating an ever-growing number of Big Data strategies, even including 
manipulative experiments.11 
While the idea of selectively offering goods and services to individual users may look like a 
trivial extension of pre-digital customer relation management (CRM) practices, the sheer 
amount and diversity of data leaked by users opens up qualitatively new opportunities to 
create what could be termed “consumer intelligence” at the individual and collective level. 
Based on the analysis of easily accessible information from individual users, (information that 
at face value appears to require no specific protection with regard to privacy), highly sensitive 
conclusions about private and personal traits of individual users can be produced. Recent 
research has demonstrated how sexual orientation, political preferences or personality traits 
can be derived with high reliability from an analysis of Likes and Dislikes posted on 
Facebook, or how individuals can be identified through an analysis of anonymised geo-
location data from mobile phones. At the collective level a new kind of epidemiology is 
emerging based on the analysis of individual user information. Analysing traffic on Internet 
platforms or using linguistic analysis the spread of a flu epidemic can be followed in real time 
and early warning signs for changes of collective sentiments can be developed. Research 
conducted by Zittrain and others show, how Facebook is already considered capable of 
influencing elections.12 In some cases intelligence services even try to counteract changes or 
manipulate public perception through targeted undercover attacks on e.g. online polls.13  
 
These developments can affect citizens in many different ways without them being aware of 
the underlying processes of Big Data, data analysis, or even manipulation inhabiting the 
virtual world of cyber space. Cyber space itself constitutes a major source of information and 
orientation for an increasing part of the general population, where individuals move (act, live) 
in an environment shaped by interests and strategies not overtly identifiable or made public. 
In this virtual universe they are exposed selectively to information delivering the basis for 
their orientation, living in a world moulded by forces they do not understand and/or are not 
aware of. Moreover, it is highly likely that even allegedly objective information is 
individually filtered, based on former choices and preferences.14 The situation resembles the 
plot of Hal Ashby’s movie ‘Being there’, where Peter Sellers as the gardener in a wealthy 
man’s household exists in a secluded and virtual world with television as the only information 
                                               
11 Meyer, Robinson, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-
mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/ 
12 Zittrain, Jonathan, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-
gerrymandering 
13 Comp. Gleenwald, Glenn, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-
control-internet/ 
14 Pariser, Eli, The filter bubble. What the internet is hiding from you,  Penguin, New York, 2012. 
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channel to the outside “real” world. After his employer’s death he has to leave the house and 
is exposed to the real “real” world where he attempts to handle emerging problems using the 
remote control panel of the TV set trying to switch between channels. A similar shift is taking 
place in the everyday lives of modern citizens. An increasing part of their mundane world 
knowledge is derived from Internet sources and the mingling of virtual and physical 
experience creates interesting new attitudes towards the world. 
 
A second important assumption for the theoretical underpinning of our analysis is the starting 
point of interaction as a basic category, as opposed to the isolated individual or actor. Being 
“human” is primarily a social form of existence, i.e. the central unit of analysis in social 
research should be the dyadic pair (or the group) and not the isolated individual as bearer of 
beliefs, attitudes, or habits. Combining these two aspects – merging the social and the 
technical, and taking interaction instead of individual action as the starting point – the 
problematic of surveillance and technology can be reconstructed in a comprehensive way. 
Starting from the dyadic constellation points to an important dimension for the analysis of 
surveillance: the relations of communication.  
In a trivial sense communication has been one of the main targets of surveillance from the 
very beginning. The massive interception of Internet traffic, telephone conversations and 
other forms of communicative exchange between individuals and organisations has triggered 
heated debates about the right to privacy in personal communication. With the global spread 
of digital electronic communication media, organisations like NSA or GCHQ access 
communication deemed private to a hitherto unprecedented extent.  
But at the level of everyday life the technologically mediated changes of the relations of 
communication can produce a number of effects not immediately linked to surveillance in the 
sense of eavesdropping. Being constantly online due to mobile phone and E-mail switched on 
24/7, with a low threshold for accessibility for third parties, transforms patterns, routines and 
standards of communicative exchange.  
 
From a theoretical perspective this can be analysed as a decoupling of proximity and 
intimacy. As authors like Alfred Schütz have demonstrated, the social world is comprised of 
what Schütz called different provinces of meaning.15 Developing his analysis in pre-digital 
times, Schütz focuses on the immediate world “within reach” as the prime source for an 
actor’s experience of the world. With growing (physical) distance objects and individuals 
become less tangible and remote. Such structures of the life world, extensively analysed by 
social phenomenologists, are changing with the advent of electronic communication media. 
New communities and new forms of intimacy can emerge uncoupled from the constraints of 
physical space. New forms of co-presence and exchange are made possible in the realm of the 
virtual. This affects also the notion of privacy. The private sphere no longer is co-extensive 
with a space of physical proximity but has to be reconceptualised on the basis of data 
protection in a much wider sense. 
 
This may sound rather abstract (and it probably is). But in the overall context of IRISS we 
strive to go beyond simple ideas like privacy, defined as a category applicable to isolated 
individuals (or legal subjects, endowed with fundamental rights). Conceptually the analysis in 
                                               
15 Schütz, Alfred, The Phenonemology of the Social World. Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL,1967.  
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WP 4 will focus on interaction, exchange, embedded action or social action in context. 
Privacy then is rather to be applied to social constellations, which in a way may be a truism, 
but could help to clarify the theoretical status of the concept. 
The basic intuition informing the analysis in WP 4 is that “technology” injects a new element 
into the social, transforming it in many (often unpredictable, unforeseen, under researched) 
ways. In social theory writers like Zygmunt Bauman elaborated extensively on the 
liquefaction of the social. Modern communication technologies (at the consumer/user end as 
well as at the level of infrastructures) do play an important role in that process of such 
liquefaction. Bauman is referring to the changes in the basic categories of time and space, 
which are used to provide structure to the social.16 Nikolas Rose has suggested extending the 
(cultural, political) idea of citizenship towards what he terms “biological citizenship”,17 
introducing notions like bio value or “biosociality” borrowed from Waldby and Rabinow18 
respectively. In a similar way one could think about a kind of technological citizenship and 
introduce the concept of techno-sociality or information value and perceive of humans as 
machine-readable techno-social hybrids.19  
 
What WP 4 investigates are the many mundane situations where citizens in their “liquefied” 
existence are governed by surveillance, i.e. how the social flows and individual access to 
goods and services are controlled by means of surveillance practices, directing movements, 
excluding and including individuals on the basis of their information value. We collected 
stories about how people relate to the fact of being techno-social hybrids. Of course a concept 
like techno-social hybrid is not used for self-description. It is a term for the interpretation, 
used to understand when and where humans are linked to technology and technologically 
mediated surveillance.  
 
The focus of WP 4 is on the reconstruction of the multiple ways surveillance, mediated by 
new technology, is embedded into the fabric of society and shapes social relations. This can 
be achieved by looking at what at a first glance may look like idiosyncratic micro-events on 
social ground level.  
With regard to the analytical perspective, what we are interested in is the citizens’ point of 
view. There are the most incredible technological systems operating in the world, many of 
them hidden and unnoticeable, but nonetheless affecting the everyday lives of the general 
population.  
 
Interdependencies within the IRISS project 
In doing this we are connecting to the ideas about the social perspective on surveillance of our 
theoretical framework of IRISS, developed in WP 2: 
“The essences of the social perspective are the social implications and consequences 
of surveillance technologies, including the way that human relations evolve with the 
diffusion of new technologically mediated surveillance systems and practices. At the 
                                               
16 Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity, Politiy Press, Blackwell, Cambridge, UK, 2000. 
17 Rose, Nicolas and C. Novas, Biological citizenship. Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 
18 Rabinow, P., Artificiality and enlightenment: from sociobiology to biosociality, Essays on the anthropology of reason, 
Princeton University Press, NJ, 1996. Waldby, C., The visible Human Project: informatics bodies and posthuman medicine, 
London; New York, Routledge, 2000. 
19 Brown, Sheila, The criminology of hybrids: Rethinking crime and law in technosocial networks, Theoretical Criminology, 
May 2006, 10: pp. 223-244. 
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heart of this perspective is a recognition that surveillance technologies interact with 
and shape (and are shaped by) societal structures, institutions and relationships. The 
focus of the social perspective is therefore ‘the social’, how humans interact and 
relate to one another and with new technology. The underlying theme emerging from 
this perspective is that surveillance, mediated by new technology, is increasingly 
embedded in the fabric of society, and as such shapes and is shaped by social 
relations and structures.”20  
 
The work in WP 4 provides the empirical underpinning for the theoretical propositions 
developed in the preceding Work Packages. 
 
 
1.3 OPERATIONALIZING SURVEILLANCE EFFECTS 
 
As mentioned above the approach chosen in WP 4 is to understand citizens’ perspective on 
living in a surveillance society in their own words. We can and have identified in IRISS a 
number of technologies and practices affecting the lay citizens’ life in many different ways. 
We then started to elicit stories from respondents about technology use and their personal 
views. These accounts and narratives then had to be analysed and interpreted against a 
theoretical background. We identified a number of problems, tasks, or dilemmas each 
individual living in a surveillance society is facing and tried to read the stories we received in 
our interviews as attempts to “solve” these problems, manage the tasks or come to grips with 
the dilemmas.  
One of the basic problems citizens as techno-social hybrids face in surveillance societies is 
the task to actively provide for their privacy. We assume that privacy no longer can be 
assumed to be the default state in surveillance societies. We used the term privacy labour to 
account for this problem. We conceive of privacy as a cultural category informing social 
practices and defining behavioural obligations in daily life. Entering another person’s house 
without being invited to do so would have been considered a breach of privacy. Reading 
letters addressed to a third party, peering into one’s neighbour’s window, intentionally 
listening to private conversations or making private information publicly available without 
consent – all this would constitute a breach of privacy in the traditional sense. The crucial 
point though is that such breaches typically require an activity on the side of the “breaching” 
party. In the age of electronically mediated communication and new social media, this 
changes in several respects. Person related information is documented automatically in a 
myriad of databases (such as consumption and shopping habits, browsing histories, etc.). On 
social media platforms like Twitter or Facebook an individual’s data, communication and 
images are made available to a more or less unlimited number of viewers and readers. The 
image of a leaking data container, frequently used in surveillance studies nicely captures this 
situation: each technology-mediated individual action produces data leaking “into the open”. 
Many trivial daily actions are of this kind: using loyalty cards, mobile phones, social media 
platforms, electronic banking – shopping, communicating, paying bills. All of these activities 
                                               
20 IRISS Deliverable 2.4, Comparative theoretical framework on surveillance and democracy,  p. 12. 
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produce person related data leaking from the private sphere of the individual into virtual 
space.21  
 
At the same time, injecting technologies into everyday life changes many routine activities, 
increasing convenience, lowering thresholds, providing a wide array of options at the tip of 
one’s finger. All this entails data exchange, and affects a person’s privacy, but at the same 
time there is an increase of convenience. So from the perspective of our analysis in WP 4 we 
construe the dilemma of convenience vs. privacy. How do citizens handle this dilemma? Are 
they aware of it? Is it reflected in the narratives they produce? These are the kinds of 
questions addressed in the analysis. 
 
While the trade-off between privacy and convenience may become obvious only upon 
reflection, the dominant discursive frame in public and policy debates about surveillance 
addressing the trade-off between privacy and security is a constant topic of political 
controversy22. The basic idea behind this trade-off or dilemma is rather simple: increasing 
surveillance in society by means of more technologies and control measures will help to 
identify potential perpetrators; identifying perpetrators before they can do any harm (plant a 
bomb, commit a crime) will increase the security of citizens. This simplistic reasoning is 
based on a number of problematic assumptions about surveillance, criminal actors and the 
inner workings of law enforcement agencies. Nonetheless it is widely accepted when it comes 
to the introduction of surveillance technologies, legislation or control procedures targeting the 
general public. In the interviews conducted in WP 4 we elicited stories from respondents 
about their experiences with different surveillance assemblages, trying to identify if and how 
they reacted to the fact of being surveilled. The majority of stories we identified were from 
the perspective of the watched, i.e. from individuals exposed to different surveillance 
technologies; but we also identified a number of stories narrated from the position of the 
watcher, i.e. from individuals practising surveillance while watching others in different 
institutional or organisational contexts. What we sought to identify in the analysis are 
different types or forms of reactions towards surveillance measures, designed to increase 
security (e.g. CCTV in different public spaces). With this analysis we could reconstruct a 
large variety of sometimes highly complex and contextual readings of individuals’ awareness 
of living in surveillance societies. This also entails a number of resilient reactions – from 
straightforward resistance to explicit avoidance of being exposed to surveillance. Looking at 
individual reactions to surveillance measures that are justified with the need to increase 
security, reveals a number of highly reflective interpretations of surveillance regimes among 
our respondents. Although we cannot generalize or draw any substantiated conclusions about 
large populations on the basis of our data, we are able to demonstrate that individuals develop 
highly sophisticated and unexpected forms of dealing with surveillance measures, based on 
sometimes highly elaborated interpretations of the technology and its uses for security 
purposes. 
 
                                               
21 see Carr John et al., Hitting the moving target: challenges if creating a dynamic curriculum addressing the ethical 
dimensions of geospatial data. Journal of Geography in Higher Education, 2014,  publ. online. 
22 see e.g. Anderson, Malcom, Jean Carlo and Apap Joanna: Striking a Balance between freedom, security and justice in an 
enlarged European Union. Brussels, 2002; Heymann, Philip B. and Juliette N. Kayyem, Protecting Liberty in an Age of 
Terror. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2005. 
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As opposed to the constellation of being watched as an individual from an unknown third 
party, i.e. being under surveillance from outside, a different scenario emerges when looking at 
the changes in what we term the relations of communication. Here we can observe a trade-off 
or dilemma similar to the one mentioned above between privacy and convenience. Shifting 
the daily mundane communicative exchange from face-to-face encounters onto the platforms 
of social media can make trivial chats accessible to undisclosed audiences. While some basic 
privacy settings may be adjusted to create a kind of private zone the new cultural practice of  
“posting” information on the Internet produces new communicative formats and changes the 
relations of communication. A person might want to share a piece of information (a string of 
text, an image) with others in a non-directed way, i.e. it is not Ego addressing Alter in a one-
to-one interpersonal relation, but Ego posting-addressing a broader audience the limits of 
which are unknown. Since this audience is not physically present, its size may be irrelevant 
for the individual. New formats like Twitter, operating with the model of “followers” are 
specifically designed to communicate with a larger public: the higher the number of 
followers, the higher the prestige of a person.  Barack Obama, President of the United States 
has around 45 million followers for his Twitter account. 
While the mundane notion of person-to-person communication may be based on the idea of 
physical co-presence and a shared, more or less intimate space, the electronic infrastructure of 
ICT-enabled communicative exchanges creates completely new boundaries, formats and 
forums.  
We tried to capture these changes as a dilemma of privacy and sociality, investigating 
citizens’ reactions and responses to the very fundamental changes in the relations of 
communication brought about through ICT and the surveillance potential these new 
technologies entail. 
 
Asking respondents about their everyday use of modern technologies, one area that we 
frequently touched upon in our interviews was the use of these technologies at the 
individuals’ workplace. Controlling the workforce by means of more or less sophisticated and 
rigid surveillance regimes is a practice emerging with the modern form of production in the 
factory. Technology changes the work processes and at the same time creates new 
opportunities for management to monitor and control performance and behaviour of 
employees. Some of these monitoring practices may be justified with the need of improving 
workflows and optimizing processes and use of resources. But surveillance can reach far 
beyond what could be termed functional needs of optimization and intrudes into the privacy 
of employees in a hitherto unprecedented manner. The ensuing surveillance practices 
sometimes resemble the highly problematic practices of law enforcement agencies – like 
monitoring electronic mails of employees – and in our interviews, respondents were highly 
concerned about these practices. On the other hand being employed involves an asymmetrical 
power relation, i.e. while our respondents were aware of the probably illegal nature of privacy 
intrusions going along with surveillance at their work place, they at the same often 
surrendered to these practices since the only viable alternative would have been to quit the 
job. The use of surveillance technologies at the workplace displays the general problematic of 
the surveillance society in a nutshell: traditional relations of trust between the involved parties 
are replaced and eroded by surveillance, the implementation of new ICT paves the way for 
multiple forms of function creep and the existing power relations between employer and 
employee are changing in many different ways. From the perspective of the respondents in 
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the interviews we conducted one of the main dilemmas was the relation between privacy, 
trust and fairness. Surveillance practices at the workplace replace traditional relations of trust 
and the amount and intensity of surveillance raises concerns with regard to fairness: the 
stories we received in our interviews are often moral stories addressing the legitimacy and 
adequacy of surveillance practices, shaping the work environment and restraining what is 
perceived as legitimate areas of freedom and privacy.  
 
The final constellation we addressed in our analysis involves citizens as active agents in a 
surveillance relation. Prototypical cases for such relations are provided by neighbourhood 
watch schemes or any attempts of citizens to increase what could be called local security by 
active engagement in surveillance practices. Grass root activities like Neighbourhood Watch 
can also be interpreted as a form of bottom-up resilience, i.e. a joint effort by citizens to 
increase the (perceived) security in their neighbourhood. Surveillance in different forms is a 
key element here, from video cameras installed on private premises to volunteer citizen 
patrols searching for suspicious individuals in the streets. Stories about Neighbourhood 
Watch are different in different countries. This is due to different cultural traditions of 
policing and law enforcement. Whereas in the Anglo-Saxon context citizen involvement has a 
long tradition, continental societies like Germany, Austria or Italy did never develop this kind 
of active vigilantism. In post-authoritarian societies like Slovakia the recent political 
transformations create a very specific situation, where ideas like Neighbourhood Watch do 
not resonate well with public understanding of crime fight and security. With regard to 
privacy and security a core dilemma emerging here is the trade-off between individual 
freedom and communal supervision (or surveillance for that matter). Neighbourhood Watch 
schemes often emulate a rural village-type social climate, where everybody should know 
everybody else in the neighbourhood and also watch over his or her neighbour. The downside 
of this sometimes over-romanticized image is very dense and rigid control among local 
residents – social theorists like Walter Benjamin and Georg Simmel praised the anomie of 
city life and the individual freedom it entails. 
 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY: THE INTERVIEWING PROCESS AND THE DATABASE  
Regina Berglez 
 
In the course of the WP4-fieldwork until December 2013, a total number of 217 open and 
elaborate personal interviews were conducted. The five involved countries are: Austria, 
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Slovakia.23 
 
The interviews 
Citizens were partly recruited on the basis of their particular interest in or their special 
experiences with a number of topics listed below. In order to compare this deliberately biased 
sample with unbiased respondents, however, the largest group in the sample was the random 
control group that was not recruited on the basis of any particular experience or engagement.  
 
 
                                               
23 For further details on recruiting and the interviewing process see: “Guidelines for the participant observation and 
interviews”, IRISS Deliverable 4.1.    
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The distribution of interviews across the involved countries is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
The recruiting topics were:   
● Surveillance as a side effect of consumer culture 
● Privacy and data protection  
● Control at the workplace 
● Neigbourhood Watch and the like 
 
Nevertheless and of uttermost importance is, that in all of the 217 interviews a standardised 
interview guideline was used consistently.24 Although the emphasis of a particular interview 
varied according to the interests and experiences of the respective participant (as above), the 
five main overall topics were, however, in every interview circumstancially addressed. 
 
These five overall themes (‘topics in IRISS’) within the course of the interviews were:  
● Crime prevention 
● Workplace surveillance 
● Consumer advocacy 
● Data protection 
● (General) questions on surveillance, privacy and control 
 
                                               
24 See Annex II 
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22%
50
23%
Austria
Germany
Italy
Slovakia
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Interviews conducted per country
N= 217
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The distribution of interviews conducted per entry topic is as follows: 
 
 
 
Also, so as not to trigger an immediate association with surveillance, initial warm-up 
questions used in the interviews were expressed along the lines of “What comes to your mind 
first when we speak of modern technolgy”.    
 
The timeframe of the individual interviews varied from around 40 minutes (as the minimum) 
up to a maximum of 90 minutes. The timeframe estimated for an interview at the outset was 
one hour, to which the majority of the interviews conformed and which has also been the 
average interview length. 
  
All interviews were  
● electronically documented  
● synapsed   
● and summarised along the core questions 
● produced in English,  
● entered into an online-database (accessible to all partners involved), 
● transferred into a master database, 
● and recoded and structured (bottom-up approach) 
● in accordance with our theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
22
10%
54
25%
33
15%26
12%
82
38%
Consumer
advocacy
Crime
prevention
Data protection
Workplace
surveillance
Random
control group
Interviews conducted per entry topic
N= 217
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The database 
The finalised master-database contains a total number of 1000 quotes that were extracted as 
narrative stories from the 217 interviews conducted. 
 
As already stated in the previous chapters, we have identified a number of areas (or domains) 
with regard to the dominant dilemmas. These dominant dilemmas serve as the overall 
framework for the structure of our extensive final database and are as follows: 
 
Privacy – convenience  This dilemma is regarding the ‘trade-off’ in the domain of 
electronic commerce, that is the citizens’ desire for convenience 
and the possible consequences of ‘Big Data’ that come along 
with electronic consumerism. 
  
Privacy – security  This can be seen as the political ‘master dilemma’, as the basis 
of the ‘better safe than sorry’ rhetoric, and is relevant in daily 
life in a great variety of different contexts. 
 
Privacy – sociality Addressing the need to use social media in order to stay in 
contact with friends and colleagues while at the same time 
making personal information available for the service providers 
or a wider public is the core dilemma in this category. 
 
Privacy – trust/fairness Stories about work-place surveillance, as well as stories 
regarding the general relationship between citizens and the state 
are subsumed under this heading. 
 
Engagement – security This is a specific category for stories from and about activities in 
the field of Neighbourhood Watch and consists mainly of stories 
about the aim of citizens’ to ‘increase’ security. 
 
The unit of analysis is always the quote – also referred to as a story. A quote consists of a 
self-containing story from an interview and is therefore independent from the course of an/the 
entire interview. On average, one interview resulted four to five stories, although this varied, 
as can be the case with such qualitative approach.  
 
Each of our 1000 stories is linked to at least one of these thematic categories (=main 
dilemmas), constituting the heuristic grid to structure the narrative data. In some cases it made 
sense from an analytical point of view to assign a quote to more than one category (e.g. if an 
interviewee telling a story about CCTV in the public sphere was at the same time 
problematizing the role of the state with regard to the cameras). This means, that there is 
either a one.-to-one or a one-to-many relation between categories and stories. 
 
To clarify this point, a visual exemplification of the database (screenshot) of an extract 
regarding the coding structure for the various dilemmas is provided as follows. 
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 Screenshot: section of the WP4 database 
 
As can be seen, the main dilemmas were also categorized into sublevels. To some extent these 
sublevels also go along with the subchapters of this report (e.g. in a story belonging to the 
main dilemma “trust – fairness” the topic could regard the relationship between citizen and 
the state, or the topic might fall into the realm of surveillance in a work environment). Some 
of these – obviously still rather generic – sub-categories were then much structured further 
and deeper, i.e. they contain more than only the one sublevel per dilemma as is shown above,  
which was necessary in order to handle the database accordingly. The details of this complex 
coding process, however, do not need to be elaborated at this stage.  
 
The classification (final coding) of the 1000 quotes into the five dominant dilemmas is as 
follows, adding up to a total number of 1048, since in 48 cases the quote was double-coded 
(as explained above). 
 
 
 
Topic in IRISS: Initials: /IF CHANGES were made: Initials of person 4. Convenience (Dilemma)4.x Sublevel Convenience 5. Security (Dilemma)5.x Sublevel Security6. Sociality (Dilemma) 6.x Sublevel Sociality7. Trust - Fairness (Dilemma)7.x Sublevel Trust-Fairness8. Engagement (Dilemma)8.x Sublevel Engagement (if needed) 9. NSA Snowden & Co
Crime prevention security neighbourhood watch
Crime prevention security crime prevention without NW
General questions RB trust - fairness relationship citizen-state
Data protection sociality data protection
General questions security CCTV
Consumer advocacy convenience loyalty cards
General questions trust - fairness relationship citizen-state
Data protection sociality social media
Crime prevention security victim experience 
General questions security CCTV trust - fairness relationship citizen-state
Crime prevention neighbourhood watch
Workplace surveillance trust - fairness workplace surveillance
Crime prevention security crime prevention without NW
General questions sociality social media
Crime prevention neighbourhood watch
• 185 quotes
Convenience
• 299 quotes
Security
• 243 quotes
Sociality
• 273 quotes
Trust - Fairness
• 48 quotes
Engagement
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For clarification: the structuring into these five dilemmas should not be confused with the 
recruiting entry point of the interviewees, or with the variable ‘topic in IRISS’. These three 
points/variables (recruiting topic; topic in IRISS; and the dominant dilemma) mark different 
information i.e. different stages in the course of the work process: entry points (recruiting), 
data collection (interviewing) and data structuring (coding). 
 
Further information on the process of data entry and coding can be found in the condensed 
guideline in Annex II.  
 
The participants  
Gender:   
The gender balance was almost perfectly representative: 51% of respondents were female, 
49% were male. The gender distribution within the various age groups was also satisfactory.   
 
Age:  
The general age categories of the respondents are as followes:  
 
 
    *3 missing 
 
The distribution of the age categories can in generall be seen as satisfactory. 
31
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52
24%
38
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44
21% 18 to 24 years
25 to 34 years
35 to 44 years
45 to 54 years
55 to 64 years
65 years and
older
Age structure of the interviewees
N= 214* 
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Education:  
The educational level of the respondents is as followes: 
 
 *18 missing 
 
The distribution of the educational level shows a slight bias toward higher academic degrees. 
This distortion is due to the sampling strategies applied to this research. Reseacher were 
snowballing respondents from their immediate social environment. Although we tried to 
cover a wide array of social demographic groups this copuld not always be fully achieved.    
 
For a more detailed overview of the demographics of the interviewees see Annex II.  
 
Overview on the fieldwork in a nutshell 
- A total number of 217 interviews was conducted  
- in five countries: Austria, Germany, Italy, UK, Slovakia. 
- These 217 interviews resulted in a total number of 1000 different stories. 
- The stories are the main unit of analysis in WP4,  
- and were classified into five overall dilemmas and diverse subcategories 
- that constitute the overall framework of this report.  
  
 
 
 
 
11
6%
70
35%
22
11%
30
15%
25
13%
29
15%
5
2%
7
3%
PhD
University Degree
(MA)
University Degree (BA)
Secondary Degree (12
years)
Secondary Degree (10
years)
Vocational Degree
Other
No Certificate
Educational level of the interviewees
N= 199* 
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1.5 CONSIDERING NATIONAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE CASE OF GOOGLE’S 
STREET VIEW 
Alexander Neumann; Chiara Fonio and Alessia Ceresa, Martin Kovanič, Keith Spiller and 
Charles Leleux , Daniel Fischer 
 
The research in IRISS WP4 was conducted in five different European countries: Slovakia, 
Italy, Austria, Germany and in the UK. Although the sampling strategy applied to recruit 
citizens in these five countries was the same (e.g. using the same field entry points) it can be 
assumed, that the perception of surveillance differs in different everyday contexts. To reflect 
on these assumed differences in the public perception of surveillance and to consider the 
different relevance that organisations involved in surveillance have, IRISS drafted reports on 
the involved countries. The country reports worked along research questions dealing with data 
protection and privacy sensitive issues such as the national implementation of the EU data 
retention directive (2006/24 EC) for example, which was in place while conducting the 
empirical field work in IRISS.  The full length reports can be found in ANNEX I, this 
subchapter will highlight the case of Google’s Street View for two reasons. In the narratives 
of individual experiences with different kind of technologies the respondents often referred to 
“the Internet” as one of the most powerful sources of information and control. Control in the 
sense that through the various social media sites, citizens can watch other users but also be 
watch by other users and the services providers on the same page. As one the most prominent 
search engines, Google has a special role here. 
 
The country reports25 compared the national responses to the question of how Google’s Street 
View (GSV) project was received in the respective national contexts? The research assessed 
public awareness and documented critical reactions. The results of the analysis on GSV 
implementation in the national context is summarised in the following table: 
 
 Is Google’ GSV 
available in your 
country? 
Influence on the public 
awareness? 
Which national 
association raised 
their concerns? 
Austria No – the national DPA 
stopped the GSV 
project 
None – There was a little 
interest in 2010, since then 
almost no coverage 
“ARGE Daten” (a data 
protection organisation) 
and the Green Party 
Germany Yes 250,000 Objections against 
being mapped recorded by 
German DPA 
Local government 
institutions (small 
towns), Politicians from 
all parties 
UK Yes In 2009 almost no interest – in 
2013: considered as beneficial 
tool 
ICO, Citizens stopping 
google cars, Privacy 
International 
Italy Yes None - Limited One consumer 
association 
Slovakia Yes In general positive reactions by 
the general public, the media, 
the government and the DPA 
None 
                                               
25 See Annex I 
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Google’s Street View in Austria 
Alexander Neumann 
 
The Google Street View car was first sighted in Vienna in April 2009, recording data for their 
service.26 However, 2 months earlier a similar service had already gone online, showing 
pictures from Vienna and, in further succession, other Austrian cities. This service is provided 
by a Romanian company – the eXtreme Soft Group S.R.L. – “the first “street-level imaging” 
service for Eastern and Central Europe.”27 Another similar service for Austria was provided 
by herold.at – the Austrian yellow pages – called “Herold Straßen-Touren” showing a GSV of 
the shopping areas in the federal state capitals of Austria and went online in July 200928 but 
doesn’t seem to be available anymore.  
Google registered the GSV application at the DPA in January 2010 with the plan, to go online 
sometime in 2010.29 In spring 2010, information emerged that Google not only collected 
pictures but also non-encrypted data from wireless networks via their GSV cars throughout 
Europe. As a response to this, the Austrian DPA launched an investigation against Google 
resulting in a provisional ruling – issued end of May 2010 – that forbade Google to use any of 
the GSV data, including data collection.30 Google appealed against the provisional ruling, 
declaring that no more WLAN data was beingcollected in connection with the GSV 
application.  
The investigation led by the DPA revealed “that the WLAN data had been collected for a 
different purpose than the one stated in the notification for “Google Street View” and should 
therefore not be regarded as a part of the “Google Street View” data application”.31 The ban 
was lifted on the 30th November 2010, although the examination regarding the use of WLAN 
data by Google is still running to date. This led to a new registration of the GSV application 
on the 21st April 2011 with three recommendations provided by the DPA to Google. Those 
recommendations state that: (1) Google must blur the entire image of a person in the entrance 
area of sensitive places (churches, prisons, etc.); (2) as well as images of private (fenced) 
properties, not visible to pedestrians; (3) and a suitable tool has to be provided, so a subject 
can object in a simple way to the data published by Google.32  
Google stated that they were happy that their application had been registered, but that the 
GSV project has no priority in Austria and has been postponed indefinitely. To date. this 
status remains in place, as Google shows no intention whatsoever of resuming the collection 
of images and launching GSV in Austria, and the data previously collected remains in their 
                                               
26 Der Standard 9th April 2009 Google macht Österreichs Straßen unsicher http://derstandard.at/1237229445223/street-view-
Google-macht-Oesterreichs-Strassen-unsicher 08.04.2013 
27 Der Standard 9th Februar 2009 Mit GSV-Klon Wiens Straßen erkunden 
http://derstandard.at/1233587023245/Ansichtssache-Mit-Street-View-Klon-Wiens-Strassen-
erkunden?_slideNumber=1&_seite= 08.04.2013; http://www.norc.at/about-norc-help.html 08.04.2013 
28 Krone Zeitung 1st July 2009 Herold.at bietet virtuelle Straßen-Touren 
http://www.krone.at/Digital/Herold.at_bietet_virtuelle_Strassen-Touren-Shops_schauen-Story-151188 08.04.2013 
29 Krone Zeitung 13th December 2009 "GSV" soll 2010 in Österreich an den Start gehen 
http://www.krone.at/Digital/Street_View_soll_2010_in_Oesterreich_an_den_Start_gehen-Heimische_Strassen-Story-175686 
08.04.2013 
30 Kleine Zeitung 27th May 2010 Österreich stoppt GSV 
http://www.kleinezeitung.at/allgemein/multimedia/2362022/boxenstopp-fuer-google-street-view-fahrzeuge-oesterreich.story 
09.04.2013 
31 Case history “Google Street View“ http://www.dsk.gv.at/site/6733/default.aspx 09.04.2013 
32 Conclusion of the proceedings regarding “Google Street View” in Austria http://www.dsk.gv.at/site/6733/default.aspx 
09.04.2013 
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archives.33 Recently, a few GSV pictures have been launched in Austria: Since April 2012 the 
Kunsthistorisches Museum (museum of Art History), the Leopold museum and the Albertina 
museum have included images from the “Google Art Project” in their collections and in 
November 2012 Google expanded GSV, showing pictures from ski resorts in Europe, Canada 
and the US, including Ischgl and Sölden in Austria.34 
The main opposition against the GSV project was led by the Austrian working group 
specialized on data protection and privacy, the ‘ARGE Daten’. Among others, they provide a 
long explanation on how to prevent a breach of privacy concerning  GSV including a template 
cease-and-desist letter.35 On a public level, there were no noticeable protests or actions 
against GSV. The only – quirky – case in Austria was the attack of a 70-year-old resident in 
Steyregg, a small town in Upper-Austria. At the sight of the GSV car, the resident wanted 
them to leave. As they didn’t react, he started to chase the GSV car with his pickaxe until 
neighbours overpowered him.36 This happened in April 2010, around the time the GSV 
application was covered a lot in the media. 
 
Google’s Street View in Germany 
Daniel Fischer  
 
At the beginning of the project (in 2008 first pictures were taken by the GSV cars), there was 
protest especially in smaller town or villages all around Germany who tried to ban GSV cars 
from their streets. Even as the project became increasingly prominent, there were no 
institutional protests reported coming from bigger cities, but from many suburban 
communities with huge living areas consisting mainly of terraced or detached family houses. 
The only action taken by politicians at the federal level was the initiation of judicial 
examinations of the GSV case, which did not produce unanimous results: An expert opinion 
by the “Institut für Rechtsinformatik” states that GSV does not infringe privacy rights 
(23.2.2010), whereas other expertise obtained by the Ministry of Justice of Rheinland Pfalz 
considers the project partly illegal, e.g. because GSV-Pictures are taken above eye level and 
because “raw data are exported to the US and further processing can’t be controlled”.37 In 
addition to this lack of clarity within data protection and privacy laws it also became evident 
that institutional responsibilities were not clear enough to deal with the issues brought up by 
GSV: German GSV-Project Manager Keuchel said that as of April 2009 there was one single 
office/person who was authorized to lead the discussions and bargaining with Google 
                                               
33 Futurezone 21st April 2011 Grünes Licht für Google Street View in Österreich http://futurezone.at/netzpolitik/2815-
gruenes-licht-fuer-google-street-view-in-oesterreich.php 09.04.2013, die Presse 30th August 2011 Google: Google Street 
View noch länger nicht in Österreich http://diepresse.com/home/techscience/internet/google/689380/Google_Street-View-
noch-laenger-nicht-in-Oesterreich 09.04.2013, der Standard 8th March 2012 Google: Vorerst kein Start von GSV in 
Österreich http://derstandard.at/1330390635488/Kartendienst-Google-Vorerst-kein-Start-von-Street-View-in-Oesterreich 
09.04.2013. 
34 Der Standard 4th April 2012 GSV für Wiener Museen http://derstandard.at/1333185134991/Google-Plattform-Street-
View-fuer-Wiener-Museen 09.04.2013, Google Europe Blog 28th November 2012 The real Mountain View: on the piste 
with GSV http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.be/2012/11/the-real-mountain-view-on-piste-with.html 09.04.2013. 
35 Google GSV – Wie verhindere ich eine Verletzung der Privatsphäre 
http://www2.argedaten.at/php/cms_monitor.php?q=PUB-TEXT-ARGEDATEN&s=65120uap 09.04.2013 
36 Austrian Times 8th April 2010 'Google GSV' driver escapes axe attack http://austriantimes.at/news/Panorama/2010-04-
08/22317/%27Google_Street_View%27_driver_escapes_axe_attack 09.04.2013 
37 http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/googles-strassenfotos-gutachten-erklaert-street-view-fuer-teilweise-
rechtswidrig-a-681084.html, http://www.merkur-online.de/aktuelles/politik/gutachten-google-street-view-illegal-
652444.html 
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(Johannes Caspar).38 Until that point, it had been an “Irish stew” of European, national and 
federal law that could not provide a secure legal basis for claims of any party, and all political 
reactions where based on “vague fears and lack of understanding”.39 
The role of privacy or rather the scepticism against any form of data collection in Germany 
has been discussed in the preface. Some politicians (across all different parties) tried to profit 
from this historical and cultural fact and drew very fatalistic pictures to provoke even bigger 
resistance against GSV, after the start of the service was announced: “No Secret Service in the 
world would go for pictures like these as unabashed as Google. [They] already have personal 
profiles that are more precise than any government in the world can produce.”40 This was 
criticized by Data Protection Agencies, who called for a more pragmatic way of dealing with 
modern technologies and services like GSV. After long discussions a 13-Point Catalogue of 
requirements was presented to Google that had to be fulfilled before the service could go 
online. The main point was the right of every citizen to have pictures of his housing pixeled. 
In the case of apartment buildings, a request from one citizen suffices to have the house 
pixeled. Finally 250.000 houses were pixeled, far less than estimated by politicians, such as 
those cited by Aigner, above. Debates around GSV continued after the release of the service 
but the tables have turned: Pixeled houses are perceived as annoying and shameful by leading 
internet activists41 and journalists.  
The last episode of the GSV-case in Germany deals with the trouble caused by the fact that 
Google had collected personal data by coincidence, when using WLAN Networks to get more 
precise geographic data. As a consequence Google was fined 145,000 Euro in 2013.42  
 
Google’s Street View in the UK 
Keith Spiller and Charles Leleux  
 
Google’s Street View was introduced in the UK in 2009 and it is reported that 96% of the UK 
is now covered by the mapping system.43 One incidence in particular has raised more media 
attention around GSV than any other and this related to data collection. When recording GSV 
images Google’s cars also recorded information from unencrypted domestic Wi-Fi traffic. 
The recording of this information only came to light when the Germany Data Protection 
Authority conducted an audit in 2010.44  Google have stated that the capture of this 
information was ‘unintentional’ – an engineer was blamed for installing this capability 
without the consent or knowledge of the organisation. The Wi-Fi information, it appears, was 
collected in every country that has received GSV mapping. In the UK, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office deemed the collection illegal and Google were instructed, by the ICO 
and a number of National Data Protection Authorities (including US, Ireland, France and 
                                               
38 SZ, 18.3.2010, page 2. 
39 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/steamrolled-by-google-street-view-internet-challenges-overwhelm-german-
government-a-712106.html 
40 http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/street-view-debatte-bruellen-gegen-google-a-676609.html 
41 http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2010-11/street-view-jeff-jarvis-verpixelung 
42 http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/wlan-mitschnitte-datenschuetzer-verdonnert-google-zu-
bussgeld/8103482.html 
43 See, http://crave.cnet.co.uk/software/google-street-view-to-cover-96-per-cent-of-uk-roads-from-tomorrow-49305236/ 
 
44 Guardian 15 May 2010. ‘Google admits collecting Wi-Fi data through GSV cars, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/may/15/google-admits-storing-private-data, accessed 28 Feb 2013 
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Germany), to delete this information.45 In November 2010 Google agreed to delete all Wi-Fi 
information collected, however by July 2012 Google had not deleted the information,46 
causing further concern to data protection authorities.  
 
Indifferent attitudes to breeches of privacy are all too familiar in the UK, in this instance, 
while widely published the harvesting of data has not, as yet, lead to any convictions or even 
public debate on the illegally captured online private data. Moreover, non-sensitive personal 
data is often considered to hold little importance or relevance for most online users (Green 
and Smith, 2002, New Scientist, 2009); however, if GSV captured, for example, bank details 
or personal and intimate pictures or even information of national interest, what then?  
 
On an associated issue, the introduction of StreetView has raised some moral, ethical and 
discerning issues, for example, highlighting the location of refuge centres or images of people 
exposing their buttocks – these images were removed due to national media attention.47 In the 
UK, the privacy of individuals photographed leaving less salubrious establishments has been 
questioned (the examples include people recorded leaving a sex shop and urinating in 
public),48 but as yet no major objections have been raised as to the impact of StreetView; 
especially from those photographed or who have had their data recorded. 
 
Google’s Street View in Italy 
Chiara Fonio and Alessia Ceresa  
 
Google’s Street View was introduced in Italy in 2008, along with implementation of the 
service in France, the first country with GSV outside the United States49. Critical reactions 
soon emerged from Adoc (Associazione Difesa Orientamento Consumatori), a consumer 
association, which has been involved in many campaigns (from transparency in banking to 
consumers’ privacy) from the early 90s until the present. Adoc drew attention to the fact that 
the automatic face blurring technology employed by Google did not always function properly, 
as pointed out by consumers who claimed that their faces could be identified, and also to 
potential infringements of the Italian Data Protection Code50. The consumer association asked 
the Italian DPA to check which data were collected by Google cars.  
                                               
45 Daily Mail 27 July 2012, Sinister truth about Google spies: GSV cars stole information from British households but 
executives 'covered it up' for year, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2150606/Google-deliberately-stole-information-
executives-covered-years.html. New York Times 30 April 2012,  Data Engineer in Google Case Is Identified,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/technology/engineer-in-googles-street-view-is-identified.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
New York Times 1 Aug 2012, Google Failed to Delete GSV Data in France, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/technology/01iht-google01.htmlNewYork Times 22 May 2012, 22 May). Google 
Privacy Inquiries Get Little Cooperation. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/23/technology/google-privacy-inquiries-get-
little-cooperation.html?pagewanted=all. All accessed Feb 2013 
46 Guardian 27 July 2012, Google faces new GSV data controversy. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jul/27/google-street-view-controversy Daily Telegraph 27 July 2012, Google: 
we failed to delete all Streetview data. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/9432518/Google-we-failed-to-delete-
all-Streetview-data.html 
47 Irish Times 10 Oct 2010, 10 Oct). Barefaced Cheek on Google Street View, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/...reaking42.html USA Today 6 April 2007, Google's street-level maps raising privacy 
concerns. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2007-06-01-google-maps-privacy_N.htm 
48 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/5022390/Google-pulls-embarrassing-Street-View-images.html and 
http://www.express.co.uk/pictures/galleries/1469/Google-street-view-s-most-embarrassing-pictures 
49 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Street_View. 
50 http://www.adoc.org/notizie/4130/privacy-ecco-le-prime-vittime-di-google-street-view-per-adoc-a-rischio-la-privacy-dei-
cittadini (Retrieved on March 14th 2013). 
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Besides Adoc, the TagMeNot51 project raised privacy concerns from a different perspective, 
trying to enhance citizens’ online privacy through a pre-emptive approach and a “free opt-out 
technology for pictures taken in public”.  In particular, TagMeNot is a QR-Code that can be 
worn or displayed outside a house in order that pictures are not “put on the web”.  The 
displaying of the TagMeNot QR-Code means that “you are asking to remove personal details 
and blur faces”52  
 
However, the abovementioned critical reactions did not help to raise public awareness, as 
media coverage was both limited and fragmented. Despite the fact that the Italian DPA did 
launch an investigation of Google Street View and reacted promptly to complaints made by 
citizens and consumers associations, neither relevant public debates nor citizens’ protests 
occurred within the national context. The level of awareness for privacy was so low that an 
Italian start-up even opened a website called Trail me up53 in order to offer views of places all 
over the world out of GSV’s “gaze”, places accessible only on foot, like national parks.  
 
As mentioned, the Italian DPA launched an investigation requesting Google Inc. to provide 
information on its data gathering and data processing.  In April and May 2010, Google Italy 
s.r.l. informed the authority that while collecting images through Google cars, both data on 
Wi-Fi networks and “payload data” that were not protected were collected54 from 2008. The 
letter by Google Italy s.r.l was sent a few months after the Italian DPA notified Google of the 
start of an administrative procedure in order to establish the lawfulness of their processing 
operations. As stated in the press release issued by the DPA, Google declared that data were 
“collected mistakenly, have never been used for any service, have never been communicated 
to third parties and are currently stored on servers located in the USA […]”55. 
The DPA considered the data processing, in particular the collection of payload data, as 
potentially in breach of, inter alia, the section 617-quarter (1) and 617-quinquies of the 
Criminal Code, focused respectively on, “whoever fraudulently intercepts communications 
that relate to a computerised or IT system or else take place between several systems (…)is to 
be punished”, and “except where provided for by law, whoever installs equipment that is 
suitable for intercepting, preventing or discontinuing communications that relate to a 
computerised or IT system or else take place between several systems (…)is to be punished”.  
On the basis of the DPA evaluation, the case file was forwarded to judicial authorities. 
Additionally, the DPA ordered that Google Inc. stop, in pursuance of the Italian Data 
Protection Law, any collecting of Wi-Fi data. 
 
As the authority received several complaints from Italian citizens about GSV, a decision was 
adopted in October 201056. Under the Italian Data Protection law, in fact, data subjects have 
the right to: a) object to the processing of their data even if they can only be partially 
identified (e.g. Google’s face blurring) and b) be informed of the processing. According to the 
DPA, “the arrangements for informing data subjects are insufficient”57 and, therefore, the 
                                               
51 http://www.tagmenot.info 
52 http://www.tagmenot.info 
53 http://www.trailmeup.com 
54 http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1751001 
55 http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1751001 
56 http://www.gpdp.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1761443 
57 http://www.gpdp.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1761443. 
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authority took 4 actions, which included: 
1. the appointment of a representative based in Italy in order to enforce the compliance with the 
Italian DPA; 
2. adequate information (publishing 3 days in advance, on its website, the date of when image 
acquisition will start)  to data subjects on the routes patrolled by Google cars; 
3. adequate information to data subjects also through advertisements published in at least two local 
newspapers and broadcasted by a local radio. 
4. Visible stickers on Google cars in order to make them noticeable. 
 
Since 2010, articles in mainstream Italian media on GSV have been mainly focused on 
challenges faced by Google outside the national context, especially in the USA. 
 
Google’s Street View in Slovakia 
Martin Kovanič  
 
Google’s Street View in Slovakia was at first (2007-2009) picked up by technological media, 
especially Internet sites, by explaining technology and the ecosystem of the project. Later 
coverage, again almost exclusively by technological media, focused on project launches in 
individual countries, covering problems of GSV project in Britain, Germany or Switzerland. 
As the GSV project moved to neighboring Czech Republic, where its first part was launched 
in October 2009, media reported about problems it was facing. Czech DPA criticized Google 
for not registering the GSV project, and temporarily refused to grant Google data retention 
permission, a conflict that continued all through 2010. 
The actual GSV project in Slovakia started in 2010. At this stage, media coverage was 
influenced by a decision of Google to establish a regional office for Slovakia in December 
2010. It is obvious from media analysis that the PR department of Slovak Google worked 
hard on presenting the GSV project for Slovak media in a most “friendly and accessible” way. 
All national media covered the announcement of the GSV project in Slovakia. Headlines 
included “Slovakia Goes to Google”, “StreetView also in Slovakia”; “Watch Out for Cars 
with Cameras!”.58  
Later, media offered additional reports on the GSV project that also included news on 
problems of GSV in other countries. For example, the most popular Slovak daily, the tabloid 
Nový čas, reported in August 2010 in an article entitled ”This is How You’ll see Your House 
on Internet”, that the GSV project met with problems in several countries. “Germans are 
protesting against GSV and Slovakia is calm.” The article pointed out the problems of GSV in 
Germany, and stressed that GSV could be a useful tool for burglars in assessing future 
targets.59  
In September 2010, media informed that GSV in Slovakia have not started yet, because the 
Slovak DPA was still negotiating with Google on conditions of the project. Despite early 
optimism, GSV in Slovakia started officially more than a year later than originally planned, in 
April 2012. According to the Slovak DPA, the delay of the project was not influenced by the 
registration process, in which Google, as in Czech Republic, promised to lower its cameras 
                                               
58 Slovensko ide na google,  Plus jeden deň, 2010/08/12 ;  GSV prichádza už aj na Slovensko 
Zdroj: SME, 2010/08/12; Pozor na autá s kamerou!, Nový čas, 2010/08/13 
59 Nový čas, Takto uvidíte váš dom na internete (”This is How You’ll see Your House on Internet”), 17/08/2010, p. 14 
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from 2.7 to 2.3 meters, to automatically blur faces and car number plates, and to avoid 
recording material in rush hours and near localities such as schools and churches.60  
Another important PR coup for Google was the establishment of official contact with Slovak 
authorities, both national and local. In February 201261, the Transportation Minister J. Figeľ 
publicly supported the GSV project as a great tool for the propagation of Slovakia, the Slovak 
tourism industry and Slovak SMEs. Leadership of ZMOS, the biggest organization of Slovak 
Mayors, expressed the same enthusiastic support for the GSV project. The media, especially 
local media, were full of reports that informed about GSV decisions to photograph their 
respective city, or complained that their city was not included. This "goodwill" was picked up 
by Google, which revised its original plan for coverage and included more Slovak cities.62   
The official launch of the Slovak part of GSV in October 2012 was reported in all media, 
followed by dozens of articles that asked people to provide embarrassing photos63. Only a few 
articles went further and pointed out unclear privacy issues about the GSV project.64 No 
official complaints to the Slovak DPA were reported. The overall success of GSV in Slovakia 
and the unproblematic preparatory phase probably contributed to the decision to expand GSV. 
In a new project, which was announced by Google Slovakia in 2013, GSV will expand its 
coverage of Slovakia, also using GSV Trike. In addition, Google will work closely with 
governmental agencies in order to "revive local culture and traditions in Slovakia through 
online technology".65 
 
Conclusion  
It would take less than an hour for a Google Street View car to drive from the city centre of 
Vienna to Bratislava; nevertheless the case of Google’s Street View is a very good example 
how national, legal, historical and cultural differences shape the public perception of 
technologies. The country reports in Annex I were conducted before the interviews took place 
to better understand how different national contexts should be considered in the analysis of 
the narratives in the following chapters. They display a number of national differences with 
regard to the attitudes entertained towards surveillance. The results from the country reports 
provide valuable background information for the detailed analysis of the stories elicited in the 
interviews.  A systematic analysis of country-specific perceptions will be subject to further 
investigations beyond this project.  
                                               
60 See for example: Slovak Spectator, Google finally views Slovakia's streets,16/04/2012 
61 See: DSL.sk, Ministerstvo dopravy chce, aby Google na Slovensku spustil GSV (Ministry of Transportation wants Google 
to launch GSV, 14/02/2012 
62 See: Zive.sk, Googlu sa asi Slovensko páči, bude fotiť ďalšie mestá (Google probably likes Slovakia, To Photograph 
Additional Cities), 19/04/2012 
63 Several of them included photos from Roma settlements. 
64 See for example: Nový Čas, 06/11/2012, Porušuje Google naše súkromie (Is Google Violating Our Privacy?); SME, 
02/11/2012, Google odhalil naše ulice aj chudobu (Google showed Our Streets, But Also Poverty), p. 5 
65 "Na slovensku notu", https://sites.google.com/site/slovenskanota/home .In a statement on opening page of the site, the 
local Google director “thanked Slovakia and Slovaks for their hospitality and interest”. 
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2 1ST DILEMMA: PRIVACY AND CONVENIENCE 
Daniel Fischer, Wolfgang Bonß, Nils Zurawski, 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: CITIZENS AS CONSUMERS, PROVISION OF SERVICE IN MODERN 
TIMES 
 
In this chapter we want to address the problems and dilemmas/trade-offs emerging in the 
world of electronic consumerism. While almost all forms of shopping and consumption could 
have been performed anonymously in pre-Internet times, this is no longer possible. One 
reason lies in the changing methods of payment and the problem of establishing trust in 
commercial relationships without cash transactions. Paying cash over the counter allows for 
highly anonymous transactions. By paying with cheques, credit cards or advanced forms of 
electronic payment like PayPal consumers have to identify themselves and hence leave data 
traces; by shopping via Internet they provide additional relevant marketing information about 
what they buy, when and where they shop and what they look at before and after buying. This 
may yield various data concerning, for instance geo locational information, personal 
preferences, medical conditions, personal relations and so forth. Using these data, profiles 
could be constructed in order to derive e.g. credit ratings from shopping patterns or postcode 
information.  
What can be observed here is a paradox of anonymity. Being involved in a commercial 
transaction with your local shopkeeper may create a social relation, in which anonymity 
ceases to be an issue, and relations will be re-configured and once anonymous customers will 
be rendered loyal customers, of whom the shop owner is well informed regarding preferences 
and so forth. This is represented in the iconic figure of the grocer at the corner-shop acting as 
a communication hub for the neighbourhood. In this setting an individual as a customer is 
known to his/her local community, but anonymous outside this environment. The same 
person shopping in an inner-city department store would enter into another setting, one in 
which anonymity is still a leading faculty. Businesses in such a setting do not know their 
customers personally. They neither know their names, nor preferences. Anonymity is the 
default setting, and at the same time, a problem for the business striving to extend their base 
of loyal customers in terms of advertising, offers and service.  
 
Developing sustainable customer relations following the “traditional” model of 
personal/intimate relations between local shopkeepers and their customers requires extended 
efforts in this world of anonymous consumerism. Loyalty cards and bonus programs have 
proven to be an effective way to achieve this. Collecting clients’ personal information and 
linking this information with shopping habits, businesses try to lure customers to their 
premises. This approach demonstrates the problem of privacy and convenience in a nutshell: 
consumers (citizens, clients, customers) give away personal information in exchange for 
presumably preferential treatment and increased convenience. Signing up for a bonus program 
or applying for a loyalty card still requires an active decision on the part of the individual, 
whom in principal retains the choice to remain anonymous. Thus, there is no necessity to 
exchange personal information for special offers, treatments or discounts.  
This has gradually changed since the proliferation of the Internet since the early 1990s and its 
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rapid expansion since 2000.66 The emergence of Internet-based e-commerce affected 
shopping and consumption patterns in many different ways. They lost their territorial grip, 
creating more convenient and economical opportunities for customers to screen and select 
from a wide array of goods and services, presented as seductive offers in virtual space. 
However, the emergence of this new form of commerce – this is important in the context of 
our study – made data provision mandatory for customers.67 Using electronically mediated 
forms of shopping or payment, consumers are tied into a comprehensive system of data 
collection. Connecting to the world of e-commerce requires repeated and continuous personal 
identification and creates a multitude of behavioural data, which puts these dimensions of 
current consumer practices at the heart of what we have defined as “surveillance society”. In 
this context consumers cannot avoid being transformed into leaking data containers, 
continuously leaving traces of their daily actions and movements. Therefore, we wanted to 
analyse this development within four empirical settings: the use of loyalty cards (1.2), online 
shopping (1.3), the use of Internet (1.4), and misuse of personal data (1.5). Before we present 
our empirical findings, we would like to briefly introduce the settings that we have chosen as 
focal points of our analysis and how they build upon each other. 
 
Loyalty Cards 
Loyalty cards hold a prominent and special position within shopping practices. Loyalty to a 
store (known as customer loyalty in marketing terms) is an inherent part of modes of 
consumption since the advent of the department store, mass production and the consumer as a 
social figure from mid-19th century onwards. As consumption, particularly shopping has been 
widely affected and its forms changed or influenced by digitalisation, so have loyalty cards. 
They have become part of the global personal information economy.68 This topic generates 
interesting stories, since the act of data production and collection requires activities on the 
side of the customer: a loyalty card has to be ordered, the application form has to be filled out 
with personal information, the card has to be handed over at the cash desk. So the act of data 
collection is clear for the customer to see and suggests an active involvement. Thus loyalty 
cards within the IRISS research were addressed in the course of the interviews and yielded 
interesting answers from which important evidence for further development of the concept of 
“doing privacy“ can be drawn.  
According to a survey by Finnaccord69 across Europe as a whole, loyalty cards achieve the 
highest usage with fuel retailers (88.5%), department store / variety retailers (34.0%) and 
supermarket / hypermarket chains (28.4%). Estimates on the amount of loyalty cards in 
circulation in Europe are difficult, but some examples may provide a small insight. About 
85% of households in the UK have at least one loyalty card, according to the market 
researchers TNS. Tesco's Club Card is the giant, with 15 million active members in the UK 
alone.70 The amount of users does appear to be falling though, or at least UK shoppers are 
                                               
66 Castells, Manuel, The rise of the network society, Blackwell, New York, 1996. 
67 Garfinkel, Simon, Database Nation - The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century, O'Reilly, Cambridge et al., 2000.  
68 cf. for example Zurawski, N., “Local practice and global data. Loyalty cards, social practices and consumer surveillance“, 
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3, Fall 2011, pp. 509-527. Also: Pridmore, J., “Reflexive marketing: the cultural circuit 
of loyalty programs“, Identity in the Information Society (IDIS), No. 3, 2010, pp. 565-581. Also: Coll, S., “Consumption as 
biopower: Governing bodies with loyalty cards“, Journal of Consumer Culture, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2013, pp. 201-220. 
69http://www.finaccord.com/documents/rp_2013/report_prospectus_retailer_payment_gift_loyalty_cards_europe.pdf 
 
70 cf. Daily Mail, 25.06.2012: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2164270/Loyalty-cards-25-million-shoppers-used-
Government-snoop-eating-habits.html 
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using them less than they used to – a drop of 8 million in active use has been reported.71 In 
Germany the biggest player is payback, claiming that 60% of Germans hold a payback-loyalty 
card. Furthermore, it is estimated that every adult German holds between 2 and 4 loyalty 
cards of some sort. For the Italian market, estimates state that since the early 2000s, the 
biggest 20 distributors manage loyalty programs involving over one million registered 
customers with around 20 million active cards in all sectors.72 In contrast in Slovakia, it is 
estimated that 90% of all customers are equipped with a card or are users of a program – up 
from 69% in 200673.  
 
Online Shopping 
A fundamental shift in the constellation of advertising and shopping practices can be 
observed: Whilst consumers increasingly “go shopping” online, they “go browsing” in 
shopping centres.74 There, e.g. flagship stores offer the ultimate branding experience, while 
the actual purchase occurs later via the Internet. Online shopping, however, radicalises the 
principle of loyalty cards: Although consumers have to engage actively, e.g. by creating an 
account on Amazon, EBay etc., many other data are recorded automatically when visiting a 
company’s website:  How much time was spend on a site? Which items were browsed or put 
into the shopping cart? Which other sites were visited before?75 The customer no longer 
remains anonymous in online shopping, since every action/click is recorded, stored and 
analysed for marketing purposes. Although the benefits of online shopping are obvious for the 
consumer (perfect availability of goods, comparability of prices, convenient delivery, etc.), 
payment remains the one crucial aspect. However, there have been many developments in the 
payment services sector (such as PayPal, Amazon Payments, Credit Cards) and online 
banking, with ever increasing security standards preventing fraud and misuse of data.  Part of 
our research in IRISS was focusing on the levels of awareness among users about these 
different “payment”-acts and their implications: How aware are European citizens about 
online tracking? Do they worry about privacy infringements or are they more afraid of 
criminal misuse of data? 
The importance of online shopping as a field of inquiry is highlighted by a few numbers. 
According to Ecommerce Europe (2013),76 of 820 million people living in Europe, 529 
million use the Internet and 250 million are e-shoppers – almost a third of Europe‘s 
population (figures for 2012). Although the Internet economy only makes up for 3,5% of 
overall GDP in Europe, it nonetheless achieves 311.6 Billion Euro in Business to Consumer 
turnover.  
 
Use of Internet 
In the third field of analysis, we broaden our focus from the “act of consumption” towards 
                                               
71 cf. New Statesman, 21.06.2007, http://www.newstatesman.com/life-and-society/2007/06/tesco-supermarket-mother-data  
72 Cedrola, Elena, and Memmo, Sabrina: “Loyalty marketing and loyalty cards: a study of the Italian market“,International 
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2010, pp. 205-225. 
73 For more information in Slovak see: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/6461392/prieskum-vernostnu-kartu-vlastni-takmer-90-
percent-slovakov.html 
74 Suau, Cristian, and Munar Bauzá, Margarita: “The mall in the online shopping era”, Unpublished Paper, presented at the 
4th International Conference of the International Forum on Urbanism (IFoU), 2009.   
75 For information on “Behavioural Tracking“ see: https://www.eff.org/issues/online-behavioural-tracking; these data are so 
tempting that retailers try to build similar surveillance systems also for shopping centers: 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2014/jan/10/how-tracking-customers-in-store-will-soon-be-the-norm 
76 http://www.ecommerce-europe.eu/news/2013/10/eurostat-releases-figures-on-online-shopping-in-europe 
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general Internet usage (1.4), which can be described as a multitude of different services 
(communication, information, entertainment), which may appear to be „for free“, but are 
financed via advertising that again is based solely on the production, collection, combination 
and evaluation of personal data.  
 
According to the Digital Agenda Scoreboard 201277 of the European Union, “Finding 
information about goods and services“ is the most used online service – 71% of all users use 
search engines in order to find information, with Google the leading company used by 
approx. 80%. This is followed by “Reading and downloading online newspapers and news“, 
and „searching for information on health, general knowledge (i.e. consulting wikis such as 
Wikipedia)”. 
“Social Media” and “e-Commerce” make up for the second most important sector in Internet 
use. This “time spent on the Internet” is clearly recognized by the marketing industry, as 
online advertising grew 11.9% to a market value of €27.3bn in 2013.78 An important trend 
that was addressed in IRISS is that Internet usage is decreasingly confined to the classical 
desktop/browser-based setting. Thus, the use of mobile devices makes up for 30% of daily 
internet usage in Europe, and here again more than 80% of the time is spent using “apps” 
(messaging, shopping, social media, information) instead of browser based allocations. Such 
apps however collect large amounts of personal data. Most of this is performed by automated 
systems of data production, data collection and data evaluation. 
The percentage of individuals in the EU using the Internet in 2013 was 70%. About one third 
uses the Internet on mobile devices away from home or work. And 60% report use of the 
Internet on a daily basis. The level of Internet access ranges from 54% of households in 
Bulgaria to 95% in the Netherlands, which accounts for other more specified uses as well. It 
has to be added that by 2012 around 120 million European citizens have never used the 
Internet. Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal have the highest rates of non-users 
and account for 25 million citizens who lead their lives without the Internet (a figure similar 
only to Italy with 23 million non-users). Without going into a more detailed analysis of the 
statistical evidence it should be clear that Internet usage, whether at home, at work or on 
mobile devices is spread widely across most European countries, and the electronic services 
provided through this medium have become an elementary part of social, cultural and 
economic life in Europe.  Table 1.1 shows detailed information for the countries participating 
in IRISS79: 
 
 Austria Germany Italy Slovakia UK 
Internet access (pct. of population) 81 83 58 80 87 
Mobile Internet Access (pct. of 
population) 
71 58 16 38 63 
Time spent online via 
stationary/mobile device (hrs/d) 
- 3.7/1.6 4.7/2,2 - 4.1/1.6 
Table: Internet Usage in Europe /Countries involved in WP4.2  
                                               
77 cf. European Commission, Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-
agenda/files/scoreboard_life_online.pdf [pp.11-12] 
78 http://www.iabeurope.eu/news/european-online-advertising-market-records-new-high-273bn 
79 cf. European Commission, Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2013, Brussels, 12.06.2013.: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/DAE%20SCOREBOARD%202013%20-%20SWD%202013%20217%20FINAL.pdf 
[pp.76-80] 
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Comparing these figures to the correspondent European average, shows that our interviews 
were conducted in countries with high internet penetration (except for Italy, all countries lie 
above the average of 70%). Concerning mobile Internet access, the European average is 36%, 
but in all countries the increase of online activities on mobile devices is considerably higher 
than on stationary devices. 
 
Misuse of personal data, victim experiences in the digital age 
The final section will focus on experiences of fraud and misuse of personal data, gathering 
narratives about how negative trade-offs are perceived and reconciled with on-going practices 
of (online) consumption, internet usage and the production of personal data this entails. 
While detailed evidence of users is readily available it is difficult to assess the level of misuse 
or Internet-related crimes (e.g. identity theft, fraud, etc.). The Fraud Prevention Expert Group 
of the EU (DG Internal Market and Services)80 states in its report on the matter that actual 
estimates are difficult due to the piecemeal nature of the data in the EU. However, the group 
estimates that in the UK alone 100,000 individuals are subject to identity fraud each year 
costing the UK economy roughly 1,7 billion Euros annually. 
 
 
2.2 NARRATIVES OF LOYALTY CARDS USAGE AND THE ROLE OF “PRIVACY MANAGEMENT”  
 
2.2.1 Loyalty cards as “bearable nuisance” 
 
We identified a number of different narratives about loyalty cards in our interviews. Besides a 
straightforward refusal of the cards – mostly on the grounds of objections against limitless 
data collections and the ensuing dangers – loyalty cards are met with what can be described as 
a practical scepticism, prototypically summed up in the following quote (answering to the 
question: Why don’t you like loyalty cards?):  
 
“You leave your traces everywhere, and then they also sell your data. This happens 
and we know it. You get all of a sudden spam mails, as soon as you enter your e-mail 
address, or you get personal advertisement in your mail. […] It’s nothing evil, but it’s 
unpleasant.”  
(Interview ID 499, 67 years, male,  Austria) 
 
It is not considered as an outright evil, but as a bearable nuisance that, following a recurring 
argument, either has to be considered as a trade-off in a digitalised world, but more often then 
not is accepted as an inevitable part of everyday life. It is interesting to note that very few of 
the interview partners had either no opinion on the subject, even if not owning or using 
loyalty cards, or did not know about it. There are varying degrees at which loyalty cards are 
rated – from „being a good thing“ to an outright suspicion of continuous malpractice 
concerning the collected data. This connects with a general feeling of mistrust that runs 
through many of the accounts. Such mistrust reflects the confusing situation of data collection 
and the conditions of digital everyday life in general. It reflects a constellation where an 
                                               
80 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/index_en.htm; 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/1public_full_20_sept.pdf 
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individual is exposed to an undefined, not identifiable, invisible, but nonetheless existing 
actor. All our respondents were convinced that something was happening with their data, but 
they had no operational idea, who was doing what. This created an almost Kafka-like 
situation of uncertainty: Ego (the card bearer) cannot see what Alter (the card issuing 
company) is doing but nonetheless knows that his actions produce some reaction on the other 
side. This uncertainty can be compensated by generalised trust, assuming the other side will 
act within the limits of law. But often mistrust seemed to be the default attitude towards these 
schemes. However this sort of mistrust does not automatically lead to open resistance or 
protest, but is often rationalised and woven in with further arguments addressing the personal 
use of loyalty cards. What becomes clear is that a vague awareness of the implications of 
loyalty cards exists, which seems to be provoked in the instances of talking about, but not 
necessarily when using them. Also, the reflections on the personal uses express this quite 
distinctively.  
One would expect to find a clear distinction between what could be called positive or negative 
accounts. However although positive or negative statements do occur as such, many of them 
are ambivalent – aside from responses that state an outright refusal, which are overtly 
negative. But also positive statements may display an ambivalent element, i.e. loyalty cards 
may be perceived as positive regarding the promised bonuses or discounts, while the same 
person may be suspicious when it comes to the collection of data. This again displays the 
double character of loyalty cards, as both a medium embedded in the mundane activity of 
shopping and a means to collect data for a global economy that takes a leading role in the 
process of producing glass consumers, a process eluding the control of the customers 
themselves. Hence an overview of positive or negative arguments also has to be grouped 
according to the addressed qualities of the loyalty cards and their setting. But it has to be 
noted that most accounts display the strong ambivalence of this medium as being part of 
everyday life through its use in shopping practices and as a data-gathering instrument, 
evoking discourses of surveillance. 
 
2.2.2 Exchanges, personal data and privacy labour 
 
Positive arguments for using loyalty cards circle around the bonuses, discounts, possible 
advantages and the argument to actually save money by using them, because some of the data 
is used for „your own good“ (Interview ID 242). Some respondents argue that the other side 
(the card issuing company) obviously displays an interest in their personal desires and wishes, 
thereby adapting the situation to a person-to-person situation. 
Not outright positive, but rather accepting the fact that loyalty cards are part of what shopping 
is also about, many arguments that stress the fact that loyalty cards are part of everyday life 
and always have been can be found, albeit in different forms and under different conditions. 
Some statements refer to stamp cards or sticky points that could be collected in the old days. 
They do not see a big difference in relation to customer loyalty or shopping practices. Here 
the loyalty part is emphasised, while the data collection aspects of the card are ignored. 
 
However some statements hint at the fact that digitalisation has brought about changes in the 
ways advertising is targeting people, which is mostly felt as a nuisance, but not as threatening 
individual privacy. Shopping, it seems, is nothing that people, who have a positive attitude 
towards loyalty cards, view as something that should be necessarily being treated as a 
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personal secret. We would argue that this has to do with the integration of loyalty cards into 
shopping and hence into the rather mundane activities of everyday life.  
Negative statements about loyalty cards (which were not necessarily produced by respondents 
who did not own such cards) were concerned mainly with the effects of targeted marketing, 
i.e. soliciting unwanted advertising to their mailboxes or phones via SMS. This was 
considered as an infringement on the right to freely choose what to consume (often framed as 
„manipulation“) on the one hand, and on the other the respondents felt unease at being rated, 
categorised and profiled by the company. The customisation of consumers to meet market 
needs was rejected. It was seen as an attack on the autonomy of the consumer, who as free 
citizen wants to choose without being manipulated by targeted offers.  
Data protection is also an important issue when rejecting loyalty cards or making critical 
statements. Especially the selling of collected data to third parties was a high-ranking issue 
among interview partners and thus referring back to the issue of advertising and targeted 
marketing. Loyalty cards‘ position at the intersection of everyday life, data collection and 
privacy issues as well as its prominence and pervasiveness often give it a special role, one that 
cannot be explained by its connection to the personal information economy alone. The 
following quote exemplifies this particular role and also highlights the role of „privacy 
management“ when dealing with personal information:  
 
“I’m aware of the privacy issues, although I am not really very active when it comes 
to privacy protection in the online environment. But when it comes to consumer 
loyalty cards, I do not use them at all. I know that they offer you some advantages, but 
I wouldn’t use it, since I consider it too much of a privacy breach.“ 
(Interview ID 601, 29 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
Here a general lack of activity in dealing with privacy issues is confessed, when on the other 
hand the rejection of loyalty cards is clearly stated, because of the perception of a privacy 
breach. Privacy is managed according to context, technology used and personal reasons that 
are not further explained, despite the awareness of possible advantages for the consumer. So 
although this clearly is an exemplary account of rejection, it also displays the existing 
ambivalence towards loyalty cards. Furthermore, no matter whether positive or negative, 
many accounts display this ambivalence, in which „privacy labour“ surfaces. Other 
statements show that there is awareness of the data protection and privacy issues that may be 
negatively connected with loyalty cards, but that they are used anyway. A narrative, which 
featured in many interviews, is that customers are „complicit“ in the gathering and subsequent 
processing of data. Although many things are not needed, they come in handy, and people are 
being „practical“ (Interview ID 232) about it. Again this supports the argument of privacy 
management or labour. The following quote serves as a very good example summing up the 
major aspects of the construction of the average narrative – including awareness of data 
protection issues, a feeling of futility to resistance because of complexity, privacy 
management/labour and its role in everyday life.  
 
“Of course: The companies know a lot about me, the whole mobile phone 
surveillance, they know everything about me. But what choice do I have? Not acting 
online anymore, just paying cash again? I think it's an all or nothing thing. Either you 
accept that and act like you wish or you do nothing at all. But to create some little 
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nuances: No credit cards, but payback, or payback only at gas stations but not in the 
department store. Surf the Internet via special proxies but having an iPhone. I think 
that's… no, much too time consuming and complex.” 
(Interview ID 303, 60 years, male, Germany) 
 
The core of the dilemma of being a consumer in a digitalised environment of consumption is 
summed by the following quote:  
 
„I have loyalty cards, yes. And I know that they also look at my data, what I buy and 
when I buy it, but that’s ok for me, because I get my stuff cheaper. So I sell them my 
data, so to say.”  
(Interview ID 550, 34 years, female,  Austria) 
 
Loyalty cards on a very basic level offer deals within modes of consumption that are shaping 
citizen’s everyday lives. Given the complexity of a world that is deeply entangled with, if not 
almost exclusively dependent on various forms of digital data processing, there seems to be 
no other way than to surrender to data collections and data processing, as exemplified in the 
following quote:  
 
“Well, not engaging with any of those things, but it’s kind of hard to do that 
nowadays, ... Yes, you’d have to live on a farm in the middle of nowhere, grow all your 
own food, not use the Internet, because even things like ... because in order to buy a 
house you need a credit history.”  
(Interview ID 86, 42 years, female, UK) 
 
To understand loyalty cards as a form of surveillance, analytical limitations regarding the 
term surveillance have to be considered, since it is used for quite different forms of 
protocolling, watching, monitoring and recording data or behaviour. In the case of loyalty 
cards there are certain problems. Surveillance was rarely evoked in the interviews in relation 
to loyalty cards. Thus, the perception of data collection, targeted marketing or consumer 
profiling is not linked to surveillance, in the same way as e.g. to NSA practices or state 
oriented snooping are. Although a major narrative highlights the trade-off or deal-narrative, 
this cannot be compared to the deal an ostensible benevolent state may offer its citizens, i.e. 
surveillance under the guise of security or the like. Loyalty cards are a part of everyday life, 
embedded in everyday activities and not perceived as something external to it.  
So, if there is an awareness of the complexity of global data processing and also of the futility 
of resisting, one might ask why this does not lead to a shock, to a standstill or to open forms 
of resistance. Open resistance in a consumer society, one may argue, is only possible within 
the realm of the consumer society itself, i.e. not by its denial. Hence resistance is achieved 
through measures of privacy labour. Thus privacy labour is the key to understanding societal 
resilience in terms of data collection. Making sense of the trade-dilemma, the 
consumer/citizen "ignores” or “surrenders” in order to reduce complexity. The situation is 
simply not bad enough to be socially disturbing, and consumption is part of everyday life and 
vice versa. Consumption is not repressive (or not felt in that way), which makes it more 
difficult to evade its ostensible necessities, such as giving personal data for services enjoyed. 
“The distrust that has grown over decades not to become too transparent that’s it in 
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the end …. I must say, my wife has loyalty cards of course, then again it is my wife 
who goes shopping and not myself. My wife has all of them, Merkur, Billa, whatever 
… There is certainly a certain distrust. It is probably also an age issue. One has 
experienced another time. One knows surveillance states etc. So I do not want to 
become too transparent. You can only avoid it to a certain extent. You cannot travel 
and pay everything in cash, you cannot avoid using debit cards and credit cards.”  
(Interview ID 40, 55 years, male, Austria) 
 
In effect the use of loyalty cards reveals strategies of privacy management and a very clear 
and at the same time futile outlook on the digital world. Differences can be observed when 
comparing “lay citizens” (digitally naïve) and “digital experts” (digiterati). People identifying 
themselves as experts (or who are put into that category by e.g. their job description), show a 
somewhat more self-confident mode of handling loyalty cards and dealing with the problems 
connected to their use. They seem to know more and also mention a certain knowledge that 
enables them to assess the risks and engage in somewhat more informed privacy management. 
They are not worried, they pay attention and have developed quite sophisticated routines, as 
for instance multiple email accounts to circumvent being a totally transparent glass consumer. 
Resilience here seems to be connected to a form of risk management by knowledge, not 
withstanding the fact that these experts do not necessarily reject loyalty cards by default, but 
also embrace the advantages, while at the same time claiming to know how to handle the 
complexity. 
 
 
2.3 ONLINE SHOPPING   
 
As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the B2C sector of electronic commerce has 
witnessed a crucial expansion: Shopping activities and advertising practices are no longer 
bound to limits of time and space, but goods can be advertised and consumed/ purchased 
anytime and anywhere. While the positive aspects – i.e. enhanced convenience through 
increased availability of goods, competitive prices and bargains, and instant home delivery – 
are appreciated by a majority of respondents, the negative aspects are perceived and appraised 
differently. 
 
2.3.1 The daily loop 
 
A few respondents mentioned advertising as a concern. They considered advertisements to be 
redundant, cloddy, or classified them as „junk“. The following accounts identify typical 
problems or unease with the proliferation of advertising through emails that were casually 
provided in seemingly harmless circumstances:  
 
“Yes last time I was looking for boots at an online shoe shop. Now there is always this 
ad for a certain brand of shoes on my Facebook profile. I don’t like this but what 
should you do? I don’t really pay any attention to advertisements to be honest.“  
(Interview ID 521, 21 years, female, Austria) 
 
“Personally, I just think this is done in such a primitive way. I search for "guitar XY", 
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they show me: Here's guitar XY for the cheapest price. I mean come on... I think other 
people, especially young people also know that. Because that's pretty much a topic, 
yes.“  
(Interview ID 201, 21 years, female, Germany) 
 
The majority of our interview partners understood this particular business model that is based 
on advertising. Nevertheless, they consider advertisements as an inconvenience and annoying, 
and an additional cost of their shopping activities. The act of shopping does not end with the 
actual purchase of an item, but consequently is further deepening the relationship between 
company and customer. As a result a continuous flow of advertisements is forced upon the 
consumer – seemingly in return for its loyalty. However this does not seem to be sufficient to 
create open resistance against such practices: 
 
“I don't like that personalised advertising. I always see the same. It's not torturing or 
really on my mind all the time, but if there was an initiative against that, they'd have 
my signature.”  
(Interview ID 198, 21 years, female, Germany) 
 
2.3.2 The glassy customer 
 
A common form of advertising is to offer things that have been bought or looked at before. 
Advertisements follow a motto of “same, same, but different” – e.g. guitars are offered to 
guitar players, hotel vouchers to regular travellers and so forth. Another strategy is to analyse 
the collection of increasingly complex personal data by one or more companies over time, i.e. 
profiles of behaviours, preferences and locational data. The goal is not to satisfy recurrent 
needs that can be deduced from specific shopping or online histories (by way of cookies or 
else), but to distil a more encompassing profile of a customer based on a multitude of direct 
and indirect information. When this takes place in an everyday life setting such as shopping 
activities – e.g. in a supermarket – it creates multi-layered, rather emotional reactions on 
behalf of the consumer/citizen: 
 
“It has put me off; it has actually put me off. And I’m even a bit like that with the 
bloody [supermarket] website because it brings up all your list, and you know how. 
which is really irritating... after you’ve finished your shopping it then asks you if you 
want all these things because you’ve ordered them before, and it’s a complete con and 
I feel like I’m being conned all the time, they’re trying to just get me to spend that little 
bit extra, and so I never click on any of those things and, in fact, it makes me not want 
to order through [supermarket]. I think that sometimes... because it’s also useful 
because it’s useful to have your list up there that you’ve already ordered and it’s 
useful to remind yourself that you’ve ordered all those things, but I think they have to 
be really careful about the balance ... and I think that’s the thing, it’s actually quite 
useful for companies to remember all your information, and it’s actually quite nice, 
like with your loyalty card thing, that you might get adverts through about certain 
things that might be useful to you and you might not notice otherwise, but I think it is a 
bit too much sometimes.“   
(Interview ID 82, 42 years, female, UK) 
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Quite clearly we can observe a psychological process within which the respondent is 
balancing chances and costs, commencing with an emotional reaction towards the non-stop, 
penetrating efforts of businesses to make people buy more. A first reaction is total denial („I 
never click on any of those things.“), which then resolves into a more rational assessment of 
the situation. It’s interesting to note that the respondent doesn’t differentiate between being 
reminded of buying things already bought and being offered things that she „might not have 
noticed otherwise“. This particular respondent is a good example of someone who hasn’t 
found a good balance between denial and appreciation of the loyalty programs she’s offered 
or takes part in. Such an account represents an exception, since most people show a more or 
less relaxed way of coping with the “new ways” in which they are treated and targeted as 
customers: 
 
“It seems like it’s hard to avoid someone building up a picture of who we are, 
obviously figure out we’ve got kids and la, la, la. Yes I don’t like it, I don’t 
particularly like it but I’m not horrified by it.“  
(Interview ID 71, 35 years, male, UK) 
 
“No, I haven’t had any experience with misuse of personal data, really. No. I suppose 
we’re getting onto this, but I just accept that there’s no privacy.... You can’t be King 
Canute and hold back the tide, is, I suppose, what I think. Well it is a deal, isn’t it? If 
the market is transparent, the customer has to be as well who wants to use all the 
data.” 
(Interview ID 131, 69 years, female, UK) 
 
Respondents claim that they are fully aware of how much information is collected about 
them. Denial and open resistance are not viewed as preferred, and indeed promising, ways to 
deal with this situation. Our findings suggest that increased knowledge about the complexity 
of data flows in the commercial sector doesn’t result in more caution concerning online 
activities: 
 
“I have credit cards, yes, and I have all kinds of loyalty cards, although I have 
informed myself now on what happens with the collected data, how they link them and 
the like. I am not sure anymore whether I really want that everywhere ... but my data 
is already spread out.”  
(Interview ID 172, 63 years, female, Austria) 
 
“And I’m also aware that Amazon stores the data and has profiles for every user. 
They also sent e-mails with ‘we recommend you this and that’ and that always 
matches very well with the things I previously bought. But that’s the price you pay for 
shopping there, which is of course very convenient.“  
(Interview ID 477, 32 years, male, Austria) 
 
“Concerning companies like Amazon, EBay or PayPal, there I have no scruples. What 
does Amazon know about me? They know my name, my address, my credit card and 
my shopping preferences, because I shop there. And those are things where I think 
that they need them, to do their job, to offer me products, to send it to me and to bill 
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them. It’s not disproportionate.”  
(Interview ID 494, 32 years, male, Austria) 
 
People display a readiness to give up privacy in such settings, as long as they can see a clear 
benefit (special offers, good prices) for themselves, and as long as this benefit outweighs any 
annoying side effects (advertisements, etc.) that accompany it. Strangely enough, the same 
service is considered an infringement and is dismissed when other people find out about their 
purchases or preferences, as a result of their collection by Amazon.  
 
“Yes, what Amazon is suggesting to me that I should buy next, is most of the time 
actually something I’m really interested in. Except for the kids’ toys I’ve bought for 
my grandson, there they are wrong with their suggestions but for music and books 
they have quite a good instinct. What I did was that I enabled the privacy settings for 
my Amazon account. That is something a former student of mine taught me years ago. 
She showed us how you can figure out what kind of books the former Austrian 
President had bought with his Amazon account. I don’t want that. I don’t want them to 
know what I’m buying. That is something nobody should be interested in.”  
(Interview ID 292, 72 years, female, Austria) 
 
In conclusion, our findings show that the narrative of the „glassy customer“ is made up of 
three elements: First, there is a reflex to hide information, due to the feeling of being trapped 
and overwhelmed by the permanent efforts of companies to identify the needs of their 
customers. This results in more emotional utterances. Second, there is a more relaxed, but not 
more cautious handling, of the situation, often emerging from an increased knowledge about 
data handling practices by companies. Third, it is obvious that transparency exists only as 
transparency of the consumer, rendering the assumed trade-off a one-sided one, while there is 
little to no transparency on the side of corporations or businesses, for instances in terms of 
data usage, data deletion or data processing.81  
 
2.3.3 It’s the money, stupid! 
 
So far we have learned much about our respondents’ instincts regarding privacy infringements 
that occur while shopping online. This last section draws attention to a more mundane and 
indeed widespread phenomenon concerning online shopping: The fear of becoming a victim 
of fraud as the following quote illustrates: 
 
“[...] I guess I’m not sure what I would be worried about in terms of somebody using 
my passport number because if somebody pretends to be using my passport number 
I’m not sure what they can do and would it harm me. For me, the biggest fear would 
be... there’s two big fears, one of them is anything to do with my children, and the 
other thing is money, them taking my money. But in terms of, I don’t know, some 
                                               
81 We see this as an important point considering some arguments being used by data protection activists: Often they illustrate 
the NSA practices by asking people to send them an email with all their passwords to Facebook, Ebay, Amazon and the likes, 
which of course nobody would do. But these are two different things in the eyes of the people: Being exposed to an 
anonymous institution is something different than being exposed to a specific person, who is in any way known or even 
stands in any kind of relation to you. 
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criminal somewhere pretending to be me, as long as it’s not impacting on me I can’t... 
and that’s probably a crazy way to view it, but, yes.“  
(Interview ID 859, 42 years, female, UK) 
 
The experiences expressed in the interviews provided a wide range of cases. Regarding credit 
cards, respondents emphasised the good experiences, particularly when problems occurred. 
The conclusion was that credit card companies themselves were under public surveillance and 
wouldn’t want to risk having a bad image: 
 
“I shop online quite a lot. I never had a bad experience. When I shop through e-bay, it 
happened a few times that some damaged goods came or I did not get them, I wrote 
them and I got the money back. I even took advantage of this a few times, I got the 
product and I wrote them that it did not come and I got the money back. I think that 
they don’t want to risk bad reviews so it’s easier for them to send back 20 euro. I 
never order anything too expensive.”  
(Interview ID 774, 25 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
Only few respondents claimed to avoid online transactions completely, without being able to 
state clear reasons for this. They argued that it would be more of „a feeling thing“, 
„mysterious“ or would call themselves „phobic“.82 However, most followed clear principles 
or rules to put self-induced limits on their activities: 
- only paying via third party companies, that offer insurance (PayPal, prepaid-Credit Cards) 
- only buying a particular set of goods or services online (vacations, train tickets, books, 
records) – things they cannot get otherwise, products under 100 Euro 
- only performing online shopping from home, not via  public or semi-public WIFI 
Networks 
The theoretical concept of the “trade-off” which we employed in our analysis seems to be 
quite valuable in these cases, as every piece of information given away, is presumably 
resulting in a service returned “for free”. However, the permanent presence of advertisements 
and shopping options is perceived as stressful, if not annoying, which in turn may result in 
some form of fatigue or carelessness, ultimately with serious consequences: 
 
“Keyword Amazon, yes I admit I got very lazy through time. I order a hell of a lot of 
my books there. It is so easy, practical and convenient. And I don’t care too much 
about the profiling, I bet I have some sort of ‚into special posh weird pop cultural 
stuff‘..- profile, I can surely live with.“  
(Interview ID 992, 44 years, male, Austria) 
 
 
 
 
                                               
82 "Somehow I feel I do not have a control over my credit card, I prefer brick stores.” Q: “But if it is the same store you use, 
even in that case you will not use its online version?” A: "No, I wouldn't, I would go there in person. I am almost phobic 
when it comes to online banking. I dont do it, well yes, but not very often. It’s more of a feeling I have. I find this mysterious, 
I dont know so many things, giving my credit card details, and PayPl, I dont know how that works. It is not really my thing to 
shop online.“ 
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2.4 USE OF THE INTERNET  
 
From the dilemmas described in the previous sections, multiple connections between 
everyday life activities and online services emerge. These connections may be exploited to 
pursue political as well as economic interests, which in turn may analytically be classified as 
privacy infringements, e.g. in a juridical sense. But how are the same infringements identified 
by people on the streets? Are they also viewed as infringements into their own privacy? We 
have analysed three accounts along which we can describe how people perceive this dilemma 
and react accordingly. 
 
2.4.1 The „Dead End“-story: Pervasive, ubiquitous, useful, inclusive 
 
“I don’t think it is possible to protect your personal data from being accessible and 
being public. If I wanted to have my data protected, I couldn’t exist...” 
(Interview ID 413, 22 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
“You are dependent on the technology. I couldn’t imagine that you can for example 
study nowadays without Internet. ... Nowadays, you simply need all the folderol. That 
makes it easier for people to trace you.”  
(Interview ID 158, 28 years, male, Austria) 
 
A considerable number of statements in our interviews hint at the fact that people think of 
online surveillance as inevitable. Describing the situation as an „all or nothing“ option is 
regularly the starting point of their accounts. Thereafter, the handling of the situation differs: 
Most people emphasise the positive aspects of the trade off, since „being abstinent“ or 
cancelling the trade-off is considered impossible: 
 
“The convenience I gain by using dropbox and similar services, outweighs the risk of 
being harmed, because I suppose that if he means to do it, it will happen anyway.” 
(Interview ID 486, 32 years, male, Austria) 
 
Another important element of how people perceive the situation is that privacy and security 
are often used interchangeably: You cannot achieve total security, neither for yourself, nor for 
your data. So that leads to a reflection of how to balance interests for privacy needs and 
convenience, which eventually cannot be resolved: 
 
“Yes. It's funny. I'm aware of how vulnerable your own networks are but I suspect, like 
a lot of people, I suffer from security fatigue. When I set my passwords I'm slightly idle. 
When I’ve put a password in and they said moderate security and I've tried various 
permutations and it's still moderate, I can't be asked to find one which says high-level. 
Which is ridiculous, really, because I'd like to think I'm reasonably well-versed in the 
threats out there. But, again, it's a kind of security fatigue. It's just like there are so 
many passwords for this and that and after a while you just feel like well, I’ve got to get 
on with life, I can't...” 
(Interview ID 36, 27 years, female, Italy) 
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Here the notion of privacy-as-security emerges and it seems like an associative reflex, which 
is somehow positioned in the cultural understanding of privacy. Ultimately this is a dead end, 
since „total security“ is a condition that is deemed un-accomplishable.83  
 
“You would more or less need to give up your wealth if you really … But that is actually 
quite paranoid, if you are so annoyed by that, then you give up everything, no internet 
(…) you would go to an internet café to look up the various things that interest you. You 
would live simply, like in former times. If you want to write a letter to somebody, you 
would actually write a letter by hand and bring it to the post office … because Internet 
… I have seen the worst documentaries. Everything that runs via Internet is known by 
people. There is no way that you can protect yourself well enough.” 
(Interview ID 151, 28 years, male, Austria) 
 
2.4.2 Privacy Management 
 
Having realised both the inevitability of online surveillance as well as the positive aspects that 
come along with it, people start managing their privacy in a very complex way, i.e. as 
something that could be described as a form of cognitive coping. It’s important for people to 
assume, that although their personal data are being collected, they are not the target of 
surveillance activities as an individual: 
 
“So, like I said, because if you wanted to assemble all the information that’s ever been 
on the internet about me you probably could, but I think it would take a huge amount of 
effort and I wouldn’t imagine you would do that, like that any... I don’t think that a 
couple of guys who want to defraud me and take over my bank account would go to that 
extent, so I’m not really so worried about that and the CCTV footage of me walking into 
a shop.”  
(Interview ID 143, 18 years, female, UK) 
 
“Although I think that they store a huge amount of data about citizens, but they can 
never analyse all the data. I know that technically, it's possible and I think it is done, 
but I don't think that MY data is analysed.“  
(Interview ID 480, 32 years, female, Austria) 
 
This response clearly illustrates a position, which assumes that mass surveillance is not 
directed against specific individuals. Many accounts reflect on the complexity of mass 
surveillance, which is seen rather as an appeasing fact than as a genuine source of danger, in 
contrast to strategies that depend on a certain level of criminal energy:  
 
“I am not interesting enough, to have my data exploited in the large mass, for that I’m 
not a thrilling target. If someone means to get my data, or to sabotage my PC or 
                                               
83 We believe that the understanding of privacy in terms of security concepts should be discussed and criticized. Privacy 
functions as a value that is generated by securing the absence of harms. Thus, we never found anything that could be 
interpreted as a „positive concept of privacy“ in our interviews. We assume that this is due to a structural change of the 
concept of privacy over the last decades.  
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whatever, then he will succeed. If someone really tries, then it doesn’t really matter 
what I do.”  
(Interview ID 486, 32 years, male, Austria) 
 
2.4.3 Symbolic resistance  
 
Besides strategies of organising knowledge about surveillance along specific elements or 
categories, we identified quite a few symbolic actions used to emphasise awareness about 
online surveillance. In fact, it is quite rare that people do not regulate or limit their online 
activities at all. The common objective is to minimise connections between the “online” and 
the „real“ identity. This is achieved by the following actions: 
- avoiding pictures, where someone is clearly recognisable 
- eliminating the full/real name from online platforms 
- having a „registration“ email-address that is not used to communicate with others and only 
known to the individual. 
- turning off GPS-systems within all applications, if this is not required for the very sense of 
the application (e.g. in navigation systems). 
 
We found differences in terms of how well informed people were about the effectiveness of 
their measures: Some interviewees knew that these measures could be thwarted by the actions 
of others (who may identify – i.e. tag – people on their own pictures or give away similar 
information): 
  
“A friend of mine showed me, that even if I am not on Facebook, she can insert my 
name when she's "checking in" somewhere. Or that she can identify me on pictures with 
my name and so on. Or that she can see where somebody is at the moment.”  
(Interview ID 70, 55 years, female, Germany) 
 
We classify these strategies as „symbolic resistance“, although we cannot generally tell 
whether people really know how effective such measures are. It seems that these actions are 
directed against threats, which are expected to emerge in peer-to-peer interactions. The ability 
of algorithms and intelligent software to track a person is often not perceived as too 
problematic, as long as these efforts are directed against masses of people. However, it is seen 
as problematic, if one can be traced by ordinary people, simply based on one or very few 
pieces of information known to someone else. And in the case of social media, users are urged 
to provide a plethora of data through which a more or less complete identity can be 
reconstructed. Additionally, it is not only the company itself, which is aware of this 
information, but also individual users, i.e. when they are “a contact”.  
 
„I am always asked to „accept“ that, x and y said that I am attending this university, 
that I have attended that school, or that I am a member of this sports club or something. 
Which is true of course, but I don’t want to be found via this information.“  
(Interview ID 1001, 21 years, female, Germany) 
 
Respondents choose a variety of strategies, to share information and personal data on the 
Internet or online storage (i.e. clouds). Some respondents share or store “as little as 
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possible”, others share/store only “the most important” things and others again, share/store 
only unimportant documents. However, most find it reasonable to think about the issue, even 
if it leads to ironic or sarcastic comments regarding one’s own carelessness. 
 
“I try to avoid sharing too much of my private data online, in that respect I don’t really 
like online platforms and apps. But my passwords (laughs) aren’t that safe on the other 
hand. I always use the same password for every platform I visit. One shouldn’t do that 
but I can’t remember dozens of different passwords.”  
(Interview ID 460, 34 years, male, Austria) 
 
 
2.5 MISUSE OF PERSONAL DATA, VICTIM EXPERIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE  
 
Reactions to the misuse of personal data, i.e. the experience of being a victim „in the digital 
world“ follow on from narratives on the uses of loyalty cards, online shopping or assessments 
of internet usage as such. Quite astonishingly, quite a number of our interview partners had 
experienced data misuse, identity fraud or skimming attacks on their email accounts, credit 
cards or elsewhere. A main thread that runs through the accounts of misuse experiences is the 
aspect of complexity of the online world, i.e. a certain futility vis-a-vis the digital 
environment that has evolved into a fact of everyday life in many aspects – “actually, you 
can’t succeed in leaving no traces world wide. (….) (Interview ID 60). However, privacy 
management does also play a major role in many of the accounts we have gathered. Some 
respondents are very savvy and aware, mostly those identifying themselves as experts in the 
field, often persons that work in the IT sector – they take serious precautions to protect their 
data, knowing about the technologies, the procedures and their often incomprehensible nature 
as well as the dangers lurking behind them.  
 
“I don’t use them because I experienced a misuse with my data – identity theft – and I 
also protect my personal data. Windows shouldn’t be used because there are many 
security bugs. As an activist, I do have something to hide in my computer so I use a tool, 
a virtual machine, to surf the web. What I do on the Internet cannot be tracked and I use 
TOR. I always encrypt my emails and I’ve always encrypted all my communication. 
Cryptography is nothing strange, it is a forma mentis. 50% of my friends use encrypted 
emails and we also use other ways to communicate, for instance VoIP. We’re 
developing specific tools to communicate.”  
(Interview ID 19, 26 years, male, Italy) 
 
The following quote shows how the difficulties to fully understand how data protection 
works, what it actually implies and the futility of being able to protect oneself is rationalised. 
This quote is an example of a more general trend.  
 
“I recently got to know an expert on data protection, at a seminar at my company. But 
what she does exactly… I must confess, I don't know… haha. But when I see and hear, 
that even big companies are not capable of protecting their data properly, how should I 
do this as a small company or as a private person?“ 
(Interview ID 360, 69 years, female, Austria) 
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Being personally confronted with misuse of data or other forms of fraud and theft the 
interviewees reveal a high degree of competence in dealing with these issues, often personally 
or by involving police, data protection offices or consumer advocacy groups. The following 
account tells of an often surprisingly relaxed reaction to incidents of hacking, data theft or 
else.  
 
“I have been a victim of hacking, it happened twice. The first time it happened 7/8 years 
ago, I reported it to the Postal and Telecommunication Police, as I contacted the call 
centre of my account and they suggested I report it to the police. [...... ] Anyhow the 
police solved this situation within 3 weeks. Yesterday afternoon it happened again: 
Gmail asked me if I tried to access my account from China. I contacted the police to 
report an attempt of hacking. At the end the police just informed me that the provider 
cancelled my account and suggested I create a brand new account.“ 
(Interview ID 103, 28 years, male, Austria) 
 
In other cases, such as credit card theft and misuse of data, people seem to know where to 
call, what to do and where to do it and showed a high degree of trust in the system that helped 
them to rebuild their digital lives. The problem here is that the misuse of data is quite 
diversified and refers to a multitude of incidents – among them data theft, selling of data by 
companies to generate money, the use of existing data by intelligence services such as the 
NSA in their quest for terrorists, especially if it concerns presumably deleted data from old 
email, Myspace or Facebook accounts. Fraud and misuse seem to be perceived as inherent 
facts of life in the digital age as one „can’t succeed in leaving no traces world wide“ 
(Interview ID 60). Although the misuse of one‘s data implies being a victim of a crime, 
reactions differ from reactions within narratives that address crime prevention measures, most 
often relating to urban or public security. In contrast, within these cases calls for more police, 
stronger measures or prevention were articulated, whilst in the case of data misuse in general, 
the reactions displayed a form of resignation, due to misuse being ‘part of the deal’ of online 
(inter)action. This is not to say that respondents did not feel pain or loss accordingly, but the 
interviews suggest that this is dealt with on another level and more in line with other 
narratives on the digital and the role of data and privacy management. The following quote 
exemplifies this reaction or narrative:  
 
“I had a bad experience with one website that used a registration process as a valid 
contract agreement, and if you agreed with the terms, then they send you notice, with 
the invoice by post that you have to pay for visiting their site. It contained my address, 
but not my real name, they used the nickname I registered with on the site. I contacted 
the Slovak Trade Inspection, they recommended one consumers' association, and they, 
together with media solved the problem after a while. I paid nothing to the company. 
Around 2000 people had this problem.”  
(Interview ID 644, 26 years, male, Slovakia)  
 
The reference to the large number of victims of the same crime may be interpreted as an 
attempt to rationalise the ubiquity of such crimes or the potential dangers associated with the 
Internet and the digital more generally. There are a few other stories of victims’ experiences 
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that did not relate to data and could not be categorised accordingly. However, many others 
were different. Respondents who were a victim of crime that happened in public space (e.g. 
mugging, violent assault) for instance, often made comments about CCTV cameras. However, 
as they often did not help to prevent the crime, statements were rarely in favour of this 
technology as a preventive measure. It also seems that preventive measures against burglary, 
mugging or other more „public“ crimes are easier to install, such as martial arts, „good 
running shoes“, „a big lock“ (on the bike or door) than measures against Internet and data 
related crimes, hence the reactions towards the latter tends to portray more resignation than 
reactions towards the former. Overall a certain acceptance of these forms of non-violent 
crimes seems to be prevalent among our interviewees, which may also be interpreted as a 
form of resilience.  
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
 
As laid out at the beginning or this chapter, we wanted to explore the dilemma that exists with 
regards to electronic consumerism and online activity on the one side and issues of data 
protection on the other. We used interview data gathered in five countries to find common 
narratives of how this dilemma is addressed, expressed and rationalised within the everyday 
lives of our respondents. In examining this dilemma through different focal points – i.e. 
loyalty cards, online shopping, internet usage and victim experiences of online crime – we 
were able to identify a few overarching themes or narratives of how the assumed dilemma 
was rationalised and coped with in everyday life. These can be seen as prototypical reactions 
or coping strategies.  
 
● „What can I do?“ This is in essence what many interview partners responded when asked 
to assess their own engagement with the world of digital consumerism. They were aware 
of the data protection issues regarding the commercial realm, but were engaging with it 
anyway, not least because they assumed they had no other choice.  
● A less fatalistic approach came through in a reaction that can be termed „trade-off as a 
bearable nuisance“. The respondents were not happy about the abuse of their data, but 
accepted it as something they had to go along with, not least because it gave them 
amenities and provided for the conveniences of many aspects of their daily lives. 
● A rather more positive version of this previous reaction or assessment of the trade-off, 
emphasises the bargains, benefits and received goods that can be obtained in exchange for 
the personal data provided. Respondents speak of exchanges or actual deals. 
● Being a victim of online or Internet fraud – also referred to as cybercrime – is a 
reoccurring experience within all of these cases, especially the first one of „what can I do“. 
Compared with other security issues, such as personal assault, muggings or burglaries, 
these kinds of crimes are seen as less intrusive and frightening.  
● The respondents are well aware that digital consumerism is an integral part of everyday 
life, which has pitfalls, negative sides, but very often also provides new conveniences for 
which a certain amount of personal data may be traded. If not willingly then with an 
indifferent acceptance, or – rather rarely – with an effort to resist or better prepare for 
existing threats. A very important way of coping with these issues is what we refer to as 
the management of privacy, although this does not necessarily mean that the strategy is 
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effective. However, it shows that the problems as such are reflected and coping strategies 
are developed based on this reflection.  
● Yet another different way of coping can be found in arguments that stress the fact that 
“everybody does it”, i.e. justifying the action with reference to others who act in the same 
way.  
● And finally we have found various stories that refer to something we call security fatigue. 
This is often based on a lack of bad experiences concerning the abuse of ones’ data. The 
threat appears to be too abstract to be reckoned with on a daily basis, and indeed it seems 
tiresome to individuals to constantly pay attention to digital pitfalls.  
 
Throughout the interviews statements on privacy, data, the uses of data in everyday life, the 
personal encounters with data collection and the respective assessments were often embedded 
in a narrative of „managing“ data and privacy (thus hinting at a concept of „doing privacy“) in 
everyday life. This narrative of what could be termed „privacy management“ or “privacy 
labour” occurs in various contexts and to various degrees throughout many interviews, as do 
statements referring to data protection and privacy issues. As data and privacy issues become 
relevant in more mundane, everyday activities, the digital appears to be an inseparable part of 
everyday life. Accordingly, managing privacy and personal data implies the existence of 
routines and socio-cultural „scripts“ that are followed to cope with the many requirements and 
demands of a digital information society in everyday life. The pervasiveness of the Internet in 
all its forms is apparent and has long become a part of everyday life and practices - socially, 
culturally and economically. To frame this under the term surveillance may thus be 
misleading as many of those measures and strategies are not driven by a desire to control the 
citizen in the sense of an authoritarian state, but to make money – hence knowing and 
managing the customer is paramount here. But as much of these strategies appear in the 
everyday contexts of Europeans, the perceptions of these strategies and the attitudes towards 
the data collection behind them, may be framed differently than in terms of surveillance and 
control.  
Together these two developments irreversibly have put questions of data protection and 
online security back on the agenda of citizens, in contrast to previous years. As a result this 
has massively sharpened the dilemma that we have outlined here.  
 
Final reflections on modes of surveillance: private versus state 
This leads to yet another finding of our analysis, namely the focus on different modes of 
surveillance: private/corporate vs. state surveillance. The boundaries between the two are 
increasingly blurred: CCTV is situated in public as well as private spaces; it is likely that 
private companies possess increasingly detailed data than agencies of the state (with the 
exception of the NSA); and both private and state surveillance increasingly rely on algorithms 
to gather, process and analyse data.  
 
However, both areas are perceived differently and hence are subject to different discourses 
and debates: Surveillance is what the state does and it is labelled accordingly. Surveillance is 
perceived as an „assault“ on the „deviant“ citizen, as a threat to the individual and his 
freedom and rights. It is the person as such that is the aim of these kinds of surveillance 
„attacks“. The individual is defenceless and naked. The NSA and others are no longer old 
school spies eavesdropping from the neighbouring room or via miniature bugging devices, but 
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complex organisations that run high-end computer systems that look for keywords in data 
collections, constructing new relations based on temporal, social or other indicators. The 
relatively small protest against new surveillance infrastructures such as INDECT may be 
interpreted as a general lack of awareness of how these developments may impact on personal 
lives in general. Instead, as our interviews have shown, the „classical“ image of state 
surveillance prevails, an image, which is oriented on the person, aimed to infringe on personal 
freedoms in order to control and manage the person and his/her good conduct within society. 
To a much lesser extend this holds true for the perception of the corporation; in this case 
control and surveillance are framed as a trade-off, a deal or a bearable nuisance.  
Within this logic the literary model of George Orwell’s „1984“ is cited time and time again. 
Orwell portrayed this particular form of surveillance, in which concrete persons (Winston 
Smith, Julia) are controlled by others (O’Brian) or watched and later threatened, tortured, 
killed or forced to change behaviour by personalised entities (Big Brother). All of this is 
linked to a totalitarian state that neither protects people, nor gives them any kind of 
advantage. The individual is threatened.  
Corporate activities by companies such as Google and Amazon, from data collection to 
customer profiling, do not seem to be perceived in the same way. They are not identified as a 
mode of surveillance in the Orwellian sense. Responses refer to these activities as „data 
usage“ that are made by anonymous entities, not by persons, but through algorithms. These 
procedures do not represent an attack on the individuality or the freedom of choice – the 
biggest problem identified here lies in the fact that data can be sold, hence it is an attack on 
private property. However, corporate „data usage“ does provide advantages: Discounts, bonus 
points and special offers are welcome benefits, as long as the gathered data is not sold or 
otherwise redistributed.  This would devalue the trade that has been made by disclosing 
personal data in return for these advantages.  
 
Interestingly the discussion about private/corporate surveillance does not refer to a particular 
literary model (although Big Brother is evoked from time to time). Aldous Huxley’s „Brave 
New World“ would provide a very fitting model. However, Huxley’s work in which the brave 
new world is less a threat than a seduction through drugs and other offers of happiness, is not 
chosen as a reference. Rather, our interview partners try to take refuge in silence or 
suppression – „I don’t want to think about it, as it would make my life too complicated or 
impossible...“. The dependency on the digital world – particularly among young people – 
seems to be so all-encompassing, that possible limits to personal freedoms of choice or fears 
on how their own behaviour is managed by the digital actors, are rendered insignificant.  
It is interesting to note that private/corporate surveillance on the one hand and state 
surveillance on the other are perceived so differently – despite the fact that they increasingly 
come to resemble each other in terms of technology. It seems that potential threats are 
rationalized differently. While state surveillance is a political threat aimed at the person 
(freedom of speech, freedom of choice, censorship etc.), private/corporate data usage is a 
problem of personal/private property and its management. The latter is situated within the 
world of consumption and linked to possible monetary benefits or gains. Against this 
background we identified different ideas of „resilience“ among our interview partners. In the 
case of political surveillance, resilience is associated primarily with political protest and 
resistance (although not necessarily active resistance). With regards to private/corporate 
surveillance, resilience takes the form of ignorance or indifference.  
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It is debatable whether such a reading of resilience is sensible or even acceptable. It may well 
be that the digitisation has also produced a new normality that forces the revision of classical 
concepts of subjectivity, privacy and freedom of choice.  
 
Indeed, our interview partners’ responses indicate a structural change within the security 
discourse itself. This discourse, which has previously been characterised by an idea of steady 
security accumulation, i.e. that the level of security may be raised through particular activities 
or investments, it now becomes clear that there is no such thing as “total” security. In the 
discourse on the use of nuclear power for instance this perspective has been introduced with 
the recognition of "residual risks". Although no one speaks of residual risks in a digital world, 
we can identify aspects of such a diffuse uncertainty therein. When it is too complicated to 
implement current security options, and even professional companies are not able to make 
their own systems secure, it is of no surprise that lay persons develop a "security fatigue". 
Against this background, 'resilience', (understood here as a form of resistance against multiple 
threats) seems to be realized neither by the rejection of monitoring practices, nor a continuous 
enhancement of security (at least when concerning private/corporate surveillance). Instead we 
can observe a certain indifference and "security fatigue". If one is too concerned with possible 
threats beyond agreed minimum standards, it seems almost impossible to move freely and 
carefree in the digital world. In addition to the aspect of resistance, resilience also implies the 
capability to move or exist in a “hostile” environment that is not characterized by a 
continuous progress in security, but rather by permanent uncertainty. Such uncertainty has to 
be bypassed. Under such conditions surveillance measures of various kinds are either 
accepted helplessly or reinterpreted as rather unproblematic “measures of data usage”. 
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3 2ND DILEMMA: PRIVACY AND SECURITY  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: SECURITY TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SECURITY  
Reinhard Kreissl 
 
Security at the level of citizens is primarily discussed as perceived security. Over the last 
decades the concept of perceived security or subjective security has attracted attention in 
academic and policy discourse. There are a number of reasons for this replacement of security 
with perceived security. First of all the figures of registered crime, crime being the dominant 
source of insecurity for a long time, are not representative of the development of criminal 
behaviour. They primarily reflect activities of law enforcement agencies, i.e. more police 
creates more (registered) crime, more reports of incidents by citizens to the police lead to 
higher crime figures. Secondly, as criminological research on victimization and fear of crime 
has demonstrated, levels of perceived insecurity do not mirror objective victimisation risk: 
persons with statistically low probability of victimization often display high levels of fear or 
insecurity and vice versa. As fear of crime studies have repeatedly demonstrated, levels of 
fear of crime reflect other, broader existential insecurities.84 Law enforcement agencies thus 
have begun to focus on feelings of insecurity as public sentiment, while at the time 
acknowledging the limitations of combatting or reducing crime in the literal sense. 
 
Security technology in the broadest understanding of the term introduces a new element in the 
ecology and dynamics of (in)-security. Under conditions of relatively high levels of perceived 
insecurity, technology can help to ease these feelings. Asking citizens which measures they 
would prefer to increase security, many surveys produce similar results: technological 
security measures and increasing surveillance both score high on the list of preferred 
measures. Installing CCTV in public places is perceived as an effective security measure. 
Increasing checks, controls, and scanners at airport gates is also seen as having a positive 
effect on security. But at the same time, the manifold forms of flagging insecurity by 
introducing visible security technology can foster a feeling of insecurity. So the evidence is 
mixed. It is hard to determine whether security technology has an overall positive effect on 
perceived (in)-security of citizens. This is due to the paradoxical nature of feelings of security. 
Security as a subjective mental state is predominantly a by-product, i.e. a person feels secure, 
when s/he is not reflecting on his/her security. As soon as s/he starts to think consciously 
about how secure s/he feels in a given situation a cognitive frame is activated, scanning 
his/her environment and inner state along the dimension of security/insecurity. This 
paradoxical constellation is similar to the well-known communication paradoxes, e.g. when a 
person is addressed with a message like: “Be spontaneous!” Being or acting spontaneously 
cannot be achieved by will or as a reaction to a request. The same holds for security. 
While on the one hand the desire for more and better security technology is fuelled by 
feelings of insecurity or growing fears of security threats, every new technological add-on 
creates new insecurities. This is a dynamic of addiction: increasing security measures fosters 
                                               
84 Comp.e.g. Ditton, Jason and Stephen Farrall, The Fear of Crime, Ashgate/Dartmouth,2000. 
Lewis, Dan and Greta W. Salem, Fear of Crime: Incivility and the Production of a Social Problem. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1986. 
Vanderveen, Gabry, Interpreting Fear, Crime, Risk, and Unsafety: Conceptualisation and Measurement. Boom Juridische 
Uitgevers 2006. 
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insecurity which then in turn triggers the demand for more security measures. Breaking this 
vicious cycle of security technology and technological security is difficult – like with all 
addictive behaviour. 
 
What supports the demand for security technology is an approach that outspoken critics like 
Morozov have termed “technological solutionism” or “techno-fix”85. This approach takes on 
different forms. One version is based on the assumption that security problems can be 
successfully addressed, when they are identified at an early stage. The best way to identify 
such emerging problems is to keep the environment under constant surveillance in order to 
detect warning signs or potential predators before any damage materializes. Another variety 
of solutionism operates with the idea of target hardening: A potential object of an attack is 
equipped with technological fences and locks, controlling the access. The prototype for this 
variety would be the gated community, as a space, where residents take all measures to keep 
potential security threats (spelt out as non-resident criminals) out. 
 
The different varieties of technological solutionism also create an added value in a political 
context. Security issues can be translated into problems of accountability. Whenever a 
security problem is identified and accepted as such the question emerges, who has to take 
remedial action to prevent future damage and what kind of action would be appropriate for 
the given problem. To address a publicly accepted security problem a responsible political 
actor has to take appropriate measures to react to the emerging threats. Since many issues on 
the political agenda can be redefined as security problems, a process, which has been defined 
as “securitization”, policy actors feel the need to react. One of the most convenient options in 
such a situation is the implementation of surveillance and security technology. Working 
within the mind-set of solutionism, technology always entails the promise of remedy. From a 
political perspective it is the promise that counts. Whether a new technology or surveillance 
measure will live up to the promises of the suppliers’ marketing brochures is often hard to 
determine.  
 
With security as one of the political and cultural main frames, individual citizens are also 
addressed to take precautions in their daily lives and environment. Being a prudent citizen is 
perceived as a key challenge in present day societies. Taking precautions, constantly 
screening the world for risks in order to prevent future damages is part and parcel of 
laypersons’ reasoning. This preventative turn in many fields of everyday life86 (from health to 
crime) is reinforced by a number of governance strategies implemented by public authorities 
and private enterprises alike. The premium for health insurance may be lower for those 
individuals, who can demonstrate a healthy life style and regularly take health checks. Police 
can advise citizens to be on the alert, communicating local threat assessments to the public 
(“Beware of burglars!”). Technology is an important element in this context as well. Installing 
private video cameras or burglar alarms on one’s premises is perceived as a meaningful way 
to protect life and limb. Monitoring the performance of your physiological system is 
perceived as a form for self-enhancing biofeedback. Again technology here holds a promise to 
                                               
85 Morozov, Evgeny, To save everything, click here. The folly of technological solutionism, Public Affairs, New York, 2013. 
86 Luhmann, Niklas, Risiko und Gefahr, In. Soziologische Aufklärung, 5, 2 Auflage, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993, 
pp. 131 -169. 
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increase security (or hardening the target of one’s body). It is understood as a tool, helping to 
keep the forces of evil out through early detection, deterrence or prevention.  
 
This understanding of technology as a tool to be used like a wrench or a screwdriver ignores 
the pervasive nature of technology-use, the effects technology has on human lives and the 
incorporation of cultural and social structures in the materiality of technologies.87 It creates 
many futile controversies about (benevolent) use and (malevolent) misuse of technologies 
ignoring the “autonomy” of all technology.  
Such issues are addressed in Science and Technology Studies (STS) or Actor Network Theory 
(ANT), although both of these approaches do not address security problems as their main 
topics of interest. But the conceptual ideas from both of these approaches can be applied to 
the analysis of security as an element of citizens’ everyday life. 
 
Technology makes objects visible (let’s them appear), enables remote and onsite social 
sorting, extends the range of perception and communication, injects the idea of objective 
knowledge in the debates about security, threats and vulnerabilities. While in surveillance and 
critical legal security studies, technology is seen as a means to widen and deepen the panoptic 
gaze or as a force to be tamed by proper constraining legal measures, a number of questions 
are ignored with regard to the role of security technology and the working of technological 
security. The autonomy of technological systems can be studied nicely in areas like high 
frequency algorithmic trading in the financial system or in the effects of automatic web-tools, 
creating more traffic on the Internet than human users do.88 Technology simply by its use 
changes the world in many different ways. And it also changes the life-world of the ordinary 
citizen in a myriad of ways, some of them related to security, surveillance and fear. 
 
Investigating these effects with a focus on security and surveillance is the key objective of 
this chapter. While from the surveillance studies experts’ perspective, the massive 
surveillance potential of technological systems is the dominant focus, there are other “effects” 
of technology that have to be considered. Surveillance technologies permeating everyday life 
can have subtle and remote effects beyond the intended societal domains. Making these 
effects visible is one of the main objectives of this chapter. 
 
 
3.2 CCTV IN EUROPE 
Chiara Fonio 
 
In the last few decades, the diffusion of CCTV both in public and private spaces in Europe 
has grown gradually but systematically. Despite this proliferation, the use and the regulation 
of surveillance cameras vary widely across the continent; one might argue that CCTV is now 
a routine feature of security in modern European cities. Notwithstanding significant national 
differences, if compared with other surveillance techniques like dataveillance, CCTV is one 
of the “oldest” and most studied security tools within the cross-disciplinary field of 
                                               
87 Woolgar, Steve, and Neyland, Daniel, Mundane Governance. Ontology and Accountability. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 
2014. 
88 Madrigal. Alexis, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/welcome-to-the-internet-of-thingies-615-of-
web-traffic-is-not-human/282309/ 
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“surveillance studies”89. CCTV epitomizes the archetype of contemporary surveillance90 and 
not only is the literature rich, but it has drawn attention to a myriad of complex socio-
economic and cultural dimensions which seem to constitute the framework of the far-reaching 
rise of CCTV cameras. As Norris puts it, “when we are trying to understand the rise of CCTV 
as a global phenomenon we should not only see it as a technology but a discursive object. A 
discursive object waiting to be deployed in public debate as a response to the latest perceived 
crisis […]”91.  
The development and the use of CCTV in Europe from a comparative perspective, has been 
documented by empirical studies such as the UrbanEye Project92.  This research was carried 
out from 2001 to 2004 involving seven countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Hungary, Norway and Spain. As an in-depth analysis of the UrbanEye data goes 
beyond the aim of this short introduction, it will suffice to look at common trends and 
differences93.  The data suggest that there is a significant difference between the diffusion of 
surveillance cameras in the United Kingdom and other countries involved in the project. The 
diffusion or the technological sophistication in public and semi-public spaces is most 
advanced in the UK (40%) and least developed in Austria94. The numbers demonstrate the 
wide variety between countries: “while it was estimated that around 40,000 cameras monitor 
public areas in more than 500 cities in Britain, less than 100 cameras monitor public areas in 
around 15 German cities, and no open street CCTV system is in operation in Denmark”95.  
When asked for their attitudes towards CCTV, the majority of respondents in all five capital 
cities (in Austria, Germany, the UK, Hungary and Norway) seemed supportive of surveillance 
cameras “with Britons being most supportive and Austrian and Germans being rather 
sceptical”96. The data also show that the locations of cameras play a relevant role in terms of 
acceptance:  while CCTV at banks or at subway platforms is not questioned, the use of 
cameras in changing and/or fittings rooms in sport centres and shops is considered much more 
problematic97. It is also worth noting that two thirds of respondents agreed with the statement 
“nothing to hide, nothing to fear” but more than half thought that the footage could easily be 
misused98.   
 
The UrbanEye project remains the only comparative European study focused on surveillance 
cameras. However, there is a considerable amount of literature, which documents camera 
                                               
89 Lyon, D., Surveillance Studies: An Overview, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997.  
90  Doyle, Aaron, Randy Lippert and David Lyon (eds.), Eyes Everywhere. The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance, 
Routledge, New York, 2012.  
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94 Hempel, Leon, and Eric Toepfer, CCTV in Europe. Final report, Working Paper No.15, Centre for Technology and 
Society, 2004, p.5 http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf  
95 ibidem. It is worth noticing that the situation in the above-mentioned countries is probably quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from the picture that emerged in the UrbanEye project. For instance, in 2012 in Denmark 2,200 cameras were 
mapped  http://www.journalism.co.uk/news/data-journalism-crowdmapping-denmark-s-cctv-cameras/s2/a550761/ Accessed 
on 01/07/2014. 
96 Hempel, Leon, and Eric Toepfer, CCTV in Europe. Final report, Working Paper No.15, Centre for Technology and 
Society, 2004, p.42 http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf 
97 ibi: pp. 43-44-45 
98 ibi: p. 45 
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growth, CCTV regulation and the potential impact of cameras99.  More often than not, there is 
a distinction in the literature between the development of CCTV in the UK and elsewhere. In 
contrast to the rest of Europe, in the UK substantial government investment in crime 
reduction schemes have promoted an unparalleled diffusion in the public space. Norris argues 
that “it is not unreasonable to estimate that between 1995 and 2005 over £500 million of 
central and local government funds was allocated to CCTV”100. This has also led to a 
proliferation of studies within the British national context which have revolved around lines 
of, inter alia, asymmetries of power between the watchers and watched101, the evaluation and 
the regulation of CCTV102, the rationale behind the policy of CCTV cameras103, etc.   
 
Despite the growth of surveillance cameras in other European countries being more 
“silent”104, CCTV is now ubiquitous, especially in urban contexts. The emergent picture is an 
increasing “normalization” of (video) surveillance technologies, meaning not only an 
increasing number of cameras but also “how these are embedded in the norms and institutions 
of society and how they are reflective of other aspects of modern society”105.  Living under 
the gaze of CCTV is, especially after Islamic terrorism hit European soil, normal even in 
countries where the shadows of an authoritarian past  are still present106.  
 
For the purpose of this chapter, we will limit the discussion to the countries involved in this 
part of the IRISS project, namely Austria, Germany, Slovakia, Italy and the UK.  
 
The UrbanEye report on Austria107 has drawn attention to the use of video surveillance in 
traffic management, public transport and to specific areas of the capital where CCTV is in 
place to protect government buildings. It seems that, due to low crime rates, the number of 
open-street cameras or the public debates are limited. In 2014 only 18 “hot spots”, defined as 
areas with high crimes rates, are monitored by the police through CCTV. One would not find 
                                               
99 Inter alia, the special issues published in Surveillance & Society: “The Politics of CCTV in Europe and Beyond” Vol. 2, 
No 2/3 2004: http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/issue/view/CCTV; “Revisiting Video 
Surveillance” Vol 6, No 1 (2009):  
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/issue/view/Relaunch. And more recently the issues published 
in Information Polity: “Revisiting the surveillance camera revolution: issues of governance and public policy” Vol. 16, no 4 
2011: http://iospress.metapress.com/content/h03500355222 ; “Revisiting the surveillance camera revolution: issues of 
governance and public policy”, Vol. 17, No 1, 2012: http://iospress.metapress.com/content/r161232517m7  
100 Norris, Clive, “There’s no Success like Failure and Failure’s no Success at all: Some critical reflections on understanding 
the global growth of CCTV surveillance” in Doyle, Aaron, Randy Lippert and David Lyon (eds.), Eyes Everywhere. The 
Global Growth of Camera Surveillance, Routledge, New York, 2012, pp. 23-45. 
101 Most notably, the seminal work of Norris, Clive, and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of 
CCTV, Berg, Oxford, 1999 and MacCahill, Michael, The Surveillance Web: the rise of Visual Surveillance in an English 
City, Willan, Collumpton, 2002. 
102 Inter alia: Webster, W., “The Diffusion, Regulation and Governance of Closed-Circuit Television in the UK”, 
Surveillance & Society, Vol.2 (2/3), pp. pp. 230-250. http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-
society/article/view/3376/3339  
103 Inter alia: Webster, W., “CCTV Policy in the UK: Reconsidering the Evidence Base” Surveillance & Society, Vol. 6, No 
1(2009) pp. 10-22 
 http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3400/3363  
104 Fonio, C., “The silent growth of video surveillance in Italy”, Information Polity, Vol. 16, No 2/2011 pp. 379-388: 
http://iospress.metapress.com/content/d187624350281110/  
105 Murakami Wood, David and William Webster, “Living in Surveillance Societies: the Normalisation of Surveillance in 
Europe and the Threat of Britain’s Example”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol.5, No 2 (2009) pp. 259-273 
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/159/144  
106 See, for instance, the implementation of video surveillance in Portugal: Frois, Catarina., Peripheral Vision. Politics, 
Technology and Surveillance, Berghahn Book, Oxford, 2013. 
107 Ney, Steven and Kurt Pichler, Video surveillance in Austria, Working Paper No. 7, Interdisciplinary Centre for 
Comparative Research in the Social Sciences, 2002, http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp7.pdf  
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larger parts of cities under CCTV surveillance, as is common in British cities. Of course 
public private spheres such as shopping malls are monitored more frequently but a CCTV 
camera in public space remains rather uncommon phenomena According to a survey 
conducted in 1999, 84% of Austrian citizens are in favour of video surveillance only if it is 
used to fight violent and serious crime. Additionally, more than half do not think that “new 
tracing methods” are invasive of their privacy. However, while Google’s Street View is not 
CCTV as such, the fact that it was banned in Austria is indicative of a certain level of public 
awareness as far as surveillance and privacy are concerned.  
 
In Germany the use of CCTV in public spaces is neither “new”108 nor overlooked in the 
public debate109. The UrbanEye project documented the “inescapability” from the gaze of 
surveillance cameras in the city of Berlin. However, in contrast to other European countries, 
in Germany the freedom to reveal or hide personal data made the use of CCTV highly 
controversial110.  In 2013 many cameras were trashed in Berlin “to protest against the rise in 
close-circuit television across Germany”111 Despite differences in purpose and sophistication, 
surveillance cameras have rapidly expanded in Germany. Toepfer argues that since 2004, 
Germany has doubled the number of cities where CCTV is operating, from 15 to 30112.  
 
In Italy, the literature on video surveillance is very limited. While there are no assessments at 
a national level pertaining to the effectiveness of CCTV in preventing crime and/or public 
attitudes towards surveillance cameras, emerging trends are not dissimilar to the rest of 
Europe. The increasing number of cameras in Italian cities did not go unnoticed and the DPA 
issued the first “guidelines” in 2000 due to the steady growth of video surveillance both in 
public and private spaces. Moreover, the only qualitative research113, carried out in the city of 
Milan, confirms findings that also emerged elsewhere114, namely categorical suspicion and 
the exclusionary features of this tool. However, due to the lack of empirical data it is difficult 
to infer overall tendencies. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the decentralization of security 
policies has impacted on the implementation of CCTV at a national level.  
 
Data on the use of surveillance cameras in Slovakia are almost non-existent, except for 
concerns raised by Privacy International, which highlighted that, in 2007 and 2008, many 
CCTV systems in Bratislava and in other municipalities were in breach of privacy115.  There 
is no public debate and the media seem to report on new implementations of surveillance 
                                               
108 Kammerer, D., “Police use of  public video surveillance in Germany from 1956: management of traffic, repression of 
flows, persuasion of offenders”, Surveillance & Society, Vol.6 No.1, 2009, pp. 43-47, 
http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3403/3366  
109 See, for instance: http://www.dw.de/germany-debates-surveillance-cameras-after-boston/a-16760452  
110 Hempel, Leon and Eric Toepfer, CCTV in Europe. Final report, Working Paper No.15, Centre for Technology and 
Society, 2004, p.62 http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf 
111 Stallwood, O., “Game to destroy CCTV cameras: vandalism or valid protest?” , The Guardian, 25/01/2013 
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/shortcuts/2013/jan/25/game-destroy-cctv-cameras-berlin Accessed on 22/04/14. 
112 In Norris, C., A review of the increased use of CCTV and video-surveillance for crime prevention purposes in Europe” 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, April 2009, p.10 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/apr/ep-study-norris-cctv-
video-surveillance.pdf  
113 Fonio, C., “The silent growth of video surveillance in Italy”, Information Polity,Vol 16, No 2/2011 pp. 379-388: 
http://iospress.metapress.com/content/d187624350281110/ 
114 Inter alia: Norris, Clive, and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV,  Berg, Oxford, 
1999; Mork Lommel, Heidi., “Targeting the Unwanted: Video Surveillance and Categorical Exclusion in Oslo, Norway” 
Surveillance & Society, vol. 2 (2/3), 2004 pp. 346-360 http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles2(2)/unwanted.pdf  
115 https://www.privacyinternational.org/reports/slovakia/ii-surveillance-policies#footnote18_8o5n4kx. Accessed on 
22/05/2014. 
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technologies (it is estimated that that in the old centre of Bratislava there are 187 publicly and 
privately-owned surveillance cameras116) without disputing the actual need for them117.  
 
As mentioned above, there is a significant amount of research and a number of theories, 
which have attempted to explain CCTV intensification in the United Kingdom. In the late 
90s, 86% of local authorities had installed CCTV systems in public places and, as argued by 
Webster, “CCTV had become a core element of law and order policy, for both government 
and opposition parties, and politicians have been keen to promote the virtues of 
technologies”118.  In 2013, the British Security Industry Authority estimated that there are up 
to 5.9 million CCTV cameras in England, 750,000 of which are in “sensitive” locations like 
schools, hospitals and care homes119.  In particular, a report released by Big Brother Watch in 
2012, drew attention to the sheer amount of CCTV used in secondary schools and academies 
in the United Kingdom where the total number of cameras used by 2,107 schools is 47,806120. 
A comprehensive summary of what has emerged from the rich scholarly literature on the UK 
cannot be given here, however, drawing on Norris121, there are a few aspects which are worth 
considering: a) evaluations on the effectiveness of CCTV have been contradictory; b) a 
British Home Office evaluation in 2005 reported that CCTV does not reduce fear of crime; c) 
the use of CCTV footage in investigations is far from certain and d) CCTV could have social 
implications (i.e. the exclusion of already marginalized minorities).   
 
Having this complex framework in mind, we now turn to analysing narratives around CCTV, 
drawing on quotes from the interviews. The analysis is articulated around topics and 
hypotheses, which arose from the interviews. 
 
3.2.1 General opinions on CCTV 
 
As stated in the introduction, the use of surveillance cameras is nothing new in Europe. One 
might argue that European citizens are familiar with CCTV and that the use of surveillance 
cameras is now taken for granted. Not only are citizens familiar with this surveillance tool 
but, as documented by the research analysed in previous pages, large parts of society are 
supportive of CCTV. Living under the gaze of the cameras, in cities and in small 
municipalities alike, can be considered as an embedded feature of today’s surveillance 
societies. Therefore, we expected to deal more with the “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” 
argument than with people who seem to question the normalization or the effectiveness of the 
cameras. The standard explanation given by citizens for thinking positively about CCTV in 
various contexts was, that they had nothing to hide and therefore nothing to fear. Asked about 
                                               
116 Source: Accessed on 22/04/2014. 
117 Durinanova, M., “Cameras cut down on Bratislava city crime”, The Slovak Spectator, 
http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/22527/3/ Accessed on 22/05/14. 
118 Webster, W., “ The Diffusion, Regulation and Governance of Closed-Circuit Television in the UK”, Surveillance & 
Society, Vol.2 (2/3), p.237 http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3376/3339  
119 Barret, D., “One surveillance camera for every 11 people in Britain, says CCTV survey”, 10/07/13,The Telegraph, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/10172298/One-surveillance-camera-for-every-11-people-in-Britain-says-CCTV-
survey.html Accessed on 01/07/14 
120 A Big Brother Watch report, Class of 1984. The extent of CCTV in secondary schools and academy, 2012, 
http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/files/school_cctv.pdf  
121 Norris, Clive, “There’s no Success like Failure and Failure’s no Success at all: Some critical reflections on understanding 
the global growth of CCTV surveillance” in Doyle, Aaron, Randy Lippert and David Lyon (eds.), Eyes Everywhere. The 
Global Growth of Camera Surveillance, Routledge, New York, 2012, pp. 23-45. 
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the CCTV cameras at the local airport for example, many citizens explained to us that if 
CCTV helps to prevent future terrorist attacks it is a good tool for law enforcement in their 
views. Depending on the location of CCTV a general attitude that could be found in the 
material was that CCTV is a profound measure to prevent crime. In other words, we expected 
that the proliferation of CCTV has to some extent and with significant national variations, 
“settled” both in the psychological and in the urban landscape. However, this is certainly not 
true for all respondents and stories collected for this report. While CCTV is ubiquitous, issues 
of proportionality, effectiveness, regulation and privacy were raised by a number of 
interviewees. The steady proliferation of surveillance cameras does not make them more 
acceptable. Additionally, concerns on the overall approach to security seem to be significant 
to the respondents. 
The following quote, for instance, epitomizes criticism towards the use of CCTV for security 
purposes:  
  
“Well how should I put it? It’s the wrong way to solve a real problem. That there is 
vandalism and that people get robbed, those problems exist. But you can’t solve them 
with video surveillance. At BEST you can solve the crime and not even this works 
every time and it also delivers a wrong feeling of safety that there is someone who is 
watching. This leads to people not being cautious themselves anymore” 
(Interview ID 794, 36 years, male, Austria) 
 
When prompted about his general views on video surveillance, this respondent answers that 
CCTV is not effective in dealing with “real” security problems. Moreover, he emphasizes the 
risks of delegating personal safety to someone else. This points also to the role of technology, 
which, instead of being a socio-technical tool used for security reasons, has gradually 
colonised the social to the point that people are not “cautious” anymore. He does not deny the 
fact that there are security problems but instead he seems to question the way in which 
problems are dealt with. It becomes clear that the narrative revolves around issues of 
effectiveness and also of false feelings of security. Even though the interviewee does not 
develop his argument further, his opinions are straightforward: relying on CCTV does not 
always work and it also conveys distorted sensations. This quote shows that the overall 
approach to either security or safety, embodied by cameras, is criticised.  
 
Other respondents also addressed issues of asymmetries of power along with general concerns 
for the normalization of surveillance among the general public: 
 
“I accept the use of CCTV systems per se, but I do not trust the way the footage is 
managed and what it is used for: who’s watching whom? People are getting used to 
video surveillance, when it was something new, people immediately criticized this 
technological tool and they were confused by CCTV, but now nobody bothers about 
CCTV anymore and they do not look at the video-cameras anymore. This is a system 
that functions for those who have the power, as a control instrument, which, although 
at the beginning it was not accepted, because nobody removed CCTV systems, 
everybody passively got used to it and the citizen has no power to contrast this 
situation” 
(Interview ID 574, 48 years, male, Italy) 
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In this case, the interviewee is not against the surveillance tool as such but nonetheless 
expresses his concerns in relation to: a) the ways in which CCTV is used, b) the passive 
acceptance of CCTV by citizens, c) the issue of power, and d) the impossibility to resist the 
increasing use of video surveillance. Moreover, the respondent frames the argument along 
lines of trust by questioning who the watchers and the watched are and why CCTV is used. 
This account is of particular interest as it points to several dimensions; one of them being 
criticism against the alleged normalization of CCTV. In his view there has been a shift: from 
criticism of video surveillance to acceptance. This citizen seems concerned about the 
normalization of video surveillance without being “against” it. It is worth noting that 
surveillance cameras are directly related to issues of control and power. If, on the one hand, 
the watchers have power over the watched, on the other the watched – being increasingly 
accustomed to the use of surveillance – are now disempowered. To him, disempowerment 
goes hand in hand with acceptance. Resistance is not even an option or, at least, it is not an 
option anymore. Additionally, the issue of trust between citizens and the watchers is raised. 
 
There are several statements on CCTV footage. Interestingly enough, questions on video 
surveillance footage were not asked directly but, as we also examine in paragraph 5.2.3, this 
is obviously an important topic to the citizens we interviewed. In fact, this issue was 
addressed by interviewees answering general questions on cameras.  
 
“In general, I can agree with the use of CCTV cameras if the data show that it helps 
bring down crime. I think that the request for the use of these devices from the law 
enforcement side is relevant. However, I’m not sure about the way the use of records 
is regulated. I can see some possible negative consequences, breach of human rights. 
So I can see some potential danger, because we have recently seen what was going on 
in the USA with surveillance. So it has to be strictly regulated”  
(Interview ID 739, 26 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
This respondent is not opposed to the use of CCTV but he argues that the effectiveness of the 
tool has to be corroborated by figures on crime rates and that it has to be rigorously regulated. 
In particular, the regulation of CCTV pertaining to the use of footage is considered as a 
safeguard against potential misuses. He also stresses that the demand for more CCTV comes 
from police forces and that, in light of recent global surveillance disclosures, the dangers of 
surveillance have to be taken into account. Once again, like many others, this respondent does 
not blindly support the use of cameras but rather articulates a discourse in which 
effectiveness, regulation and the social impact of CCTV are considered. 
 
The majority of the respondents focusing on general ideas about CCTV are far from being 
generic. Although descriptive accounts are rare, one might argue that the layperson is not 
naïve: the mere fact that cameras are widely used does not make them acceptable. Hence, a 
routine feature of everyday life is – more often than not – assessed in terms of effectiveness 
and regulation.  
 
In order to grasp how people deal with the gaze of the cameras, we now shift from general 
opinions to real-life experiences as far as the “watchers” are concerned. 
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3.2.2 The watchers and the watched: dealing with CCTV and the feeling of being 
watched  
 
Discourses on the feeling of being watched, namely the subjective dimension – as opposed to 
the objective dimension which pertains to more abstract ideas on CCTV from a security 
perspective (see paragraph 3.2.3) – shed light on if, and to what extent, CCTV affects 
behaviour. This is of particular relevance as research on this topic is almost non-existent. 
Some guiding questions constitute the analytical framework of this section. Specifically, we 
look at the strategies used – if any – to deal with CCTV: do citizens try to avoid the gaze of 
cameras or do they accept it? What do they think the watchers are looking at? The underlying 
assumption is that if CCTV is not just taken for granted but instead, as described in paragraph 
3.2.1, it is often questioned, it might also be that people are uncomfortable if they are 
constantly being “watched over”.  
 
The following quote typifies the complexity of feelings of the “watched”: 
 
“I think when it is at the places where there is a need for it, it’s OK, in banks, or 
shops. My parents’ house was burgled a while ago and my parents are seriously 
considering some CCTV, so far we have only a fake camera with a red light, I guess 
better than nothing. In shops, I had an experience recently, I found a nice pair of 
trousers, but it was the last pair and I needed to get cash from the ATM, so I tried to 
hide them behind other clothes. I was very scared about CCTV and looked all around 
if somebody is watching me. Also, in Tesco, when I try to test a new antiperspirant and 
there is a sign that says it is forbidden, I try to avoid cameras and try it nevertheless. 
But it is more about customer service in Slovakia, if I try on a new pair of shoes, they 
are usually tied together, so once again, in order to try them properly, I have to untie 
the knot that holds them together, all that while being conscious about CCTV”  
(Interview ID 622, 23 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
In this case, the interviewee shows both acceptance towards CCTV and uneasiness of being 
watched in semi-public spaces while shopping. Despite the fact that, in her view, shops are 
places where surveillance cameras should be used, the impact on behaviour is clearly stated. 
The terminology used in this context seems noteworthy, as this woman is “scared” of CCTV 
and deliberately tries “to avoid” the gaze of the cameras. Therefore, the experience of 
consciously being watched by CCTV renders shopping potentially stressful. Strategies to 
cope with CCTV range from checking to see if there is CCTV before doing something, to 
avoiding video surveillance. Being aware of CCTV does not prevent this person from 
shopping, but rather triggers what can be interpreted as a resilience strategy, namely coping 
with surveillance through avoidance. This account suggests that acceptance does not imply a 
lack of awareness and/or insignificant impact either on feelings or on behavioural patterns. 
While it is true that visibility in the form of surveillance is an unavoidable aspect of today’s 
social world, it also holds true that people do not simply comply with the fact of constantly 
being visible, not even when surveillance is considered legitimate. When people cannot 
“negotiate” visibility dialectically, they seek to evade it. For a number of our respondents, 
being under surveillance means being “bothered” by the sheer fact of being watched, “spied 
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upon” or “stalked” and questions on whom the watchers are, are raised. Some respondents 
query who –and for what purposes – is watching and argue that they are not at ease with 
CCTV. Others significantly change their behaviour as they avoid streets with cameras or are 
much more cautious about things that they do in front of cameras. 
 
“Lately I went to an area where there are many surveillance cameras. I was bothered 
by the cameras, I felt spied on but I didn’t know by whom. I was with other people and 
we were all annoyed by CCTV. When I feel bothered by the cameras in the public 
space I tend to go where there are no cameras”   
(Interview ID 41, 27 years, female, Italy) 
 
Once again, the terminology is a key element. Not only does CCTV annoy the respondent, but 
she feels that someone is watching her and is sceptical about this fact. Not knowing the 
identity of the watcher causes tensions and the only way to reduce it is going to a space free 
from surveillance. Thus, resilience options here relate to avoiding surveillance altogether. As 
opposed to private or semi-public spaces where avoiding entails “hiding” from the gaze, in 
the public realm citizens have more opportunities as they look for less-controlled 
environments.  
 
However, the picture is too complex to be put in terms of acceptance/compliance versus non-
acceptance/resilience or resistance. The following quote highlights further aspects. 
 
“It’s all over the place, isn’t it?  Yes, it’s everywhere. … I certainly know that there 
are some in the [shopping] centre, because I go through there all the time, and I know 
there is CCTV in there.  I imagine it’s all over the city centre, and at road junctions, 
road corners.  It may not be very obtrusive, but it’s there, and it’s in buses. … I’m 
trying to think.  I try and ignore them, actually, and walk along with my head down, 
but I think there are certainly some near John Lewis” 
(Interview ID 888, 70 years, female, UK) 
 
This account is not as “strong” as the first two as this woman is not scared of CCTV. Video 
surveillance is not intruding and yet, while trying to disregard CCTV, she does not want to 
raise attention and walks with her head down. The level of awareness is high, as the 
interviewee knows where CCTV is located. This shows a more subtle impact of surveillance, 
which may be related to the culture of suspicion generated by the very presence of the 
cameras. The discourse articulates the inevitability of surveillance (not obtrusive but it’s 
everywhere) and the impact on the act of walking. The respondent is not against the use of 
surveillance cameras but the constant “regimes of visibility”122 bear consequences on 
everyday life. Other responses refer to “behaving normally” under the gaze of cameras. The 
disciplinary power of CCTV, thus, seems to produce “docile bodies”123 and ultimately leads 
to conformity. People try to behave “normally” or “not suspiciously” and this too, we would 
suggest, is an important aspect of dealing with CCTV from the watched perspective.  
 
                                               
122 Brigenti, Andrea  Mubi., Visibility in Social Theory and Social Research, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
123 Foucault, Michel., Discipline and Punish:  The birth of the Prison, Allen Lane, London, 1977. 
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At the opposite ends of the spectrum, there are also a few respondents who do not mind the 
cameras and do not feel restricted in their movements or in their actions, but the “nothing to 
hide, nothing to fear” argument is rarely formulated. These narratives convey a sense of 
“surrender” to the situation, especially in the public realm but they relate also to security. The 
“nothing to hide, nothing to fear” argument emerges when CCTV is linked to security and/or 
to the inevitability of surveillance cameras in order to deter crime in public and semi-public 
spaces. Positive attitudes towards CCTV often reveal trust in technology and in law-
enforcement. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, optimistic views or lack of concerns for 
privacy are seldom, when compared to more cautious opinions.  
 
3.2.3 CCTV and crime prevention  
 
In this chapter we analyse what might be called the objective dimension of video surveillance. 
In particular, we look at narratives on CCTV from a security perspective, which deals more 
with thoughts on the effectiveness of this tool rather than with potential implications on 
behaviour. There appear to be differences between normative statements on surveillance 
cameras and crime prevention and more descriptive accounts. When it comes to thinking 
about the cameras at an abstract level, the dilemma of security versus privacy is not of 
particular significance. If CCTV is used for security reasons, it is accepted. Nevertheless, 
concerns on how footage is used are sometimes raised along with doubts on the usefulness of 
surveillance cameras as tools for crime prevention. Overall, more ambiguities and 
contradictory statements than straightforward opinions emerge. The following response, for 
instance, highlights controversial thoughts on the effectiveness of CCTV: 
 
“No, I don’t think it prevents crime, but I think it has obviously had a role in tracing 
criminals. If you see how many crimes have been solved, lately, with abductions, or 
whatever else, CCTV has had a crucial role.… There is also so much if you, for 
example, if they are trying to solve a crime using CCTV, more often than not the 
footage is completely useless, because the cameras have not been looked after 
properly, or are not functioning, or whatever else, so, yes, I think it's not… usually not 
intentionally to record more than they're supposed to.” 
 (Interview ID 10, 38 years, male, UK) 
 
This respondent thinks that cameras do not function as a deterrent but rather that they can 
assist law enforcement after a crime has occurred. It is worth noting that his views on CCTV 
vary from the tool being central to criminal investigations to the uselessness of the footage in 
the majority of cases. Yet, privacy concerns are not even mentioned and excessive recording 
is not considered problematic. Framing a discourse along the lines of security is clearly 
different from contemplating potential drawbacks of being watched. The trade-off between 
security and privacy is not often taken into account when respondents are prompted about 
crime prevention. If privacy is not at stake, the uselessness of CCTV is often mentioned, 
especially in descriptive accounts such as the following: 
 
“The mansions here in this area all have CCTV installed but they are only allowed to 
film as far as the plot boundary. Three years ago we had a case of arson. A series of 
arson attacks to be correct. Also here, at the bus station, in front of our house. At the 
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lady’s house on the other side of the street they burned her letterbox. She had CCTV 
running on her property and she recorded everything but in court she was not allowed 
to use the footage, as you are only allowed to film within the boundaries of your 
property. So she was only allowed to show the shoes of the arsonist. They would have 
busted him if she was allowed to use her footage from the CCTV camera.”  
(Interview ID 360, 69 years, female, Austria) 
 
The interviewee describes the use of CCTV in private spaces. While a neighbour has video 
surveillance, which recorded a pyromaniac, legal restrictions on the use of footage, precluded 
the opportunity to catch the arsonist. This narrative seems to question the benefits of having 
surveillance cameras to protect private properties if the footage cannot be used in court. The 
distinction between public and private space is only relevant in terms of what can be brought 
to court. Interestingly enough, when the layperson is not the watched but the watcher who 
uses surveillance tools like CCTV to defend his/her space, the “regime of visibility” is fully 
supported.  
 
In several statements, the overall security approach behind the use of cameras is disputed. 
Video surveillance can only be effective if there is real-time monitoring or if it is used to 
support, not to substitute, law enforcement agencies. Crime prevention is seen as a multi-
faceted problem that should be addressed with the help of security technologies but there 
must be a good reason (i.e. high crime rates) to rely on CCTV. Electronic eyes should not be 
everywhere simply because this is a common trend, rather the training of CCTV operators as 
well as risks of potential misuses of footage occasionally pop up in the interviews. Some 
respondents do not understand why surveillance cameras have been implemented and would 
like to reclaim “public common spaces”: 
 
“I know where the cameras are here and I don’t understand why CCTV was installed. 
CCTV does not make sense to me because it is only used to watch what has already 
happened. They are not effective in preventing criminality, they’re just a waste of 
money. I can understand the use of video surveillance in private spaces, like in a bank 
where CCTV can be effective in order to catch robbers. But public squares are 
“common goods”, they belong to the citizens. I am really annoyed by the use of 
surveillance in the public realm.” 
(Interview ID 91, 52 years, female, Italy) 
 
This respondent struggles to grasp both key questions with regards to CCTV –  the original 
reason for implementation and the question of effectiveness. The issue of space is yet again 
the key to understanding narratives on video surveillance. In this case, the use of the cameras 
is reasonable in private spaces but not in spaces that, as she puts it, “belong to citizens”. 
Given that space seems to be central in the majority of the statements, we will focus on 
citizens’ attitudes towards the use of video surveillance in the public realm in the following 
chapter. 
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3.2.4 CCTV in public space 
 
As stated in the introduction, the location of cameras plays an important role in terms of 
acceptance. The comparative study UrbanEye has shown that, despite crucial socio-cultural 
differences, people are more supportive of CCTV in publicly accessible spaces. In the context 
of our research, CCTV is seen as a “good thing” by the majority of respondents, especially in 
spaces such as “banks, stations, platforms, shops, shopping malls, along motorways and in 
open streets”124 as opposed to spaces that are considered more intimate. However, attitudes 
towards video surveillance are contingent upon culture and situations, such as specific 
security problems that are contextually addressed through CCTV.  
 
In the context of this chapter, the analysis focuses on narratives on the use of surveillance 
cameras in the public realm with the aim of understanding how the trade-off between security 
and privacy is framed when people contemplate technologically mediated control. Do people 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public spaces or do they rather think that the 
erosion of privacy is less important than security? The following quote seems to shed light on 
the ambiguity of feelings towards this argument: 
 
“Personally, I don’t care, let’s put them everywhere! We can talk about privacy in our 
houses but it is different outside. A soon as we reach the street we are controlled by 
other people and we lose our privacy automatically anyway. So I don’t see a 
difference between situations when I am stalked by camera or by people on the street. 
However, I don’t think that cameras help. Anyone who wants to do something, he does 
it anyway. It can prevent small criminality but it definitely doesn’t help to reduce 
serious criminality. It can be used as a tool to solve an already committed criminal act 
but not to prevent the crime itself. I do notice the cameras when I am in the town. 
Sometimes, I do modify my behaviour when I know about the cameras appearance and 
I intentionally avoid the places with them. Even though I am seen I don’t have to be 
seen by everyone.” 
(Interview ID 679, 24 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
This account points to several interesting dimensions. Initially, the issue of private versus 
public spaces seems to determine the attitudes towards surveillance cameras. The respondent 
thinks that CCTV should be ubiquitously used and that privacy is not an abstract idea but 
rather a condition reliant on situations, in particular, privacy depends on where we are. People 
are entitled to have an expectation of privacy within their homes, but as they enter into public 
space (“the streets”), privacy is lost. He then uses quite a strong verb to describe the way in 
which one is controlled either by human or by electronic eyes: there are no differences, in his 
account, between being stalked by technology or by people. The narrative turns to what we 
previously defined as the objective dimension of CCTV that is, the use of surveillance 
cameras from a security perspective. Yet again, cameras are considered of little help as far as 
crime prevention is concerned but they can be useful in criminal investigations. Perhaps the 
most important statement comes at the end of the quote, where the ambiguity is most 
                                               
124 Hempel, Leon and Eric Toepfer, CCTV in Europe. Final report, Working Paper No.15, Centre for Technology and 
Society, 2004, p.43 http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp15.pdf 
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apparent. While initially the respondent is fervently in support of video surveillance, he then 
goes on to claim to avoid places with cameras and to change his behaviour if CCTV is in 
operation.  
 
On the one hand this story confirms what has been discussed in previous sections, in 
particular the difference between objective and subjective ideas on CCTV. On the other hand 
it draws attention to a “dilemma within the dilemma”, namely visibility versus invisibility for 
which no clear-cut views seem to emerge. The trade-off between security and privacy 
depends on spaces (public and/or private), but it is seen critically as the respondent negotiates 
visibility. In other cases, negotiation is not even taken into account, as the use of CCTV for 
security purposes in public spaces is not questioned because “surveillance is there for a good 
reason”. It is difficult to identify trends within the interviews, as feelings are diverse and 
sometimes conflicting. When respondents are aware of specific cases that have been solved 
with the help of cameras in the public realm, then privacy is considered irrelevant and CCTV 
is viewed as “a good thing” or as unavoidable. If it helps catch the “bad guys”, privacy is not 
a concern. It seems that when citizens have a reason to believe that cameras are helpful, other 
arguments are not raised.  
 
There are certain, specific places within the public realm, which were referred to in the 
interviews. Public transport, for instance, is considered more vulnerable than other locations 
and respondents sometimes refer to deviant acts occurring, for instance, on the subway. Yet 
opinions on surveillance cameras in these locations are divergent. A direct link between 
surveillance and security is only made if the respondent is aware of a specific fact/crime that 
has occurred. 
 
“I do support CCTV on the subway. Since there was this rapist on the subway last 
winter I always have a look if there is CCTV operating. Especially the new ones with 
the 360 degree vision are excellent. Especially during the night time CCTV is perfect, 
nothing can happen then” 
(Interview ID 517, 21 years, female, Austria) 
 
This respondent feels protected by the cameras: the powerful vision of CCTV prevents violent 
crimes from occurring on the subway. Her views are very straightforward since she claims 
that nothing can really happen in an area controlled by cameras. In contrast to the previous 
quote, the dilemma is non-existent here as she wants to be seen and even actively looks for 
cameras, in order to feel safer. She “trusts” the tool to the point that she does not raise any 
concerns whatsoever. This exception seems to reinforce our hypothesis: surveillance is 
welcome if it perceived as effective – independent of empirical evidence. The priority is 
security (or the feeling of being safe) rather than potential breaches of privacy. In this case we 
do not know whether the rapist was caught thanks to CCTV, but we know that this young 
woman thinks that cameras are ideal tools (the vision is excellent and nothing can happen). It 
is worth mentioning that gender might affect opinion on cameras, especially when talking 
about specific places at particular times (subway at night). Another aspect of this story 
highlights the role of media in the public debate about surveillance measures. Only a few 
months before this interview was recorded three women of the same age as the respondent 
where molested in a subway line running through the outskirts of Vienna. In response, the 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
74
free tabloids, which are available at subway stations in Vienna, were campaigning for several 
weeks to install more CCTV on subway trains. In fact, the rapist in question attacked his 
victims outside the trains on their way home. The general public was demanding to install 
more cameras in trains but not in public space. 
 
Narratives on the use of cameras in publicly accessible areas are diverse and do not allow for 
generalizations. However, we might argue that – as mentioned above – conditions and 
experiences play a role in determining support. Additionally, levels of awareness pertaining to 
the presence of cameras in public spaces seem to be high. A number of respondents are aware 
of the location of cameras and consider them legitimate for security purposes. 
 
3.2.5 Absences 
 
During the analysis of our data, we were struck by significant absences. Certain aspects of 
video surveillance were rarely discussed or raised. Although these missing aspects might be a 
result of the questions posed, it might also be that our lay-person respondents did not consider 
certain features important enough to be mentioned during the interviews. Rather than 
suggesting simplistic explanations, we would like to draw attention to these absences and 
consider them as missing narratives, which, conversely, are of great relevance in the 
literature. The subject of smart surveillance cameras, for instance, was barely mentioned 
during the interviews. When prompted on video surveillance, respondents seem to have the 
basic version of CCTV in mind with rare instances of precise identification, such as 
biometrics. This form of contemporary governance125 does not occur in citizens’ discourses 
on surveillance cameras. The same holds true for the issue of data matching, as respondents’ 
concerns on gathering visual images and then matching those images with other data was 
rarely mentioned. Thus, everyday encounters with cameras are perceived as encounters with a 
technology which is considered as “standalone” and, perhaps, less high-tech than others. 
Terminology is important to highlight absences: for instance, the word “profiling” is neither 
used nor is it conceptualized by referring to targeting on the basis of appearance. As shown, 
while discourses on CCTV are not generic, they are framed as if video surveillance were 
rather unsophisticated. Narratives are more imbued with “gut feelings” of being spied upon by 
electronic eyes, than with feelings of being watched by smart technologies whose data can 
easily be merged with other pieces of information. 
 
There are also settings or locations missing in the interview. Citizens’ perceptions of CCTV 
are shaped by urban experiences, from shopping to getting from one place to the other. As has 
been mentioned, public transport is one of the locations where CCTV is probably more 
apparent while other places, such as banks or motorways are often not taken into account. 
Surveillance cameras are understood to be embedded features of urban contexts and different 
locations are rarely considered.  
Whilst refraining from suggesting reductive interpretations, we argue that missing narratives 
are worth pointing out as they may point to what lay-people do not consider and consequently 
emphasize a deeper understanding of how surveillance is really perceived in relation to 
mundane activities. 
                                               
125 Ajana, B., Governing through Biometrics. The Biopolitics of Identity, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
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3.2.6 Concluding thoughts  
 
Our analysis shows a number of distinctive elements. Whilst the following cannot be 
generalized, they can certainly contribute to the rich debate on citizens’ views on surveillance. 
In particular, our respondents drew attention to these factors: 
 
· The normalisation of (video) surveillance is often questioned through narratives that 
revolve around issues of a false sense of security and asymmetries of power; 
· The feeling of “being watched” has significant consequences which range from direct 
impact on behaviour to the production of “docile bodies”; 
· People do not simply comply with the fact of constantly being “spied on” or visible; 
· The gaze of CCTV is inevitable but there are options for resilience; 
· When it comes to thinking about cameras at an abstract level, the dilemma of security 
versus privacy is not of particular significance. If CCTV is used for security reasons, it is 
accepted and welcomed; 
· The overall security approach behind the use of cameras is often questioned as is the 
usefulness of surveillance cameras (especially on how the footage is used) as tools for 
crime prevention; 
· Feelings towards the use of CCTV in public spaces vary from acceptance to privacy 
concerns. Specific conditions and personal experiences play an important role in 
determining support.  
 
As we have demonstrated, citizens’ attitudes are far from unproblematic and cannot easily be 
dismissed through the notorious “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” argument. The steady 
proliferation of surveillance cameras in Europe has not led to CCTV being uncritically 
accepted. The emerging picture is multi-layered and brings social and legal concerns to the 
fore.  
 
 
3.3 PREVENTING CRIME AND VIEWS ON SECURITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY  
Martin Kovanič 
 
Provision of security for its citizens is traditionally understood as one of the main functions of 
states. In today’s world, which is considered to be increasingly unstable and insecure, the 
installation of various surveillance mechanisms is a common answer to these perceptions. The 
area of security has experienced a fundamental shift in our societies. With their move towards 
post-modernity, socio-economic changes brought an increased sense of insecurity in societies, 
which reacted with a focus on management of risk126. Combined with technological 
revolution and the development of surveillance technologies, the ways in which order is 
created and maintained changed essentially127.  
 
The reliance on traditional policing mechanisms, such as community patrolling and face-to-
face surveillance gave way to the use of more sophisticated technologies, which enable the 
                                               
126 Lupton, Deborah, Risk. Routledge, New York, 1999. 
127 Ericson, Richard V., and Kevin D. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1997. 
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monitoring, collection and processing of information in order to come up with a set of pre-
emptive activities. The temporal orientation is towards the future – identifying crime before it 
even happens. 
 
9/11 was a paradigmatic event, which brought a change in the perception of surveillance 
technologies and practices in connection with security. It brought about widespread 
acceptance and normalisation of surveillance. Lyon argues that “it is possible that on a simple 
calculus, citizens accept that loss of privacy is the price to be paid for security.128” This was 
reinforced further by subsequent terrorist attacks and the “war on terror”, which facilitated the 
implementation of various surveillance technologies that aim to increase public perceptions of 
safety. 
 
The main purpose of this subchapter is to inspect the relationship between security and 
privacy. Moreover, we are interested in identifying citizens’ views on the functioning of 
various surveillance mechanisms used to prevent crime and increase safety in public spaces. 
Simultaneously, we are interested in people’s strategies to protect their personal property. 
This subchapter focuses on surveillance mechanisms other than CCTV cameras, which were 
the main focus of the previous subchapter. 
 
The central concept of this chapter is fear of crime, or feeling of insecurity, which affects the 
respondents’ attitudes towards surveillance. Fear of crime has become one of the major issues 
in today’s societies. Research in the UK however, has shown that there is a gap between 
actual crime and perceived crime.129 The fear of being victimized is higher than the actual 
threat. Nevertheless, fear of crime is an important factor, which needs to be taken into 
consideration. This can be illustrated by statistics in our respondents’ countries of origin. 
 
In the UK, the fear of crime level is one of the highest. A survey showed that 33.7% of British 
citizens feel unsafe or very unsafe in public spaces after dark. The highest levels of insecurity 
are in Slovakia – 39.7% of Slovak citizens. In Germany, it is 24.8% of citizens. The lowest 
levels of fear of crime are in Austria – 17.7% of citizens130. These figures confirm that this is 
a relevant concern of European citizens, especially in the UK and Slovakia.  
 
On the other hand it should be noted that violent crime in general is declining in the countries 
studied. This fact is illustrated by the following table. Although statistical evidence in the 
field of crime is only of limited value, it can, however, demonstrate general trends.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
128 Lyon, David, "9/11, Synopticon, and Scopophilia: Watching and Being Watched", in Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. 
Ericson (eds.), The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006, pp. 35-54. 
129 Mirrlees-Black, Catriona, Pat Mayhew, and Andrew Percry, The 1996 British Crime Survey. Issue 19/96, Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, Research and Statistics Directorate, London, 1996. 
130 The survey was carried out in 2010, it is taken from Hummelsheim, Dina, Helmut Hirtenlehner, Jonathan Jackson, and  
Dietrich Oberwittler, “Social insecurities and fear of crime: a cross-national study on the impact of welfare state policies on 
crime-related anxieties”, European sociological review, 27 (3), 2011, pp. 327-345.  
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  Violent crime instances           
  Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country Italy 136 322 145 209 153 997 146 598 131 610 127 736 
  Austria 42 928 43 316 46 217 47 034 47 602 44 618 
  Slovakia 13 575 11 584 10 274 9 669 8 963 8 094 
  Germany 212 832 215 471 217 923 210 885 208 446 201 243 
  
England and 
Wales 997 159 972 283 885 718 839 323 827 122 795 615 
  Scotland 26 558 27 618 25 182 24 777 21 662 21 499 
Statistics taken from EuroStat - Crimes recorded by the police131   
 
Although this table only deals with violent crime, it can be seen that generally figures are on 
the decline. However, as already mentioned, the fear of crime itself, whether justified or 
unjustified, should be taken into account, because it has an effect on individuals’ perceptions 
of security. 
 
This section will be divided into three main parts. In the first part, we will analyse the fear of 
crime itself, the way it is constructed, as well as respondents’ individual strategies to 
overcome this problem. The second part will discuss crime prevention in public places – from 
the perspectives of the watched and the watchers. A typology of citizens and their attitudes 
towards public surveillance will be created based on the stories analysed. Moreover, this will 
include the perspective of law enforcement on the use of surveillance for the purposes of 
crime fight. Although this was not envisaged in the research, which is mainly focused on 
citizens’ perspectives, a number of interviews were conducted with law-enforcement 
agencies, which provide a supplement to the analysis of attitudes towards surveillance in the 
context of security, also touching on the issue of privacy. The last part will deal with property 
protection and attitudes towards the processes of privatization of security and the growing 
responsibility of individuals to provide for their own safety 
 
3.3.1 Fear of crime 
 
Fear of crime is a feeling of insecurity in citizens’ lives, which influences their behaviour in 
both public and private. It can be influenced by many factors and it affects various groups of 
people in different ways. Fear of crime can have negative social ramifications – it can lead to 
increasing isolation of individuals and withdrawal from ‘normal’ social life, as well as 
growing mistrust in authorities, which are supposed to provide security and the feeling of 
safety132. The existing research shows that fear of crime is higher among women and citizens 
of higher age, although the age factor has been challenged133. The distribution of changes in 
                                               
131 Eurostat, Crimes recorded by the police. Accessed on 
 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=crim_gen&lang=en, 08 Jun 2014  
132 Review of Scientifically Evaluated Good Practices for Reducing Feelings of Insecurity or Fear of Crime in EU Member 
States, European Communities, 2004.  
http://www.eucpn.org/pubdocs/review_reducing_feelings_insecurities_fear_crime_en.pdf  
133 Lagrange, Randy L., and Kenneth F. Ferraro, “Assessing Age and Gender Differences in Perceived Risk and Fear of 
Crime”, Criminology, vol. 27, 1989, pp. 697–720. 
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the levels of insecurity are also spatial, the highest levels are usually connected with town 
centres and deprived neighbourhoods. 
 
High levels of insecurity are a precondition of the proliferation of surveillance in the context 
of crime fight. It is the most commonly used justification for the implementation of more 
surveillance, as well as the introduction of new technologies, which can help to decrease 
crime rates. This claim – that fear of crime leads to calls for more surveillance – is one of the 
overriding themes of this subchapter. In this section, we show that citizens, have different 
rationalizations of their fears of crime and causes of security problems. 
 
The stories of fear of crime can be divided into two categories. The first category is the fear of 
crime based on experience. Here, the justifications are based on either personal or mediated 
occurrence of crime in the areas, where respondents live or spend their time. The second 
group is constructed fear of crime. In this case, the crime was not personally experienced, but 
it is a result of one’s beliefs and prejudices. First we will analyse the experience-based fear of 
crime, which can be illustrated by the following story: 
 
 „Yes, I talk about crime with my neighbours, as all my neighbours have been victims 
of burglaries, I have been victim of an attempted burglary, but they succeeded only in 
breaking a window, but I came back home after just 15 minutes…I was so angry… I 
immediately asked my daughter to close the gate and I went out, as I saw two guys 
passing by I simply shouted that the police was coming and they didn’t reply to me 
obviously… I think that technical or technological measures are useless, my neighbour 
who has been victim of burglaries three times, has bars to her windows but I think they 
are useless systems of prevention…nobody has installed alarm systems.” 
(Interview ID 208, 62 years, female, Italy) 
 
The feeling of safety of the respondent was changed by her neighbour’s personal experience 
with burglary, which altered the previous feeling of safety. This feeling of insecurity does not 
lead to direct calls for more surveillance in the area. People who experienced crime often have 
similar opinions, which are also connected with implicit distrust towards the authorities – the 
police – who in their views do not do enough for crime prevention. Therefore there is a need 
for people to take matters into their hands and take the initiative in providing their own 
security. This is something we will address in a later section. 
 
The second category, the constructed fear of crime can be illustrated by the following quote. 
This story is from Austria, a country that has rather low crime levels, and therefore is an 
example of the gap between perceived and real crime levels, referred to above. 
 
“I used to compare the EU always with our Monarchy [Austria, Habsburg monarchy], 
it won’t work. The EU destroyed the surveillance we already had in this country; that 
surveillance was good and it worked. The EU took away the security and the strict 
control over the borders every single member state had. The EU did not offer any 
compensation for that act. The EU acted like a slob who says I’m going to destroy all 
the infrastructure all the possibilities we had to fight crime in our countries. I destroy 
everything, just in case. Now everything is ruined and destroyed by the EU but nothing 
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was offered as compensation. A system that really works. I mean (voice gets louder) 
that can’t be the consequence, first destroying everything and then offering nothing. 
There are crime tourists and other things like that. The EU offers nothing to fight these 
people. I’m not on my own with this opinion, believe me. There are many out there 
who are thinking the way I do and therefore I stand for a community that is informing 
and defending itself, more or less.  
(Interview ID 359, 69 years, female, Austria) 
  
This story illustrates an opinion – a belief or prejudice – that is not grounded on either 
personal experience, or in statistical data. The respondent clearly identified the actor, which is 
responsible for the rise of insecurity (the European Union), which resulted in the abolishment 
of internal border controls within the Schengen zone. This caused the inability of nation states 
to thoroughly control the movement of people across their borders. It led to the abandonment 
of working surveillance mechanisms – border control – and to the influx of “crime tourists,” 
in other words individuals who come to the country with the objective of committing crime.  
 
The response to this situation is an increase in surveillance, or more specifically the 
reinstallation of previously functioning surveillance mechanisms. This reinforces the 
hypothesis that the feeling of insecurity leads to demands for more surveillance, thus creating 
a rather paradoxical situation in connection to the relationship between resilience and 
surveillance. In the society, where the levels of fear of crime or insecurity are rather high, the 
response of the society to decrease these levels and create a secure environment, is to install 
more surveillance. Therefore, in this context, resilience of the society is equated with 
increased surveillance. For the insecure citizen, the existing network of surveillance means 
that s/he can feel safe – in relation to moving through public spaces, as well as in connection 
to the protection of his/her personal property. Surveillance is the means with which such 
individuals can adjust to the changing environment in which they live, which they consider to 
be increasingly more insecure. In this sense surveillance is resilience: a way to adapt. Rather 
than just adapting to living in society in which they are surveilled more ubiquitously, this 
actually forms part of the resilience strategy of certain groups of citizens.  
 
The call for more surveillance is not the only result of the existing fear of crime among the 
respondents. There are various strategies people apply when dealing with the feelings of 
insecurity, especially when moving through an area that is perceived as high-risk. The 
following stories illustrate such tactics: 
 
“I also lived on the ‘Gürtel’ [ring road in Vienna], and there I felt really safe, because 
of the large amount of prostitutes standing there. So no matter what time you got 
home, there were people on the street. This gave me a feeling of safety, it was 
illuminated, also with the clubs and the brothels.”  
(Interview ID 537, 34 years, female, Austria) 
 
The story shows that people are aware of their surroundings, which can be used to increase 
their feeling of security and lower the fear of victimization. This applies to both physical 
surroundings (such as the existence of bars on the streets where they walk), as well as 
pedestrianisation of the area – meaning presence of the people who can see them (prostitutes 
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on the streets). This shows that certain individuals do not always trust technology, such as 
CCTV cameras, but prefer face-to-face surveillance, a chance to be seen by somebody else in 
case they feel insecure. This to some extent corroborates Ditton’s research, which showed that 
CCTV cameras are trusted more in relation to detecting and solving crime, but are not as 
effective in making people feel safer. To increase the feeling of security, people prefer 
physical oversight, such as more policemen in the streets.134 
 
3.3.2 Preventing crime in the public space 
 
Crime prevention in public places has many faces and makes use of many technologies, 
which fall under the umbrella term of new surveillance. Moreover, technological progress has 
resulted in the availability of various technologies to make public places safer. These new 
technologies – including biometrics and drones – however raise concerns of privacy 
infringement, thus creating a dilemma of whether their use can be justified. Again, CCTV will 
not be discussed in this subchapter. In this section, we are going to present the views of our 
respondents concerning crime prevention in public spaces and a plethora of reactions towards 
these issues. It will be divided into two main parts – perspectives of the watched and the 
watchers. 
 
The Watched 
The first section focuses on the reactions from the point of view of the watched – individuals 
who move through public spaces and either engage with the existing surveillance 
technologies, or present their opinions about their use. In general, people are aware of the 
existence of these technologies and they have adjusted to living with them as they engage 
with them on a regular basis. This is especially evident in specific surveillance sites, such as 
airports. Security checks at the airport epitomize the use of surveillance for the purpose of 
crime prevention, since engagement with them is very physical and very real. Therefore this is 
something mentioned in a number of the stories analysed. Although we can claim that these 
security checks are in general accepted – and hence surveillance is normalized – the reactions 
of the respondents varied.  
 
The first type of reaction is complete acceptance of the measures, in order to be secure. This 
approach is demonstrated by the following story: 
 
„If you think about America where you need to strip off your clothes more or less 
before [you enter the country] nowadays. The advantage is that I enter the country in 
5 minutes today because they have already everything on the screen. They take your 
picture and finger prints and that’s it. (…) I accept the checks/controls, because - in 
the end – reason tells you I prefer to be checked and not to explode when somebody 
smuggles something into the airplane. At the same time, you know that a lot can be 
smuggled in nevertheless.” 
(Interview ID 52, 55 years, male, Austria) 
 
                                               
134 Ditton, Jason, "Crime and the city: Public attitudes towards open-street CCTV in Glasgow", British Journal of 
Criminology, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2000, pp. 692-709. 
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This type of respondent, the accepting individual, sees the existing surveillance in public 
places as something necessary, even advantageous. Endorsing the “nothing to hide, nothing to 
fear mentality,” the existence of large amount of data is seen as favourable, since it enables 
him/her to pass along the surveilled entrance (in this case it is a security check at the airport) 
without need for any further control. He voices no concerns about the loss of privacy – 
security is “a right,” which is important and which can be achieved through surveillance. The 
type, accepting individual, confirms the hypothesis that people always choose security over 
privacy.  
 
This particular case also shows another recurring theme, which is the effectiveness of 
surveillance in relation to the provision of security (which is something often connected to 
CCTV surveillance). This particular concern was raised by a plethora of respondents, 
especially pertaining to airport security. This is to some extent a paradoxical situation, since 
airport security checks are allegedly very careful but on the other hand, respondents still have 
doubts whether they are thorough enough, when it comes to looking for liquids and sharp 
objects. Therefore one of the main concerns does not address the infringement of privacy, but 
the ability of surveillance to function properly and effectively.  
 
The second type of respondent, the conscious individual, accepts surveillance, but has certain 
reservations towards some of the measures. S/he voices some privacy concerns and thinks 
that there is a need for certain “boundaries”, even when it comes to security. This is illustrated 
by the following story: 
 
“I do think the safety controls are ok. But I’m not in favour of the liquid regulations 
[at airports] because people are thirsty and they need something to drink. I think 
naked scanners are not necessary and they are violating privacy. And I am also 
against recordings, taking pictures, and finger prints. The controls in North America 
are annoying. In Vienna, it’s still not too bad.” 
(Interview ID 386, 24 years, female, Austria) 
 
Although the surveillance mechanism is accepted in general a concern for the existence of 
boundaries is clearly voiced. The respondent is particularly against the introduction of new 
surveillance technologies – such as full body scanners and biometric fingerprinting – that are 
considered too pervasive. The reaction to the introduction of such technologies is a demand 
for stricter regulation. The same line of argumentation can be seen in the some of those stories 
that are normative, not based on experience. Introduction of new technologies such as drones, 
or biometric databases is considered a development, which could help fight crime, but 
conscious individuals also think about possible threats of misuse.  
 
Another problem voiced by the conscious individual is function creep. The respondent 
accepts the existing surveillance measures, which have their functions. However she is also 
aware of the fact that many technologies, which were designed for fighting crime and the 
provision of security – such as ANPR – are being used for other purposes as well. Function 
creep is seen as one of the biggest problems and the reflective individual opposes it. This 
results in the aforementioned call for more regulation. The problems of function creep are 
compounded by the fact that the consequences and possible threats of new surveillance are 
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not always carefully contemplated – even by the people responsible for approving their 
implementation. 
 
The final type is the antagonist, an individual who opposes the existing surveillance 
measures. This results either in surrendering to the situation or a conscious action – such as 
avoiding the surveillance. This approach can be identified in the following quote: 
 
„It is about connecting data about certain persons from different sources. I have a 
problem with this. See at the INDECT-Demo, the police filmed us, almost close-ups, if 
they cut out single pictures and then use face recognition technologies to find me on 
Facebook and see: Uh, he's received jobs from the "civil service", then maybe this 
information could be passed? I am not thinking that this is paranoid, but I have 
become more cautious.” 
(Interview ID 35, 60 years, male, Germany) 
 
This type of respondent is aware of the existing surveillance, as well as of its possibilities. He 
is aware of the amount of data that exists in databases and sees this as a breach of privacy. 
Some of the accounts of antagonists draw a parallel between the functioning of modern 
societies and Orwell’s dystopia. The 9/11 attacks are identified as a breaking point, which 
enabled the introduction of excessive surveillance and control. This particular account shows 
an antagonist, who is trying to take a conscious action – being more careful when moving 
through public spaces, especially in the context of specific events, such as demonstrations. 
The respondent voices concerns of being identified when attending these kinds of events, so 
in this sense surveillance is an obstacle in exercising basic human rights and freedoms. 
 
Antagonists suggest that we are living in the society of presumption of guilt – they 
emphasize “feeling like a criminal,” when having to engage with existing surveillance 
systems. They clearly oppose the introduction of new technologies for surveillance purposes 
(such as INDECT). Another example of resilience by the antagonist is to avoid flying 
whenever possible, in order not to have to go through security checks.  
 
The watchers 
Some of the interviews concerning crime prevention were also conducted with experts – 
representatives from different law enforcement units. Therefore in this section, we present 
the perspective of the watchers as explained by the watcher themselves. Roy and McChaill 
suggest, that our societies underwent a paradigm shift towards risk-based strategies of social 
control, which has implications for criminal justice. This shift towards the new penology 
changed the focus from individualised suspicion towards risk assessment of potential 
criminal behaviour135. In order to be able to do this, law enforcement needs large amounts of 
data and consequentially takes advantages of various mass surveillance technologies. 
 
The empirical material collected for this part of the IRISS project highlighted, that this is 
indeed the case. Law enforcement agents confirmed that they make use of a variety of 
information – ranging from tracking cell-phones, through Electoral roll in the UK to making 
                                               
135 Coleman, Roy and Michael McCahill, Surveillance and Crime, SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 2011, pp. 69-70. 
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use of various databases such as Trace IQ136. However use of surveillance technologies is not 
straightforward and does not always produce a definite answer. This experience is illustrated 
by this example: 
 
“So this pantechnicon is not all-seeing and embracing, and we rely… Like this public 
domain, I can find the quotation for you if necessary but I can’t remember the exact 
figure, but it’s something like 80% of the plots in Western Europe have been identified 
through electronic surveillance, the original catalyst to start the investigation, which 
obviously now we know after what Snowden and Prism allege makes a lot more sense. 
But exchange of emails or whatever, somebody’s gone and referred it through to the 
Security Services, who then have done their own work and decided yes or no, or we 
think it’s a runner, and then it’s passed out to the catch territory to look at, or we think 
you should do something about this. And then you start on your focus rather than just 
putting out a call.” 
(Interview ID 387, 60 years, male, United Kingdom) 
 
This story clearly shows that surveillance – in this case electronic mediated surveillance – is 
an integral part of the risk-based approach. It serves as an initial catalyst; it can help 
identifying the possible threat. However the next step is going back to traditional policing 
techniques. Technology alone does not catch suspects. Therefore there is a need to go back to 
individualised suspicion, which is a characteristic trait of old rather than new penology.  
 
One of the issues law enforcement units face when accessing private information of possible 
suspects or persons of interest, is data protection. Naturally, some of the databases cannot be 
accessed without a valid judicial order. One of the stories deals with such a database and 
offers a strategy of how to bypass the need for official order. 
 
“There's a way, if you're in the tax office, if you're at your terminal, if I search for you, 
there's a record – or my understanding of it when he was telling me – there'll be a 
record that I have searched for you. Now, if I do a general search for all the people 
that share your name or what sounds like your name, there's no record that I've 
searched you. But what I can do is I can go down the screen and it'll just go through 
all the people with your name on it. Now, if I look into your folder – again, there's a 
record kept that this individual has looked at your folder. So what they do is, as they're 
going through the screen, they just do a screen grab of what's there, and that gives you 
the last three years. So it's your name, your address, national insurance number, what 
your tax code is, who you work for, how much tax you've paid over the last three years 
and what your income's been. What they give is a screen grab and then there's no 
reference that that search has ever taken place.” 
(Interview ID 403, 50 years, male, United Kingdom) 
 
Although there are some regulations in place, there is usually a way to avoid them and to 
make use of existing surveillance infrastructure. This is in accordance with the belief that 
                                               
136 These are web-based tracing and investigation facilities, see more at eg. http://www.tracesmart.co.uk/ 
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criminals can always be one step ahead of the police, since they do not have to follow any 
regulations and therefore the police have to react accordingly.  
 
Law enforcement agencies are aware of the fact that you cannot always trust the information 
collected by various surveillance mechanisms. Criminals are also aware of them and they 
come up with their own avoidance strategies. The case of the planned English Defence 
League rally bombing is mentioned: 
 
I suppose if you’re talking about digital surveillance, it’s just simply it could be 
recorded. I don’t think we’ve got a hedge round that yet as a society where you leave a 
magical digital footprint. But criminals and aspiring terrorists know they’re 
vulnerable by leaving a digital footprint, and they will take fairly simple steps to 
ensure that their digital footprint isn’t there, or it’s much reduced. So I’d have to look 
it up, but it’s in the public domain, the arrests of the guys from Birmingham who went 
to Dewsbury to attack the whole process, they didn’t have a phone with them. They 
had left their phones at home. Now the very nature of leaving your phones at home, if 
they had been under surveillance and they were not, then nobody would know what’s 
going on, but they left their phones at home, and that’s the simple thing to do.” 
(Interview ID 384, 60 years, male, United Kingdom) 
  
This case is a fairly controversial one, since it illustrates the failing of the existing 
surveillance network – police and security services had no intelligence about the plan 
although one of the perpetrators was under surveillance due to being a suspect in a different 
case. However, they were caught by a different surveillance network – ANPR – which 
identified that their car had no insurance and were then stopped by the police137.  
 
Perpetrators in this case were aware of the surveillance possibilities and therefore left their 
mobile phones at home. This again is an example of resilience, from the point of view of 
criminals. A high level of awareness of the surveillance potential of various technologies 
leads to conscious strategies of avoidance.  
 
3.3.3 Property protection  
 
In this section, we will turn to crime prevention in the context of private properties. The 
working hypothesis of this subchapter is that when people feel insecure they do not rely on 
public authorities, but rather they try and take care of their property themselves. The 
underlying argument can be found in theory. In today’s societies, “responsibility for security 
is being distributed to individual citizens, or insecurity subjects, to ensure their own safety 
through consumption.138” This can be achieved through various means – either increased 
protection of one’s property with technological systems (such as CCTV, alarm), or living in 
gated communities with a private security service.  
 
                                               
137 For detailed information about the case see http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22344054 
138 Monahan, Torin, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 2010, pp. 81. 
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However, the notion that individuals are responsible for their own security is not 
straightforwardly accepted. The following quote illustrates the line of thinking about the 
relationship between public and private security provision: 
 
“It‘s complicated. On the one hand protection is traditionally a function of the 
national state, and actually one of its main legitimacies. But the public is asking for 
more and more protection all the time? Really? On the other hand of course you have 
to take some minimal care yourself. Burglary exists in a society and you have to take 
care - if you leave the house door open most likely your bike will be gone from the 
backyard.” 
(Interview ID 987, 44 years, male, Austria) 
 
The belief that individuals have a co-shared responsibility when it comes to protecting their 
property is shared among the respondents. However, as can be seen in this response, the 
delegation of security to individual citizens is not fully accepted. The provision of security by 
public authorities (in this case the nation state is mentioned) is seen as one of their 
fundamental functions, although the respondent expresses the view that public demand can 
never be fully satisfied.   
 
The need of individuals to perform some extra activity in order to secure their property is 
clearly linked with the feeling of insecurity, something that is often connected to the 
perceived security of the neighbourhood, where the individual lives. This means that the 
secure citizen does not have the need to employ any additional precautions: 
 
“Personally, I haven’t taken any measures to prevent crime and I wouldn’t use 
anything to protect me from burglary as I feel safe only when I am open to society. 
However, this depends on the context. I live in a small city. We watch over each 
other's apartment. There are 36 families in my condo, twice a year we have a big 
lunch all together and this makes a difference, I think. Nothing has ever happened. 
Never. The logic is: building relationships of trust with neighbours. We don’t ask 
people who come to visit other people in my condo to show their IDs! He or she is 
someone's guest. This someone takes responsibility for his/her guest.” 
(Interview ID 1, 70 years, male, Italy) 
 
The decision to take extra security precautions is a rational calculation. It has certain costs – 
financial as well as time, although in this case there are no privacy considerations since the 
system is operated by the same individual, or family members – and benefits – the increase 
of security. If the security level is high (living in a good neighbourhood, as compared to 
others, where crime levels are higher), then the costs are high. However, even when the 
respondent claims that s/he is feeling safe, the cost-benefit analysis leads to the introduction 
of some low-cost solutions – such as installing lights next to the front door, or having a more 
sophisticated security lock. 
 
Another cost, which was mentioned in several interviews, was the value of an individual’s 
property. An approach– “I have nothing valuable, therefore I do not need any extra 
protection” – was mentioned by several respondents. In contrast, when somebody has 
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advanced security measures in effect, it might suggest that his/her property includes valuable 
items. 
 
On the other hand, for the insecure citizen the cost-benefit analysis leads to the decision to 
employ security measures of some kind. These can be either technological (such as CCTV, 
or alarm systems) or construction-based (such as the installation of more secure doors, 
windows, lock system). The fear of crime, as we mentioned earlier, is either a direct result of 
experience, or constructed. An example of experience-based fear of crime can be seen in the 
following story: 
 
“The feeling of someone having broken into your home, snooped around in your 
privacy and opened your drawers. And then the police was also there and just stepped 
over all my belongings that where lying on the floor. That was really unpleasant. And 
it damages your safety feeling. Since the burglary happened, I always control my door 
twice. In the past at the countryside we didn’t lock the door at all, it was open all the 
time. And I did the same in my apartment. I just let the door fall into the lock. But now, 
I lock the door, also with a chain, because I know it can be opened really quickly.  
(Interview ID 541, 34 years, female, Austria) 
 
With the experience of burglary, the feeling of security rapidly declined and changed the 
perception, as well as the actions of the involved individual. In this case the change does not 
involve a radical introduction of new security measures, but rather that the respondent starts 
to make use of existing ones. An increased feeling of insecurity leads to the introduction of 
both construction-based changes (in this case it is the chain on the door), as well as 
technological – such as instalment of CCTV (already discussed in chapter 2.3 “CCTV in 
Europe”) or alarms and even motion-sensors throughout the house. 
 
3.3.4 Concluding thoughts 
 
The analysis showed that there are various types of people, who interact and react to 
surveillance in different ways. The attitude towards the relationship between surveillance and 
security is influenced to a large extent by an individual’s feeling of insecurity. This applies 
when respondents talked both about movement through public spaces, as well as protecting 
their private property. Several interesting trends emerge: 
 
· The feeling of insecurity, which can be both experience-based and constructed, has an 
effect on the perception of surveillance 
· The “insecure citizen” is more likely to be in favour of surveillance and privacy 
concerns play a secondary role at best. Surveillance can be considered resilience 
towards existing insecurity. This is especially true for the accepting individual. 
· The “conscious individual” is aware of surveillance, does not oppose it, but s/he raises 
the issue of regulation  
· There is a type of respondent who opposes surveillance on the grounds of rights 
violations and modifies his/her behaviour when interacting with the technologies. 
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· Decisions about measures to protect one’s property are rational. The level of 
insecurity, as well as the value of possessions is taken into account. 
 
In conclusion, the attitudes of respondents towards surveillance vary. Although the 
opposition/resistance towards surveillance is almost non-existent, there are demands for 
regulation of its use in public spaces by citizens who feel relatively safe. The “nothing to fear, 
nothing to hide” approach is only voiced by the insecure individual.   
  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Chiara Fonio, Martin Kovanič 
 
In this chapter we explored the dilemma between privacy and security by focusing on 
technology. In particular, we drew attention both to a specific surveillance tool (CCTV) and 
to views on security and crime prevention. In general fear of crime plays an important role in 
this context.  We investigated several dimensions, one of them being the difference between 
the watchers and the watched and how the latter perceive control through technology. As we 
showed, several ambiguities seem to arise pertaining to citizens’ attitudes towards 
surveillance technologies. More often than not, citizens do not have clear-cut views, however, 
there are a few recurring themes which are worth considering.  
 
The dilemma between security and privacy is presented as irrelevant if the respondents have a 
good reason to believe that security tools “work”. Moreover, the general belief is that more 
surveillance is more likely to increase security. Despite the differences between reality and 
perceptions, it is worth noting that the latter affects feelings of security and can therefore also 
play a role in changing the attitudes of citizens who perceive themselves as “insecure” or “at 
risk”. However, what seemed to emerge are doubts about the effectiveness of technology 
along with questions on the overall approach to security. For instance, the delegation of 
security to technology was emphasized by many respondents as well as the false sense of 
security provided by surveillance tools. The effectiveness of technology is connected rather 
more with fighting crime, then with crime prevention. Our interviewees highlighted the 
importance of personal and/or social responsibilities in order to feel safe and to live in a safe 
environment.  
 
Privacy is at stake when citizens report personal feelings of being “stalked” or “watched”. 
Surveillance is not always taken for granted, especially in the urban context.  Although the 
“surveillant gaze” is not always accepted, the inevitability of surveillance permeates everyday 
life. Nonetheless, there are options for resilience, namely avoiding places where there are a 
certain number of cameras, for instance, or trying to be “less visible”, that is behaving 
normally when “spied upon”. However, the notion of resilience appears complex and multi-
faceted. Like surveillance, resilience has two faces: one draws attention to options to avoid 
control, the other is the opposite as resilience can also be surveillance. In other words, 
resilience as surveillance emerges when the feeling of insecurity is prevalent.  
 
Another important insight is the high level of awareness of surveillance technologies. Citizens 
we interviewed are familiar with the surveillance society they live in and daily encounters 
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with technology do not go unnoticed. Yet, it is difficult to determine whether awareness 
relates only to the visibility of security tools or also pertains to a deeper understanding of the 
consequences of surveillance. Nevertheless, especially when considering new high-tech 
surveillance mechanisms such as drones or biometrics, “the nothing to fear, nothing to hide” 
approach is not prevalent and respondents implicitly recognize the need for regulation.  
 
To conclude, citizens only rarely use the language of rights violations when it comes to 
thinking about surveillance in the context of security. Even though the “gaze” can be 
uncomfortable and – as we showed – might affect behaviour, acceptance towards surveillance 
in the general public is quite high.  
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4 3ND DILEMMA: PRIVACY AND SOCIALITY  
Keith Spiller  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY  
 
The Internet has had a dramatic effect on Europe and the world since the mid-1990s. As we 
have seen in other chapters it has revolutionized forms of shopping and marketing, as well as 
intensifying issues of privacy and security. In this chapter the emphasis is on communication 
or more especially how the Internet has facilitated new and inventive means of connecting 
people and the emerging socialites that are entwined with this development. How citizens 
now chat via Skype or write via email have revolutionized the speed and agility of 
communication. Indeed, less intimate forms of communication – where contact is not one-to-
one and is directed at mass audiences – have equally opened up new social forms and means 
of interaction. In these instances, the motivation and appeal is often promotional and opinion 
driven and this form of communication has been used in ever diversifying contexts. Twitter 
and Facebook, for example, have the ability to promote new consumer products, academic 
publications, community events or the comments of journalists and sports stars. There are 
some distinctions to be drawn here between social network and social media; media is 
predominately used to speak to larger audiences and, while it can, it is not designed to speak 
directly, i.e. one-to-one conversation. Social networking, on the other hand, tends to cultivate 
familiarity through establishing and maintaining friendships or sharing personal pictures and 
preferences. Other differences include the design and function of sites and the commercial 
opportunities afford by the platforms.139  However, one overriding commonality linking much 
of this activity is the generation of digital and recordable data. In each and every instance, 
there is a data trail left by users indicating what they are viewing, commenting on and how 
and where they are interacting with other users. The use of this information has untold 
implications for surveillance, particularly the harvesting and mining of the information 
produced. Indeed, as the Snowdon revelations have vividly indicated the value of this 
information and its use by governmental agencies as well as the private organisations 
providing services such as the Internet, search engines or email all deliver extensive and 
intimate details of how citizens live their lives and the activities they engage in.  
 
A growing awareness of the power of the information users provided through their online 
activities is taking hold. Indeed, due in no small part to Snowden, the use of data and 
concerns about the data trail have featured in media outlets not commonly associated with 
focuses on surveillance or privacy. For instance, a recent British Airways inflight 
publication140 – a publication aimed at airline passengers – ran an article that included details 
such as, ‘63% of UK adults worry about how much personal data they’ve revealed online’ or 
‘48% say data privacy is an issue they think about’. The growing interest and dissemination 
of such findings highlight the awareness that users are party to. However, many citizens while 
enjoying the benefits the Internet extols are at times carefree in the management of personal 
data – as we explain in the following section. The focal narrative of this chapter is how some 
                                               
139 See, http://www.examiner.com/article/social-media-vs-social-networking-what-s-the-difference 
          http://socialmediatoday.com/SMC/194754 
140 Downer, S. ‘Up Close and Personal’, Business Life, British Airways, May 2014, pp 33-38 
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of these issues of privacy and surveillance are understood, ignored and dealt with in relation 
to using and socialising on the Internet. 
 
4.1.1 The influence of social media has grown and grown 
 
Depending on the platform used by users the impacts and expanses of social media posts or 
comments can be widespread. The scale of impact is of course relevant to the person posting, 
for instance, Barak Obama has over 35m Facebook friends his comments therefore have 
greater exposure than most. However, posts also have the potential of going viral – this is 
where a post is picked by other users and through recommendations its content spreads. One 
example of this phenomena includes a video clip placed on YouTube with the intention of 
showing it to immediate family members. Due to the comedy value of the clip it went ‘viral’ 
and has received over 700 million views.141 This of course is a relatively harmless example, 
there are many others where people have found themselves in compromising or embarrassing 
positions and again the information has gone viral.  The propensity with much of the 
information placed on social media is to have an impact, as well as ease of access for certain 
audiences.   
 
Early examples of social media were based upon the structure of bulletin boards, where 
notifications were placed and audiences could respond or comment on notifications. It is the 
interlinking and bonding of users that expands on the noticeboard format. The comments, 
likes and posts of users can be interrelated with others who have commonalities or have 
joined the same pages or web groups. Beginning in 1985 with what is one of the most widely 
accepted first forms of social networks Well (Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link) was effectively a 
bulletin boards where members could send private messages.142  The trajectory of online 
networks then development with sites such as friendsreunited in the 1990s, where member 
sought and contacted past classmates and friends. These sites in turn developed, for example, 
MySpace in the 2000s was used predominately by music lovers and to promote music in 
various guises, as was LinkedIn introduced in 2003 and designed to help business networks 
and connections. In 2004 Facebook was launched and in 2006 Twitter went live. What these 
various sites have in common is an embryonic place to share ideas, opinions, information, 
photographs or music, as well as providing an opportunity to meet and chat with friends and 
strangers online. The popularity of these sites has spawned new ways of interacting online, 
for instance, passive observations, where the need to meet face-to-face in order to exchange 
personal news or stories has been adapted. Commonly, friends and family are up-dated on the 
activities of a person through posts made on a social media site. This of course is nothing 
new, as the postcard or photo album, it could be argued provided similar functions, however 
what is different is the spread and audience of this information provided by the Internet. Who 
sees can be controlled and curtailed, but for the most part the information is widely available 
to many viewers and as such, pressing for a sociologist examining such a concept, is how this 
technology encourages citizens to perform.  
 
                                               
141 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OBlgSz8sSM 
142 http://www.well.com/aboutwell.html 
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Example of this sort include LinkedIn, which has a business or professional context, where 
users present profiles related to work experiences and the platforms serves the purpose of job 
recruiter and business networking opportunity all in one. Again in this instance, users seek to 
build an online presence, where they ‘visualize’ presentations of the self. Equally the 
geographical location service of foursquare pin-points the live location of users and 
advertisers and acquaintances are informed of the users’ whereabouts, which could be used to 
initiate a social meet-up or a sales opportunity. Much of the speed and spread of social media 
has been aided by the growth of mobile technologies and the growing sophistication of 
wireless capabilities – users have the capability of always being ‘on’. All of these platforms 
have the potential to expose the lifestyles, preferences and movements of individuals and this 
in turn presents distinct advantages and disadvantages to how user’s information is exploited.   
 
The premise to users’ interaction on social media is a repository of personal information that 
is shared to varying degrees with the audience and organisations that use and manage social 
media systems. Users edit and censor the information they wish to present. Nevertheless 
much can be inferred or explicitly extracted from user information that is present as a profile. 
Recent surveillance work on social media has highlighted some on the security and privacy 
difficulties faced by social media users. Trottier143 has drawn attention to how users of social 
media make themselves visible in ways that may not always be clear to the user and indeed 
their acquaintances or audiences. In commercial terms this information is often used to match 
consumers with products. The profile, as Gandy,144 states is the accumulation of information 
by an organisations or individuals on an individual. Included are all representations of the 
self,145 even ones of exaggeration or those removed from certain realities. The blurring of 
public and private personas extends the complexity of these presentations, as for instance 
images from a drunken vacation are viewed by the user’s employer; or employers viewing 
less than polite comments made on Twitter. Online expressions and identities have real and 
often unforeseen offline social, legal, political or financial impacts.  
 
User profiles and the use of information within these profiles, Trottier suggests, pose four 
dilemmas. Firstly, as mentioned there is the marketing and monetizing aspect where collected 
information can be used to profile and target certain audiences. Secondly, police analysis of 
user information can be used, as was the case in investigating the London riots and in other 
high profile cases.146 Here it would seem issues of privacy and covert intension of police 
forces posing under assumed user identities has questioned the rights of basic civil liberties 
most especially in relations to the ethical procedures of such policing practices. Thirdly, 
institutional or organisational management of data has been called into question, most 
especially after Snowden’s claims that large online organisations when requested hand over 
large amount of raw data to governmental agencies.147 Again issues of privacy prevail. 
Fourthly, concerns have been raised about self-presentation where users are activating and 
normalizing online identities, as well as revealing large amounts of personal information - 
data that may not have been exposed in other circumstances, i.e. work colleagues viewing 
                                               
143 Trottier, Daniel. "Social media as surveillance." Farnham: Ashgate, 2012. 
144 Gandy Jr, Oscar H. The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information. Critical Studies in Communication 
and in the Cultural Industries. Westview Press, Boulder, 1993. 
145 Erving, Goffman. "The presentation of self in everyday life." Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1959. 
146 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/social-media/8723038/Facebook-and-Twitter-to-help-police-track-riots.html 
147 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/03/microsoft-facebook-google-yahoo-fisa-surveillance-requests 
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personal images.  Other commentators have also highlighted the generational influence of 
social media, particularly for teenagers,148 as Boyd suggests, networked publics are how some 
of the social interactions of social media online spaces are actualized and used. With 
reference to the now decreasingly popular music site Myspace, Boyd presents a convincing 
argument of the need felt by teenagers to conform to social norms. Within these online 
spaces, ‘everyone is doing it’ and therefore if a teenager wants to be popular, informed and 
fashionable they will participate in this form of communication. Not to do so would lead to a 
form of exclusion. This statement of course needs to be taken in context, as being part of a 
collective is highly desirable for some but not all teenagers. Nevertheless, social media 
provides a platform for communication and socializing that presents a world in which nascent 
social etiquettes are formed and reformed for young adults. To some degree this is also an 
exclusive space or one many teenagers are confident that adults, i.e. their parents, are not 
comfortable in and unlikely to participate. Although as Boyd states when parents do enter this 
world there is a quandary because if privacy is set high to exclude the gaze of parent potential 
teenage viewers will also be omitted.149 
 
A current popular platform in social media is the micro blogging site Twitter. In this case 
there is less of a generational gap, for example, many academics have taken to it in order to 
access new research findings from conferences, and accepted-but-not-yet-published papers, 
and to hear views of leading academics on current theoretical/methodological/policy-related 
issues in the field. Indeed, championing the benefits of Twitter some leading academics have 
blogged about how to use it in academic settings150. Twitter limits user’s comments to 140 
characters; pictures, videos and shared links can also be included. One of the defining features 
of Twitter is the re-tweet function; found information can be re-posted by the new users.151 
Equally the hashtag function allows topics of information to the easily found and the re-
posted with comment; for example, #IRISS included at the end of a tweet would make it 
straightforward for any Internet user to find and comment on this project. The power of 
Twitter is far reaching and can have dramatic political implications, as well as impacts on 
social unrest. Indeed tools such as BlackBerry Messenger were widely used in the London 
riots of 2011. The encrypted messaging service encouraged the participation of rioters and 
offered enticement such as ‘come and get free stuff’ in relation to the many sports stores that 
were raided. Stealing sports clothing was one of the main activities of the riots, nevertheless it 
was this form of social media that co-ordinated and advertised the activities to rioters. In other 
highly contentious settings, social media has also contributed to politically motivated events. 
Social media supported and intensified the political tensions in the 2012 movement for regime 
change in North Africa. Equally influential in this context was YouTube, as Twitter was used 
to co-ordinate activities and YouTube presented the happening to wider and international 
audiences.152 A critical event in North Africa was the protest of Mohammed Bouazizi which 
                                               
148 Boyd, D. “Why youth (heart) social network sites: The role of networked publics in teenage social life”. MacArthur 
foundation series on digital learning–Youth, identity, and digital media volume, 2007,pp 119-142. 
149 See, Beer, David. "Can you dig it? Some reflections on the sociological problems associated with being uncool." 
Sociology 43, no. 6 (2009): 1151-1162. 
150  See http://deevybee.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/gentle-introduction-to-twitter-for.html 
151 Boyd, D., Golder, S., & Lotan, G. (2010, January). Tweet, tweet, retweet: Conversational aspects of retweeting on twitter. 
In System Sciences (HICSS), 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference, 2010 (pp. 1-10).  
152 Eltantawy, Nahed, and Julie B. Wiest. "The Arab Spring| Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering 
Resource Mobilization Theory." International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 18. 
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when reported on Facebook went viral.153 Moreover, Tunisia, where the Arab spring is 
credited as starting, had 2 million Facebook users at the time that helped to spread and drive 
how the event was reported. Twitter, bloggers and Facebook users all carried messages of 
protest as its profligacy and political impact grew. Indeed, social media users often posted 
clips of television coverage to highlight the governmental message and it’s, at the time, 
political leanings.154 Such clips were used to highlight abuses of civil rights and often resulted 
in western celebrities posting comments or re-twitting the information.  
 
Much of the power of social media can be understood through the changing elements of the 
Internet. Being ‘on’ and having instant and 24 hour access to news, blogs and ‘feeds’ has 
irredeemably altered the communication landscape. To the forefront has been the use of smart 
phones or devices, where access to the Internet is available remotely and widely throughout 
most European countries. Indeed, the use of mobile Internet use has seen a substantial jump in 
the level of usage, 36% of Europeans in 2012 accessed the Internet daily via a mobile device 
(smart phone, tablet or PDA (personal digital assistant),155 whereas in 2011 14% of Europeans 
did.156 It is to some of these effects that we turn in developing our argument throughout the 
chapter. However, we now introduce the 5 focal countries to this report and give some 
background information on Internet use in these countries. 
 
4.1.2 Focal countries 
 
The five countries from which our data is generated are Germany, Slovakia, Italy, Austria and 
the UK. As mentioned in earlier chapters these locations where picked to provide an overview 
of some of the contemporary issues facing Internet usage in Europe. The impact of Internet 
use and indeed some of the surveillance repercussion felt in Europe post-Snowden has 
differed throughout Europe particularly in reaction to the security of personal data revelations. 
This may be related to the rates of Internet use, therefore we provide a short overview here. 
We limit the detail to percentages of citizens with access to the Internet, average daily use of 
the Internet and use of social media. All of these results concentrate on our selected countries 
and on popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. 
 
Facebook has over 250 million active users157 and about 347m account holders in Europe158. 
However other platforms widely popular worldwide such as Twitter have proved less 
successful in Europe, as a recent article stresses, Germany’s reluctance to use Twitter may 
have cultural and historical antecedents – recent histories of state-watching personal 
communications may make users less likely to volunteer personal opinion.159 Indeed, some 
commentators suggest Germans rarely comment online and are passive users.160  
                                               
153 Khonder, H.H. Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring, Globalizations. Vol 8 (5) 2011, pp 675-679 
Beaumont, P. The Truth about Twittter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab World. The Guardian, 25 February, 2011. 
154 The liberating quality of the internet has of course been queststioned – see, Morozov, Evgeny. The net delusion: The dark 
side of Internet freedom. PublicAffairs, 2012. 
155 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/DE%20Internet%20use_0.pdf 
156http://www.iabeurope.eu/files/3713/6852/4105/european20mobile20Internet20use_executive20summary.pdf 
157 http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm) 
158 http://www.insites-consulting.com/347-million-europeans-use-social-networks-results-of-a-global-social-media-study/ 
159 http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2013/12/social-media 
160 http://lovable-marketing.com/2013/10/18/twitter-in-germany/ and Insites-consulting.com op cit 
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Nevertheless, the popularity of other forms of social media in Europe is substantial and 
continues to expand, as the follow figure demonstrates.161  
 
 
 
 Figure: Social Media Use in European Countries 
 
The European share of social media is over a quarter of the world traffic and to give some 
context to this level of impact we provide figures below for each of the focal countries on 
levels of household Internet access and averages on weekly or daily use of the Internet in the 
countries (figures are from 2013 and 2012 respectively).  
 
Slovakia 
· 75% of households have access to Internet162 
· 80% of population use Internet weekly163 
Germany 
· 88% of households have access to Internet164 
· 84% of population use Internet weekly165 
 
                                               
161 http://wearesocial.net/blog/2014/02/social-digital-mobile-europe-2014/ 
162 For detailed account and trends see: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-050/EN/KS-SF-12-
050-EN.PDF  
163 www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/.../Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls 
164 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tin00134 
165 www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/.../Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls 
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Italy 
· 69% of households have access to Internet166 
· 58% of population use Internet weekly167 
Austria 
· 81% of households have access to Internet168 
· 81% of population use Internet weekly169 
UK 
· 88% of households have access to Internet170 
· 87% of population use Internet weekly171 
 
In drawing on the use of the Internet in Europe and in our 5 focal countries we highlight four 
main hypotheses that frame this chapter and we also seek to challenge understandings the 
impact of the Internet and social media use. We concentrate on: 
 
· How and why do citizens use online technological innovations? 
· How does an innovation such as social media affect understandings (attitudes) and the 
actions (behaviours) of citizens? 
· Is there a dilemma between online and offline attitudes and behaviours?  
· Is there a dilemma between privacy and sociality? 
 
The chapter follows a structure of firstly discussing the impact of online technologies (section 
4.1), for instance, online banking or email and how to some degree it has revolutionized the 
worlds we live in. Shopping, as another example, is now an altogether different proposition to 
what it was as recently as 15 years ago, the Internet for most is one of our first ports of call 
particularly when we want to secure competitive prices or research a potential purchase.  The 
chapter relies on the inputs of our empirical research and it allows the voices of our 
interviewees to tell their story. In each section we concentrate on a central story, which is 
used to highlight the dilemma we pose in that section. The dilemmas focus on some of the 
trade-offs, difficulties, tensions or new socialites that, as we have found, are emerging in how 
citizens talk about Internet use (section 4.2). We also consider lives offline and the ever-
increasing influences of the Internet and mobile technologies into issues of privacy and 
sociality evident in Europe today or during the summer of 2013, when the interviews were 
recorded (section 4.3). Finally we conclude by offer some thoughts and just how these aspects 
are actualised in Europe. 
 
The chapter proceeds by looking at practices of using social media and concentrates on 
activities engaged in by citizens. These activities centre the on issue of managing – where 
citizens actively maintain and care for their online profiles, identities and relationships. This 
focus is on the selective processes, for example, choosing online friends. The second focus is 
using and how the Internet and social media are engaged in by citizens, whether they are for 
                                               
166 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tin00134 
167 www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/.../Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls 
168 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tin00134 
169 www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/.../Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls 
170 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tin00134 
171 www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/.../Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
96
example ‘passive’ users – who use the internet as a source of information – or ‘active’ users – 
who blog, comment or post information online. The emphasis here is the act of doing and 
how things are initiated online and more explicitly how citizens live online. This focus will 
also link into some of the online lives and influences that now extend into offline behaviours 
and everyday life. The third focus is upholding and this refers to some of the legal parameters 
set in place to ensure the protection of citizens’ rights when online, such as data protection 
rights. It also, however, looks to the online etiquettes that govern or certainly demand how 
social interactions are conducted online. Lastly we focus on living and socializing in a 
mediate world and argue there is evidence of new socialites emerging in how citizens live 
their lives online and offline. The impacts and commonalties citizens now share because of 
their lives online, as well as their lives offline, and the influences that chaperon such 
phenomena. We begin by discussing the role of technology and the Internet in our European 
contexts. 
 
 
4.2 USING TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET  
 
As we have seen, a generous proportion of European Citizens are active online. Activities 
range from shopping, to dating, to using the Internet as a source of information. Other 
activities centre on promotional incentives where individuals and organisations advertise 
events or products. However, of huge significance to online life in Europe are the growing 
opportunities for social interaction online, with the rise of the web 2.0 the private use of the 
net seems to have become mainly about communication and socializing. Online tools such as 
emails, video conferencing or the ever-growing diversity of social media services have 
changed the landscape of how citizens talk to each other, as well as how business operates. 
No longer is the telephone or postal letter the main means of correspondence. What we refer 
to is not new, and email has certainly been widely used since the mid-1990s. Yet, it is the 
acceptance and normalization of these activities that have seized online sociality and to some 
degree offline sociality. For example, it is rare to now take a journey on any form of public 
transport without observing at least one fellow traveller using a smart phone, and one can 
presume, observing them checking emails or accessing the Internet. Equally these new 
technologies offer fantastic labour saving devices, for example, sharing online calendars. 
 
What citizens do online has sparked much debate of late, sparked in no small way by the 
Snowden revelations. How information from social media is being used by governmental 
agencies, spammers or app developers is of growing concern to users.172 For sociologists the 
narcissism inherent in the presentation of the online self and the formation and maintenance 
of online sociabilities has generated a litany of comment.173 Arguments include the careful 
crafting of identities174 or look to Milgram’s work on the inter-connectivity between people, 
and the 6 degrees of separation concept.175 Many sociological arguments centre on the 
weakening of sociability as the social bonds and interactions of face-to-face behaviours and 
                                               
172 https://www.privacyrights.org/social-networking-privacy-how-be-safe-secure-and-social 
173 Preece, Jenny. "Etiquette online: from nice to necessary." Communications of the ACM 47.4 (2004): 56-61. 
174 Rosen, Christine. "Virtual friendship and the new narcissism." The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society 
17.2 (2007): 15-31. 
175 Milgram, Stanley. "The small world problem." Psychology today 2.1 (1967): 60-67. 
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networks are curtailed in favour of non-immediate or non-intimate online communications. 
Nevertheless, there is also a social strengthen in how citizens work, play, socialize and even 
engage in public or political debate and action online. Indeed, there is a cohesive community 
often evident in how citizens choose to participate online. As Barabási and Frangos 
suggest,176“The world is shrinking because social links that would have died out a hundred 
years ago are kept alive and can be easily activated. The number of social links an individual 
can actively maintain has increased dramatically, bringing down the degrees of separation.”  
 
For Barabási and Frangos the 6 degrees of separation, Milgram once proclaimed, can be 
reduced – this concept suggests social relations are integrally interlinked and individuals are 
never more than 6 intermediaries apart. Barabási and Frangos argue that due to online 
relationships this separation has now lessened to 3. Indeed, the power apparent in social 
networks and media has been quickly harvested by political movements, as mentioned. The 
cause célèbre being the mobilization of voters in the elections of Obama in 2008 and 2012, 
when Facebook amongst other platforms was used in firstly identifying potential voters and 
then used to influence users’ voting. As Bond et. al.177 excellent paper argues, influence is 
still spread through face-to-face social networks and the online political message sent by the 
Obama camp is at its most effective amongst those with strong offline ties. What citizens 
observe ‘good’ friends doing online stimulates political thoughts and outlooks. Such micro-
targeting, as Bennett178 calls it, has culminated with election campaigns ‘in a box’, where 
organisations now specialize in providing the capabilities to target specific audiences with the 
sole intention of influencing democratic practice. 179 
 
Sharing details online, be they political affiliations or allegiances, is de-rigour and something 
as causal as expressing a ‘like’ on Facebook can indicate sensitive knowledge. For instance, 
likes have been used as indicators of preferences, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, illegal 
drug use and political allegiances.180 This information is valuable in directing campaigns and 
indeed in providing strong indications as to demographic information, as well as, cultural and 
political leanings. Likes are a means of indicating your approval for comments or captions 
placed on Facebook. However, one problematic that comes to light in our interviews with 
citizens is issues of privacy and indeed, issues of prolific commentary. In relation to privacy, 
users do have the options to select and limit who views their posts, but are only too aware that 
organisations, such as Facebook or Google commonly use the entirety of their comments 
when analysing data. How people use social media can have detrimental effects as the 
frequency of posting can defy online norms. Posting too frequently and with too much detail 
can lead to viewers turn-off and restrict access to over-eager participants. In the following 
quote a participant gives some indication to the un-comfort they feel. 
                                               
176 Barabási, Albert-László, and Jennifer Frangos. Linked: The New Science Of Networks Science Of Networks. Basic Books, 
2002. Page 39 
177 Bond, Robert M., Christopher J. Fariss, Jason J. Jones, Adam DI Kramer, Cameron Marlow, Jaime E. Settle, and James H. 
Fowler. "A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization." Nature 489, no. 7415 (2012): 295-
298. 
178 Bennett, C. Knowing how you vote before you do: micro‐targeting, voter surveillance and democratic theory. Session 9, 
SNN Conference, Barcelona 2014. 
179 Williams, Christine B., and Girish J. Gulati. "Social networks in political campaigns: Facebook and the 2006 midterm 
elections." annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 2007. 
180 Kosinski, Michal, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel. "Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of 
human behaviour." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110.15 (2013): 5802-5805. 
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Yes, the privacy settings. People who are not friends with me can just see the profile 
picture and that’s it. … When I started using Facebook, in 2007 or something, nobody 
had that. It just developed in the last years. At the beginning, you could spy on 
everyone because there were no privacy settings (…) And I protect myself by not 
putting certain information on Facebook. Most of the time it’s just when I see 
something on the Internet then I share it. Or when I have an afternoon with my 
girlfriends and then we take a picture and post it. It’s not too private information … 
not that I put every day how I am feeling and so … actually, I never do that (…) it’s 
also because I think it is not interesting that all my other friends are reading what I 
am doing. The people that are interested I phone them. And I think it is annoying the 
people that post something every day. Most of the time I also don’t post where I am at 
the moment … you could check in at places.” 
(Interview ID 536, 24 years, female, Austria) 
 
The citizen is an experienced Facebook user and has some sense of pride in being at the 
forefront in maintaining her privacy. The participant’s guardedness is key here, despite her 
being a blogger and someone comfortable with life online. She is very selective in who has 
access to her online profile and highlights the fact that for her, if a person is important to her 
she would rather telephone than contact them through Facebook. We can presume these 
friends are also Facebook friends and to some degree this goes along with the findings of 
Bond et al that stronger relations remain offline181 – but what we do online or what we see 
close friends do online is important. However, most interesting in the comment is an 
awareness of self-selection where this experienced user is critical of overly exposing oneself. 
To blog or post too much is ‘annoying’. Equally, the participant limits the potential for others 
to locate her by not ‘checking-in’. Yet, being online is a central means of communication for 
her, as she has practiced it for over 7 years and, judging by her age, many of her formative 
experiences may have revolved around online socialites. Nevertheless, for this participant at 
least there are a clear set of guidelines in how she performs online, care and attention are 
given to privacy and close friendships can be understood by those who she chooses to 
telephone. In the following section we extend our examination of how technologies encourage 
citizens to perform and concentrate on how online social media lives are manages by users. 
 
 
4.3 SOCIAL MEDIA  
 
Here we begin to dissect the attitudes and behaviours of citizens toward social media, and 
indeed the various issues of control and power that extol from citizens engagement with 
social media. Important are considerations of how information and the dissemination of that 
information have consequences in terms of how citizen data is being used by third parties. 
Much of the information placed on social media posts has value, as mentioned, that can be 
readily applied to political, financial or criminal motivations; however what citizens choose to 
place in their posts is also telling. What is posted often gives an indication of how citizens 
may be formulating the story or identity they wish to portray. Therefore section 6.2 has a 
                                               
181 Bond, 2012. Op. cit. 
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focus on the management of social media and how users control and manipulate how they use 
the platform and how they understand the impacts of this management. As we discover, 
participants in our research are aware of the implications of their posts and are aware that 
industries and governments may be watching their posts, but despite this, there appears to be a 
naivety or carefreeness attitude to in how some engage with social media, for others keeping a 
tight control is of concern. 
 
Central to our observations and to the comments of participants are their deep and troubled 
appreciations of privacy and the making of online personas. Both aspects mutate and need 
management. Firstly in terms of privacy, as Albrechtslund182 states, mediated publics are not 
private and there is a participatory surveillance to users proactive on social media. A privacy 
dynamic exists, in that users often feel they are in control of their information and what others 
can see.  Through the functions available on sites limits are placed on accessibility for others, 
however as Boyd183 warns what of the invisible audience, for whom privacy settings do not 
apply. Law enforcement agencies marketers and fraudsters, for example, can easily 
circumvent these limits. Equally through the networks users join or participate in, much can 
be gleaned or certainly inferred. More pressing still are the modifying qualities of social 
media platforms, where ‘improvements’ to the functionality of sites, for example, establishing 
new links and commonalities with other users or creating new formats to present personal 
information such as photographs. In these instances when the changes are initiated, privacy 
settings are set to a default of open. For the privacy conscious user action is required. 
Andrejevic 184 speaks of ‘digital enclosure’ where every action generates information, and so 
nothing goes to waste. Indeed, social media offers much thought for surveillance studies 
because social media quantifies in very real ways the opinions and thought of individuals, 
because the interactions of users become measurable, traceable and visible and ultimately 
they are never forgotten.185 Of interest to us is the notion here of collaboration in identity 
construction and in particular how the formatting of the sites moves users in certain 
directions, for example, using a photograph on a profile page and then mimicking the 
presentation of other users. As Castells186 argues, the construction of identity is an organising 
principle and how users engage with particular audiences indicates the dynamics of those 
interactions. As mentioned earlier if a user is a member of a Facebook page for long distance 
running, it is safe to assume they have an active interest in this activity – again all increasing 
the quantification of how users can be read. 
 
Pressing in the following quote is how citizens are keeping control of their social media 
accounts. She begins by discussing the social media accounts she has, 
 
                                               
182Albrechtslund, Anders. "Online social networking as participatory surveillance." First Monday 13.3 (2008). 
183  Boyd, Dannah,. “Social network sites: Public, private, or what?” The Knowledge Tree, edition 13 (May), 2007a, at 
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“Yes, I use FB, Twitter, Linkedin and YouTube. I have really tight privacy settings 
being aware that my data are lost anyway, namely that my privacy settings don’t 
protect me from Mr. Facebook who can use my data for aims I don’t even know….  
I don’t put my email and phone number on LinkedIn because LinkedIn is open. I put 
only my name and surname. … 
 
I don’t use my name and surname in Twitter even though this does not protect me as 
I’ve been found by people I don’t necessarily want a direct connection with. I share 
opinions I am passionate about which I don’t consider “sensitive”. I avoid tweetting 
on politics because I am not so passionate about politics and I don’t have clear-cut 
political ideas. Data are lost anyway in Twitter. … 
 
When I want to share something, Twitter is the last social network I use as the sharing 
practice is really fast and sometimes one does not think much about potential readers. 
… 
 
In FB I use groups. When I share a video or a post sometimes I share it only within a 
certain group. In this sense, FB is easier as there are privacy settings. In Twitter there 
is no such thing and the problem is that Twitter is addictive but does not guarantee 
privacy at all. Black or white: the account is public or private. When I signed up on 
Twitter my account was private but then I went public as I was disconnected from the 
world and I "had" to go public. And I would do it again. Ideally one should have the 
opportunity to share in Twitter like in FB: you share ideas only with some people. 
Meets the criteria” 
(Interview ID 37, 27 years, female, Italy) 
 
To the forefront of the participants’ comments are her provocations about privacy on social 
media. ‘Mr. Facebook’ as she rightly indicates in one of the many faceless audiences that 
have access to her information.  Interestingly she also refers to ‘sensitive’ information and 
passionate opinions, which drive her posts. Avoiding topics, of course, may be linked to her 
lack of interest or knowledge and therefore she is reticent about commenting. All of which 
helps in the construction of her online identity as she registers her interests in the posts she 
does make. Nevertheless, there are clear demonstrations of power, trust and control in how 
the participant speaks of managing her account and the worries and concerns she has about 
her privacy and the security of her data. Indeed, note-worthy is the time-lapse of Twitter. 
Twitter for her is too instant and therefore has the greater potential of posting something that 
may be regretted at a later date. 
 
Managing profiles by deleting and up-dating information allows for an editorial process in the 
construction of online presence. The audience and who they are dictate access to accounts and 
what they can and cannot view. ‘Mr Facebook’ will always have the opportunity to view, 
however the participant does not want ‘too much’ information online, because privacy is 
important. The participant has also considered erasing their profile, but to do so would have 
led to disconnection with family and friends. The fear of detachment is also of concern to the 
following participant,  
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“I decided to boycott FB, but I did not want to have my profile erased, because I have 
these friends abroad and I want to stay in touch with them. I think it [FB] is addictive 
and people lose personal contact with each other… I think that people use Facebook 
because they want to share their privacy, be like an open book, what they do, when 
they do it, where he is. People post pictures with their friends; I think this is a loss of 
privacy.” 
 (Interview ID 458, 37 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
A compulsion or the necessity to stay online are a forceful influence and as the participant 
states they sought to boycott Facebook, yet they still wanted to use it for connecting with 
friends, which raises the issue if it was really a boycott. We want to finish this section, by 
suggesting that there is deep-seated compulsion within social media and one based on a fear 
of not-knowing or isolation. Indeed, many of the quotes we collected referred to social media 
as a source of information.  
 
“You need to be part of certain things. If not, one doesn’t get to know/hear about 
anything anymore, for example Facebook. My nieces and also nephews … do a lot 
there, and I got to know all of that when I am on Facebook. Thank god, they don’t 
block me (hihi) so, I do get the information. Otherwise, I would find Facebook 
superfluous … On the other hand, I am a church guide. I frequently find things [on 
Facebook] that are quiet important for my work. There are old views [pictures] of our 
church and the like … on Facebook where people would not expect it. One can also 
connect with people, one can get to know people that I would not get to know 
otherwise because they are not in my [social] environment … I have an account on 
Twitter… I always read what my nephew does occupationally. That is also interesting, 
or what another nephew does … then there are the sites/networks for elderly, like 
senior.com, that I barely use.”  
(Interview ID 175, 63 years, female, Austria) 
 
Using social media as a promotional tool, as some do, to highlight information is different to 
the management of the tool as an essential and it would seem addictive entity. Being online, 
being connected and posting can overpower the management of the tool. Even in instances 
where the compulsive nature of a participant’s use is acknowledged, concerns about privacy 
are raised and despite these concerns the tool is still used. This is not to dismiss the many 
advantages of social media which was touched upon in the introduction, but it does highlight 
the surveillance potential inherent in the activity and in the production of data. As social 
commentators caution, within social media, sociability and personal networks become very 
visible.187 And while most of our participants were quick to acknowledge the prevalence and 
hazards of visibility, it would appear being connected is of greater importance. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
187 Trottier & Lyon 2012 op. cit. 
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4.3.1 Googleveillance  
Alexander Neumann 
 
In the last story an aunt was reading her nephews Twitter accounts to obtain information 
about them. This story highlights that social media sites are not only a source of information 
for users. These platforms also enable users to watch others members of these networks and 
simultaneously the watcher is becoming the watched as well. In other words many social 
media services enable the user to act as the surveillant whilst at the same time the surveillant 
user becomes surveilled by an anonymous group of other surveillants. Of course there is a 
third actor in this surveillance practice, the service providers. Google and Facebook are 
collecting and processing data about their users by means of dataveillance, data mining and 
profiling. While interviewing citizens about the integration of various communication 
technologies into their everyday lives, sooner or later many of them almost “admitted” that 
they enjoy using services such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and the like to “check on other” 
people they have just met or they want to meet in “real life” soon. Surveillance studies 
scholar Fernando Bruno188 describes this practice as participatory surveillance. Where, 
through such practices, users of Web 2.0 platforms constitute a participatory panopticon. The 
term participatory panopticon was coined by Cascio189 and describes cyberspace, especially 
the Web 2.0 as a realm where a bottom-up version of the constantly watched society is 
developing. One can find a large variety of examples for participatory surveillance as 
explained by Bruno and Casico on sites like crime maps or wikicrimes where Internet users 
are collaboratively producing reports on criminal incidents in their neighbourhood. Separate 
from these practices, research in IRISS identified the fact that users are watching their peers 
or even complete strangers online through googleveillance. A good example of what is meant 
by the term googleveillance is provided by a story already quoted above.  
 
“I posted something controversial when I was drunk, you know about it, you also read 
it. Not for the first time, but I had begun a new job recently and when I woke up, I really 
felt bad about it. My new boss even read it, made jokes about it and all. But on Sunday 
morning, it's like the whole world is on Facebook, I received comments from people I 
haven't seen in years and I thought, no, no more of that”. 
(Interview ID 66, 31 years, female, Germany) 
 
Borrowing from the famous don’t drink and drive slogan for the “Generation Facebook” the 
saying don’t drink and Facebook has become a popular quotation that can be found on several 
social networks when someone obviously posted something under the influence of alcohol. In 
the narrative above, a young person from Germany regrets a Facebook comment she posted 
when she was drunk. People probably start to tell stories or make comments when they are 
drunk, which they often regret the following day. What is new about this story is the problem 
for the citizen as techno-social hybrid to actively provide for his/her privacy. Of course the 
controversial posting can be deleted the next morning when sobriety has returned, but in a 
world where everyone is on Facebook on Sunday morning and not sharing the gossip of last 
night’s pub escapades on the church stairs, keeping-up privacy in the global village becomes a 
problem for the techno-social hybrid. There are two other interesting aspects in this story. 
                                               
188 See Bruno, Farnanda. ‘Survaillance and participation on Web 2.0’ in „Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies“ Ball, 
K, D. Hagerty and D. Lyon (Eds.), Routledge New York, 2012. 
189 Casico, Jemais, The rise of the participatory panopticon, The World Changing, 4 May 2005. 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
103
Firstly, the linking of private and professional life on social networks: As the storyteller’s new 
boss is also part of her Facebook friends the storyteller comes to the conclusion, that in the 
future she will better consider what is to be shared with her Facebook friends. Second, the 
decoupling of time and space is obviously the biggest advantage of all Internet based 
communication. In this narrative the virtual friends of the storyteller, whom she hasn’t met or 
seen for years personally and who are now commenting on the embarrassing drunk Facebook 
posting seem to become very real the morning after. One could get the impression that 
googleveillance is a phenomenon experienced only by the younger generation, who are using 
social media platforms more frequently, where the distinction between real and virtual life 
begins to blur. However, this is not entirely the case as the next story from Austria highlights. 
 
„Basically everyone who is my friend in real life is also my friend on Facebook, also my 
former colleagues or students. Especially many of my former students are my friends on 
Facebook,that is quite interesting. I can look what they are doing or I look what my 
grandchildren are doing or my son. I myself do nothing on Facebook. I also have an 
account on LinkedIn but I don’t use it. I wanted to share my experiences as a consultant 
for teachers on LinkedIn, but that was to stressful to me and you have to know that 
teachers are very bad clients (laughs).” 
(Interview 256, female, 77 years, Austria) 
 
Interestingly social media platforms seem to be a vital source of information for family 
members to gather information about their relatives, although no one would ever consider this  
a surveillance practice: Neither the aunt reading her nephews’ accounts on Twitter or the 
grandmother in this story would say that they are watching their loved ones. Stories like the 
ones mentioned here represent a fundamental change in the relations of communication 
brought about through social media platforms. While checking on your relatives’ status 
updates on Facebook is one thing, the borders between work and private life become 
increasingly blurred on these platforms. It is not surprisingly that the professional network 
LinkedIn launched its latest advertising campaign with the slogan “Facebook for your private 
life and LinkedIn for your professional life”. As explained by the storyteller in the story above 
this slogan applies for her, as she tried to make use of LinkedIn as a platform to sell her 
services as a consultant to teachers. However, it is not so true anymore when Facebook 
information is used in a professional context as explained by the next storyteller form Italy. 
 
“Once I should have employed a person in my husband’s company, so beyond the CV I 
looked for information about him on Facebook. For instance I check the political 
opinions (I have many friends who are directors in big companies and they notice that 
the employees that are too much left-wing oriented usually are against the company 
owner) (…). I agree with this system of selecting the human resources, as on the 
Internet you can collect info about his behaviour, if he is a reliable person or the 
friends he has, (“profiling” his friends). (…) I check also if he writes on the Internet 
faked information about himself during the interview and I check if he says the truth on 
his Facebook profile. (…). Although I refuse to employ a person on the exclusive base 
of the Facebook information and I match them with the info collected through the 
interview, but I evaluate the person also on the base of practical motivation for the 
company (job experience, competence, etc.). At the end we did not employ this person 
but the motivation was beyond the Facebook info and the interview itself...”  
(Interview ID 206, 49 years, female, Italy) 
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This story is a good example how ICT paved the way for function creep and the changing 
power relations between employers and employees. In many of the interview passages that 
dealt with workplace related surveillance experiences (see chapter 5.2) the interviewees 
clearly supported the position that what they do after working hours is not their employer’s 
business. This is true for a time in which the borders between private and public or 
professional life where crisp but once you are friend with your Boss on a social media 
platform, then s/he is also your friend after 5pm. In the case of the Italian businesswoman the 
storyteller is explaining how she is using Facebook to look for information about potential 
employees. The profiling she is conducting is not based on Big Data or dataveillance, she 
simply checks the political opinions of the people that have been invited for a job interview 
and whether they tell her the truth during the job interview. Facebook was originally not 
designed to allow employers to get an impression about their next employee, but it enables 
employers to get a glimpse into the private life of their workers.  
 
The last story in this sub-chapter on googleveillance is also related to Facebook activities and 
how a virtual profile can influence the life of citizens, although this story is more of a private 
nature than the one before. As the Italian job applicant in the previous story would have done 
well to use a fake user name for his Facebook profile to avoid awkward questions from his 
employer, the storyteller in the next story explains which difficulties he experienced precisely 
because of the use of a fake user name on Facebook.   
 
A friend of mine always warned me to use a fake name. Actually this caused some 
trouble with my ex-girlfriend, as her friends have seen her engaging in a relationship 
on Facebook with an Indian sounding name they warned her to quit this relationship 
as this person, me, is only looking for a residence permit and not for true love. I’ve 
changed my fake profile name into my real one and also used a real picture of myself 
to avoid further troubles with her girlfriends. 
(Interview ID 514, 37 years, male, Austria) 
 
Using fake user names is a common strategy applied by many citizens interviewed in this 
study to protect their privacy on social media platforms. To some extent this strategy would 
qualify as a resilient practice as the surveilled user seeks to increase his/her privacy by doing 
so. In this story the fake user name strategy somehow backfired for the storyteller, as his fake 
name did not sound typically Austrian in the eyes of his girlfriends’ friends who checked on 
him on Facebook. The friends of his girlfriend came to the conclusion that, because of his 
foreign sounding name, he was a potential marriage imposter and that his girlfriend has to be 
warned about the upcoming tragedy. This led the storyteller to withdraw from his plans to 
increase his privacy on Facebook with a fake username and picture and he changed his user 
information and picture accordingly to avoid further troubles.  
 
The googleveillance related stories should not be interpreted in the way that social media 
platforms enable citizens to surveil other users in the sense that they are collecting and 
processing data about the surveilled to influence their future behaviour. Googleveillance is a 
common strategy of gathering information about relatives, friends, employees or even people 
that users have never met before personally. The interpretation of this information is mostly 
based on gut instincts and is not a profiling of personal data to draw conclusions about a large 
population of surveilled individuals, but rather this phenomenon is part of the normalisation 
of surveillance in contemporary society. 
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4.3.2 Social Media and accepted practice 
Keith Spiller  
 
In this subsection we concentrate on some of the practices that accompany the use of social 
media. The first centres on issues of protection and legality, specifically issues of privacy and 
the data protection policies that govern social media. Then we consider some of the social 
etiquettes apparent when participating in social media and the accepted social interaction that 
direct social media use.  
 
Legal protection 
Max Schrems is a law student at the University of Vienna and over the past two years has 
challenged Facebook’s interpretation and application of EU data protection laws.190 Schrems’ 
complaint relates to the longevity that user data is retained by organizations and the practice 
of photo archiving data without user consent. Facebook insist they are working within the 
regulatory guidelines set by the EU Data Retention Laws and the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner (the European headquarters of Facebook is in Dublin) is satisfied the 
organization’s data protection practices are legal. The challenge made by Schrems and his 
group Europe-v-Facebook has taken the dispute to the Irish High Court; which on June 18th 
2014 referred the case to the European Court of Justice.191 This action draws attention to the 
types of data held by social media organizations, in particular how information is handled, 
stored and traded all of which raises pertinent data protection questions. And as Schrems 
suggests, this is not an issue limited to young users of social media – young people do care 
about the privacy of their data.192 Instead, this is a larger problem affecting all users. Much of 
the problematic surrounding social media data is a lack of clear policy and regulation.   
 
Under the EU data protection framework users must consent to their data being used and 
collected and information can only be used in situations were consent has been given.193 
However, where this becomes deeply complicated is the multifarious means in which 
information is shared on social media platforms and when national security interventions take 
precedence over privacy.194  While users are appeased with a sense of control195 in how they 
can set their personal profiles, other areas are more difficult to manage; for example 
interpretations and analysis of likes. Current civil right law, data protection law and copyright 
law are unsuited to the demand placed on them by social media.196 Important here is the 
context of the interaction and level of interaction, because consent, for example, is not 
                                               
190 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/technology/austrian-group-plans-court-challenge-to-facebooks-privacy-
policies.html?_r=0 
191 http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/europe-v-facebook-higher-court-to-decide-on-giving-data-to-spies-
30367044.html 
192 Bonneau, Joseph, and Sören Preibusch. "The privacy jungle: On the market for data protection in social networks." 
Economics of information security and privacy. Springer US, 2010. 121-167. 
193 Danezis, George. "Inferring privacy policies for social networking services." In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on 
Security and artificial intelligence, pp. 5-10. ACM, 2009. 
194 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/google-youtube-ban-turkey-erdogan and  
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/the-nsa-is-using-facebook-to-hack-into-your-computer-20140312 
195 26% of EU social network users feel they have total control of their data, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/factsheets/3_en.pdf 
196 http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/technology/citizens-need-to-ask-why-their-data-is-being-held-online-
1.1801157 
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explicitly labelled to apply to policy that regulates social media. 197 More attention is needed 
on the detail on how the data is being used and by whom and in what situation – for example, 
consent for likes to be gathered and analysed. In this regard a recent open letter by leading 
literary figures to the UN calls for, an International Bill of Digital Rights, they state,198 
 
“WE DEMAND THE RIGHT for all people to determine, as democratic citizens, to 
what extent their personal data may be legally collected, stored and processed, and by 
whom; to obtain information on where their data is stored and how it is being used; to 
obtain the deletion of their data if it has been illegally collected and stored.” 
 
As they state, an explicit understanding of what is being consented and by whom needs 
development. One development that has taken place is the introduction of the ‘right to be 
forgotten’. The European Court of Justice ruled in May 2014 that user data must be deleted if 
requested.199 This case centred on the removal of links to "out-dated, wrong or irrelevant" 
information; therefore if a citizen requests Google to remove links to out-of-date data, Google 
search results will then not display the information. The information does not disappear and 
could be found through other resources, for instance, newspaper archives; however Google 
are prevented from finding and presenting the information. The warning ‘Some results may 
have been removed under data protection law in Europe’ appears on search results. This law 
only applies to European searches and is not evident in searches made elsewhere in the 
world.200  Despite the impact of this development, privacy concerns still exist, especially with 
regard to data being used in a responsible manner.201 This, no doubt, is complicated by the 
multitude of ways users provide and produce data to, for instance, social media sites. Finding 
an adequate framework to counter data protection concerns obviously needs direction.202 
Moreover, users are now increasingly aware of these discrepancies and are demanding 
adequate protection. 
 
User etiquette 
Participating in social media follows, as mentioned, certain parameters and rules. There are 
restrictions on how much a user can write on some sites, while in others there are set formats 
to be followed, for instance only writing on ‘walls’. Interestingly, one of the successes of an 
early network site, MySpace, was due to a code gap in the page design, where users were able 
to personalize the background display of their profile page.203 Most of the more recent 
network sites however have produced much more standardized page displays and functions. 
Recent academic work has looked to the homogenising effect of social media and networks.  
Farquhar204 argues that much of the social capital of these networks is based on the 
interpretation of others and the formation of identities that are used to ensure entry to 
preferable groups. Getting into the ‘in’ group encourages exaggerated performances that are 
                                               
197 idbid 
198 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/international-bill-digital-rights-petition-text 
199 http://www.irishtimes.com/business/sectors/technology/citizens-need-to-ask-why-their-data-is-being-held-online-
1.1801157 
200 See, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/26/google-removing-right-to-be-forgotten-links and 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27631001 
201 Business Life, 2014, op. cit.  
202http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/data-protection-and-social-networks, Brown, I., 2012.  
203 Boyd, 2007, op. cit 
204 Farquhar, Lee Keenan. "Identity negotiation on Facebook. com." Unpublished PhD Thesis University of Iowa.  
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designed to appeal and conform to the inferred preferences and approval of the online group. 
In this manner behaviours are tailored to the perceived interpretations of others.205 In other 
instances conformity is driven by the desire for privacy, where for example children post 
conventional opinions due to an online parental gaze. As Brandtzæg et al suggest, many older 
social media users begin using social media in order to monitor the behaviour of their 
children. 206 Nevertheless, the benefits of social media include having an extended audience 
and having all your friends in one place. Expediency and efficiency are guaranteed as a single 
notification can alert all to engagements, events or attitudes. However with catering for large 
audiences comes difficult social dynamics, one such example is the tailoring of comments to 
appease or not offend – or on occasion comments designed to offend and bully.207 Managing 
audiences through social media is a lattice of complexity and getting beyond certain numbers 
of friends and viewers can stimulate irritation.208 Equally, the sometimes competitive nature 
of collecting large numbers of online friends has little or no correlation with emotional 
closeness offline or how a person interacts face-to-face with another person.209 Social media 
enlivens a social etiquette that at times is very different to the social clues and indicators that 
lubricate offline sociability. New forms of sociability are established and these can be 
evidenced in the comments made by our interview participants. In the following quote the 
participant speaks of her online friendships. 
 
“At the beginning, I wanted everyone, now I select more, on the other hand I do not 
want to offend anyone. I would like to leave Facebook altogether, but it is not 
possible, I mean, just for school, who is not on the Facebook like he does not exist. 
You will find everything there and the access to information is faster than in real life." 
(Interview ID 632, 25 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
As the participant states her original goal was to include any person who wished to join her 
friendship list. In time, this caused a quandary once she learned to be more selective, rejecting 
a friendship request or even de-friending an existing friend, although this carries the risk of 
offense. It would appear such selections can have far-reaching consequences. How these 
maybe realised in offline life is unclear, but certainly they have an impact for this participant. 
In addition, and much like some of our earlier discussions, the conundrum of leaving 
Facebook is also aired. Again, the desire is to leave but the fear of social isolation or 
separation is too great. To ‘exist’ one must be on Facebook! Indeed, this form of existence 
may also create a need to continually express oneself in order to ensure one is visible, verbose 
and prolific – all of which confirms an online presence or when done too much an online 
irritation.  As the following participant suggests, 
                                               
205 Lewis, Kevin, Marco Gonzalez, and Jason Kaufman. "Social selection and peer influence in an online social network." 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 1 (2012): 68-72. 
206 Brandtzæg, Petter Bae, Marika Lüders, and Jan Håvard Skjetne. "Too many Facebook “friends”? Content sharing and 
sociability versus the need for privacy in social network sites." Intl. Journal of Human–Computer Interaction 26.11-12 
(2010): 1006-1030. 
207 Lenhart, Amanda, et al. "Teens, Kindness and Cruelty on Social Network Sites: How American Teens Navigate the New 
World of" Digital Citizenship"." Pew Internet & American Life Project (2011). 
208 Schwartz, B. (1968). The social psychology of privacy. American Journal of Sociology, 73, 
741–752. 
209 Pollet, Thomas V., Sam GB Roberts, and Robin IM Dunbar. "Use of social network sites and instant messaging does not 
lead to increased offline social network size, or to emotionally closer relationships with offline network members." 
Cyberpsychology, Behaviour, and Social Networking 14, no. 4 (2011): 253-258. 
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“But with Facebook I started to have problems with people that shared a lot of 
information with me, but in real life we had nothing to talk about. I had too much 
information about people, but I was not willing to filter between different groups." 
(Interview ID 578, 25 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
Evident in this quote are some of the contradictions inherent to social media practices. There 
is a desire to post and present an image and identity, but in the offline life there can be a 
distance or unease felt in dealing with real time sociabilities. These difficulties persist in the 
following quote, 
 
“I am aware of the risks Facebook brings – you can easily find out a lot about a 
person. Sometimes I use it to look for some people and information about them. For 
example if I like some girl, and I don’t even need to know her name or anything, and 
sometimes I am able to find her and get some information about her. For example, I 
liked a girl who worked in the same building where our firms is. So I was thinking 
about how can I find her? My boss actually mentioned, that she does go to the same 
gym as him [crossfit] so I went to the Facebook page of the gym and looked at some 
pictures they posted there. I found an interesting picture of a pregnant girl working 
out so I looked who liked it and I found her there. Then I looked at her profile, 
checked out some pictures but I didn’t like them very much. (laughter) So it’s enough 
that you know one little thing and you can find the person.” 
(Interview ID 781, 28 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
Here the difficulty is to some degree reversed, the real person appears attractive to the 
participant, but when she is viewed online her appeal wanes. Highlighted in these quotes are 
some of the new social etiquettes and practices surfacing through the use of social media. 
Two notable trends emerge in our estimation; the first is the perception of risk that 
accompanies not being online. If you do not have a social media presence then the likelihood 
is that the user will miss out on particular activities. There is also risk apparent in the division 
between online and real time living, as the quotes suggest, making judgements or inferring 
knowledge about a person is dependent on what can be learned online as well as what can be 
seen offline. The second trend relates to new found forms of social distance, in particular 
knowing when to curtail certain activities, such as posting too frequently. As well as the 
invasion of online personal space, for instance delving deeply into profiles or learning to cope 
with ordinariness in real life meetings and interactions. These trends, it would appear, uphold 
how citizens use social media and the social guidelines they abide-by in their activities. 
 
4.3.3 Social Media and the social: My life online  
 
As we have explored in previous sections, social media is now a well established and 
recognised phenomenon, for example, in 2013 ‘tweeting’ was added to the Oxford English 
Language Dictionary. Indeed, the vernacular and the activities of social media are now 
commonly used by presidents, rock stars, teachers and nurses alike. Stimulated by social 
media an emergence of unique and diverse activities has occurred and with it some unusual 
contexts in which social media has made deep impacts, for example, in health contexts 
citizens have often found solace and support with regard to particular conditions and 
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diseases.210 In other instances, social media has been used to find information or report on 
new and distant places to live, study and work.211 These aspects, and others, of social media 
have unsurprisingly spawned much academic enquiry and chief amongst these has been 
considerations of the personalities of those who predominately use social media. Correa et al. 
draw on character traits of extroversion, neuroticism and openness in establishing who uses 
social media.212 Personality they state has strong correlations with social media use, for 
example, extroversion is positively associated due to opportunities to display and perform. 
While the distancing effect of online interaction holds appeal to those seeking support for 
emotional in-stability, it can also discourage and intimidate due to the non-anonymity 
expected when using some aspects of social media. Whereas, especially for older users, social 
media offers those with a tendency for openness to new experiences an avenue to experiment 
and participate. In what follows we focus on how social media is used and how users embrace 
the medium and how issues of self-censorship prevail in their online activities. Social media 
is a way of expanding friendships and is an avenue for extroversion or openness, but our 
intention here is to also draw on some of the interesting uses of social media that have arisen 
in our interviews. 
 
In exploring this theme we concentrate on privacy ‘labour’ or how citizens often work to 
protect their privacy. This we suggest is not passive and as comments made earlier suggest 
privacy carries with it a need for vigilance. One such example of this kind of labour is 
sensitive health data, for instance how to maintain the confidentiality of patient information 
while also encouraging potential health developments and benefits.213 Indeed as we will go on 
to discuss below the sensitivity of data, particularly financial or health data are issues of deep 
concern for many of those we spoke to. We begin with an example of the care taken by a 
participant and the warnings given to her and her fellow students at school: 
 
“I would never put my location on Facebook.  I wouldn't put personal information, 
like my phone number or my address on either of them.  My photos are on Facebook, 
but on Twitter, I don't think I'd put any actual information about myself; it's more like 
what you're doing with friends.  I'm aware that anyone can access your Tweets and 
things.  I know in assembly at my school, they said we can see everything you're 
Tweeting and we're going to put someone's Tweet on the board and everyone really 
panicked...Yes, they got them up and there were all of these ones about people going 
out and not having done any homework and they put them on the board.  They bleeped 
out the names, but they were people from my year's Tweets.”  
 
“It's a shock because you don't think that people would go that far to access your 
information. ... I think the emphasis was on if you put things out there, people can see 
them and he said it took me minutes to find these.  I think that was definitely a wake-
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up call for a lot of people.. He was an IT teacher, so he was doing something on 
Internet safety” 
(Interview ID 6, 18 years, female, UK) 
 
Evident in this quote is the ease of access to information posted online and the fear felt by 
students when that information was discussed by an audience it was not intended for. The 
participant it appears was careful in limiting the information she put online, but even for her it 
was a ‘shock’ and evidently increased her awareness of online safety. All of which duly 
affects the labour she applies to her online self. 
 
The next quote relates to posting something when drunk, equally what could be applied here 
is putting something on line when one was younger and a number of years later it resurfaces – 
all relevant to the ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling. These instances can and often do have 
repercussions for reputations, employability or even incarceration. Recent examples in the 
UK include Twitter users being jailed for posts made and the UK first Youth Police and 
Crime Commissioner having to resign due to defamatory posts she made when younger and 
drunk.214 Other examples include the jailing of one individual due to derogatory racial driven 
comments made on Twitter or the harassment of campaigner Caroline Criado-Perez via 
Twitter.215  The following participant expands on her drunken experience, 
 
“I posted something controversial when I was drunk …. Not for the first time, but I 
had begun a new job recently and when I woke up, I really felt bad about it. My new 
boss even read it, made jokes about it and all. But on Sunday morning, it's like the 
whole world is on Facebook, I received comments from citizens I haven't seen in years 
and I thought, no, no more that.” 
(Interview ID 66, 31 years, female, Germany) 
 
In this instance the mistake by the participant ended with her closing her Facebook account, 
mainly due, it would seem, to the fact it was not the first time she had posted when drunk to 
calamitous effect.  
 
We finish the section with what we consider as an unusual use of social media and one that 
demonstrates the growing research and insight this tool can provide, but also the ethical and 
moral challenges it creates. This quote refers to an adoptive parent viewing the Facebook 
account of his child’s birth mother. The mother had her privacy settings open and therefore 
nothing unlawful took place. However of note is the fact that he was instructed by the 
adoptive agency not to place images of his child online as her birth family could search or 
locate the child. Therefore his privacy setting were highly maintained and valued. He 
comments, 
 
“Yes, absolutely, and I have to be careful as an adoptive parent.  One of the things we 
talked about with the social workers was the danger of putting stuff online that would 
make you traceable to the birth parents, who might want to find you.  Obviously it’s 
                                               
214 See, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-17515992 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/21/paris-brown-no-action-twitter-comments 
215 see, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-17515992 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25641941 
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important that [child’s name ] has complete security, in terms of where she is, so stuff 
you would normally post online, talking about your kids, and maybe putting pictures 
up, or whatever…  Actually, I don’t put pictures of my kids up.  I know a lot of citizens 
do, but I just took that decision from the start that we weren’t going to do that.  With 
[child's name], I’ve had to be extra careful so, for example, on Facebook I don’t 
mention her by name, which doesn’t make a big difference, really, but it’s just a 
precaution, and I’ve told friends offline not to say anything, not to refer to the 
adoption on Facebook.   
When we were adopting, I’d check the Facebook page of the birth mother, so I was 
able to check her out that way.  She probably put certain things on there that she 
shouldn’t have done, so that made me quite aware of the fact that other citizens can 
just go in and read it.” 
(Interview ID 59, 42 years, male, UK) 
 
A unique dilemma is evidenced here and most telling is what appears to be the reinforcement 
of certain contradictions enlivened by social media. The dilemma centres on privacy; on the 
one hand there is a strong emphasis on the privacy of the child and on the participant as well 
as his friends and family, as they too have made a concerted effort to privacy vigilant. 
However, Facebook in this instance has also been used to explore the page of a person who 
the participant might not have come across in other circumstances. Equally a rigid rule seems 
to apply in how the participant posts on social media. It can be presumed difficulties may also 
arise if it was found that the birth-mother and her family and friends were to view the 
participants ‘open’ page. There may not be a contradiction here because both parties are free 
to set their privacy settings as they wish, however issues of privacy labour are more telling. 
How privacy is maintained and understood it would appear differs greatly. Social media 
provides an opportunity to search and view intimate details of users and while attempts have 
been made by sites such as Facebook to protect the privacy of citizens, the consequence of 
viewing pages can be acute. The contradiction in this example may be the one-sidedness of 
access, in that one party can view and make observations but the other party is excluded. 
  
The nature of social media is primarily a social tool in which friendship can be expanded and 
information and communications exchanged. This as we have mentioned can appeal to certain 
personality traits. Nevertheless, things can go wrong with social media and most pressing here 
is when defamatory or embarrassing material is circulated and the adverse outcomes of the 
exposure. The control of this information is given some safeguard due to privacy labour, but 
even here controls are easily circumvented and indeed are easily lost – particularly if an 
‘accepted’ friend has open privacy. Working to maintain privacy and working to avoid the 
consequence of information that has been posted is important. Again, drawing on the 
European Court ruling, the erasure of information is being taken seriously and the tentative 
reassurances provided by privacy settings are being superseded by stronger regulations. 
Needless to say as with privacy settings, getting around these controls is not difficult, for 
instance removing a court conviction from a search engine will not remove it from court 
records or even from newspaper records. However, it does stress that privacy labour in terms 
of online material may prove in the future to be more robust. Social media is a popular tool 
with undoubted social qualities, however at times it also needs to be treated carefully, 
particularly when used ill-advisedly. 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
112
4.4 MY LIFE OFFLINE  
Regina Berglez 
 
In this chapter the manifold interconnections between the offline sphere and the online life 
will be analysed with special emphasis on those stories of social media usage that yielded 
‘real’ consequences in positive as well as in negative terms.   
 
4.4.1 Positive aspects: being connected 
 
The adoption of other/ entirely different personalities in any given ‘online world’ didn’t play a 
role for the interviewees in our study. However, they were clearly distinguishing, and indeed 
highlighting, certain aspects of their online selves – most often in a very direct line to their 
offline life and with regard to certain roles. Respondents stressed their awareness towards the 
roles they actively take  at various occasions in various networks - as friends, fans, relatives, 
employees, professionals etc. “Facebook is a multi-audience identity production site. The 
control users have over the privacy settings of their accounts enables them to partition their 
Facebook pages into many ‘back’ and ‘front’ regions (…) whereby staging different identity 
shows for different audience.”216  
  
The interviewees were actively editing their roles accordingly, putting emphasis on those 
parts of their personalities that matter (to them) – somewhat quite similar to the Goffmanian 
‘front stage’.217 Modern forms of online interaction may vary greatly in scope compared to 
pre-Internet times, but the basic underlying mechanisms of human interaction don’t seem to 
have changed fundamentally yet. (Although the ways and forms of these interactions have, 
which is claimed already yielding consequences on the users’ perceptions and even brain 
activities.218)  
Also, the fact that there is a special ‘stage’ (= forum, newsgroup, Facebook group, personal 
blog etc.) existing for an indefinite number of roles and (almost) every possible aspect of 
one’s preferences, believe system/s, identity/identities available, makes it much easier to get 
connected. It is argued, that ‘the web’ is encouraging community, solidarity and even 
empathy, (that can all be build up and strengthened through social media). No penchant seems 
too strange, no need too special, no opinion, belief or ideology that unique, not to find 
comrades in the World Wide Web. A greater part of modern online individuals seek for 
almost everything first online - and most often successful. Information, commodities, 
necessities and satisfactions as well as porn; and, of utter importance, like-minded-people (for 
good or for bad). Positive aspects were often reported in a way that can be exemplified with 
the following quote: 
 
“Furthermore, Facebook gives me the opportunity to contact other people practicing 
the same sport I do,that live far from my city or even abroad, namely people that I 
would never have the occasion to meet them personally. Facebook gives me also the 
                                               
216 Zhao, Shanyang, Sherri Gasmuck and Jason Martin, Identity construction on Facebook: Digital empowerment in anchored 
relationships, In: Computers in Human Behavior, Vol. 24, Is. 5, 2008, p. 1822. 
(Zhao et al are referring to Goffman ibid.)  
217 Goffman; Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1987 (1959). 
218Comp. American Psychological Association: http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/social-kids.aspx   
Also: http://www.businessinsider.com/this-neuroscientist-worries-that-facebook-home-will-change-our-brains-2013-4 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/social-brain-social-mind/201310/is-facebook-ruining-our-brains 
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chance to meet people with whom I share the same interest for judo, as I’m 
interested in exchange experience and opinions with them, besides I have the 
occasion to meet some of them personally.” 
(Interview ID 936, 20 years, male, Italy) 
 
It was also emphasised that the being connected in social networks can and does – without the 
need to actively stalk a person219 –  reveal worthwhile information about this person and his 
or her offline life: 
  
“If someone posts weird Facebook-stuff, you can tell a lot about his character. Also 
the e-mails he sends, the SMS and all those things, it affects. It is as if you would be 
late (for the job interview). It counts to the first impression. It rather bothers me that 
you have to include a picture in your application. This also affects and in other 
countries this isn’t even allowed anymore. You can influence what you post on 
Facebook. You can block everything, and on your profile picture you simply don’t 
show yourself with a beer or something like that. They won’t find me if I configure it 
this way.” 
(Interview ID 504, 21 years, female, Austria) 
Also, Sofsky reminds us of the “freedom to privacy”, which he frames as “the desire to 
remain undisturbed”, seems for mankind most often of far less importance than the “desire 
for approval, care, protection, or companionship”.220  
 
4.4.2 The privacy online-offline misunderstanding 
 
The following quote can be seen as allegorical for many stories in which respondents alluded 
to the blurriness of ‘privacy’; and furthermore for the described assumptions that privacy is 
still heavily connected to a ‘real’ space that is e.g. the family home: 
   
I don’t actually have a definition for privacy. What is private? I guess really my 
family and my home will probably be. That’s the inner boundary. You don’t invade 
on my space or my family and if you do you’ve got to give me a bloody good reason 
to do it and that probably will require a warrant so, which is… but I don’t have a 
definition for it, isn’t that curious?  
(Interview ID 469, 43 years, male, UK) 
 
Privacy was most often regarded as somewhat indefinable (which is not surprising, given the 
fact that a consistent or distinct definition or a conceptual framework on privacy doesn’t even 
exist in the scientific community. The term privacy remains controversial and in flux and was 
even referred to as a conceptual jungle221). 
Other interviewees expressed an inherent connection between their online and their offline 
lives. ‘Doing’ social media wasn’t portrayed as something separate but rather expressed as the 
extension of various aspects of life into cyberspace. An extension indeed created with the help 
                                               
219 For googleveillance compare chapter “4.3.1 Googleveillance”.  
220 Wolfgang Sofsky, Das Prinzip Sicherheit. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2005, p. 148ff. 
221 Solove, Daniel J., Understanding Privacy, Harvard University Press 2008. 
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of fairly new tools, whether these were perceived as exiting, as normality, or – in some cases 
– fatiguing; but nevertheless tools. Tools that make it easier to stay in touch, stay informed, 
stay connected; despite the negative impact in terms of e.g. surveillance. 
 
Following Goffman, we state that the role/s do matter in the presentation of self in a quite 
similar way online as they do offline. The next story is about a clear demarcation line between 
a personal self and a professional self – which turns out not to be so clear after all. The 
interviewee is an early adopter of the Internet and spent two decades working in (subculture) 
media, using online-tools extensively ever since they became available. His statement 
illustrates in a somewhat emblematic manner the blurriness of the lines between one’s roles 
online: 
 
“I use Facebook quite a lot and for a long time for job reasons. Social media plays 
one of the most important roles in promoting our work. I divide very distinctively 
between the work purpose and the private use. I would never put something intimate 
on Facebook at all. I like to spread underground music, interesting articles etc. – but 
private stuff stays out there. Once it is about private stuff I call the people or people 
have to call me, and true personal stuff is only for face-to-face meetings. That’s how I 
keep it ever since.”  
(Interview ID 995, 44 years, male, Austria) 
 
Asked, if such a division works out in everyday life, the storyteller went on as follows: 
 
“Well, you’re right, I do see the point as well that a clear division between the general 
and the private is impossible. You can avoid posting personal stuff, but of course if 
you promote left-wing art your political opinion is obviously out there. But well, it is 
as it is. Whoever reads my printed articles can make this conclusion as well.” 
(Interview ID 995, 44 years, male, Austria) 
 
This exemplifies a really interesting point that seems to be a quite common misunderstanding, 
which is, that postings containing nothing ‘intimate’ or ‘truly’ private wouldn’t reveal 
anything about the private life of someone. As will be elaborated later in the conclusion of 
this chapter, not only Big Data already goes far beyond that.  
Staying with this particular story, it can well be argued that much more information than ‘just’ 
his preferences in arts and music going along with his political opinions is open to everyone 
who would google him. However, in this case it has to be taken into account that the 
respondent is to some extent via his work already a public person although restricted to a 
special circle of fans that are interested in the particular topic.   
 
Nevertheless, the respondent is putting lots of thought into which information is opened up – 
respectively posted – in terms of what is considered a ‘private’ (i.e. “my very own opinion” 
and what isn’t (i.e. “I share articles I find interesting and worth spreading”) a common topic 
in the interviews.  
 
Respondents not only highlighted this point, but also often act upon it in a certain way: Not 
posting ‘everything’ everywhere, which is considered a strong protecting of their privacy. A 
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very crucial point here is, that what may well be termed a form of resilience is based in an 
offline perception of privacy. It could be seen as the somewhat pre-social media habit of 
dealing with the balance between openness and privacy transferred to social media, marking a 
demarcation line directly transferred from the offline everyday life.  
 
“What I post is exactly what I also would tell the persons who can read it, face-to-
face, if I would meet those people. But I don’t have everything available for 
everyone. I have lists, where I can say, ‘this is something everyone can know’ but 
also lists where I say ‘this is something I only want them to be able to read.’ But the 
criteria are here and there the same, like in the daily life. There are some things, I 
wouldn’t discuss with everyone.”  
(Interview ID 487, 32 years, male, Austria) 
Unfortunately, the content of the given information is less the point than the functional 
relevance unfolding trough interconnections of data (sets). Baghai points out one of the 
crucial points in the wider context of how information creates power and vice versa222 that 
‘[t]he contention here is that privacy conflicts arise when an event in one social system 
becomes relevant, arguably without justification, to selection of communication in another 
system, e.g. when love affairs become thematic in evaluating professional competence; health 
conditions become relevant to securing a bank loan; or sexual orientations become relevant 
to employment. The public or private nature of communication is not determined by its 
content, i.e. whether it involves secrets, embarrassing or confidential information, or merely 
trivial daily transactions, rather, by its functional relevance to the social system in question. 
Thus, if the love affair involves one’s subordinate, the health condition undermines one’s 
ability to be party to a contract, and the employer happens to be the Catholic Church, the 
system reference and functional relevance of communication change and so do the legal 
contours of privacy.’223 
 
4.4.3 Negative impact on the offline life 
 
A negative perception of the overriding power of social media services is expressed as 
follows, pointing toward a separation of the individuals from each other based on the 
disintegrative sides of modern technologies: 
  
“It is probably going to be loss of people’s ability to communicate with each other 
face to face and the addiction it causes as well. People don’t realise it but when I 
wake up in the morning the first thing I do is check my phone for news and things, I 
just didn’t do that when I was in the 1990s. (...) I think most people are addicted to it 
but they don’t realise they are. If you look at any of your friends who have got 
smartphones and you often see them in the play parks, pick up the phone three 
minutes spare when the kid’s on the swing”.  
  (Interview ID 258, 37 years, male, UK) 
                                               
222 Foucault, Michel, The subject and power, Critical Inquiry, University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 777-795. 
223 Baghai, Katayoun, Privacy as a Human Right: A Sociological Theory’, Sociology 46, nr. 5 (October 1), (2012): 951–965, 
p. 956.  
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Sometimes pressure to subscribe to social networks in order to stay informed was observed: 
This illustrates that the online sphere can take over in an unwanted way. In this case – in order 
to arrange offline appointments – rather harmless, as there are presumably other ways to 
arrange meetings – so it might be rather a question of convenience than of necessity: 
 
“You are just well connected, quick and instantly. So many people use it and I can 
find anybody there. So if you are not on, it may cause problems sometimes, in some 
contexts to arrange meetings to connect with other people.  
(Interview ID 978, 33 years, female, Germany) 
The next step is no longer having the choice in how – or if – to choose to seek and gain 
information online, but being forced into social networks, since the information gap created 
by staying away, is clearly not tolerable anymore:  
 
“When I started at the university I did not have an account, but because of my 
classmates I was basically forced to create one, because almost everything was 
solved through the Facebook and I did not want to be left behind. But I was very 
passive and just followed everything, without posting any content. After I started to 
work for NGO I was once again forced to re-evaluate my Facebook existence, as my 
job is about working with people, I started to use it also as a PR for NGO, started to 
post pictures, announcements, but everything is connected to my work, so there are 
no personal information there.” 
(Interview ID 594, 23 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
Pressure, not even from self-chosen peer groups but rather through work-related 
circumstances where there is even less of a choice to resist is problematized as another 
negative side-effect of the all-encompassing presence of social media and the Internet, 
especially Facebook. 
  
Far more serious is, for instance, hate-speech that directly extends into the offline life and can 
have serious consequences for the well-being of an individual. T the intensity and the 
dynamics of online shit storms and the like, show a momentum that could hardly be spawned 
or reached with respective offline activity (in the same timeframe and intensity). 
   
“I don’t really have a problem of being in pictures from demonstrations, [gay] pride 
or when we went to parliament. I think its part of that and I am aware of the fact I 
will be in pictures. But on the other hand, taking into account the recent 
developments, it is scaring me a little bit. My friend, who is probably the best known 
lesbian activist gets lots of e-mails saying she will be beaten up or her girlfriend will 
be beaten up. So I don’t know what I would do if that happened to me. She has to 
take a taxi everywhere all the time. But I don’t really see any other way this can be 
done.” 
(Interview ID 770, 26 years, female, Slovakia) 
That makes it very distinct that the comprehensive availability of e.g. photos of all sorts of 
events can create serious issues at all levels of everyday life for those that belong to, or 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
117
identify themselves as supporters of societal minorities that are subject to all sorts of 
discrimination – or even (hate) crime. 
 
Techno-securitization is slowly but steadily taking over the offline world and disadvantages 
for people who are objects of new control mechanism were mentioned as well: 
 
“Well, not to the powers of the state, but in the football stadium, I have to identify 
myself via a bar code. This wasn’t the case a few years ago, when you could simply 
buy a ticket and get in. Now you have personalised [online] tickets, or at least I have 
with a year pass. And I was searched on entry. It takes much longer than before with 
those scanners.” 
(Interview ID 964, 57 years, male, Germany) 
 
It should also not be forgotten, that ‘old-school’ surveillance was already used for 
personalised advertising or for the collection of presumed or factual consumerists’ behaviours 
or preferences. The aim for data matching and the like is not an exclusive feature of the 
Internet era at all: 
 
Back in the day, if I wanted to phone Germany, I’d be put through an operator and if 
they had managed to get it sorted out, the operator would log where you were 
phoning to, then they could post you a leaflet being like, do you want to go on 
holiday to Germany? So this isn’t stuff that was never possible; it’s just made a lot 
easier now and so I suppose that sort of thing doesn’t worry me so much because it’s 
not something that’s… I don’t feel that much more vulnerable. It’s just it can be 
sometimes slightly more irritating because of how easy it is for people to bombard 
you with advertising and that kind of thing.(…) I don’t want Gmail reading my 
correspondence. I know it’s some robot thing, but I don’t want them reading my… I 
was more annoyed by that, when I felt that my correspondence, which I had thought 
of as private, was being, as I thought of it, read. 
(Interview ID 141, 54 years, male, UK) 
 
But, since several respondents stated, that there is “anyway no way back to pre-web times”, 
opinions like the following were also expressed, that represent ‘forward-approaches’ of 
dealing with the novel challenges of social media: 
 
“In some way, I don’t particularly like the idea – it’s what I said before, really – that 
there are all these nameless people knowing things about me, but on the other hand I 
just accept, well, that’s modern life. The amount of information about me that must 
be out there: absolutely phenomenal.”  
(Interview ID 133, 69 years, female, UK)  
  
Or it can even be taken further, as in the following statement that also characterizes a form of 
resilience:  
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“No, personally I am not afraid. To the contrary I am very open with my data. The 
more open you are the less they can make something unwanted out of it, twist it or 
else.”  
(Interview ID 970, 50 years, male, Germany) 
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
Regina Berglez 
 
The stories in this chapter unfolded around the various practices regarding social media in late 
modern times. The need and the willingness to use social media in order – mainly but not 
exclusively – to stay in contact with friends and beloved ones was expressed by most of the 
respondents. Although some interviewees described general concerns against the novel and 
suspicious services (of the Web 2.0) and depicted their reluctance against them, the vast 
majority portrayed the various advantages that social media services brought into their lives.  
 
Most of the quotes in this chapter also included privacy issues; some stories involved various 
forms of resilience. Sometimes privacy concerns were expressed explicitly – e.g. with regard 
to the Snowden revelations – sometimes they were implicitly involved. Respondents 
characterized their use of social media mostly as an extension of their offline lives, either 
using a somewhat ‘old’ concept of privacy, or to some extent taking into account that privacy 
had recently undergone some changes that are as of yet hard to grasp.   
 
Our theoretical approach to this dilemma on sociality and privacy assumed that the very need 
to use social media while at the same time making personal information available for a wider 
public would mark the core dilemma in this category, which can be confirmed. 
 
There is clearly not the use of social media, but rather many different usages, usage patterns, 
shapes, and forms. It was ostentatious, that distinctions in social media practice were not only 
mentioned as side notes, but most often explicitly captured, focused on and even scrutinized. 
Highly specialized and customized forms of usages of the social web determined the greater 
picture given in the interviews. Social media (notably Facebook as the manifest and dominant 
example) does serve as a platform and a tool for sheer endless variations of self-expression – 
and sometimes self-degradation – information gathering, information spreading, up keeping 
as well as creation of relations and relationships, networking, and also controversy all the way 
to hate speech – and, as a matter of fact, surveillance. 
 
Indeed, a negative reading of ‘the web’ in a rather dystopian way – either to a certain extent 
recalling Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s criticism of the mass media224 and/or suspecting 
irrevocable separations of the individual based on disintegrative technologies – was given by 
some respondents. The perception of a web-mediated world of allegedly highly individualised 
users that are taking selfies and spreading pictures of their daily meals all over the web is 
surely one side of the coin. Although excessive self-expression is undoubtedly a very real part 
                                               
224 Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, Stanford University Press, 
2002 (1944). 
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of the social web and was sometimes met with incomprehension by interviewees (especially 
those, that were not ‘heavy users’ or ‘digital natives’ but rather interested ‘digital 
immigrants’), it wasn’t, after all, an assertive topic in the quotes. The dominant discourse was 
clearly a positive attitude toward the social web and all its possibilities.  
 
In the previous chapter a perception of how to safeguard one’s online-privacy was illustrated 
that might as well be termed a common misunderstanding: Respondents frequently seemed to 
rely on the (outmoded) concept, that posts, shares, likes or tweets which contained nothing 
‘truly’ intimate or private about themselves wouldn’t reveal much – or even anything – about 
them.  
Not even needing to go as far as stating the common truism “the private is political” it can be 
argued that in times of Big Data this is just not the case anymore. Not only that political 
preference, personality scores, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or age, can be quite 
accurately concluded225 by e.g. Facebook likes; but Jennifer Goldbeck even revealed how the 
liking of curled fries (on Facebook) has been linked to intelligence, since curled fries were 
“(…) propagated through the network to a host of smart people, so that by the end, the action 
of liking the curly fries page is indicative of high intelligence, not because of the content, but 
because the actual action of liking reflects back the common attributes of other people who 
have done it.”226 
Another example for how customized individual ‘online-worlds’ have become, is that of Eli 
Pariser, who demonstrated insistently how Google algorithms shape (respectively narrow) the 
results of an individual users’ search results based on his/her search history.227 
 
A prototypical reaction that was described in the first dilemma on electronic commerce also 
played an important role in the reflections on the use of social media: the topic “What can I 
do?” Negative side effects – to a great extent regarding privacy issues – were noticed and 
explicitly expressed; but the advantages and the convenience factors do, however, override 
these concerns in daily practice; which is not to say that the respondents don’t take 
precautions. Nevertheless, precautions that go beyond the individual reflections and efforts to 
manage privacy i.e. paying special attention to what to post (or twitter) to which audience at a 
time, were rare. This could be exemplified with an extension or inversion of the humorous 
term PICNIC (person/problem in chair, not in computer), which is used by ICT-experts to 
describe the fact that a problem isn’t caused by the technology but rather by the user operating 
it. In a many of the stories cited in this chapter, the respondents clearly endeavour not to be 
the PICNICs regarding their privacy in the realm of social media. As it was argued in the 
previous section, the users make conscious and very distinctive decisions on what to reveal 
about themselves with a view to the specific platform used and the particular audience 
involved. Such provisions can clearly be grasped as strategies of resilience. Still, as was 
elaborated, Big Data is incrementally annulling these efforts.   
                                               
225 Kosinski, Michal, David Stillwell and Thore Graepel, "Private traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of 
human behaviour", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110.15, 2013: pp. 5802-5805. 
 
226 Goldbeck, Jennifer, The curly fry conundrum – why Social Media “likes” say more than you might think.  
http://tedxesl.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/transcript-jennifer-golbeck1.pdf , Also: TED-Talk 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgWie9dnssU, both 2014. 
227 Pariser, Eli, The filter bubble. What the internet is hiding from you,  Penguin, New York, 2012. Also: TED-Talk 2011: 
http://www.ted.com/talks/eli_pariser_beware_online_filter_bubbles?language=en 
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However, forms of resilience that presuppose a rather complex technological knowledge as 
e.g. the use of encryption software; i.e. those actions that concern and shield privacy that 
operate on the level of technology (and not the person in the chair in front of the screen) are 
naturally not seen as a manageable option by the majority of ICT-lay citizens.  
  
So it can well be stated, that“[t]he concept of a (off-line) private sphere, defined in spatial 
terms of the private home (reaching back to the Greek notion of Oikos) is of no avail in the 
age of the Homo Electronicus and hence a redefinition of privacy is becoming inevitable. The 
boundaries between public and private domains – and alongside with it the ‘old’ concept of 
privacy – seem blurred already.”228 
 
Nevertheless and after all, the (social) web is a very powerful tool and maybe even the 
vernacular of late modern times. Quoting Kranzberg, one shouldn’t forget that technology is 
neither good nor bad nor neutral.229 This will presumably stay this way whatever is to come, 
be it in terms of the web 2.0, the predicted web 3.0, the Internet of things; or in any other field 
of man-made technology. Perceiving ‘the Internet’ in a techno-centred way as either only the 
cure or only the disease would blatantly reduce the discourse.  
 
At the end of the day the ways, forms and strategies of dealing with social media root back in 
not only social behaviour but also social perception. The online sphere and the offline sphere 
cannot be seen independently from each other, although some participants referred to their use 
of social media as if this took place in a separated sphere. But the actions and also the 
consequences of the actions described, made the complexity of the interconnections obvious.  
“The alternative, everyday life perspective that is gaining prominence assumes that social 
behaviour is embedded in wider networks, and that these networks are sustained by various 
technologies and social practices. This view stresses that the Internet continues, maintains 
and extends relationships, that it is used to perform one’s identity (…) and to spin webs of 
significance (…) in old as well as new ways. People will continue to meet in online 
environments, but these are not entirely separate from their physical lives and corporeal 
contexts. The socialization into online communities, the negotiation, reproduction and 
contestation of identities and the integration of computing technologies into everyday 
practices are some of the issues that cannot be understood as long as the online/offline 
dichotomy is sustained.”230 
 
Also going along with this, the pre-social media concept of privacy is no more – now society 
has to find (better) ways of dealing with this fact. As Boyd states neatly: “Any model of 
privacy that focuses on the control of information will fail. Even achieving true control is 
nearly impossible because control presumes many things that are often untenable.”231  
                                               
228 Berglez, Regina and Reinhard Kreissl, Report on security enhancing options that are not based on surveillance 
technologies, SurPRISE Deliverable 3.3, 2013., p.25. http://surprise-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SurPRISE_D-
3.3-Report-on-security-enhancing-options-that-are-not-based-on-surveillance-technologies_v069.pdf 
229Melvin Kranzberg, ‘Technology and History: “Kranzberg’s Laws”’, Technology and Culture 27, Nr. 3 (July 1986): pp. 
544–560. 
230 Verschueren; Paul, From Virtual to everyday life, In: Jan Servaes & Nico Carpentier (ed.), Towards a Sustainable 
Information Society, Intellect, Bristol, UK Portland, OR, USA, 2005, p.179. Verschueren is also recurring to:  
Goffman; Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1987 (1959). and Geertz, 
Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 
231 Boyd, Dana, Networked Privacy, Surveillance & Society 10 (3/4), 2012, p. 349.  
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Big Data isn’t to be stopped – but individuals’ discrimination on the basis of this very data, is. 
This requires on the one hand a better public understanding of how social media and Big Data 
operate and what effects they can have; and on the other hand ambitious efforts are needed to 
create sound legal protection and a societal climate that goes against the usage of Big Data for 
the negative purposes of social sorting and discrimination. 
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5 4 TH DILEMMA: PRIVACY AND TRUST – FAIRNESS  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: SECURITY AS A QUESTION OF TRUST 
Reinhard Kreissl 
 
One of the main resources providing for security in any social setting is trust. The perceived 
feeling of knowing what the significant others – or in organisational settings – the typified 
others are doing, sustains a climate of trust producing its mental corollary of perceived 
security. Proximity breeds trust. So does routine.232 Trust is a core quality of stable social 
relations. As phenomenological sociology has demonstrated it can come in different versions, 
as personal trust and as generalized trust.233 At the same time, trust performs a kind of 
limiting function. Trusting a person or a system limits the need for further enquires and 
scrutiny. Limiting further enquiries means to respect the private sphere of others. So privacy 
in social exchange is protected by trust. One could construe a simple trade-off here: the higher 
the level of trust, the lower the need to collect confirmatory information about the other 
person. The following chapter will play on this trade-off. It will consider a number of social 
settings where trust can be replaced by surveillance. These settings share a common feature 
that runs through this whole report: the increasing use of technology. Injecting technology 
into social processes has a number of different effects as we have seen in previous chapters. 
These changes can be analysed as creating different dilemmas regarding privacy. In the 
subsequent pages we will address the dilemma of trust and privacy. We also introduce a third 
mediating concept here: fairness. Fairness can be understood as an ethical concept defining 
standards of conduct that should be applied in a situation of unequal relations of power, as in 
the idea of a fair trial.234 Hence, appeals to fairness come into play, when the misuse of power 
is addressed. In the context of the subsequent analysis, different social relations displaying 
clear power differentials are investigated: the sphere of the workplace, of the educational 
system and the relation between citizens and the state in a more general sense. In each case 
we have collected stories from our respondents dealing with technology-based surveillance, 
focusing on the relation of privacy and trust. Often the emerging dilemmas were seen through 
the ethical lens of fairness. 
 
Surveillance, privacy and trust in workplace settings 
While the relation between employer and employee is first and foremost of an economic 
nature, to be analysed in terms of wages and profits and capital and labour force, each 
workplace situation also entails an element of social interaction. The social relations in a 
workplace setting reproduce the economic relations of domination and submission, even if in 
many present-day work environments concepts like creativity, motivation, and personal 
satisfaction are invoked to describe the situation of the work force. In modern Western 
societies the model of the shop floor and the assembly line of industrial mass-production no 
longer provide the paradigmatic workplace scenario. The rise of the service economy, the 
integration of modern ICT in production processes, an increase in symbolic production and 
                                               
232 Garfinkel, Harold, A conception of and experiments with ‚trust’ as a condition of concerted stable actions. In Harvey, J.O. 
(ed.) Motivation and social interaction. Ronald, New York 1963. 
233 Schütz, Alfred, The Phenonemology of the Social World. Northwestern Uni Press, Evanston IL, 1967. 
234 The concept of fairness has been frequently invoked in assessing social relations in a political context, such as Truman’s 
program of fair deal, an attempt to connect to the “New Deal” in the U.S. and later continued under the heading of “Great 
Society” during the Johnson Administration. 
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design work, the international division of labour and the flexibility, volatility and fluidity of 
work, blurring the boundaries between private- and work life are just a few key words to 
account for the dramatic changes in the everyday situation of the working population.235 What 
used to be a tangible and collective experience of exploitation in industrial capitalism has 
been transformed for a substantial segment of the work force into an abstract, often remotely 
controlled and intangible regime of self-motivated performance in a flexible work 
environment.  
 
In the context of our analysis two of the most important changes are the emergence of a 
depersonalized relation between employers and employees, workers and supervisors and the 
availability of modern technologies, integrated into the work processes and creating a myriad 
of opportunities for surveillance. The supervisor, sitting at an alleviated desk, overseeing his 
team, has been replaced by the video camera, the electronic performance control, or the 
horizontal control regime of the “quality circle”, at peer-to-peer level.236 
Except for some niches in public service and areas with strong labour unions, control over 
performance, productivity, and output criteria have changed dramatically over the last 
decades. The balance of power between labour and capital in the era of “heavy capitalism”, as 
Zygmunt Bauman called237 it, has given way to a dominance of capital interests in the era of 
fluid or light capitalism, bringing the work force under a regime of what the late Pierre 
Bourdieu called flexploitation.238 Surveillance practices are an important element of this 
regime. The situation here is somewhat similar to the domain of electronic consumerism 
analysed in the previous chapters, i.e. surveillance often emerges as a side effect of other 
management-related practices like auditing or controlling.239 The introduction of new 
technologies not only changed production processes in an instrumental or material sense, but 
at the same time created new opportunities to monitor and surveill the work force. Issues of 
privacy and data protection emerged in this process in a similar way, as they became a topic 
of debate in society at large. While surveillance is seen as a problematic form of disciplining 
workers, there is also a dominant strain of discourse in organizational studies defending 
surveillance as a benevolent practice, increasing justice and identifying free riders and 
cheaters at work.240  
To situate surveillance in the context of individual experience of social relations of work and 
labour one can draw on the concept of moral economy.241 This concept developed in critical 
social and economic history studies, and focuses on the web of reciprocal obligations and 
expectations in economic relationships. It can be used to operationalize ideas like fairness and 
justice applied in the assessment of practices imposed by the apparent facticity of economic 
processes.   
 
                                               
235 See for a comprehensive overview of these changes Lash, Scott and John Urry,  Economies of signs and space, Sage Publ. 
London 1994. 
236 see Delbridge, Rick and Turnbull, Peter,J., Human Resource Maximation: The Management of Labour under Just-In-Time 
Manufacturing Systems, in Blyton, Peter, Turnbull Peter, J. (eds.) Reassessing Human resource Management, Sage, London, 
1992, p.56-73. 
237 Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge Polity Press, 2000. 
238 Bourdieu, Pierre, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market, The New Press, New York, 1998. 
239 See Power, Michael, The Audit Society, Oxford University Press, 1997. 
240 Sewell, Graham, and Barker, James, R., Coercion versus Care: Using irony to make sense of organizational surveillance. 
Academy of Management Review, Vol 31, No. 4, p.934-961, 2006. 
241 Thompson, Edward P., The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the 18th Century. Past & Present, 50, pp. 76-136, 
1971. 
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While contractual relations of labour law stipulate what each party of the labour contract is 
committed to do, it is assumed that both sides fulfil their obligations, since they more or less 
represent (morally) acceptable principles. This is a point Durkheim introduced in his Division 
of Labour.242 Also it is assumed and mutually understood in this context, that formal 
regulations do not capture the daily routines of work. As Macnaughton-Smith pointed out in a 
seminal paper, in each organisational setting there are two codes in operation, and it is the 
informal and implicit “second code” that defines the relevant rules structuring routine 
performances.243 Breaching this second, informal code can trigger formal sanctions, as laid 
down in the formal contract.  
 
The spread of technology based surveillance practices in work place settings can be seen as a 
process eroding or transforming the operation of these informal rules. In the most general 
sense, the daily routines in any organisation require a horizontal and local understanding of 
how to do things properly among the involved actors. If this organisation has a hierarchical 
structure like most work environments, this mutual understanding also includes informal rules 
how to interact and behave in hierarchical situations. Such rules of conduct and performance 
emerge out of local practices, they remain implicit and are transmitted to novices through 
informal learning processes on the job and – what is most important in this context – they are 
of an analogical nature, allowing for contextual interpretation, adaptation and negotiation. 
Based on this second code the supervisor has to rely on the loyalty of his subordinates and the 
co-workers have to rely on the competence and cooperation of their colleagues, i.e. the 
“system” works as long as all actors involved play according to the second code. The practical 
basis for such a regime is mutual trust. Trust seems to be a key variable for commitment and 
distributive justice in organisations.244 Building up trust requires personal relations. It requires 
a continuous personal exchange among the members of an organisation, including informal 
shoptalk. Injecting ICT and surveillance technology in such an arrangement has a number of 
consequences. Person-to-person communication can be monitored, when a third party (i.e. 
supervisors, management) has access to personal exchanges e.g. through the intranet. 
Individual discretion with regard to the organisation of tasks and distribution of workload, 
flexibility of individual time and other formal criteria is reduced dramatically when all 
individual operations are documented and monitored remotely by an organisation through 
ICT.   
 
Now while it may seem obvious from an external analytical perspective how the environment 
of the work place is transformed by new technologies and how new opportunities for 
surveillance emerge in this process for the management, it is far from clear how employees 
perceive this situation and how their daily routines are affected. Are they aware of these new 
surveillance regimes, can they verify their perceptions of being surveilled, do they know who 
is monitoring / surveilling them and how this is done? How do they react to the fact (the 
                                               
242 Durkheim, Emile, The division of labour in society, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1997 (1893). 
243 Macnaughton-Smith, Peter, The Second Code. Toward (or Away from) an Empiric Theory of Crime and Delinquency 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency July 1968 vol. 5 no. 2 p. 189-197. 
244 Mukherjee, Kamal and Bhattacharya, Ranan, Exploring the Mediating Effect of Organizational Trust Between 
Organizational Justice Dimensions and Affective Commitment Management and Labour Studies February-May 2013 vol. 38 
no. 1-2 p. 63-79. 
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feeling) of being surveilled in their performance? Do they invent any counterstrategies? 245 
Labour law has taken up the issue of workplace surveillance and unions are negotiating 
regulations regarding the use of surveillance technologies to monitor the workforce. National 
legislation beyond general data protection and privacy laws determines the limits of 
surveillance in workplace settings. But, as mentioned above, looking at formal codes of 
conduct or legal regulations governing the use of surveillance technology only scratches the 
surface of the problem of workplace surveillance. In their daily routines employees and 
managers do not use formal rules as a blueprint for action. Formal rules or for that matter any 
element of the formal organisation are invoked to retrospectively account for past events, 
making organisational action accountable.  
 
We consider the effects of surveillance at the level of social relations at the workplace, trying 
to investigate and understand if and how surveillance replaces, undermines or erodes trust as a 
basic background resource, sustaining smooth and effective social processes in organisations. 
Hence from an analytical perspective we perceive of the stories referring to technology use in 
workplace environments as attempts to handle the dilemma of trust and privacy as a question 
of fairness. 
 
Surveillance in the Educational system 
The classroom has been considered alongside the factory and the panoptic prison as one of the 
paradigmatic sites for the emergence of modern disciplinary regimes, for control and 
surveillance. Educational settings like schools display a similar dual and contradictory 
structure like the workplace. On the one hand the main objective of the educational system 
traditionally has been the creation of docile bodies and minds, to paraphrase Foucault. On the 
other hand, every process of acquiring knowledge requires an active engagement of the 
learning subjects. So in any educational setting be it kindergarten, primary school or 
universities, the students are exposed to the contradictory regimes of bureaucratic order and 
autonomous individualism; they are supposed to meet the requirements of a standardized 
system of learning and at the same time are expected to develop into autonomous self-
conscious or self-reflective individuals. What makes educational systems special is the 
layered order of power relations: teachers exercise power over their students but are 
themselves tied into the logic of the institution and governed by a regime of pedagogical 
rationality. And similar to the situation in the workplace, social relations in the educational 
system are undergoing significant changes triggered by the introduction of new technologies. 
Traditional forms of person-based surveillance and exercise of disciplinary power are 
supplemented, transformed, and moulded by new technologies. This has an effect on the 
regime of managing time, scholastic performance and general obedience to institutional 
regimes. What makes the educational institutions an interesting field to study individual 
reactions to surveillance is precisely their dual character producing a context of controlled 
autonomy, i.e. the main objective of education is the autonomous individual who at the same 
time is supposed to grow and develop under a regime of bureaucratically organized discipline. 
This creates the paradoxical constellation typical for surveillance societies: individuals are 
treated on the one hand as completely incompetent and on the other hand the default attitude 
                                               
245 see Marx, Gary, T., A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 
59, N0 2, 2003, p. 396-390. 
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of authorities towards their clients is suspicion. So while students are tied into a rigid regime 
of pre-defined learning modules leaving little room for individual, autonomous choice, they 
are under the constant surveillant gaze of the institution, as if they were habitual cheaters, 
trying to free ride the system. 
 
Citizen, Surveillance and State 
 The relation between citizen and state is complex and has attracted many scholars. As 
Nietzsche in his Zarathustra famously put it: “State is the name of the coldest of all monsters. 
Coldly it lies; and this lie slips from his mouth: ‘I, the state, am the people.’” 246 Also Ernst 
Cassirer in his seminal book on The Myth of the State dissected the concept of the state as a 
symbolic form from Aristotle to contemporary times.247 The history of political theory can be 
written in large parts as a history of the state and a good deal of social science literature 
invokes the notion of the state to analyse the reproduction of social order – the old Hobbesian 
question. 
For the lay citizen the state appears in many different forms and state power is encountered as 
representatives of public order – policemen, public servants, and politicians. At the level of 
lay discourse the state is perceived as a collective actor endowed with a number of capacities 
and confronted with several tasks. States are supposed to provide public goods for their 
population. Security is one of these goods. And surveillance as a means to fight crime and 
terrorism and to provide for the security of the citizens is a dominant topic in the public 
debate about security. The capability of the state to ward off real or perceived security threats 
is perceived as a key indicator and source of political legitimacy. The gradual transformation 
of the modern welfare state into a security state (and security not referring to social security 
here) has been described from different perspectives. The growth of the technologically 
mediated bureaucratic web, restraining individual actions in exchange with public authorities 
can be investigated and analysed. But, again, what is of interest here is the perception of the 
individual citizen: how do citizens as clients of state bureaucracies perceive of and handle the 
fact of being under a constant regime of surveillance? How do they get around the rules, 
forcing them to behave in a pre-defined way to pre-defined standard situations?    
 
 
5.2 CITIZENS AT THEIR WORKPLACE   
Charles Leleux, Reinhard Kreissl 
 
Surveillance in the workplace using information and communication technologies is a 
relatively new phenomenon, which is strongly linked to the changing structure of work.248 
Ball uses the example of call centres that ‘has accelerated the diffusion of CBPM (Computer 
Based Performance Monitoring) in the United Kingdom’249, pointing out that ‘organisations 
and surveillance go hand in hand.’250  
                                               
246 Nietzsche, Friedrich; Thus spoke Zarathustra (1.11: The New Idol), Cambridge University Press, 2008 (1883). 
247 Cassirer, Ernst, The Myth of the State, Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 2009 (1946). 
248 Hampson, Ian; Peter Ewer and Meg Smith, Post-Fordism and workplace change: towards a critical research agenda 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Sage Publications, 1994, 36, 2, pp. 231-257.  
249 Ball, Kirstie; David C. Wilson, Power, control and computer-based performance monitoring: repertoires, resistance and 
subjectivities, Organization Studies, Sage Publications, 2000, 21, 3, pp. 539-565. 
250 Ball, Kirstie, Workplace surveillance: an overview, Labour History, Taylor & Francis, 2010, 51, 1, pp. 87-106. 
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There has been a trend in recent times towards the creation of very large datasets of employee 
information using modern information and communication technologies.251 The sharing252 of 
data is becoming more commonplace, and is facilitated through the convenience of using 
adaptable and appropriate technologies. The rapidly changing nature of these modern 
technologies, coupled with changes in people’s working patterns and increasing use of 
portable technologies, such as smartphones, laptop computers and logging devices etc., has 
caused a blurring of the boundary lines between what constitutes ‘personal’ and ‘business’ 
transactions and interactions.  
This in turn has created conflicts and dilemmas for employers, employees and trade unions 
around the areas of reputational management, ethics, morals, trust, control and use of power.  
Resultantly, this has necessitated the creation of new data protection and data processing 
legislation (or guides), and within the workplace itself, the drafting of new internal codes of 
conduct for employees’ and employers’ responsibilities over the use of new technology, 
particularly where this involves Internet use, in an attempt to establish what is acceptable 
‘use’ and what is not.  
This has given rise to complex ethical tensions in the modern workplace.’253 In this chapter 
we will provide examples of the different types of surveillance practices and technologies, 
which are being deployed in the workplace. These technologies have become normalised,254 
and employees have accepted them, become resilient to them, resisted them or become 
resigned to their presence.255 They moderate their behaviour in response to being monitored 
through the almost ubiquitous presence of surveillance practices and technologies.256  
 
5.2.1 Being watched at the workplace – CCTV 
 
Being watched at the workplace can take on different forms – from simple to sophisticated. 
Employees can be involved in such surveillance regimes in a number of ways: they can either 
be exposed to a crude and constant form of overt surveillance in their daily work routines, the 
simple approach. Or surveillance can take on complex forms, integrating the workers in an 
active way. Surveillance at the work place can remain simple by installing a CCTV camera on 
the shop floor or it can be intrusive by monitoring communication and workflows, covertly 
collecting data from technologies used by employees in their daily routine activities. 
Depending on the kind of work process there are different entry points for surveillance. 
Workers can be integrated in surveillance regimes, by convincing them that a constant and 
comprehensive monitoring of their daily work is in their own best interest (which of course is 
also the company’s interest). The implementation of surveillance can be justified with the 
need to identify misbehaviour and rule breaking, what then amounts to a workplace specific 
version of the ideology of  “nothing to hide nothing to fear”.  
                                               
251 Higgs, Edward, The Information State in England: The Central Collection of Information on Citizens since 1500, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, England, 2004 
252 Bellamy, Christine; Perri 6, Charles Raab, Adam P. Warren and Catherine Heeney, Data sharing and personal privacy in 
contemporary public services: the social dynamics of ethical decision making, Loughborough University Institutional 
Repository, 2005. 
253 Sewell, Graham, and James R. Barker, Neither good, nor bad, but dangerous: Surveillance as an ethical paradox, 
Ethics and Information Technology, Springer, 2001, 3, 3, pp. 181-194. 
254 Ball, Kirstie, and David C. Wilson, Power, control and computer-based performance monitoring: repertoires, resistance 
and subjectivities, Organization Studies, Sage Publications, 2000, 21, 3, pp. 539-565. 
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256 Information on national regulatory regimes for workplace surveillance is provided in the Annex I on the country reports. 
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In any case the stories about workplace surveillance always refer to the relationship between 
employers and employees. Feelings of anger and irritation are sometimes expressed by 
employers due to concerns they have, e.g. theft, suspicion of theft, or reputational damage, 
and these feelings are expressed similarly by employees due to their discomfiture with being 
monitored, and the awareness that they are being watched and controlled.  
Sometimes, the monitoring is carried out covertly, without the employees’ awareness, and it 
is common for monitoring of additional activities to take place over and above what was 
agreed originally due to the capability, opportunity and desire to do so. The asymmetrical 
distribution of power is clearly evident in some cases, e.g. ‘top-down’ from management 
towards employees. In some instances, monitoring is used as a means of compliance, by 
ensuring that employees conform to internal guidelines, the use of the Internet for example. 
Monitoring is also used as a means of rewarding good performance, and of punishing poor 
performance or perceived poor attitudes towards the employer personally or the company.  
 
Sometimes workplace surveillance is overt, simple and – due to the local conditions – non 
negotiable. CCTV cameras are visible for the workers as in the first story below and the fact 
of these cameras being installed on the premises is justified under a rather crude pretext.  
 
“Yes for example I've been working in Tyrol at a factory producing heating boilers. 
He (=the factory owner) had cameras all over the company premises to monitor the 
workers. I’ve been there twice during summer time. But officially he has these 
cameras to monitor the premises, to see if someone is entering the factory site who 
shouldn’t. As a matter of fact, he is controlling the workers. Everybody knows that. 
You don’t talk about that. Nobody has the courage to do something about it; it’s in a 
small village you know. Everyone knows everybody. Nobody has the courage to do 
something about it, he would go mad.’’ 
 (Interview ID 463, 34 years, male, Austria) 
 
The storyteller here is in a powerless position, being watched in a kind of panoptical way 
from a boss who seems completely unwilling to negotiate with his workers. At the same time 
the technology applied, CCTV cameras, seems to be a simple add-on, a more or less primitive 
extension of the supervising gaze, extending the visual field – at least in principle. From the 
workers perspective it is the mechanism of the panopticon: they know they can be constantly 
watched, but they do not know whether at any given moment their boss is really sitting in 
front of the video screen, following their movements.   
An almost iconic relationship between the workforce and the factory owner is described in 
this story. For the workers it seems to be impossible to raise their voice against the fact that 
they are being monitored through video surveillance at their workplace. It seems impossible 
to overcome this intensified imbalance of power although there are labour unions in place and 
labour law is regulating the use of CCTV to monitor the work force. The factory owner 
appears as an irrational actor, who literally would “go mad” should someone from the work 
force touch upon this issue. The story follows a simple logic: You can’t argue with a mad 
actor in a (working) relationship, you either quit your job or you surrender.  
 
A more complex scenario – technologically and strategically – unfolds in the following story. 
Here an employer uses covert surveillance (CCTV and microphones) to control his workers. 
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The story is told by an Italian house painter detailing a case of over-surveillance at the 
workplace, through a misuse of CCTV systems and microphones for illegal surveillance of 
the employees. In contrast to the story from the Austrian part-time factory worker, the Italian 
house painter’s story shows some sort of an accomplice in the monitoring of employees with 
CCTV.  
“’I’m a house painter and I was doing restoration work in a company in the area 
where I live. As I’m a friend of the electrician, he told me that the company’s owner 
asked him to install many CCTVs and microphones all over the place, to control his 
employees. In fact, this company has been victim of some material theft where an 
employee was involved in this criminal activity and he was fired. Thereafter the owner 
decided to implement levels of control over his 50 employees. For this reason at the 
beginning he installed a CCTV system. Two years ago the situation degenerated, as 
the owner wanted to control also his employees’ conversations, therefore he asked the 
electrician to hide microphones for listening to the employees’ conversations 
everywhere: in the offices, bathrooms, corridors, as he wanted to spy on his employees 
and to know their opinion about him. The problem is that, if an employee expresses a 
bad opinion about his boss with other colleagues, the boss hears it through the 
microphones and usually transfers the person to a minor department, doing work that 
the majority of colleagues wouldn’t do. Nobody can denounce this situation, because 
they think that there is a colleague spying on them…this situation is still going on and 
the employees are still at the moment unaware of the spying activity of their boss, as 
the electrician keeps the secret about the hidden microphones, because the owner of 
this company gives him a lot of work and pays him well.”   
(Interview ID 106, 25 years, male, Italy) 
 
As opposed to the first story, workers are given a good reason why they are being surveilled: 
CCTV cameras are installed to identify thieves among the work force. This involves the 
workers in a joint effort to identify wrongdoers. CCTV is introduced as a means to a mutually 
agreed end. But with the installation of hidden microphones the situation changes and the 
relevance of the concept of trust becomes obvious. Workers start to have second thoughts 
about the intensification of surveillance and they would like to exchange their views with 
colleagues. But since they do not know whether their conversation is being overheard or 
whether the person they talk to will report to the boss they refrain from doing so. This is a 
kind of micro-Stasi regime. Trust is eroding due to surveillance. The implicit rule of: trust thy 
neighbour (or in this case: thy workmate) no longer holds and this changes the social setting 
at the workplace. What can be observed here is a kind of chilling effect, similar to the reaction 
of citizens exposed to mass surveillance by police in public protest actions.  
The next story increases the complexity of the surveillant assemblage. It represents a practical 
example of how an employer uses surveillance technologies, and a compliance officer, to 
monitor all aspects of employees’ online activities, and makes the employees aware of the 
code of conduct including giving reminders about what can and cannot be done online. The 
crucial point here is the introduction of a code of conduct in the first place: the employer 
introduces a code and then sets up a surveillance regime to make sure his employers comply 
with the code. From a logical point of view this story demonstrates the impact of new 
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technologies. Having access to the Internet creates new opportunities for employees (they can 
browse the Web, have internal chats, etc.). From the employer’s perspective this requires the 
implementation of a new code of conduct, regulating the proper use of ICT. Compliance is 
controlled using the very same technology the code of conduct is targeting.  
“We have a guy who deals with welfare of the employees and I think that he has 
access to all of the information from our internal network chat, as well as all the 
websites we visit from the work computer and so on. I think that sometimes they 
[management] know things we did not say anywhere else but the chat and I am a bit 
cautious about what I write there. He makes sure that we adhere to the code of 
conduct. That includes the rules for what we can do and mustn’t do at the workplace, 
online. He is also in charge of security of our networks. Sometimes he helps other 
team leaders in the recruitment process of hiring new employees; he does some 
background checks on the applicants and so on. Information such as where you 
worked before, what you did there and whether you did not lie in your CV.” 
 (Interview ID 726, 28 years, male, Slovakia) 
 
Use is also made of the Internet and social media for background checks on prospective 
employees in this company. What this story nicely demonstrates is the powerful position of 
those employees who are competent users of ICT. The key figure, the “guy who deals with 
welfare” is in the position to monitor all traffic on the intranet and also to help others in the 
recruitment process by screening the Web for personal information on applicants’ 
background. What can be observed here is the shift in hierarchies and the relative power 
positions of employees depending on how “literate” they are in using new technologies. 
 
The final quote in this section is told from the position of the “watcher”. It is a story that 
comes from a team leader who, along with the manager, not only monitors employees’ project 
work via online tools, but uses the surveillance technologies to award premiums and annual 
salary rises. This story represents the mirror image of the employees’ perspective: while the 
“watched” typically perceive of their being surveilled as negative, as a practice eroding trust 
and curtailing their freedom, the “watcher” interprets surveillance as a tool to distribute 
rewards and motivate his subordinates.  
 
“I currently have 9 people under me and they have each to deal with some specific 
customers. When they deal with some problems, I can easily access what they are 
doing, for example communication with the customer via email, I can see their 
projects and their status and based on that I can ask them about their work. Me and 
the manager, we get reports of their work every day. Based on these reports, as well 
as information on how they communicate with the employees, whether they meet the 
deadlines, how much they work (they do), even after office hours, they get premiums 
and also a salary increase every year. And it is actually the same for me.”  
(Interview ID 729, 28 years, male, Slovakia)  
 
The selected stories highlight how surveillance technologies are being perceived differently; 
how they are being used to reward good performance or to punish poor performance through 
the ways in which Computer Based Performance Monitoring (CBPM) is applied. What 
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clearly can be shown are the implicit dangers this technology brings, as it contains: ‘double 
edged organizational ‘‘value orientations’’ – there is the distributive justice of reward 
(material or otherwise) for effort and punishment for non-effort.’257 
 
5.2.2 Being monitored at the workplace - timekeeping 
 
Timekeeping systems have advanced over the years from the old fashioned time stamp clock 
to more sophisticated electronically mediated systems that collect, store and process data 
about employees. In this section some examples are provided of the benefits which are 
enjoyed by employees due to time recording, such as improved pay and more leave, but this 
has also caused jealousies with other employees who are not using the same recording system. 
It is clear that in some cases there is a level of acceptance of the technology and the regime 
being used, while in others it has created a culture of ‘clock-watching’ and resistance to the 
regime through adopting deviant behaviours by falsifying actual hours worked, and for 
example spending more time in the toilet than is necessary. In call centre environments a 
competitive element amongst workers has also been introduced through the use of 
surveillance technologies, involving monitoring of numbers of calls handled length of time 
taken etc. This has resulted in some employees adopting certain behaviours and forming 
negative attitudes towards other colleagues, to the detriment of social relationships.   
 
The first story is from a call centre agent and demonstrates how continual surveillance in the 
workplace and focus on targets created an unsupportive environment and unhealthy 
competition amongst different teams and team members, resulting in deterioration in the 
value of human relationships and lack of care for a vulnerable member of staff. This story 
demonstrates quite well how the conformity of having to work in a call centre amidst the 
technologies which are used for monitoring of performance, sometimes does not sit very 
comfortably with more fundamental human values which one might expect when working 
with other members of a team:      
 
‘’It created pressure in the organisation and got in the way of doing the job. You were 
pressured to work quickly which caused problems with teamwork targets and often 
created competition amongst groups and colleagues.  I remember a woman in her 50’s 
whose marriage broke down – people did not like her because she was slower.  
Surveillance tools encourage that culture.’’  
(Interview ID 282, 24 years, male, UK)  
 
What can be demonstrated here is the inherent contradiction of using teamwork models (such 
as e.g. quality circles) to increase the performance of groups. Under the specific conditions of 
tasks performed in a call centre, surveillance of workers’ time is relatively easy and hence it is 
easy to compare differences in individual performance.  “Being slower” is collectively 
conceived as deviant or uncooperative behaviour. The effect is exclusion at the horizontal 
level. The underperforming individual receives negative feedback from her co-workers. The 
management’s task to reprimand underperformers is thus taken over by colleagues. But in 
                                               
257 Ball, Kirstie, Categorizing the workers, in David Lyon (ed.), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital 
Discrimination, Routledge, 2002, pp. 201-224. 
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order to identify a co-worker as being slower standards have to be implemented and a 
technical means to measure performance has to be established. While in a work setting of 
industrial production, such as e.g. an assembly line, temporal rhythms are defined simply by 
the machines, in an environment like a call centre individualized surveillance of each 
worker’s output has to be implemented since each individual performs in isolation as opposed 
to the assembly line, where the output of worker A provides the input for worker B and thus 
speed is the same for all. While call centres stand for an extreme, highly surveilled and highly 
exploitative environment, there are settings where employees can develop counter strategies 
to deal with the regime of time control. The second story draws attention to the fact that 
surveillance technologies can have a negative impact on employees’ attitude while at the 
same time not increasing individual performance or overall work productivity.  
 
‘’Yes, we had time registration. I remember lots of people standing round the 
attendance clock and wait for "one minute more, one minute more". Let's say: Those 
who have ever been lazy, they fought for every minute. Some did forget to check in, they 
didn't care because the work had to be done in no matter which time. It was my job to 
transfer the surplus of hours or the missing hours at the end of the month. But you saw 
it every time: Those who didn't like to work, they were the ‘minutes hunters’.’’ 
(Interview ID 313, 55 years, female, Germany) 
 
The final ‘timekeeping’ story conveys a similar message: employees trying to beat the time 
tracking system by adopting deviant behaviours, such as staying longer than required in the 
toilet. But there is a second important message encountered in many of the stories about 
workplace surveillance: the workplace setting is not perceived as a place structured by 
conflict and contradiction between capital and labour but as a social setting where mutual 
interests should be pursued to achieve a collective benefit – in this case: higher profits to be 
shared with the employees. Time keeping is a strategy to make individual performance 
measurable and more or less transparent. Introducing the narrative of mutual interest (based 
on performance measures) provides at least a partial justification for the establishment of 
surveillance systems, which then are supposed to single out underperformers, cheaters and 
free riders. The underlying motive here seems to be a variation of the general theme of trust 
vs. surveillance: assuming that workers are willing and motivated there is no point in 
establishing a surveillance regime; but if it is assumed there are some who are not and who 
cannot be trusted, then surveillance may be justified. 
 
‘’Personally I believe that 70 to 80 per cent of all workers are recording their time 
correctly. 20 to 30 per cent are cheating. That is how it is. And if he is not cheating on 
the time tracking system he will stay for 15min longer on the toilet. I believe, that the 
motivation and the understanding of good and willing employees is key, of course 
money plays an important role and you have to explain to your employees why you are 
using a time recording system. But if we make a profit then it is also a profit for the 
employee. BMW and the other big companies are working like that. If we make profit 
we share it with the workers. If I would own a company I would do the same. I’m a big 
supporter of this method.’’ 
 (Interview ID 343, 67 years, male, Austria) 
 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
133
The role of labour unions 
 An interesting position is taken by labour unions. They are supposed to represent the interests 
of their members and on the other hand to cooperate with the employers. They cannot ignore 
the caring side of surveillance, such as e.g. health and safety aspects, but have to consider any 
detrimental effects on privacy and autonomy. In the UK for example, trade unions will often 
go against their members’ wishes and support the introduction of workplace surveillance 
technologies where they feel that this will help with the health and safety of their members 
(employees), such as the introduction of body-worn CCTV for traffic wardens.258     
 
A senior trade union official summarises the extent of surveillance technologies and practices 
used in his workplace (involving approximately 14,000 employees) in the quote below.  
 
 ‘’Monitoring of activities, timekeeping, monitoring of email usage, telephone records, 
Internet use, employers access to and use of medical information. All of these. 
Telephone records information is quite sophisticated: length of calls, ring time. 
Problems with employees accessing confidential records from major databases, and 
inappropriate use of email system to exchange jokes, cartoons or 3rd party’s 
name/personal information. Also, growing use of social media to complain about 
employer/colleagues.’’   
(Interview ID 148, 53 years, male, UK)  
 
The situation described here invites the following questions: is there sufficient justification 
for undertaking this level of surveillance; is this a good example of the employer exerting 
absolute control over the employees, or might the surveillance be more surreptitious and the 
employees are not really aware that it is happening, and finally, do health and safety concerns 
win over privacy and employment rights? It is hard for representatives from labour unions to 
come up with good answers to these questions, satisfying both sides – capital and labour.  
When it comes to negotiation of workplace surveillance at the level of collective bargaining 
procedures it is typically the worst-case scenario reasoning of security threats that is 
successfully introduced to justify the implementation of surveillance technologies. Protecting 
members of staff from assaults, threats and hazards is a catchall rhetorical figure and privacy 
concerns have to stand back when life and limb of workers are presumably at stake. The 
following story from a union representative who was involved in national level discussions 
around the introduction of CCTV in his industry shows how this logic operates. What is 
strikingly evident from this story is that the grounds for introducing CCTV were based on 
assaults on staff, however, CCTV was then used as a reason for introducing cost savings, such 
as closure of branches and stations, in effect creating a situation where vulnerable people 
travelling alone felt unsafe. CCTV was also used to assist in disciplinary investigations where 
the availability of CCTV footage was used not just in the case being investigated, but was 
used retrospectively too, particularly by junior managers wanting to be seen to be tough on 
employees. Clearly, trust between trade unions/employees and management has broken down 
                                               
258 Traffic wardens in the UK enforce parking restrictions through on the spot fines, and are seen by many members of the 
public as instruments of local authorities to generate additional income. They have been the subject of frequent verbal abuse 
and occasional physical assaults. It is known that some local authorities impose a ‘target’ number of fines to be issued by 
each warden each day, e.g. five or six. The introduction of body-worn CCTV was introduced as a means of protecting these 
employees, but management have used the CCTV data for other purposes, such as investigating complaints.   
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in this situation, and the CCTV technology is being used to control employees. Additionally, 
it appears as though the closure of branches (due to the availability of CCTV) has been based 
on economic grounds and perhaps the unseen costs of increased fears of passengers who no 
longer have the protection of employees when travelling, but have to rely on the CCTV 
technology instead were not factored in: 
 
‘’I was involved in the collective bargaining discussions around the introduction of 
CCTV in my industry, the argument for which was the number of assaults on staff and 
yobs spitting on staff. We worked in partnership with the police, and swab kits were 
introduced to help catch the yobs that were spitting. The installation of CCTV was to 
help identify muggers and assailants, and we welcomed its introduction as a trade 
union. But it was also used as a cost-cutting exercise by management making it easier 
to close branches and stations through conducting cost benefit analysis reviews, and 
saying that CCTV and helplines and phone lines for the public would be sufficient, but 
this was wrong as they did not reassure vulnerable women travelling alone. Some 
junior managers get promotion and want to make a name for themselves – they use the 
tapes if an incident occurs and look to see what the staff were doing prior to the 
incident and then to start a disciplinary – it’s outrageous!’’  
(Interview ID 167, 66 years, male, UK) 
 
5.2.3 Being controlled at the workplace - tracking technologies 
 
So far we have presented various accounts of the types of surveillance technologies being 
deployed in the workplace. As could be seen in the stories presented above, behaviours are 
being moderated in many different ways by these technologies, and communication can be 
similarly restricted, thus affecting interpersonal relationships. In some cases surveillance 
technologies in the workplace have become normalised in terms of how people conduct their 
working lives. Management have the opportunity to use the technologies available to them for 
purposes other than those intended originally, sometimes in the context of victimising 
employees, although examples are also provided where the technologies have been used to 
help in the health and safety or welfare of employees. We started with simple CCTV schemes 
and moved on to more elaborate assemblages displaying more complex social effects. We will 
now turn to an even more intrusive form of workplace surveillance – tracking technologies. 
 
The next story demonstrates the precise level of control over employees, which can be 
achieved by installing a tracking device in their works vehicle, and by ensuring employees 
also use hand held tracking devices. Three main points are apparent: first, there are benefits to 
the employer through better productivity and easier programming of work; second, there are 
clear health and safety benefits to the employees if their vehicle breaks down, in that 
management or the employees can summon help to a precise location, and third, the 
surveillance technologies are being used in fact finding/disciplinary cases, which is a 
deviation from the original purposes for the introduction of these technologies: 
 
‘’Locator, which is a vehicle tracking system put into the entire vehicle fleet. It caused 
big issues at the start, such as human rights. It was sold to us (i.e. the ‘case’ was made) 
on the basis of reducing the insurance bill, and with vans not being used as much outside 
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work, then they (management) could programme work better. Also, hand held devices 
(are used), which means that the majority of staff can work from home, reducing fuel and 
being more productive – they reduce travel time and they can be a good thing – we had a 
young chap (man) who was not answering because he had gone into a diabetic coma, 
and in the winter (poor driving conditions for example) management can monitor people 
getting home safely. One bad winter we had 4 managers working through the night 
contacting families letting them know where their loved one was. They (hand held 
devices) can be used for ‘fact finding’ investigations, where employees are going home 
early or not arriving for work, or where the public are complaining – Locator gives the 
number of the van and the registration.  We have CCTV in the yards (industrial 
workplaces); Internet and telephone usage monitoring, and monitoring of Facebook.’’  
(Interview ID 159, 65 years, male, UK) 
 
This is an interesting narrative since it emphasises all the good things that surveillance makes 
possible, saving money and employees lives, providing solace to the families of workers who 
got stuck in bad weather. The problem of workers being in an emergency situation probably is 
overstated and provides a justification for the introduction of highly intrusive surveillance 
technologies serving economic ends defined by the company. 
 
The final quote in this section represents an attitude often found in discussions about 
workplace surveillance. Surveillance technologies have become normalised and the individual 
exposed to an ever denser and more intrusive surveillance regime surrenders to the fact of 
being constantly forced to demonstrate who he is and that he is legitimately doing the things 
he does in the workplace:     
 
‘’I have experienced many surveillance technologies. I’ve been working there [oil 
refinery] for 30 years and the use of these technologies have increased. I don’t pay 
attention to them anymore. At the beginning I was annoyed but now I am used to them. I 
don’t talk about this topic with my colleagues. Nobody seems to care. There are lots of 
surveillance cameras and we have badges either to access to any areas or to provide 
access to a computer. I can’t log in without my badge. Everything is monitored but it’s 
understandable.  It's for security reasons.’’ 
(Interview ID 577, 50 years, male, Italy)  
 
5.2.4 Feeling of being spied on at the workplace – Facebook, Google and the like  
 
There are many examples provided in the interviews of the widespread use by employers of 
googleveillance and other forms of social media to check both on the activities of candidates 
for positions, and of existing employees. Some elements of social sorting by employers are 
evident from these practices. Resistant and deviant behaviour also takes place by some 
employees to the practice of monitoring their online activities. The use of googleveillance and 
other social media for checking on the private activities of employees or prospective 
employees brings the issue around the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ firmly into the debate. 
Wigorts Yngvesson describes the ‘private and public sphere’ in the context of human 
relationships, which are fluid and do not have defined boundaries: ‘They have boundaries 
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which vary according to circumstances.’259 In this context, workplace surveillance 
technologies are no respecters of privacy or private activities due to the universality and 
ubiquity of their coverage.  
   
The first story in this section reveals not only the ‘normalised’ use by an employer of 
checking social media such as Facebook (FB) in selecting candidates for positions, but admits 
to personal prejudice in so doing, e.g. political allegiances. In reality, the influence of 
subjective personal prejudice is probably prevalent, but not admitted to, in virtually all checks 
made on social media in the recruitment of employees: 
      
‘’Once I should have employed a person in my husband’s company, so beyond the CV 
I looked for information about him on Facebook (FB). For instance I check the 
political opinions (I have many friends who are directors in big companies and they 
notice that the employees that are too much left-wing oriented usually are against the 
company owner) (…). I agree with this system of selecting the human resources, as on 
the Internet you can collect info about his behaviour, if he is a reliable person or the 
friends he has,. (…) I check also if he writes on the Internet faked information about 
himself during the interview and I check if he says the truth on his FB profile. (…). 
Although I refuse to employ a person on the exclusive basis of the FB information and 
I match them with the info collected through the interview, but I evaluate the person 
also on the basis of practical motivation for the company (job experience, competence, 
etc.). At the end we did not employ this person but the motivation was beyond the FB 
info and the interview itself... I would do the same with other candidates, I check also 
when I select friends: of course it is more reasonable to select a candidate at the 
workplace, rather than to select a friend. It is a further “tool”, beyond the CV and 
references from the previous companies he worked for to select a person, it is a 
further info’ channel on the person. Once the person is employed I do not check 
anymore on FB, unless he has strange behaviours. Last week on the radio there was a 
speaker talking about big companies that usually have a psychologist to manage the 
interview for selecting candidates and they also check the FB profile of the potential 
candidate, although I haven’t a big company, I agree with this system for profiling the 
person you are going to interview and potentially employ.’’  
(Interview ID 206, 49 years, female, Italy)   
 
What this story nicely demonstrates is the blurring of private and public spheres as a 
consequence of living in virtual or cyber space. New social media like Facebook make highly 
personal information easily available but at the same time the question arises whether this 
information should be considered private and personal since it is openly accessible by anyone. 
What is affected here are the strategies of identity management: being exposed to a situation 
like an interview when applying for a job, there are typically a number of standard data 
provided, such as information about prior employment record, qualifications, degrees etc., all 
documented in written form. The applicant can refer to this information producing an account 
of him/herself as a competent person, qualified for the position advertised. With access to 
                                               
259 Wigorts Yngvesson, Susanne, The Boss as Big Brother: Moral Aspects of Workplace Surveillance, in Gudrun Vande 
Walle; Evelien Van den Herrewegen and Nils Zurawski (eds.), Crime, security and surveillance: effects for the surveillant 
and the surveilled,  Eleven International Publishing, 2012. 
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other sources like Facebook this situation changes. From the employer’s perspective this is 
simply an easy to use additional source of information, while for the applicant there is a loss 
of control over the way s/he wants to present his/her personality in the given situation of the 
interview. 
  
Learning to live in the world of social media requires active and continuous privacy 
management in virtual space. Adjusting one’s privacy settings and being aware of who might 
have access to information becomes part of daily routine as can be seen in the story below: 
 
‘’Well, you have to be realistic. What can be done, will be done, that’s the way it goes 
with available technology and information. Who would stop an employer to google 
and find the information that is there? At the end of the day it doesn’t matter what I or 
we think about it. As long as we aren’t that stupid to call in sick and then post party 
pictures on Facebook (that kind of stories you hear about) there’s not that much to be 
worried about, right?  
(Interview ID 940, 46 years, male, Austria) 
 
The use of social media at the workplace can create different techno-social dilemmas. What 
can be done, what is acceptable and how social media may be used, becomes an issue to be 
negotiated among workers and management. The story below concerns the somewhat odd 
phenomenon of the establishment of workplace norms for what could be termed ‘acceptable 
deviant behaviour’, i.e. use of the Internet and social media, which appears to be tolerated by 
management provided the use is not excessive:  
 
“Our online behaviour is monitored. They are interested in the amount of data we use. 
So if you watch videos on YouTube, then your data traffic is bigger than just reading 
some articles. I know that somebody watched two hour long videos on YouTube and 
then they came and told him not to do that. He did not really get into trouble, but it 
slows down the network and then people can’t work properly. We don’t have any 
websites blocked; they don’t really care about what we do online as soon as we get 
our work done. So if I watch too many NFL highlights videos, than I try to watch less 
videos on YouTube, I don’t want the traffic to be too big.“  
(Interview ID 731, 25 years, male, Slovakia)  
 
What becomes obvious in this little episode is the full integration of new social media in the 
work process, the blurring of private and professional use of the different communication 
channels and the way in which this can be negotiated in a consensual way among 
management and employees. At the same time the potential for more or less sophisticated, 
intrusive and encompassing surveillance practices becomes obvious.  
A strategy of adopting informal regulation in those workplace settings where social media are 
used in daily routines seems to develop: 
 
‘’It is quite different, nobody monitors anything. As long as we are effective and do 
our work my boss does not care whether I take a private call, or check my email. It is 
actually helpful in my HR work, I use Facebook often to network in order to get some 
candidates for jobs. I do this strategically, when I need to ask whether my contacts 
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know someone, I will change my settings in the Facebook, so anyone can see my posts, 
after I am done I change settings back to my very close and limited group of friends.’’ 
 (Interview ID 585, 22 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
Given the extended use of new social media, management has, in principle, access to a wide 
array of facts about their employees’ lives. Depending on whether management is trusted or 
not, the positions taken can vary greatly as the assessment of human resources managers’ 
practices in the quote below demonstrates: 
 
‘’(I) Think it is terrible.  No HR manager should do that.  It is a real abuse of people’s 
private lives.  What they do is not relevant and should not be taken into account unless 
they have committed a crime or racial abuse.  Employers are unscrupulous finding out 
if applicants were in clubs until 3 am, also looking for political affiliation or 
sexuality.’’  
(Interview ID 901, 24 years, male, UK) 
 
As David Lyon observes: ‘Specialized knowledge strengthens the power of each modern 
agency, and taken together they seem to colonize ever-increasing tracts of so-called private 
life.”’260  
 
Depending on the practical organisation of specific types of work, surveillance can become 
extremely intrusive affecting every step an employee takes. A typical case is the story of a 
public servant who is patrolling the streets to enforce parking restrictions in a city in the UK. 
Here the term techno-social hybrid can be clearly applied: 
 
‘’Clocking in, signing-in and signing-out, there is a CCTV camera at the entrance to our 
office, body-worn CCTV cameras, hand held units and mobile phones.  The body-worn 
CCTV camera records video and audio, and is used with a hand-held unit and the 
mobile phone.  The body-worn CCTV camera must be switched on at all times – it is 
meant to be for health and safety reasons, but management want to use it to deal with 
complaints.  The mobile phone is used as a lone worker protection system – you have to 
phone in each time you change location. The reaction of the public has not been good to 
the signage on our jackets advising that CCTV was in operation – I expected it – but not 
the experience I had last week where a mother went to the police to complain that I had 
taken images of her child.’’  
(Interview ID 157, 44 years, male, UK)  
  
5.2.5 Regulating privacy, trust and fairness at the workplace 
 
Most national governments in the European Union have passed data protection and data 
processing legislation or codes to help define the boundaries under which public and private 
bodies may operate in relation to handling data, and indeed many have created regulators who 
issue guidance and investigate possible breaches. Within the workplace, responsible 
                                               
260 Lyon, David, The electronic eye: The rise of surveillance society, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, p7.  
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employers have produced a code of practice (or conduct) which attempts to define what is 
acceptable and unacceptable use of technology both within and outside the workplace, for 
example some may allow limited personal use of the Internet (using the employer’s 
technology/network) provided that this is carried out at lunchtime or in the evening and does 
not involve anything which could cause offence, such as harassing other employees, looking 
at inappropriate websites or sharing information or jokes which contain discriminatory, racist, 
sexist or homophobic material. Other employers may take a much stricter determination of 
what is ‘acceptable’ depending perhaps on the type of business in which they are involved. 
Some quotations refer to a degree of common sense being required when considering one’s 
own online and communications activities either in the workplace or outside the workplace 
when using the employer’s technology or networks.  
 
Whatever the regulations at the level of black letter law, at the ground level of social relations 
between employer and employee the final decisive factor is trust. In our interviews we found 
a number of moral stories, contemplating the “right” and “fair” way of handling the problems 
emerging with modern technologies in work place settings. The resource of trust shapes the 
way in which available technology is applied also from the management perspective, although 
surveillance technology sometimes appears like the iron fist in the velvet glove: it is there, it 
can be used, but as long as daily business runs smoothly and management has no indication of 
any wrongdoing, it will not be applied. In the stories below the notions of duty, fairness and 
mutual trust are invoked to describe scenarios for the adequate and reasonable use of 
surveillance technologies. 
 
‘‘Every employee and every employer should know his rights and duties. See if I make 
private calls using my company’s phone or if I’d surf the web with my company’s 
computer, or if I do take care of my private stuff at work, I have to face the 
consequences, then I’ll get a real ‘bollocking’ (reprimand) from my boss.  The 
employer has the right to control. But when the employer enters my private sphere 
outside my working hours, there I have no understanding for employers. From 9 to 5 it 
is ok, but I have the duty not to abuse the company’s phone for private talks or to 
misbehave at work. The employer on the other hand has to respect my private sphere. 
That is how it has to be. Every employee who is a good employee and wants to keep 
his job would bear a lot of measures from their employer.’’  
(Interview ID 361, 69 years, female, Austria) 
 
The scenario unfolding in the story above of an employer respecting limits of privacy is 
mirrored in the account of a manager detailing his company’s policy with regard to 
surveillance, based on a kind of three-stage incremental approach to undertaking surveillance, 
should the need arise. This employer is acting quite responsibly and fairly in their attitude to 
trust and surveillance, i.e. that surveillance is not undertaken on a ‘blanket’ basis of coverage, 
but occurs rather when the need arises:    
 
“When it comes to oversight of our employees, we have a working relationship based 
on trust. But we have several ways we can monitor the way our field employees – 
representatives – work. The first option is GPS tracking, people have GPS in their 
cars and we could use them to see where they drive and who they visit (doctors in 
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certain towns). We do not use this GPS monitoring but it is very common among other 
pharmaceutical companies. We never used it because it is another paid service. But 
this could show you complete movement of the car. Our employees have to use 
software, where they put in information about their daily work – who did they visit and 
so on. Based on this information, the sales area manager can contact the person the 
representative visited, get some feedback and also find out whether the representative 
really visited the place and whether he was doing his job correctly. The third option 
and this is the one we used maybe twice in past 15 years and we did it only because we 
had a strong suspicion, is the monitoring of mobile phones. We had a suspicion that 
these people did not go to work, did some personal trips during their work hours, so 
we contacted the mobile phone operators and got information about their movement.”  
(Interview ID 742, 53 years, female, Slovakia)  
 
While mutual trust is seen as a basis for good social relations it has to be acknowledged that 
trust and fairness are rather soft concepts and hence a realistic perspective should be taken 
when it comes to surveillance. The management reserves the right to use surveillance 
technologies and employees know that taking precautions is a safe bet. Whatever the legal 
regulations or the trustful relation between capital and labour, in the final analysis, as this last 
quote shows,  it is better to take precautions.  
 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
 
Surveillance at the workplace can take on different forms depending on the kind of setting. 
From the perspective of the actors involved there are different ways of integrating new 
technologies with high surveillance potential into their everyday work life. One option is to 
develop a moral perspective, justifying surveillance practices as an adequate means to identify 
wrongdoers, to develop an adequate system of rewards and to improve health and safety of 
the workforce. Understandably this narrative is used mostly in stories told from the 
perspective of the “watchers”, i.e. management. A moralistic approach to surveillance can go 
either way, supporting and justifying the use of technology or criticising and condemning it. 
A key concept in either case is trust. If trust prevails, there is no need for surveillance; if 
surveillance is introduced this erodes trust.  
Having to work in an environment under surveillance produces a number of practical and 
discursive strategies of normalization. Employees are aware of the fact of being surveilled in 
sometimes rather complex ways, but they learn to find ways to either work around the 
surveillance regime or to adapt their routine practices. What can be clearly seen is how the 
introduction of new ICT in work processes changes the situation of employees dramatically 
and how new rules and regulations, formal and informal have to be negotiated and 
implemented. Those who grew up with new social media have acquired the skills to adapt 
their behaviour when using e.g. Facebook. They are aware of the pitfalls of documenting their 
private life online.  
What could be shown in the stories about workplace surveillance is the wide array of 
technologies and strategies deployed here. From crude and simple CCTV cameras installed on 
the premises to highly sophisticated multi-channel and multi-sensor systems tracking every 
move across multiple sites and assessing performance using several indicators.  
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The changing structure of the workplace and working environment in recent times has been 
accompanied by greater flexibility in how, when and from where employees conduct their 
employers’ business. Greater flexibility has been encouraged by employers through 
facilitating flexible workspaces, home working, provision of laptop computers, smartphones 
and other technologies to allow businesses to respond to the 24/7 demands of the modern 
working world.  However, accompanying this more flexible approach by employers, and 
apparent weakening of previous monitoring controls, which they might have used to ensure 
that employees were performing to required standards, there has been an increase in the 
availability of surveillance technologies, which can and are being used in the workplace. 
Many examples of the different types of workplace surveillance technologies being used are 
provided in the stories, including the most direct: body-worn CCTV. Some evidence of the 
resilience of employees is provided, through resistance to the practices of management, or 
indulging in deviant behaviours. Coupled with the increase in flexible working has been a 
massive rise in the use of communications technologies, including the Internet and social 
media, all of which are being used in both professional and private settings. This has resulted 
in what has been described as a ‘blurring’ of the boundaries between the private and the 
personal, which then invites an ethical debate around these issues. Many governments have 
produced legislation covering data protection and data processing, and most have appointed 
regulators to try to manage the inevitable interpretations and sometimes conflicts which arise, 
although in reality the legislation can never be expected to keep up with the speed of 
technological change. In the workplace, many responsible employers have produced codes of 
conduct for employees around use of the Internet and use of employer’s hardware and 
software when not on working time, and provided definitions of what is acceptable and 
unacceptable use. Above all, a fair degree of common sense is required from any employee 
engaging in what might be regarded as ‘personal’ activities while on ‘work time.’  
Call centres are popular with governments and development agencies due to the labour 
intensive nature of their staffing requirements, and impact which they can have on 
unemployment levels, however as can be seen from the interviews and the literature, they also 
create environments which are target driven and feature what some might regard as 
ubiquitous and oppressive forms of surveillance monitoring. Due to the ubiquity and non-
discriminating nature of the surveillance technology within call centres, this is claimed to 
have mediated the behaviour and attitudes of some employees (and supervisors) in harbouring 
resentment against some team members who perhaps do not meet the required standards, and 
in effect some managers may look at the statistics and not the underlying (and personal) 
reasons which might lie behind the output or performance. 
 
Turning to ‘googleveillance’ and the use of social media in a recruitment setting, there are 
many examples provided from the interviews of employers using it to monitor the activities of 
employees, and as an aid to informing their recruitment decisions for prospective employees. 
There seems to be inevitability about the continuing growth in use of social media in this 
context, and to that extent, it could be regarded as having almost become ‘normalised’. 
Personal prejudices are also evident when using this medium. Reputational management is a 
key driver for many employers in justifying the use of social media or checking work emails 
to view what their employees have been saying. It is important therefore for employees not to 
be irresponsible and to write (publically available) disparaging remarks about their employer, 
their team leader or colleagues.  
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Regarding national trends in workplace surveillance within the countries where the interviews 
took place, i.e. Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovakia and the UK, it is difficult to draw firm 
comparisons, however it is clear that they all have a regulatory system at the national level for 
data protection and processing; they all respect the rights of personal privacy, and there is a 
role for some form of representation of employees through trade unions or works councils etc. 
when discussing surveillance technologies in the workplace.   
 
Surveillance in the workplace, due to its ubiquity and omnipresence, is no respecter of the 
development of relationships.  Regarding trust, it is the single-most important building block 
upon which future relationships, reciprocity, and mutual respect can be developed and 
strengthened.  Time and again from the interviews, we were provided with examples of the 
breakdown of trust caused by management, most often simply because they used the data or 
images which the surveillance technology provided them with, which of course was too 
tempting (in their eyes) to turn down.  
Often, the data and images were used for purposes other than those originally agreed upon, 
resulting in the breakdown in relationships, and sometimes increased resilience and resistance 
by employees to their employer.  
 
In the final analysis it seems that there are no serious options for an active strategy of 
resistance against the rise of surveillance in the workplace. The only option is either to quit 
the job (only to probably find a new position where a similar regime of surveillance prevails) 
or to develop informal counter strategies to neutralize the surveillance practice to some extent. 
Since ICT is on the rise in most workplaces settings, be they industrial or service, it can be 
assumed that surveillance of work environments will become more intense across all areas 
and workers will continue to develop – wherever feasible, morally justifiable and practically 
possible – their counter strategies to work these systems in their favour.  
 
 
5.3 SURVEILLANCE IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
Alexander Neumann, Reinhard Kreissl 
 
None of the interviewed citizens across the participating was directly asked about experiences 
with surveillance at school. Nevertheless, several stories related to surveillance and education 
were documented. Most of the stories revolved around routinized surveillance by means of 
technologies like CCTV or swipe cards for students to register the time of entry to the school 
building or the dorm. In some of the stories the headmaster or the teacher as a charismatic 
watcher was contrasted to the present-day routinized surveillance in schools. The feeling of 
being influenced or controlled by a supervisory person like the teacher is something most of 
the interviewees could recall and talked about during the interviews. The iconic figure of the 
dominant teacher they were referring to is a prominent icon that can also be found in popular 
culture. One could think of the teacher in Pink Floyds music video for the song “Another 
brick in the wall” from 1979 where a teacher in a traditional British school uniform with a 
wooden switch is standing at the gate of a school waiting for the pupils. 
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5.3.1 Charismatic panopticism or the headmasters’ ritual  
 
Besides technologically mediated surveillance and the charismatic panoptic type of 
surveillance, two other types of school surveillance stories were identified. We identified 
stories of pupils being watched and expressing the malaise of being a student and stories of 
teachers watching students and expressing the impossibility of herding ‘young rascals, both of 
which were very common. An additional story describes a headmasters’ ritual: 
 
“Once the headmaster wanted to know who’s coming late to school. He only thought 
about the pupils not the teachers. So he locked all doors and waited outside the school 
to welcome those pupils who were supposed to be late. It was like 5 minutes before the 
first lesson would have started at 8am. He stood at the school gate for a while, then he 
recognised that that even some of the teachers were not at school after 8am. He was a 
kind of old fashioned, a true headmaster. You don’t find these kind of headmasters’ 
anymore today, today they are way more liberal and moderate.”  
(Interview ID 281, 72 years, female, Austria) 
 
What is described in this anecdote is literally an old fashioned form of surveillance. Although 
one could develop a reading of this story as an uncomfortable measure, both for the teachers, 
who are normally in the more powerful position of the watcher and are now being watched by 
the headmaster, and the pupils, this story provides a good example for a common technique of 
neutralization used to cope with surveillance. This technique can be called the legitimacy of 
power or the Eros of the watcher. The headmaster as described in this story is an old 
fashioned powerful male person of respect and authority. In the context of the story, he is the 
only one able to stand at the gate and wait – or better watch – for the other actors in the story. 
In the setting of the story a traditional type of authority is attributed to him, almost in a 
Weberian sense of charisma. The power of the watcher and his ability to control a large group 
of pupils and teachers on his own is not made possible by technology e.g. a CCTV control 
panel in his office, but rather the traditional headmaster’s ability to control others rests on his 
physical presence at the school gate. He is described as an authentic leader, or in the words of 
our storyteller a “true headmaster”. This perception of the charismatic leader who is capable 
and entitled to watch others because of the charismatic authority ascribed to him is the 
opposite of a modern management executive.  
It is extremely difficult to account for privacy labour in settings in which the watcher acts as a 
charismatic and authentic leader. To contest the authority of the charismatic leader and to 
develop resistance or resilience against the surveillance regime of the leader would be most 
likely considered deviant behaviour. The story does not end with a twist where the pupils or 
even the teachers stand up against the headmaster and demand more trust, that they show up 
at school or work on time. The story concludes with an almost nostalgic statement that 
headmasters nowadays aren’t like that anymore. Today they are “way more liberal and 
moderate”. Today the headmaster would have had access to CCTV footage to watch pupils 
and teachers coming late or he would have access to a database in which tardiness is 
documented and stored.  
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5.3.2 Routinized surveillance in schools using technology  
    
A contemporary headmaster waiting for pupils and teachers at the school gate would be 
considered old fashioned with a negative connotation and the story would probably contain 
justifications for this old fashioned behaviour. Indeed the fact that CCTV is being used to 
monitor students was raised in several other interviews touching on the issue of surveillance 
in the educational system, particularly in Italy where video-surveillance at schools has 
become a highly controversial topic over the past 10 years. The previous quote reminds us 
that teachers are not only and exclusively in the role of watchers, they are also watched, 
although in times of electronically mediated surveillance the attention of the electronic eye is 
focused on the students. The school in the next story recently decided to install CCTV 
cameras to protect against vandalism. The teacher telling this story was sceptical about the 
effectiveness of CCTV as she mentioned that on the whole, the teaching staff knows who is 
responsible for vandalism at her school. In this story it is no longer the headmaster waiting at 
the gate for the pupils and the other teachers, but rather the CCTV camera that is installed at 
the gate.  
 
“I worked in schools where there was CCTV and in one specific case video surveillance 
was on school buses to stop bullying. Usually CCTV was at the entrance of the 
buildings. A few years ago surveillance cameras were installed to protect a school 
against vandals after teen vandalism had occurred. This really annoyed me as I felt 
spied on and I didn’t get why they put up the cameras. We all knew who did it [who 
vandalized the school] and I don’t think CCTV is a deterrent. We have to deal with 
social unease in a different way. The city council didn’t explain anything to the parents, 
they just installed the cameras. By the way, the parents were enthusiastic about it. ”  
(Interview ID89, 52 years, female, Italy) 
 
Although the effectiveness of CCTV to prevent future acts of vandalism is called into 
question, the story provides a good example for the inescapable character of modern video 
surveillance systems. It is not only the potential perpetrators who are being monitored: the 
electronic eye is indiscriminately watching everybody and in that sense the CCTV camera at 
the gate has a similar function to the iconic headmaster in the first story of this subchapter, 
although considerably more effective.   
 
 
5.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZEN AND THE STATE  
 
The relation between citizens and the state is the mother of all surveillance relations. The 
growth of public bureaucracies in the modern state is considered the dominant driver for the 
development of technologies with high surveillance potential. Being identifiable in a database 
administered by a public authority is the proto-typical characteristic of citizenship. Individuals 
are endowed with enforceable rights, duties and privileges only as more or less machine-
readable subjects of the state. While on a daily level personal encounters between citizen and 
representatives of the state are strictly speaking rare, a plethora of daily routines take place in 
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the shadow of the Leviathan, as Spittler fittingly put it.261 Whenever the lay citizen is 
requested to produce personal data for identification outside the realm of commercial 
transactions (like in online shopping) this can be perceived as an encounter with the state. The 
practical organisation of such identification encounters is affected by the kind of technology 
applied. Looking up a person’s name in a paper-based filing system creates a different 
situation compared to the barcode scanning of an identity document stored in a remote 
database. Last not least the digitisation of such procedures significantly lowers the threshold 
for setting up checkpoints where citizens have to demonstrate their eligibility goods, and 
services.   
 
5.4.1 Citizens experiencing being controlled by the state 
 
In this subchapter we deal with citizens’ experiences of being controlled in various encounters 
with the state. The constellations presented here, involve individual citizens encountering 
some sort of public or state authority, be it the police, security personnel at the airport or any 
other type of public servant. Beyond such face-to-face encounters, citizens also reported 
concerns of being treated as data-doubles in virtual databases.262  
 
The first story addresses the imbalances or perceived injustice of data collection and control 
by state authorities. While the need for data collection or surveillance measures is not totally 
rejected, the fact that surveillance practices are unevenly applied is seen as a problem. The 
basic logic of the first quote is straightforward. Being exposed to controls is acceptable as 
long as these controls are perceived as being effective and evenly applied to all subjects in a 
given situation. 
 
"It happened at the airport in Dubai at least 6 or 7 years ago, but it was after the 11. of 
September, we went through, sitting in the transit area, there was a negro sitting next to 
me. She checked in and was examined like me, and she manicures her fingernails with a 
razor blade. Well, we see what still goes through. Therefore, it makes no sense to 
control for dangerous objects.” 
(Interview ID 48, 55 years, male, Austria) 
 
Surveillance measures and practices by public authorities are deemed acceptable when the 
surveillant gaze extends symmetrically to both sides: citizens and public authorities. 
Surveillance can also serve as a means to document encounters and conversations between 
state bureaucracy and its citizens. Such documentation, based on recordings of telephone 
conversations, like in the story below, can provide evidence to be used by the citizens when 
they feel improperly treated. Surveillance here is an element of a bureaucratic culture: every 
act, event or encounter with bureaucracy has to be documented and filed. A recurrent 
argument running through the interviews is that in a democratic society such documentation 
should be made available to both sides: the organisation and their clients. If this symmetrical 
                                               
261 See Spittler, Gerd, Streitregelung im Schatten des Leviathan : Eine Darstellung und Kritik rechtsethnologischer 
Untersuchungen. Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie Jg. 1 (1980), H. 1, S. 4-32. 
262 Haggerty, Kevin D. and S. Ericson, ‘The surveillant assemblage’, The British Journal of Sociology, 51,No. 4 2000, pp. 
701–717. 
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relation is violated, this has a negative impact on trust in institutions. Surveillance is seen as 
an illegitimate practice if done incompetently or applied in a one-sided manner, as highlighted 
in the story below. 
 
“Yes, in fact it was a conversation I'd had with the County Council and I'd felt that I'd 
been treated in a bad way on the phone and I wanted a recording of the conversation. I 
told them I was entitled to that recording. Two weeks later I got a CD of the recording 
but the sound quality was appalling; you couldn't hear anything. And at the time I felt 
cheesed off because, by law, I know that the local authorities have to record all local 
conversations and I couldn't take further recourse to make a complaint. 
Legally I knew I was entitled to ask for information. But I did get it. It took a long time 
to get. When I say a long time, it took ten days but it wasn't a viable recording so I 
wasn't quite sure if they were fulfilling their end of the legal bargain, if you like.... I was 
satisfied that they were prepared to do that. And, as I said, I didn't do it as a threat but 
the conversation that I'd had with a certain individual, I thought had been extremely 
rude and aggressive and at the time if I had had a clear recording I would have taken it 
further, but as it was the integrity of the recording was very poor so you couldn't hear 
anything.” 
(Interview ID 46, 44 years, male, UK) 
 
Trust in institutions is a major resource when it comes to the acceptance of surveillance 
measures. If law enforcement institutions do their job in a professional manner, surveillance is 
acceptable to a certain extent. However, a tipping point is reached when thresholds for data 
collection are so low that anybody can indiscriminately become an object of police 
surveillance activities. Forcing ordinary citizens to provide their data under the pretext of a 
generalized suspicion is regarded not acceptable and creates a feeling of powerlessness. 
Providing personal information in an encounter with a police officer based on a reasonable 
request to provide this information is perceived to be an acceptable practice. This is different 
from a situation where personal information stored in databases is processed without 
knowledge of the individuals involved.  
 
“I can see the problems with it, but I also think there’s a fair amount of truth in that I 
feel pretty secure, I suppose.  At the same time, I don’t think the state, the police, or 
whatever, has a right to look into every aspect of people’s lives for no reason other 
than fishing around for issues.  I think it’s okay for the police or authorities to look 
into something if it arises, and look at all sorts of data, as they do, but I think as a 
matter of force…  That’s what seems to have come up recently in the news, that they 
are doing this as a matter of force, and I’m less comfortable with that, obviously.” 
(Interview ID 64, 43 years, male, UK) 
 
What many stories demonstrate is an understanding of “the state” as personalized. Encounters 
with police officers, IRS-personnel, social workers and civil servants and data collection 
activities are acceptable to a certain degree. This changes completely, when these faces of the 
state vanish and are replaced by technology or technically mediated forms of interaction. The 
symbolic or personal representation of state authority can be compensated for by a high level 
of generalized trust in the state as institution and provider of services and (public) goods such 
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as security. In a situation of trust, state surveillance measures are accepted and perceived as 
effective and legitimate. The standard pre-emptive reasoning of better safe than sorry lets 
surveillance appear as a solution to problems of crime and security. Citizens following this 
line of reasoning are willing to trade in their privacy for a presumed gain in security and 
protection against criminals, as demonstrated in the following stories. 
The overall idea informing these stories is that surveillance increases the security of the 
citizen. Citizens consider themselves exposed to more or less threatening individuals in 
different situations and that threatening individuals will be identified and identified through 
surveillance measures. 
 
 “We want to be safe at night and everywhere, but we are against cameras. We want 
terrorists to be recognized and arrested, but we don't want to be monitored. I mean this 
is not how it works, right? … And how much they've prevented already, I don't want to 
know it. So if they want to monitor and wiretap me: Go for it.” 
(Interview ID 311, 55 years, female, Germany) 
 
 “For example, take the airport. I always travel with my kids. If I had to give my 
fingerprints as an additional security measure in order to prevent, for example, 
kidnapping I would do it. This wouldn’t violate my privacy.  At banks or hospitals 
where access control is very important, more surveillance is not a problem to me. I 
would also increase access control measures at schools through CCTV at the entrance 
of schools and also at the entrance of classrooms. CCTV is not that invasive and it is 
useful ex post.” 
(Interview ID 575, 40 years, female, Italy) 
 
 “I don´t notice cameras in public places at all. I don’t care and what am I supposed 
to do anyway? I think that the idea of it is great! I want to be protected and I feel very 
comfortable with it. Let everybody see me, I don’t care. It serves the public good and 
better security.” 
(Interview ID 673, 26 years, female, Slovakia) 
 
“I guess, my logic is that the government are tight on money, so they wouldn't just 
randomly pick your conversation and just listen in for fun; they do it for a reason. … If 
it's for a just reason, then I'd be fine with it, but that does make me a bit uncomfortable 
because you think it's private.  If I was committing crimes the whole time, then I would 
mind, but I'm not, so I don't really mind.  I just feel like it's taking it quite far, but when 
the raids and stuff were going on in London a couple of summers ago, didn't they 
realise that was going to happen by tracking people's BBMs and texts, so that does 
make me think that it's serving a purpose and that it's good, so I don't mind as much.” 
(Interview ID 915, 18 years, female, UK) 
 
The subtext in some of these stories is interesting as it suggests a clear difference between the 
law abiding citizen who has nothing to fear and gladly gives away his/her personal 
information and a group of unidentified (but identifiable) wrongdoers who can be detected by 
massive surveillance and control. There is the implicit assumption of a powerful and 
benevolent state capable of identifying wrongdoers by means of surveillance. 
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5.4.2 Data collection and data retention 
 
In April 2014 right after IRISS completed its empirical research phase, the European Court of 
Justice declared the EU Data Retention Directive invalid. From March 2006 to April 2014 the 
“Directive 2006/24/EC” allowed for citizens’ telecommunications data to be stored for 6 to 24 
months. The directive enabled law enforcement agencies to request data from 
telecommunication service providers such as E-Mails, IP-addresses, phone calls etc. During 
the interviews most respondents were aware that there is such a law in place, and some 
expressed rather critical views on the directive.  
 
“I don’t want people to know about my medical history. I don’t want them to know 
when I’m travelling abroad. I don’t want them to know my opinions. I don’t want them 
to know all sorts of private things. Why should this wonderful system know my beliefs 
whichever label that is, political, social, sexual. Look at the attitude towards the gay 
community. In 40 years it’s massively changed. That doesn’t mean in the next 40 years 
the attitude towards a minority or a majority could change. I always used to say to 
friends, look, in Federal Germany the Greens, the former Communists, are part of the 
government. And no doubt the Germans at one stage collected intelligence on the 
Greens, even though they were… I don’t know why, but they did. But they’re now 
members of the government” 
(Interview ID 393, 60 years, male, UK) 
 
Here the respondent raises concerns about the fact that data can be stored for a very long 
period of time. Even if it remains unclear what is to be done with this information and by 
whom, it raises the awareness of citizens – the fact of data being stored for any form of future 
processing creates substantial unease.  
  
The next story draws a comparison between “the good old days” before communication and 
data storage technologies and tools became elements of everyday life and the present day. 
Asked about his opinion on the data retention directive, the respondent did not see a need for 
a general rule to store data as citizens often “give their data away” anyway. He sees a 
function creep in social media platforms such as Twitter or Flickr where one can share images 
with the rest of the connected world, including law enforcement agencies who in this case do 
not need a data retention law for their investigations, as the necessary information is readily 
available. 
 
“When there's a major incident, if you think back to our youth, the good old days of 
rioting. When they showed a film, everyone was throwing things at the police. You look 
at the riots now, half the people are throwing things at the police. The other half have 
their mobile phones out, taking photos.... Now, those photos are going straight onto 
Twitter, they're going straight onto Flickr, so if you're the police, rather than rushing 
around trying to identify who's there, go on a few websites that look at the geo-location 
markers from different information and say, who was there taking photographs on that 
night. And you can see all the photographs being uploaded.” 
(Interview ID 405, 50 years, male, UK) 
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The next story is located in Austria, where a long and controversial public debate about the 
data retention law took place, before finally, in May 2014, the Constitutional Court in Vienna 
declared the law invalid. Here the respondent is rather sceptical about the fact that personal 
information about her is being stored and is, in theory, accessible to state authorities such as 
the police. She was aware about the present situation in Austria and also saw a clear trade-off 
in this respect – a trade-off that does not always work to her personal advantage. If citizens 
nowadays want to participate in electronically mediated forms of communication they more 
or less have to agree to their personal data being in some form. This quote also shows the 
inevitability of this practice, which creates great unease amongst many of our respondents. 
Most citizens know that communication data will be stored, although they are normally not 
aware by whom and for what purpose. 
 
„If I want to participate, I need to be willing to expose certain parts of my personal 
data. I myself determine where I disclose which data. The only thing that maybe annoys 
me a bit – but I can’t do anything about it – is that maybe somebody draws wrong 
conclusions based on my behaviour in the Internet that is of course recorded precisely. 
For example, the data retention law [in Austria], one knows what [who] I phoned, what 
websites I visited. There somebody looks it up in a [specific] context and says ‘I see, 
madam XXX was there and there, then she must have done or planned this and that 
according to our profile.’ … that is indeed a little bit [unpleasant] … [but] I would not 
know how I could influence that. Whoever processes that [the recordings], it could be 
also a private person or an [research] institution. Who knows? I cannot assess whoever 
it is.” 
(Interview ID 179, 63 years, female, Austria) 
 
For many citizens it seems to be rather unclear how the technology behind the data retention 
law is operating. Questions, such as – are entire phone calls being recorded and what is going 
to do with all this information? – were raised by several respondents. Finally the fact that 
communication is been recorded also leads to further considerations about becoming an active 
member of the civil society (e.g. what is being recorded about me when I’m participating in a 
demonstration).  
 
„Not directly, but all that data retention of my mobile phone, that's not happening to 
really do something right? They just collect and then "Let's see what we can do with it". 
But maybe, I don't know may my presence at a demonstration has been recorded via my 
mobile phone. Not to judge me, but they know it.” 
(Interview ID 274, 33 years, female, Germany) 
 
Many of these stories report a Kafkaesque experience: we do not know what happens to our 
personal information once it vanishes in cyber space. Someone may do something with this 
information that may have unforeseen consequences in the future. For some respondents, data 
collection by public authorities seems legitimate to a certain extent, although any form of 
outsourcing or private data collection is consistently considered illegitimate.  
 
„This is not legitimate.  There are problems with companies developing face 
recognition software – this should be done by public officials.  The police for example 
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should not be sub-contracting this type of work to companies, which have less control 
and accountability.  Using Facebook or Twitter to record crimes should not be a first 
resort.  People accused of a crime are innocent until proven guilty.  This accuses the 
person and causes a real problem with the judicial process, and of proving guilt.”  
(Interview ID 153, 44 years, male, UK) 
 
"I know about a case when footage was used in case of rape in my city, so for me it 
makes sense to have public CCTVs, but I do not trust private CCTVs, I do not think 
there is enough control and accountability that is there with public CCTVs.” 
(Interview ID 587, 22 years, female, SLO) 
 
For other respondents, the presumably unprecedented and uncontrollable policies of 
collecting and processing data, makes the state look like a “big fishing net” indiscriminately 
sucking in data around the globe. This feeds into dystopian views leaving no room for civic 
action and resilience is equated with surrender. 
 
“I think the fact that you have branches of governments who are collecting information 
on people. For a start, it’s all just a net. It’s not like they talk about how software picks 
up code words or that specific phrase. That’s bollocks. It’s not because they are just… 
It’s just a great big fishing net and the fact that it’s being operated in such a way that, 
as I said previously, we’re collecting the Aussies, the Aussies are collecting the Yanks, 
the Yanks are collecting the New Zealanders, the New Zealanders are collecting the 
Canadians. It’s, like, pull the other one. If it were targeted, you’d be collecting your 
own, but it’s not. It’s Tempora, isn’t it, that does it here?” 
(Interview ID 227, 43 years, male, UK) 
 
Embracing this dystopian global view leaves no room for deliberation. It should be noted, 
however, that this and similar views are in the minority. In many cases citizens are aware of 
what the state is doing, what its capabilities are and that any legal restrictions can be 
overruled if it is deemed necessary in a presumed or real state of emergency.  
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
 
Running through this chapter was the question of fairness, trust and surveillance from the 
perspective of citizens as members of the work force, clients of the educational system or 
simply as plain lay citizens in their multiple relations to the state. Trust and fairness are 
important resources shaping citizens’ attitudes and actions. Trust operating in the background, 
i.e. without being questioned or closely scrutinized provides for ontological security. Erosion 
of trust breeds surveillance and being under a surveillance regime erodes trust. This mutual 
dependency amounts to a vicious cycle. As the chain of events unfolding in the stories 
demonstrated, it is often impossible to evade the surveillant gaze and if so only at very high 
costs (such as giving up a position or risking severe sanctions).   
This cycle can be broken when the notion of fairness is introduced. The notion of fairness is a 
guideline to determine when surveillance may be justified. It provides a measure of what can 
be deemed acceptable and what is perceived as beyond any reasonable limit of intrusion into 
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the private sphere. Striking a fair deal is a baseline for every controversial constellation of 
surveillance. Any attempt to negotiate surveillance regimes invokes the idea of fairness in one 
way or the other. Taking a fairness perspective, the standard trade-off model can be translated 
in a different discursive frame, introducing fairness as a third element. Any suggested 
invasion of privacy for the sake of increased security has to undergo a kind of “fairness test” 
to determine whether the burdens of surveillance are adequately shared, whether other options 
might be feasible or whether – as often seems to be the case – the cure is worse than the 
disease. The simple and blatant move “… because it increases security” no longer is 
considered a legitimate and sufficient answer, when fairness is introduced as a criterion. 
While fairness is not often mentioned explicitly in the stories from the interviews, it can 
easily be invoked when reconstructing the underlying mundane ethical reasoning applied in 
the narrative accounts. Citizens are willing to accept being exposed to surveillance when this 
happens in a fair and even way. They develop dystopian or negative views only when there is 
no other option and they lose all control over the situation to which they are exposed as 
surveilled individuals. 
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6 5TH DILEMMA: ENGAGEMENT AND SECURITY 
William Webster, Charles Leleux 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION: DOING SECURITY, CITIZENS WATCHING CITIZENS  
 
The analysis of ‘citizens watching citizens’ (CWC) and neighbourhood watch (NW) has been 
written from the perspectives of first, careful examination of people’s ‘stories’ taking into 
consideration the context and settings in which they have relayed their account, and in 
particular whether or not their story is a descriptive and factual account based on real-life 
experiences, or rather a normative one which is based on their feelings and opinions; second, 
consideration of the stories and their relation (if any) to the discourse around contemporary 
surveillance studies and surveillance theories, i.e. are the stories merely reaffirming what we 
know already about the discourse and theories, or are they telling us something new; third, 
examining what the stories are telling us about the negative, positive or ambivalent attitudes 
arising towards CWC and NW; fourth, comparing the national practices and trends in CWC 
and NW in those countries from where participants were interviewed and from where national 
case studies were carried out (Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Spain and the United 
Kingdom), and finally, the identification of three ‘master stories’ which highlight the key 
dilemmas which are emerging around the issues of NW surveillance, democratic 
accountability and governance of NW, and the societal, cultural and historical reasons which 
have influenced the growth of NW or its lack of development. This contribution is intended to 
help inform the European Commission, wider academic, policy-making and practitioner 
communities when considering CWC, NW and surveillance in the community. 
 
CWC carried out through NW is usually done covertly. It is an example of community-based 
resilience in response to localised or societal problems (or issues) such as theft, anti-social 
behaviour, fear of crime, bogus callers or simply an example of community solidarity 
amongst people who share similar values and have common concerns over personal security 
and welfare. Surveillance undertaken through NW is not normally negotiated or regulated and 
is not subject to any conventional forms of governance controls. It often represents an 
asymmetrical power relationship in which the power lies with the ‘watchers’, and the 
‘watched’ are powerless, most likely being unaware about when, where, by whom or how 
they are being surveilled.263 The ‘watched’ will commonly not have been consulted, and 
therefore will not have had the chance to participate democratically in the process, or to have 
had the chance to discuss whether or not they agree to have this form of surveillance in the 
first place. Consequently, the right of the ‘watched’ to be anonymous has been removed 
unilaterally as has their right to personal privacy. The persons carrying out the surveillance 
will probably not have been elected democratically or be subject to the usual rigours of public 
accountability, and the democratic legitimacy to undertake NW surveillance is therefore 
questionable, and to this extent it could be described as a community ‘harm’ due to the fact 
that the ‘watched’ do not have a say in almost any aspect of its conduct. NW volunteers will 
not normally have been subject to any criminal records checks, and the trust and confidence, 
which communities may place in them could therefore be misplaced. On the other hand, the 
fact that citizens are willing to give up their spare time to help their community by attempting 
                                               
263 Lyon, David, Surveillance Studies: An Overview, Polity Press, 2007, p. 23. 
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to prevent crime, or perhaps allaying the fear of crime, or by undertaking ‘good neighbour’ 
activities by looking after more vulnerable members of the community, demonstrates a 
commendable form of active citizenship or civic engagement. Stakeholders include local 
communities, community groups, public bodies including utility and transport organisations, 
elected politicians, the police, and local and national governments. Limited evidence was 
found about the use of technologies in undertaking surveillance through CWC, although 
examples of the use of websites for NW were observed. The national co-ordinating bodies for 
NW in the UK use a NW Alert Notification System which allows them to send out email 
alerts to all of their registered contact persons, allowing national dissemination to potentially 
thousands of NW members in a very short space of time.  
 
No ‘shocks’ were evident from the survey results from each country, although tensions were 
sometimes found in communities, which were experiencing either temporary or longer-term 
difficulties with integration, for example, of marginal Roma communities and the majority 
indigenous populations in Slovakia, and the consequential stigmatisation or re-stigmatisation 
of these groups. Further tensions were seen in Austria, Germany and Spain, due to their 
former authoritarian pasts, where sometimes the media, the police or politicians raise fears 
over the potential right-wing tendencies of NW groups. The authoritarian pasts of some 
countries, coupled with cultural traditions of respecting authority, has had a major influence 
on the low levels of growth of NW, compared to say the UK, which has experienced 
significant development of NW. Best estimates of the current numbers of registered schemes 
in the UK, provided by the national co-ordinating bodies in 2013, are England and Wales 
(12,324); Scotland (1,600), and Northern Ireland (776). The British Crime Survey estimated 
that in 2006/07, 16% of the UK population was covered by a NW scheme (which equated to 
3.8m households in England and Wales).264   
 
Examples of ‘active citizenship’ and ‘caring for others’ are to be found in many of the 
countries from which quotations are provided. One of the most common themes emerging is a 
lack of faith in politicians and in some cases the police to tackle perceived or actual societal 
problems such as burglaries, bogus callers, and fear of crime. This is one of the factors, which 
have resulted in communities or individuals showing collective resilience and taking on 
responsibility for watching over each other, and each other’s properties, and in so doing self-
empowering themselves. This self-empowerment includes the use of power to monitor 
members of their community either with, or more likely without, their consent. Lyon makes 
the following point with regard to surveillance and power: ‘Surveillance is always bound up 
with questions of power and its distribution….’265 Some examples demonstrate the desire to 
look after each other in a caring and humanitarian sense, which has probably grown stronger 
as the members of the community have aged. The actions (including surveillance) which are 
then undertaken are arguably not sanctioned in a formal sense or approved by any authority, 
other than perhaps registering a neighbourhood watch scheme with a national co-ordinating 
body, and establishing communications channels with the police and other authorities. Carried 
out overtly, awareness of NW surveillance may moderate people’s behaviour or create a 
                                               
264 Nicholas, Siân, John Flatley (eds.) et al, Circumstances of Crime, Neighbourhood Watch Membership and Perceptions of 
Policing: Supplementary Volume 3 to Crime in England and Wales 2006/07: Findings from the 2006/07 British Crime 
Survey, Home Office, 2008. 
265 Lyon, David, Surveillance Studies: An Overview, Polity Press, 2007. 
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response from them, and in those senses the existence of surveillance and surveillance 
technologies undoubtedly has the ability to moderate or control people’s behaviour, reactions 
and opinions. Arguably, in the context of overt surveillance, citizens may feel that they have 
surrendered their right to anonymity and privacy.  
 
Rather surprisingly, NW viewed as a ‘soft’ form of law enforcement, has developed outside 
the formal control of the police in all of the countries examined, although in some areas of the 
UK the police still maintain an active interest in supporting NW, although admittedly at a 
lower level than some years previously. However, in countries such as Germany and Austria 
the police have at times been unsupportive of the development of NW, and its growth across 
all countries could be seen as a community response, and indeed community resilience, to the 
failure of the police to provide the level of support, which communities expect. This may be 
too simplistic a view as inevitably there will be funding pressures on the resources of the 
police, and while a community may view crime in their area as being a really important issue, 
the police may interpret this as being very low level and regard the concerns as being more 
about the ‘fear of crime’ and may not allocate the resources which the community expects. 
Bannister266 argues that NW in the UK has grown as a societal response to shared values 
within communities as opposed to responding to actual levels of risk and crime, and as a 
consequence police and local authority resources may have been distributed 
disproportionately to communities which have NW schemes with no particular risk of crime, 
instead of to those communities which may have had a greater need. The ways in which 
citizens engage with NW surveillance practices in the different countries examined through 
this Deliverable of the IRISS Project varies considerably, often due to cultural or historical 
reasons, and these are explored in further detail in the cross-country comparisons presented in 
this contribution. The policy discourse around CWC and NW is generally unexplored in most 
of the countries examined, with the notable exception of the UK, which differs from the other 
countries examined both in terms of the extent of the policy discourse around NW and the 
scale of the development of NW and its integration with UK society from the early 1980s to 
the present day.  
 
 
6.2 CITIZENS AND COMMUNITY SAFETY 
 
In this section we provide examples of a ‘cascade’ system of disseminating NW alerts which 
have the potential for reaching up to 5,000 households within a short space of time; the range 
of support services provided by the police in the UK in relation to community safety 
including an acknowledgement of the move away from giving advice primarily on prevention 
of crime to community safety, and details of the range of other community initiatives which a 
NW volunteer has engaged in. Regarding the final example, there is conclusive evidence from 
NW interviews in the UK that volunteers are active not just in their own NW group, but in 
many other community-based safety initiatives too.   
 
                                               
266 Bannister, Jon, Cases of Democratic Resistance in Surveillance Society, IRISS Consortium Meeting, University of 
Sheffield, 24-26 June, 2014. 
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The first quote is a story which presents a very positive view of surveillance in a NW context, 
and the impact which a simple telephone cascade system for NW alerts can potentially have 
for mass community (covert) surveillance of a regional population and its day to day 
activities:        
 
“Neighbourhood watch is not an identity on its own, it’s a point of reference to allow 
people to do what they want to do.  Your neighbourhood watch is as good or as bad as 
you want it to be, active or inactive as you want it to be.  In my region, there are 4 
districts and we use a telephone cascade system to pass on communications.  We have 
5 or 6 people in each contact group, which includes the principal contact person, to 
whom the message is passed, who then passes it to people below, who in turn pass it 
on again to others in the various neighbourhood watch schemes.  The beauty of the 
scheme is its simplicity, and co-ordinators will receive calls back to confirm that the 
message has been conveyed and cascaded properly. The system has the potential to 
pass a message on to almost 5,000 households within a very short time, if it all goes 
smoothly.  It ensures that lots of eyes and ears are looking and listening.  The system 
does have its faults as neighbourhood watch schemes are not always registered with 
Neighbourhood Watch Scotland.  This is possibly due to the loss of independence 
about taking control of their own activities.  The number of schemes is quite high 
which are not registered with Neighbourhood Watch Scotland in our region.” 
(Interview ID 171, male, 71 years, UK) 
 
The benefit of this system is the speed with which an alert can be issued and hopefully 
disseminated, for example if suspicious white vans are seen in an area, although the 
drawbacks would be first, its reliance on each person in the cascade system being available 
and actually passing the message on, and second, the number of schemes which have not 
registered with the national co-ordinating body and therefore could not participate in the 
cascade system. It does however represent a potentially powerful example of community 
resilience on a regional scale, although the population being surveilled will be largely 
unaware that it is happening or have the opportunity to influence any aspect of it. 
 
The second quote is a story from a serving police officer who has several roles in relation to 
crime prevention:  
 
“I am a Crime Prevention Officer, Architectural Liaison Officer and CCTV officer, 
and advise home owners and business owners on security, assess CCTV requirements, 
and also try to ‘design out’ crime at the planning stages.  If there are house break-ins, 
or unauthorised entry to business premises, or at schools, I will go and visit them and 
give advice about preventative measures which will hopefully mean that it does not 
happen again.  I will also assess the surrounding area looking at street lighting, car 
parking, perimeter safety and then develop an action plan. Formerly, I would act as a 
Neighbourhood Area Crime Prevention Officer, sitting on a local crime prevention 
panel or community safety panel, often acting as the Secretary taking minutes and so 
on.  Regarding neighbourhood watch, there is no prescriptive advice which I give, 
although there has been a shift from crime to community safety, e.g. road safety, 
playground safety, scamming advice, how to deal with illicit calls, so it has a much 
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broadened scope now.  I still give advice to neighbourhood watch groups on what is 
happening in their area, and often this is then included in their neighbourhood watch 
newsletter.  Neighbourhood watch co-ordinators still want Police involvement in their 
activities. New neighbourhood watch schemes which are registered with 
Neighbourhood Watch Scotland, have to have their scheme ‘stamped’ at their local 
Police station. There are a number of schemes in my city which are both registered 
with Neighbourhood Watch Scotland and unregistered – often, they don’t realise that 
they need to register in order to receive leaflets, notices and other advice.”  
(Interview ID 173, male, 42 years, UK) 
 
What is striking about this example is first, the range of support services and advice which 
this dedicated officer provides across different disciplines, and second, confirmation of the 
changing national priorities of the police in Scotland from crime to community safety. The 
change in focus by the police towards community safety is also mirrored by NW groups over 
recent years in Scotland, and England and Wales.    
 
The final quote presents a positive view of surveillance, community involvement and active 
citizenship, which includes NW:   
 
“I got involved having come from defence security.  I was invited (by the Police) to 
become involved about 12/13 years ago.  At that time I could only devote a small 
amount of time, but the Police asked me to help with their Neighbourhood Watch: 
Young at Heart initiative, to advise the elderly – they gave them a free lunch, and 
explained current rights. I am also involved with the Community Speedwatch safety 
campaign with the Police, and  Operation Nightlight, which is a home safety, intensive 
campaign - during dark nights it is an invitation to criminals (to burgle houses) 
between 4-6pm.  We give advice to tourists coming off cruise ships – how to get about 
and personal safety if necessary. I am the Chair of Region’s Neighbourhood Watch 
groups, there’s around 80 but not all are active, some are in limbo.” 
(Interview ID 176, male, 73 years, UK) 
 
This quote provides examples of the wide range of community safety initiatives which have 
links to NW, and the strong sense of community duty which this volunteer displays. It would 
be a misconception therefore to view NW activities in the UK in isolation from other 
community initiatives, as it was a common theme for NW volunteers to be engaged in several 
other community based activities in addition to NW.  
 
 
6.3 ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP AND CARING FOR OTHERS 
 
Active citizenship and caring for others is a theme most commonly found in the UK, but is 
also evident in some of the other countries too.  The actual surveillance which individuals or 
groups then carry out is likely not to have been negotiated and agreed with all of the residents, 
some of whom will not even be aware that it is happening, when or where it is occurring, or 
who is carrying it out. The people carrying out the surveillance will probably not have been 
democratically elected, and in that sense, their actions lack democratic accountability. On 
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balance, more good than harm will probably come from these forms of ‘active citizenship’ in 
terms of community togetherness and a feeling that something is being done to address the 
problems which the community is facing. However, the surveillance being undertaken calls 
into question the democratic right to carry it out; the accountability, accreditation or 
qualifications of the persons undertaking it (including whether or not any criminal convictions 
checks have taken place); the potential asymmetrical use of power, and to what extent the 
local community are kept informed and have some influence over what is happening. 
 
The first quote is an example of what appears to be a self-appointed community ‘watcher’ 
who clearly spends large amounts of time watching the daily life activities of the residents 
where he lives.  
 
“I know at most who lives in the houses. But we have one [guy] in the first house of 
the street who knows everything. There is nothing he is not aware of. Immediately … 
when my car window is not completely closed, he comes ‘your window is not closed’. 
It is not unpleasant … he is a nice guy, very bustling, [he] knows everything. I am sure 
he would respond to something like that … [he] is regarded as pleasant by everybody 
[in the neighbourhood]. Everybody loves him because he can handle all 
devices/machines. ‘‘Come **** something is squealing’’ ‘‘Ok, I’ll come’’. The guy 
does it without getting paid for it.”  
(Interview ID 183, male, 79 years, Austria) 
 
The ‘watcher’ also assists the local community with repairs and advice regarding their 
domestic appliances, and while it would be harsh to criticise this person for the good role 
which he performs, as it is a positive account of surveillance, it also demonstrates how the 
surveillance which he undertakes is not negotiated, and most people will probably not even 
know it is happening. To that extent the surveillance can be regarded as an asymmetrical use 
of power in which the ‘watched’ have been disempowered, although they will generally be 
aware that it is occurring, and possibly tolerate its existence.             
 
The second quote is an example of a rural NW community who have lived in the same area 
for the past 25-30 years. They make sure properties are secure when people are on vacation, 
and share personal information with each other such as holiday plans and mobile phone 
numbers:           
    
“I’d say we have a good community here. We are all part of the same generation, we 
moved to this community of terraced houses 25 – 30 years ago, we all raised our 
children here. Although now this turns out to be problematic, we are all old now, no 
youngsters are living here. But we’ve exchanged our mobile phone numbers and we 
know if someone of our community is on vacation and we can operate the burglar 
alarm of our neighbours, we have keys to the other apartments we take care of each 
other. Even the people living in the single-family-houses over the street take care. We, 
and we are very active in that, notice if somebody is not from here. We warn each 
other in case there is a stranger coming to our street. We communicate. We share the 
sweat bath, the pool and we organise evenings where we eat and drink together or 
where we clean the pool together, we constantly communicate with each other. Now 
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as we are all growing old together we are going to the supermarket for the other one 
if he is sick. It is almost very rural here in this area. Everybody knows everyone. They 
don’t have this kind of atmosphere in the city centre. And the neighbourhood watch 
scheme is a good thing, we get notifications by e-mail from the head of the scheme if 
something has happened somewhere. Not only burglaries, even cases of girls being 
raped are reported to the community. But that existed even before the scheme became 
active. As I moved into this place, 30 years ago, they’ve put flyers on trees or the 
garden fence “Attention, there was a burglary (attempt) in this street!” 
 (Interview ID 275, female, 72 years, Austria) 
 
This NW group perform a monitoring role over movements in their community and look out 
for older members of the community who may require additional help. They also socialise 
with each other, and a very strong sense of caring is evident. Perhaps due to the length of time 
that some of the members have known each other, and the strong social ties which have 
developed, this form of NW provides a very good example of how traditional concerns of NW 
such as crime and fear of crime, have possibly become less important than the fundamental 
societal and caring needs of the community.  
 
The final quote is both a descriptive and a normative account of how disillusionment with 
politicians and the police, led this NW volunteer to come to the opinion that you are better off 
taking control of your own NW activities, and independently of other agencies:       
 
“A key moment for me was the self-experience of becoming a victim and not knowing 
what else is happening in my close neighbourhood. When our organisation became 
active I once invited a high ranked police officer to one of our meetings and 
confronted him with the fact that the police are not doing anything at all when they 
say they are running a programme on community policing. That community policing 
or community safety approach already existed for 5 years when we started with our 
organisation. But there was nothing besides platitudes from politicians. They’ve 
initiated a meeting of citizens, police and politicians. That can’t be true I thought to 
myself, the community policing initiative was already dead at this point in time. Ok, so 
they’ve invited citizens to this meeting, and you won’t believe it but I was the only 
citizen who has attended this meeting, the rest were policemen and politicians talking 
to each other. That was a priceless exercise and I don’t talk to politicians. No matter 
which side you choose (he refers to the strong dichotomy between social democrats 
and conservatives in Austria) they will always say the opposite. So I started to drive 
around in my car and passed flyers to people on a street level, that is how it all has 
started with our neighbourhood watch scheme.” 
(Interview ID years, male, 67 years, Austria) 
 
This quote is representative of most of the countries from which the surveys took place, in 
that NW tends to be ‘bottom-up’ originating from within communities and not having been 
subject to ‘top-down’ initiatives or directives from politicians, governments or the police. In 
this sense, the NW scheme is ‘owned’ by the members (and possibly the community) who set 
the rules for its operation and control all aspects of it.    
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6.4 CITIZENS WATCHING CITIZENS (CWC) 
 
CWC can be conducted in both overt and covert situations. Conducted covertly, the surveilled 
may not be aware that surveillance is happening and therefore cannot express an opinion 
about it or react to it, although it is a situation in which someone (or some group) is exerting 
power over them and they are powerless to respond. A large percentage of NW activities will 
fall into the category of covert surveillance as described above in which the surveilled are 
unaware that it is happening and are therefore disempowered. Conducted overtly, citizens 
may be aware that they are being watched, and this may create alternative responses of 
uneasiness as shown in the first example provided below; both support for it and anger, as 
given in the second example, and resigned contentment or tolerance to it as provided in the 
third example.  
 
The first quote is an example of surveillance (in this case CCTV) being installed for a specific 
purpose, but due to the indiscriminate nature of its lens, the interviewee felt uncomfortable 
with other people viewing what he was discarding in the rubbish bin, and a lawyer living in 
the same apartment block also objected to its presence:   
 
“They installed a camera in our house, in a room next to the house with the rubbish 
bins. They did it after a Shisha Bar was opened in the basement and our caretaker 
suspected them of leaving their trash in our bins. But a lawyer living in our house 
objected to it. The idea was that people should call the caretaker when they saw 
"suspicious" trash, but it didn't work. I also did not feel comfortable, because anybody 
could see what I was throwing away. Anyway the situation did not improve in the 
end.” 
 (Interview ID 56, male, 38 years, Germany) 
 
This quote demonstrates the ubiquity of surveillance, and how people cannot escape it due to 
its indiscriminating nature and although initially probably accepting of the need for its 
introduction, citizens may eventually feel the pervasiveness of it in their lives and ultimately 
reject it.   
 
The second story provides information on a very direct and (usually) visible form of CWC, 
through Community Speedwatch. This method of traffic speed control involves trained 
volunteers pointing a speed gun at vehicles driving through an area known in the past for 
speeding, and has generated mixed responses from the general public, both positive and 
negative:     
 
“The local Police force where I live has a community engagement model, and they 
have prioritised road safety and speeding. A pilot project (Community Speedwatch) 
was trialled in a neighbouring town, which has been running for 14 months, and a 
new Community Speedwatch project has now started in my town. We are provided 
with dates and times by the Police, and a team of 3 (volunteers) go into the designated 
areas, the Police will risk assess it first, we will use the speed gun, and for those who 
have exceeded the levels we take their details (i.e. car registration number), and pass 
them to the Police. The Police will then write (a letter) to the owner advising them that 
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they have been caught speeding on this occasion but next time they could be charged 
(with a criminal offence). The Police provide training, and there has been a reduction 
in the number of speeders and in complaints (by the public about speeding). There has 
been a mixed reaction – some people have asked what we are doing, and others have 
congratulated us saying it is a worthwhile cause, and some give us rude gestures 
shouting ‘get a life’ and then accelerate away. It is definitely worthwhile, as less and 
less people are speeding – I passed a location yesterday and the Police had the speed 
gun. There was a 12 month review in April past, which was positive.” 
 (Interview ID 218, male, 27 years, UK) 
 
This example is unusual in that it is an open form of direct surveillance of CWC, and 
therefore almost invites a response from the public being watched, with some people having 
supported the initiative, while others have shouted derogatory remarks as they drove past. It is 
unlikely that the speeding motorists would have shouted the same unkind remarks to police 
officers if they had been carrying out these duties instead of the volunteers. The example does 
provide a participatory form of overt surveillance in which the motoring public can moderate 
their driving behaviour (and speed) as a response to the actions of fellow citizens.    
  
The final quote is a story, which although emanating from Austria could have come from any 
of the countries from which the interviews were conducted. It describes the role (probably 
mostly unobserved) of the caretaker who conscientiously and covertly watches the 
movements in and out of the residences, which he/she looks after:  
  
“We have very good caretaker in our residence, who carefully watches our house. So 
if someone takes out the trash, you will be observed. But I think it’s kind of protective 
and it’s nice. I have a bike in Vienna, but not enough space in the bicycle rack, so I 
just left it somewhere. I forget to lock it and three hours later the caretaker ringed, 
and noticed that I STILL hadn’t locked my bike. So our residence is watched out for. 
(laughs). And I think it’s nice, it doesn’t bother me because it’s this rural feeling.” 
 (Interview ID 502, female, 21 years, Austria) 
 
The surveillance being undertaken although non-negotiated and covert, is accepted with good 
humour and a situation exists of what could be best described as ‘resigned contentment.’ The 
residents however no longer have the right to remain anonymous, but on balance probably 
most of them are content with this arrangement and tolerate the surveillance. 
 
 
6.5 FEAR OF CRIME AND PROPERTY PROTECTION 
 
This section addresses some of the fundamental issues, which exist about both actual crime 
and the fear of crime, and what the response is of citizens to either condition. In the UK, 
research has shown that you are more likely to be a victim of crime if you live in one of the 
most deprived areas than if you live for example in one of the least deprived areas of 
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England.267 However, living in an area which experiences higher incidences of crime does not 
mean that there is greater likelihood of NW schemes being established, as in fact higher 
numbers of NW schemes are found in more affluent areas which also experience lower crime 
rates, than in more deprived areas which experience higher crime rates.268 This was also 
identified in the British Crime Survey in 2006/07: ‘In general, the characteristics associated 
with lower levels of (NW) membership were those related to having a higher risk of crime.’269 
Bennett, in a previous study also came to this conclusion.270 The relationship, in the other 
countries examined, between NW start-ups and the relative affluence of areas and their crime 
rates, is thought to be unexplored.     
 
The first quote is initially a descriptive story of someone who has experienced an attempted 
burglary, but then provides a normative account of her feelings towards the apparent futility 
of deploying technological measures to prevent such occurrences:  
 
“Yes, I talk about crime with my neighbours, as all my neighbours have been victims 
of burglaries, and I have been victim of an attempted burglary, but they succeeded 
only in breaking a window, but I came back home after just 15 minutes…I was so 
angry… I immediately asked my daughter to close the gate and I went out, as I saw 
two guys passing by I simply shouted that the police were coming and they didn’t 
reply to me obviously…  When something strange occurs in our street, we are used to 
phoning each other to keep ourselves informed about the potential danger. We do not 
talk about how to prevent crime, since the majority of my neighbours are old people 
who are fearful (or live in fear): they lock the door and take other 
precautions…maybe I will feel the same when I am old. I think that technical or 
technological measures are useless, my neighbour (a 75 year old lady who has a 
husband with health problems) who has been victim of burglaries three times, has 
bars to her windows but I think they are useless systems of prevention…nobody has 
installed alarm systems.” 
 (Interview ID 208, female, 62 years, Italy) 
 
It could be argued that the interviewee has a positive outlook to informing her neighbours 
about strange occurrences in her street to warn of potential danger, but is then at best 
ambivalent or at worst dismissive of the usefulness of deploying security technologies to 
prevent crime.    
 
The second story demonstrates the self-empowerment and resilience of a small community 
living in an apartment block to fight back against a series of burglaries: 
 
                                               
267 Flatley, John, Chris Kershaw, Kevin Smith, Rupert Chaplin, Debbie Moon, Crime in England and Wales 2009/10: 
Findings from the British Crime Survey and police recorded crime, Home Office, London, 2010. 
268 Topping, John, Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Watch: Participatory Mapping and Socio Demographic Uptake, 2012. 
269 Nicholas, Siân, John Flatley (eds.) et al, Circumstances of Crime, Neighbourhood Watch Membership and Perceptions of 
Policing: Supplementary Volume 3 to Crime in England and Wales 2006/07: Findings from the 2006/07 British Crime 
Survey, Home Office, 2008, p57. 
270 Bennett, Trevor, Themes and variations in neighbourhood watch, Crime, Policing and Place: Essays in Environmental 
Criminology, Routledge, 1992, pp.172-186. 
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“I only registered with neighbourhood watch last year.  I have lived at my address for 
35 years and it is a quiet area.   It is mostly 2/3 bedroom flats in tenement blocks, 
which makes them suitable for letting.  However, the flats in my area started to be 
targeted by house-breakers, and over a short period there were 10 break-ins or 
attempted break-ins.  I went to the Police for advice and help, and they said they 
would send a Community Police Officer to give advice.  Despite waiting, nobody 
came, so I went back to the police who then told me that Community Police were 
disbanded and suggested that I contact neighbourhood watch.  I was not happy 
getting the run-around.  Another neighbour was then burgled, so I went to a 
neighbourhood watch meeting in an area close by.  The Police eventually came to see 
me and attended for 2 hours and they increased their patrols.  Most people in our 
street were much more aware, and I was encouraged to buy an intruder alarm, but the 
police did admit this would just be moving the problem on elsewhere.  My neighbours 
and I fitted a new metal plate to the communal entrance door to the flats.  I also fitted 
new glass storm doors.  The burglars had been watching for the postman arriving, 
and then gaining access to the communal stairwell by going in behind him, so we 
deactivated the service button which means the postman has to wait outside for 
someone to come and take their mail.  This all helps us to get to know the neighbours 
much better, and we now let each other know when we will be away or on holiday.  
Things have now quietened down and there has been no trouble, but we are all much 
more alert.  I am not wildly happy with the Police – they clearly did not want to be 
bothered, but a very good Police officer did speak at the other neighbourhood watch 
group meeting which I attended.” 
 (Interview ID 441, female, 64 years, UK) 
 
An additional social benefit arising from the formation of this NW group has been the fact 
that the residents now share holiday information and are more sociable with each other than 
had been the case previously. This example of CWC also shows how having given up on 
trying to enlist the help of the police to deal with the burglaries, led to the NW group taking 
decisive action themselves and feeling empowered through the process. 
 
The final quote in this section is a normative account of how the (apparently unsubstantiated) 
fear of crime and lack of faith in the ability of the police to inform residents about criminal 
acts, has obscured the interviewee’s objectivity in being able to rationalise his feelings 
between fear of crime based on actual occurrences, and perceived threats of crime: 
 
“In the year 2005/2006 there was a burglary and theft from the dwelling of one of my 
daughters, and someone has also broken into my own house. I live on the outskirts of 
the city and I thought I live in paradise. I always had the feeling that everything in my 
neighbourhood is peaceful and fine, but then I’ve started to talk about such things 
with my neighbours. One told me that there were two burglaries just a few weeks ago 
down the street where we are living. Then I came to the conclusion, that it isn’t that 
peaceful at all here, crime is happening all the time and everywhere, but nobody 
knows about it and people don’t inform each other about these issues. The police do 
not inform neighbours about crimes and have not done so for decades when it would 
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have been their duty. Even the police spokesman said on national TV that they don’t 
have the time to do that.” 
(Interview ID 334, male, 67 years, Austria) 
 
This example, along with others from citizens similarly in the older persons’ category, 
perhaps demonstrates an increasing fear of crime as one becomes older and a view of society 
as being far worse and more unsafe than in reality it actually is. The interviewee regarded 
living in their neighbourhood some years previously as idyllic, and now there is 
disillusionment with the police over their ability to maintain law and order.   
 
 
6.6 RIGHT TO ANONYMITY 
 
The right to remain anonymous, and to be forgotten, is closely aligned with the fundamental 
right to personal privacy, and the almost impossible task of keeping one’s personal details, 
daily movements, conversations, transactions and interactions private.271 As shown in many 
of the examples provided, the ‘watched’ have had this right removed through the various 
forms of non-negotiated NW surveillance undertaken, with the requirements of the ‘watchers’ 
superimposed on the ‘watched’, and while some might accept this as a necessary part of living 
in a shared apartment block or a close-knit community, others clearly view it as an 
infringement of their personal rights and have taken decisive action to attempt to reclaim their 
right to anonymity which included relocating from suburbs or small towns to the city where 
they feel that it is easier not to be noticed and to become anonymous. The establishment of 
the right to be anonymous may have more resonance in those countries, which had totalitarian 
pasts. 
 
The first quote provides a story of someone who chose to move from the suburbs to the city, 
where they are enjoying not being subjected to the ubiquitous gaze of surveillance and gossip 
from neighbours, which had formerly been the case:    
 
“I am living here for 4 months and don't know anybody, but I don't miss a thing. 
That's why I live in the city, because being anonymous is possible. I've grown up in a 
small suburb town in Bavaria, there it was different, the gossip and all, I hate it. 
Neighbourhood Watch? I know that from ALF, the TV-show. In Munich? Oh please. 
Nobody lives here against his will, the rents are very high, and you know what you 
get: sometimes it's a little loud at night, yes. If you don't like that: Leave.” 
 (Interview ID 265, female, 31 years, Germany) 
 
This account provides an insight into the thoughts and feelings of someone who had been 
uncomfortable with the omnipresence of surveillance while living within her local suburban 
community, and had felt powerless to change that situation. To remedy the situation she had 
                                               
271 Szekely, Ivan, ‘The Role of Remembering and Forgetting in a World of Increasing Surveillance, in the Context of Post-
Communist Societies’, in Living in Surveillance Societies: The Ghosts of Surveillance, Proceedings of LiSS Conference 2, 
Webster, C. William R., Doina Balahur; Nils Zurawski; Kees Boersma; Bence Sagvari; Christel Backman and Charles 
Leleux (eds.) University Press ‘Alexandru Ioan Cuza’, Iasi, Romania, 2011, pp. 32-36.    
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chosen to move to the city where she could exercise her right to be anonymous, which she 
was clearly at ease with. 
 
The final quote is a normative account which provides another example of someone who has 
consciously made a decision to live anonymously in the city, but who is very well informed 
about the benefits and disadvantages of sharing part of your life with neighbours and the 
resultant effects which this can have in a surveillance sense:   
 
“Well I am someone not so engaged with my neighbours. And then there is 
ambivalence. On the one side you can help each other and support others, but that is 
more for small towns… not for cities.  On the other hand there is that normalising 
effect, they control you. So I am quite happy to live anonymously in a larger city.” 
 (Interview ID 823, male, 25 years, Germany)  
 
This quote refers to the apparent cultural norm of neighbours in small towns helping each 
other, but the interviewee does not expect that form of mutual support to exist for those living 
in the city. The interviewee also refers to the ‘normalising’ effect of surveillance, and the 
control, which those undertaking it can then exert. There appears to be inevitability about 
surveillance taking place in ‘small towns’, which is likely not to have been negotiated and 
involves a group of neighbours who can exert power in an asymmetrical manner over other 
members of the community. If anyone is unhappy living with this form of surveillance, then 
one option appears to be to relocate to the city and to live anonymously.      
 
 
6.7 MASTER STORIES AND KEY DILEMMAS 
 
The central themes and key dilemmas which have emerged from the cross-country analysis of 
CWC and NW surveillance include the democratic accountability and governance of NW, and 
the societal, cultural and historical reasons which lie behind its growth or indeed its relative 
lack of development.  
 
The first quote is a story from a NW co-ordinator from the UK who lives in an affluent area 
(‘all detached houses’) where she admits that there is little crime, however the neighbours 
have decided to form a NW group, possibly for reasons of mutual support and shared societal 
values: 
 
“I am neighbourhood watch co-ordinator of a small patch – 31 houses, and 4 streets 
in the local area.  All detached houses. Moved there in 1988, and was asked if I 
wanted to join (neighbourhood watch) – at that time all 31 (households) were 
members.  (I was) then asked to be a street co-ordinator, which I did for several years, 
then the main co-ordinator was retiring. I believe in the saying ‘‘if you know your 
neighbours you will know the strangers amongst you’’ and I was keen for a social 
event for the neighbours to get together.  The Annual General Meeting was more of a 
social get-together but more people attended than normal.  There is little crime, but a 
few bits and pieces.  I joined the Safer Neighbourhood Teams and went on to that as a 
representative from neighbourhood watch – others had much more problems than our 
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area.  We keep eyes and ears open for each other, such as letting the street co-
ordinator know about holiday plans and keyholder information.” 
 (Interview ID 174, female, 64 years, UK) 
 
This story matches the findings of several academic studies in the UK, which found that NW 
schemes were more likely to be formed in more affluent areas with lower crime rates, rather 
than in areas, which were less affluent and had higher crime rates. This phenomenon was not 
found elsewhere in other countries, which formed part of the study group. The residents of 
this particular community will, in all probability, have similar backgrounds in terms of 
professional training, income levels and employment, and can therefore identify easily with 
each other through shared social values. The surveillance undertaken is likely to be covert 
although neighbours will be aware that it is happening. The phrase ‘if you know your 
neighbours you will know the strangers amongst you’ has a particular resonance in relation to 
CWC.    
 
The second quote is a story which although brief, manages to capture a number of the themes 
which are emerging throughout this contribution, including: democratic accountability, 
consent, negotiation, discomfiture, privacy and anonymity:   
 
“In my house, there is a couple, they know everything about each and everybody and 
talk about that to everybody. Horrible. And they offered me, when they "heard" that I 
was going away for some weeks, that they would care for my postbox. And I said no. 
That's exactly that thing: I have nothing to hide, but I want to decide who is seeing 
what.” 
 (Interview ID 330, female, 34 years, Germany)  
 
The surveillance undertaken in this example has not been negotiated and has not been agreed 
through obtaining consent of the residents. It is not regulated, and has been imposed on the 
‘others’ by this ‘couple’ who indulge in gossiping with neighbours. It involves the use of 
power applied asymmetrically over the ‘others’ with the interviewee clearly feeling 
uncomfortable with it, and feels that she has lost some of her privacy and her right to 
anonymity, and above all her ability to control what is happening.   
 
The final story shows how a NW scheme can be started from the ‘ground up’ eventually 
increase its membership to include around 6,000 registered users, capturing the attention and 
interest of both local residents and politicians. Crucially though, there is an inherent distrust 
of politicians clearly evident, and a determination that the scheme should be formed without 
any influence from public bodies or elected representatives:   
 
“It started back in 2007. Back in these days we called our initiative “Help burglary”. 
We were handing out flyers on a street level to citizens and then we rented a place in a 
pub for a first meeting. At the day of the meeting the borough council gave me a call. 
They said that they’ve heard there is a meeting on burglary prevention and security 
issues in our neighbourhood and the borough mayor wants to join our meeting. 
Suddenly they realised that this topic could be of interest for them. Back then our topic 
was indeed a sensation, so I’ve answered, “yes he can join us but he isn’t giving a 
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(political) speech to our fellow citizens. I don’t want to hear anything from him, he 
can come, sit down and listen but there will be only citizens talking with the police, no 
politicians!” Then they asked me how many people will attend, I’ve guessed 
something like 30 but at the end the room was packed with 150 people, all addressed 
by simply handing out flyers on the street. It was the right topic at the right time. At 
our meeting there was this young man, in his early thirties or something. He said that 
it’s a brilliant idea we are working on and he would like to help us with a website. I 
was sceptical at the beginning, that would never work I thought. The first website 
we’ve launched was only concentrating on issues in our neighbourhood. We had the 
idea that with the help of this website, citizens could move closer together. At the 
beginning of our initiative we wrote people’s names on paper, their name and so on. 
Even at our second meeting back in 2007 we had about 150 participants joining us. 
We offered the option of registering yourself for the neighbourhood watch scheme 
online at our website later in time. Now everybody can join the neighbourhood watch 
scheme, people from all across Austria can do that. We have about 6.000 registered 
users. Yesterday I had 4 new registrations and two incidents were reported to me. 
That’s how it’s going.” 
 (Interview ID 336, male, 67 years, Austria) 
 
This quote from Austria could be representative of any of the countries from where the 
surveys were undertaken, in that it demonstrates the common desire for NW groups to be 
independent from the influence of elected representatives, due perhaps to an inherent distrust 
of politicians and local councils. It also shows the remarkable potential power of a local 
community to reach out to other communities with their message, in this case enlisting around 
6,000 users from across the country. The potential surveillance, which could be undertaken on 
this scale is far-reaching, although questions do arise over its governance, democratic 
accountability and legitimacy. The feelings of the largely unsuspecting publics are unknown, 
but it would appear that they will be unaware of the surveillance, disengaged from it and 
therefore disempowered.   
 
National comparisons 
Since NW has a strong cultural dimension, developing differently in different societies we 
will briefly compare the situation in the countries involved in this study. Further details with 
regard to national differences are addressed in the overall country reports at the end of this 
Deliverable. 
 
Austria 
Austria is generally regarded as a very safe country in which to live, and there has been very 
little public engagement with NW. Any problems of ‘insecurity’ amongst citizens might be 
generated from local media hype, as the media often acts in its own self-interests for example 
if it is a sensational story it will ‘sell’, but the figures for recorded crimes are extremely low. 
The authorities might react to public demands for increased video surveillance by installing 
some cameras. In Linz and Wels there are city watch schemes, however left-wing politicians 
have encouraged public monitoring and criticism of city watch officials (who are paid by the 
Government), but in reality there is no underlying crime problem. The main stakeholders 
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include the media, police, activists, political parties, and local communities. The police are 
not generally supportive of NW or other groups being formed such as citizen patrols or 
vigilantes, but they still wish to have direct access to citizens. Culturally, there is no tradition 
of forming NW in Austria as a societal response, and concern for neighbours is not evident as 
a community or group based response.  
 
Germany 
There are very low levels of NW in Germany where there is a strong cultural tradition of 
citizens complying with the official way of doing things, and anything, which is proposed 
beyond that is likely to be criticised. The probable response is for individuals to do things 
unilaterally, and not to organise themselves into groups. Anything, which raises fears 
stemming from the country’s totalitarian and right wing past is likely to raise suspicion, with 
the terms ‘Blockwart’272 and ‘Stasi’273 sometimes being used by the media. The police and the 
public sometimes combine their arguments to criticise NW over engagement, and in particular 
whether or not any right wing tendencies might be emerging which serve to motivate people. 
In general, the Police are not in favour of NW, and politicians rarely vote for it. In northern 
Germany there is a tradition of the ‘Nachtwanderer’274 who will look after a community in the 
evening when it is dark, but there is no such tradition in southern Germany, and nor is there a 
tradition of looking after neighbours as in the case of the UK. The very low levels of NW 
formation in Germany is due in part to the now culturally embedded and former Prussian 
historical tradition of people being trained to serve in the armed forces, and complying with 
authority. There is an underlying and general fear of community groups being formed to do 
their own thing.275 However, the ‘third’ sector is now growing and it will be interesting to see 
what the response is of the state to this phenomenon.  
 
Italy 
NW in Italy has low levels of implementation, and due to this it has tended to be overlooked 
both in the public debate and in the academic discourse, and does not feature in national level 
politics. While in the UK, NW has expanded greatly and has been analysed from different 
aspects, in Italy NW is more the exception than the “rule”.  There is some evidence of NW in 
six municipalities of the Lombardy region, which has a dedicated website: “controllo del 
vicinato” (neighbourhood watch).276  
 
Slovakia 
NW in Slovakia is mostly organised as community based responses to problems experienced 
with the cohabitation between the majority and minority populations, for example the so 
called “Roma Citizen Watches” which are supported by the Ministry of Interior (Office of the 
Government Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities). The main objectives of these watches 
is ‘the promotion of community development, the empowerment of local activism, reduction of 
antisocial acts, the maintenance of public order and the standard of environmental quality in 
                                               
272 Schmiechen-Ackermann, Detlef, Der "Blockwart". Die unteren Parteifunktionäre im nationalsozialistischen Terror-und 
Überwachungsapparat, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, JSTOR, 2000, pp. 575-602.  
273 Kretschmann, Andrea, Facets of control: Criminal justice regimes in analysis, Journal of History and Sociology, 2013, 4, 
2. 
274 Enderle, Manfred, Nachtwanderer: Kriminalroman, Gmeiner-Verlag, 2009. 
275 Kreissl, Reinhard, Governing by Numbers, 2011. 
276‘Controllo del vicinato’ (neighbourhood watch): www.controllodelvicinato.com. 
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marginalised Roma communities.’277 One of the reasons for the establishment of such ‘Roma 
Citizen Watches’ include occasions when members of the Roma community attack members 
of the majority population and there is an assumption that such ‘watches’ can keep order in 
the community.278 Another example is where conflict exists between the majority population 
and the Roma community where there is insufficient police oversight.279 
 
Spain  
There is not a strong tendency in Spain to form NW as a community response to societal 
problems. Concern for neighbours is also not evident as a group response. Communities are 
often polarised either for or against NW, and their participation in either camp tends be active 
as opposed to passive. NW is continually co-determined by the stakeholders, in whom the 
media often set the agenda by raising awareness, and the police tend to react to community 
demands by deploying more resources for example. Creating a context where NW is the 
solution is not normally politically acceptable, with the state tending to firefight on particular 
issues. The media plays a strong role in influencing public opinion on NW, while there is 
some support, equally there is some opposition and resistance to it. NW is not subject to any 
form of governance and tends to be unregulated. 
 
UK 
NW is one of many different forms of community engagement in the UK which uses various 
surveillance practices, examples of which include community speedwatch, horse watch, rail 
watch, flood watch, metal watch, church watch, school watch etc. NW membership is high, as 
shown before, but the actual total number of schemes is thought to be much higher as many 
schemes have decided not to register with the national co-ordinating bodies. In terms of how 
NW is co-determined by the different stakeholders, the Scottish Government, Northern 
Ireland Assembly and UK Governments fund the respective national co-ordinating bodies for 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales. This funding is primarily for staffing 
costs and offices, with a little remaining for media campaigns or starter packs for new groups. 
NW is very much a ‘bottom-up’ grass roots activity, which is self-regulating, and generally 
free from political interference or governance. Close links will commonly be developed with 
many other groups and the authorities, notably the police, local authorities, and local 
councillors. At the outset of NW in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s it was promoted by the 
UK government and the police, but there is little political involvement now and the role of the 
police has generally been revised downwards to one which is less involved, although in N. 
Ireland there is a strong police engagement with NW which has been developed from the 
establishment of a lasting political peace from the late 1990s. In England and Wales there has 
been a recent change involving the decentralisation of decision making on police matters to 
44 area Police and Crime Commissioners, and it remains to be seen how much influence 
community groups will have on these Commissioners regarding deployment of police 
resources to communities. The focus of NW activities in the UK has changed in recent years 
                                               
277 Cited from the official document Citizen Watches in the areas of Marginalized Roma Communities, 
http://www.fsr.gov.sk/data/files/ine/obcianske_hliadky_v_podmienkach_vyzvy_FSR.pdf, in Slovak 
278 There is an example of this in small community Huncovce, where they do not have enough police officers and where 
Roma citizens attacked football players at the stadium. More information in Slovak: 
http://romovia.sme.sk/c/7147157/v-huncovciach-po-bitke-zavedu-obcianske-hliadky.html  
279 After such an attack, the authorities are planning for a citizen watch in Tisovec: http://romovia.sme.sk/c/7089505/v-
tisovci-po-utoku-planuju-obcianske-hliadky.html, in Slovak 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
169
from property and crime related issues to a role which involves caring for neighbours, e.g. 
bogus callers, internet crime, welfare of older people etc. NW is generally unregulated and 
unaccountable in any formal sense, since members are unelected and not subject to criminal 
records checks, and some but not all NW schemes will have a constitution. Surveillance and 
NW has become more 'normalised' in the UK than in other countries, and schemes are 
commonly formed in response to either real problems such as burglaries, bogus callers, the 
fear of crime, or simply as a response to a community desire to be ‘together’ where members 
will have shared backgrounds, social values, home ownership levels, professional training, 
levels of employment (or former employment), affluence, ethnicity and religion (in the case 
of N. Ireland). Very importantly, studies have consistently shown that NW in the UK is more 
likely to be formed in areas of low crime, higher affluence, higher home ownership, low 
levels of ethnic mix etc. than in more deprived areas which have higher crime statistics and 
which are less affluent, have greater turnover of tenants, and the residents have poorer life 
chances.  
 
 
6.8 CONCLUSION  
 
Haggerty and Samatas describe surveillance and democracy in the following, clearly defined, 
context: 
‘Surveillance, when positioned on a normative continuum, tends to sit at the polar 
opposite of democracy. Democracy rests with the angels, signifying all that is 
laudable and promising about government. At the other extreme lurks surveillance; a 
sinister force that threatens personal liberties.’280 
  
Of course, in the case of NW surveillance this is clearly too simplistic an explanation due to 
the complex relationship, which it has for citizens trying to come to terms with issues such as 
democracy, governance, representativeness, citizenship, participation, transparency, privacy, 
use of power, the right to be anonymous and societal values. Also, human relationships are 
undoubtedly influenced by the conditions of visible and invisible surveillance found in NW 
and although these experiences will mostly be positive and reassuring ones, some citizens 
passively tolerate the gaze of community surveillance either favourably or unfavourably, 
while others seek to re-establish their right to privacy and anonymity by relocating to the city 
for example. Establishing or re-establishing the right to anonymity may be more of a concern 
for citizens in those countries, which experienced totalitarian pasts, and had state-sponsored 
systems of surveillance installed for the purposes of monitoring the population. However, 
NW does provide many excellent examples of active citizenship and civic engagement, in 
which communities enjoy levels of protection, support and self-empowerment which they 
might not have otherwise experienced, and in those cases the NW volunteers and groups 
should rightly be recognised for the good service which they perform. 
 
Looking now at the UK, NW has undoubtedly become ‘normalised’ in society given the scale 
and consistently high levels of participation which it has experienced from the 1980s to the 
                                               
280 Haggerty, Kevin D. and Minas Samatas, Surveillance and democracy: an unsettled relationship, in Surveillance and 
Democracy, Routledge, 2010, p20. 
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present day, and it would be inaccurate to say that this was simply because communities were 
showing resilience and organising themselves due to the lack of support from the police or 
politicians, although this may have played some part. The reasons for the growth are thought 
to be more complex. Studies have shown that NW formation in the UK is more prevalent in 
areas of low crime and greater affluence, and conversely rates of formation are lower in areas 
of higher crime and lower affluence, and so, for the UK other factors are influencing the 
growth of NW and other forms of ‘watches’. These include the fear of crime; the need for 
certain communities to look after each other, particularly vulnerable people, and the need for 
some citizens who have shared values, backgrounds and professions to form themselves into 
not only NW groups for mutual support, but in all probability engage in other forms of social 
activity and active citizenship. In the last few years, there has been a change in the main 
purposes of NW in the UK from monitoring potential criminal activity and unusual 
movements in an area, to a much more person-centred approach involving looking after the 
welfare of neighbours, making residents aware of the dangers of bogus callers, sharing 
information when properties will be empty, and now increasingly personal internet security. 
NW in the UK rarely features in the policy discourse at local or national government level, is 
largely self-regulated, and arguably, there exists a democratic deficit in term of its public 
accountability.  
 
For countries which have experienced totalitarian and fascist pasts, such as Austria, Germany, 
Italy and Spain there has been very limited growth of NW and it has not established itself at 
anywhere near the same levels as seen in the UK. This may be down to various factors such 
as the lack of a cultural tradition by communities to form groups in response to societal 
problems, or fears about a possible return to the days of right wing extremism. Opinions by 
the media, and in some cases the police and politicians, are more likely to enter the public 
debate, including open opposition to the concept. Where NW has been established, there is 
commonality with the UK in that it will have been started from ‘ground up’ and there is a 
shared sense of self-determination and eventual self-empowerment when it is achieved. There 
are examples from those countries with authoritarian pasts, of rejection of any attempt at 
proposed engagement from police, politicians or public authorities in the process of starting-
up NW groups. In common with the UK, NW in those countries tends to be self-regulated and 
democratically unaccountable.       
 
CWC and NW surveillance are difficult areas for citizens to actively participate in the 
discourse around them. This is due to the surveillance mostly being carried out covertly, 
being non-negotiated, unregulated, and lacking any of the usual forms of accountability or 
governance controls, which a democratically elected body might have. It also has a noticeable 
imbalance in the power relationship in favour of the ‘watchers’ who set the rules about why, 
how, when, where and by whom it takes place, and therefore puts the ‘watched’ at a huge 
disadvantage, but this is also true of many other types of surveillance systems.281 The central 
themes and dilemmas which have emerged therefore from the cross-country analysis of CWC 
and NW surveillance, include but are not restricted to, the democratic accountability and 
governance of NW, and the societal, cultural and historical reasons which lie behind its 
growth or its relative lack of development. 
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7  SUMMARY  
Reinhard Kreissl 
 
WP 4 was designed to investigate the surveillance society as a mundane phenomenon, 
moulding the everyday life of European citizens. We wanted to know how these lay citizens 
perceives of surveillance and react to the fact of being more or less constantly exposed to 
different types of surveillance measures. Surveillance and resilience – two of the key concepts 
of IRISS – cannot be considered household words for the layperson. There exists an elaborate 
academic discourse about these two concepts, but they are not common coinage in everyday 
language. Although the revelations of Edward Snowden have received ample response in 
public media discourse, the complex technical, legal, and political ramifications of programs 
like PRISM are far beyond the grasp of non-experts. While it is important to analyse 
surveillance and resilience from an expert position (what IRISS did in a number of work 
packages detailing theoretical issues),  it is also important to understand the effects of modern 
technologies and the surveillance capabilities they entail on ground level in everyday life. 
 
This requires first of all a move out of the ivory tower of academic seminars and libraries. 
Much of the surveillance studies research consists of either desk research or technological 
analysis of complex systems, capable to perform all kinds of data gathering and analysis. 
What remains mostly uncharted is the domain of daily routines of citizens using their mobile 
phones, electronic banking, online-shopping portals and social media, passing through checks 
at airports, producing their swipe cards to get access to their offices and walking under the 
constant gaze of CCTV cameras in public and private spaces. How do citizens perceive of this 
constant nuisance of identifying, being watched, providing data? And: Is it a nuisance in the 
first place in their view? 
 
While some studies have investigated public attitudes towards surveillance in a general sense, 
using opinion polls and questionnaires, very little is known about the way surveillance creeps 
into the everyday routines of citizens and how they cope with it. From a methodological 
perspective it makes a difference whether a subject is exposed to a set of general stimuli or 
questions, choosing from a set of fixed choices to answer or whether s/he produces a complex 
narrative account of events, actions and experiences in a communicative setting of an 
interview or a focus group giving respondents the floor to elaborate on what they think is 
important. In WP 4 we choose this second option to investigate the effects of surveillance 
from a wider perspective.  
 
In doing this we embarked on an adventurous journey into the real world. Many academics 
are not used to do this nor are they trained to do this kind of real world empirical research. As 
a renowned scholar once put it: sociologists are archaeologists by choice. They stick to 
artefacts instead of going out and observe real life to understand and analyse how the social 
world works.282 Opting for such a bottom-up approach, starting with life on ground level, 
entails a methodological trade-off. While a survey design, using fixed choice questions on a 
large number of subjects, produces a set of data that can be easily processed using elaborate 
statistical methods to test pre-defined hypotheses, the ecological validity of the raw data is 
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typically weak. Producing data in a more open, context-sensitive approach, e.g. conducting 
narrative interviews or doing participant observation yields complex raw data of high 
ecological validity, but creates intricate problems when it comes to data analysis. Such a 
qualitative approach to empirical research requires a good theoretical underpinning, linking 
data, method and analysis in a comprehensive way.  
 
We decided to follow the bottom-up approach for a number of reasons. First, there is a lack of 
this kind of investigations, secondly, the conceptual toolkit of surveillance studies should be 
exposed to a rigid empirical testing: do lay citizens perceive of themselves as leaking data 
containers, are they aware of social sorting procedures, do they perceive of surveillance as a 
mixed blessing, are they concerned about data-protection and privacy issues, what do they 
know about the detrimental effects of surveillance and what kind of coping strategies do 
emerge under the surveillance regime? In addressing these questions we at the same time 
problematized the relation between lay and expert knowledge about surveillance and 
resilience. In doing this we addressed one of the key theoretical and methodological issues 
informing the IRISS project: the different views of surveillance and resilience emerging from 
different perspectives of detached observer and involved participants. 
  
Involving more than 200 citizens in five European countries in narrative exchanges about 
their personal, mundane existence as techno-social hybrids produced a complex database of 
individual stories detailing what it means to live in a surveillance society. The challenge was 
to analyse and synthesise the individual stories into a larger theoretical framework spanning 
the geographical area covered in our research. This required a very intense and frequent 
exchange among the national research teams to develop a shared understanding of the data 
collected. Pursuing a bottom-up approach always entails an abductive form of reasoning, i.e. a 
continuous recursive process of combining theory and data driven interpretations.  
 
In WP 4 we used a basic shared actor model to guide this process: individuals were perceived 
as competent, goal seeking problem solvers acting in an environment (a “life world”) full of 
information and communication technologies structuring their range of action. We 
furthermore assumed – drawing on surveillance studies – that this produces a number of 
typified general dilemmas or so-called trade-offs. We addressed citizens as competent actors 
performing different roles, each creating a specific dilemmatic constellation with regard to 
surveillance and resilience: Citizens use modern ICT when they act as consumers, when they 
act as citoyen (i.e. members of the polity), when they seek for information and organize their 
daily communicative exchange with significant others and friends, and when they are 
involved in economic processes as members of the work force. For each of these roles we 
identified a dilemma focussing on the core concept of privacy. In the world of electronic 
consumerism privacy is traded in for convenience, in the public sphere, the central trade-off, 
rehearsed in policy debates is between security and privacy. In the realm of personal 
communication using new social media privacy is traded in for sociality and in workplace 
settings it is trust that is replaced by surveillance. Finally we also approached citizens who 
were actively involved in citizen surveillance schemes like neighbourhood watch to find out 
about their understanding of surveillance.  
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Taking this broad and comprehensive approach a number of interesting findings can be 
synthesized: 
Surveillance and resilience can be studied in a wide array of different settings. Focussing the 
critical debate on surveillance in a law enforcement end security context leaves out important 
domains like electronic commerce or socialising practices using electronic platforms like 
Facebook. 
Citizens perceive of the transformation they are undergoing as techno-social hybrids, although 
they do not necessarily use the vocabulary of surveillance and resilience to talk about their 
coping strategies.  
 
A number of routine activities in the everyday life of European citizens have undergone 
dramatic changes due to the emergence of new technologies and media like the Internet. 
These changes are acknowledged in the interviews, but they are not commonly linked to 
surveillance and control.  
When it comes to resilience a number of different reactions can be typified, ranging from 
surrendering to a situation perceived as unchangeable to active measures of precaution like 
sharing information selectively or refraining from using new social media. 
What makes coping strategies difficult to develop is the peculiar nature of modern 
surveillance assemblages operating in most cases at an invisible, infrastructural level of data 
processing. Very often there is no tangible interface for citizens (as a police officer would be 
the interface of public order) and hence in a number of cases we found a lack of 
understanding about surveillance effects, sometimes producing extreme interpretations at both 
ends of the spectrum: trivialising and demonising. 
 
An analysis like the one presented here can be seen as a minor, but nonetheless important 
contribution to the public societal debate about modern technologies, producing new forms of 
governance and changing the human condition in many ways: it can help to better understand 
what it means to live as a techno-social hybrid in a surveillance society and what options 
emerge to create a resilient society, embracing values like privacy, autonomy and equality, 
though in a probably new – electronically mediated – form. 
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9 ANNEXES 
 
9.1 ANNEX I – COUNTRY REPORTS 
Alexander Neumann; Alessia Ceresa, Daniel Fischer, Chiara Fonio, Erik Láštic, Charles Leleux Keith 
Spiller, Nils Zurawski 
 
Part of the research strategy for this study was to draft country reports along the following research 
questions to gain a better understanding for national differences that were assumed before we 
conducted the analysis of the material: 
 
9.1.1 Implementation of the EU data retention directive (2006/24 EC) 
 
Guiding question: How was the EU data retention directive (2006/24 EC) implemented in your 
country? Were there any public protests, debates?  
 
Results for the UK 
The UK is relying on the Data Protection Act rather than the EU data retention directive to guarantee 
compliance;283 as a result there appears to be little debate or reaction to the directive by the UK media 
and public. Instead much debate has focused on the Draft Data Communications Bill, which in effect 
supersedes much of the authority of the directive. The Draft Bill has received the sobriquet of the 
‘Snooper’s Charter’ due to the invasive privileges the Bill could afford to crime enforcement. In brief 
the Bill proposes; 
 
· Internet service providers having to store for a year all details of online communication in the 
UK – such as the time, duration, originator and recipient of a communication and the location 
of the device from which it was made.  
· They would also be having to store for the first time all Britons' web browsing history and 
details of messages sent on social media, webmail, voice calls over the internet and gaming, in 
addition to emails and phone calls 
· Police not having to seek permission to access details of these communications, if 
investigating a crime 
· Police having to get a warrant from the home secretary to be able to see the actual content of 
any messages 
· Four bodies having access to data: the police, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, the 
intelligence agencies and HM Revenue and Customs 284 
 
The Draft Data Communications Bill has faced much vociferous criticism; particularly from UK 
human rights groups. 285 Liberty (see Section 3.5), for example, has published a sizeable submission 
to the Joint Committee (a governmental board comprising of representatives of both houses of the UK 
parliament. Their role is to examine proposed Acts, Bills and Laws). 286 Liberty highlight the 
potential dangers of outsourcing the monitoring of citizens to, for example, telecommunication 
providers which they attest effectively asks the nation to monitor the nation. Other criticisms raised 
have called for greater clarity on the application of the Bill and how and where the huge amount of 
data captured will be stored and how this data may be analysed or reviewed in the future. 
                                               
283 See http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2075377/watchdog-slams-eu-retention-directive 
284 Source and See, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20676284 
285 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18439226 
286 See http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy12/liberty-submission-to-the-draft-communications-data-bill-
committee-aug-2012-.pdf). 
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Results for Italy 
The Directive of the European Union 2006/24/EC287 on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of the 
public communication networks has been implemented in Italy with the D. L.gs 30 May 2008 n.109. 
In light of the legal modifications in this context, the DPA updated the General Provision on 17th 
January 2008288, which represents the complementary legal framework about “data retention” in the 
electronic and telecommunication context (mobile telecommunication companies, e-commerce, etc.) 
in order to implement the art. 132 of D. L.gs 30 June 2003 n. 196289, the s.c. Data Protection Code, 
enforced on 24 January 2004. 
Therefore, according to the Italian Data Protection law, the data retention rules allow telephone/mobile 
companies to store certain data related to phone calls, including SMS messages, made/received by 
their customers for 24 months. In detail, the data retained includes the number of the phone that is 
making the call and the name and address of the customer, as well as the phone company which 
provided the phone number, the dialled number/s, the date and hour of the start-end of the phone call, 
the codes of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) of both the maker and the receiver of the phone call and finally the data 
which enables the geolocalisation of the call (caller ID). The period of data retention is reduced to 30 
days in cases of phone calls without reply. Furthermore, the data retention for SMS is related to the 
sender, receiver, place and time of the message, even when the SMS has been sent or received via the 
Internet: VoIP, e.g. “Voice over IP”, this is the case, for instance, when using Skype, Viber or 
Whatsup online services. It is evident that the typology of stored data refers to the technical data of the 
phone call or SMS but never to the content of the (verbal or written) communications, according to the 
Italian constitutional principle of the “communications privacy right, whatever communication method 
is used”290. Infringement of this constitutional principle is allowed only under approval of a judicial 
authority order (public prosecutor, magistrate or lawyer’s request) for (personal and/or public) security 
reasons (e.g. terrorism or other violent crimes)291. 
The other focus of this legislation refers to the data retention in cases of electronic communications. In 
this case, the data retention legislation refers only to the data related to the origin of the 
communication, not to the destination. In detail, the DPA defined that “the information collection on 
the web sites visited by the customers, even when there is a specific URL or a generic IP address of 
destination”292 is forbidden. The only exception is to identify the destination of the information as 
already mentioned in cases of SMS or e-mail sent via the Internet (VoIP, i.e. “Voice over IP”), as they 
are the equivalent to a phone call. Therefore, the data can be stored for 12 months and the data 
retention refers to the IP address, the customer name and address, the typology of service and the 
access line (the number of the line if “dial up”, number of DSL or other). Also, in this case, the 
information about the content of the communication is excluded for the same constitutional right and 
the exception for communication content retention is the judicial authority order293, as mentioned in 
the data retention rules in cases of phone-call communications. 
The introduction of the European Directive 2006/24/EC concerning the “data retention” issue within 
the context of electronic communications services or public communications networks has not been 
the object of diffused public protests or debates involving the citizens at a national level. 
                                               
287European Parliament and the Council, Directive 2006/24/EC of 15.03.2006 on the retention of data generated or processed 
in connection with the provision of public available electronic communications services or of public communication 
networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, in OJ L 105/54-63, 13.04 2006  
288 D.L.gs 30 May 2008 n. 109, in G.U. 5 February 2008 n. 30 
289 D.L.gs 30 June 2003 n. 196, in G.U. 29 July 2003 n. 174 – Supplemento Ordinario n. 123 
290 Art 15 Italian Republic Constitution 
291 Minozzi Marzia, “Data retention – Gli operatori telefonici non conservano i contenuti delle chiamate e degli SMS”, in 
Sicurezza e Giustizia, No. IV/MMXI, 2011, pp. 24-25 
292 DPA’s provision of the 10 January 2008, www.garnteprivacy.it 
293 Minozzi Marzia, “Data retention – Gli operatori telefonici non conservano i contenuti delle chiamate e degli SMS”, in 
Sicurezza e Giustizia, No. IV/MMXI, 2011, pp. 24-25 
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In fact, the reaction against the European Directive 2006/24/EC has been expressed much more at a 
European level through the EDRi (European Digital Rights) organisation report294. The support for the 
European protest in Italy has been represented by Netcomm (one of the three main European e-
commerce associations)295 and in particular by the company President, Roberto Liscio, who officially 
declared to the Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera, that “[the enforcement of the Directive 
2006/24/EC, especially concerning the aspect of e-commerce] would increase the costs of 
transportation, up to 10 billion Euros. [...] in fact we are going to increase the transportation expenses 
from 5,7 billion Euros to 15,6 billion Euros [...] and many small-medium companies would risk 
closing their activities, and many ‘start-ups’ wouldn’t even be born at a time where there is the 
necessity to develop the strength and vitality of managers, both in Italy and Europe, to support the 
economy and overcome the crises we are currently experiencing [...]”296. 
An answer to Netcomm was given by the General Secretary of Adiconsum (a consumer association 
supported by the CISL labour union), Pietro Giordano, who was in favour of the Directive 
2006/24/EC: “the Directive will produce negative effects only against those who operate improperly in 
the market [...]”297. Therefore any protest remained at a European level because, in Italy, there haven’t 
been demonstrations or public protest events involving the citizens or associations/organisations active 
in the data protection and/or privacy context. 
On the other hand, the implementation of D. L.gs n. 109/2008 (on the base of the EU Directive 
2006/24/EC) has concretely demonstrated its effectiveness through a recent inspection of the Fiscal 
Police-Special Privacy Nucleus (Guardia di Finanza-Nucleo Speciale Privacy in Rome), supported by 
the Italian DPA, of 11 mobile and provider companies to check whether these companies are using 
and storing personal data according to the law and procedures in line with the privacy rights, as well as 
the data retention directive. 
The Fiscal Police, in fact, found that 9 companies out of a sample of 11, infringed the law of “data 
retention” and the privacy rights of the mobile companies and providers298. Therefore, the result of this 
inspection demonstrated that, a priori, there is a clear lack of knowledge and awareness by the mobile 
companies and providers of the legal framework on this issue. In fact, one of the main scopes of this 
police inspection was precisely to develop and spread the implicit “message” about the importance of 
the legal management of sensitive data, according to the data retention and privacy related to the new 
technological channels of communication, also in light of the wide diffusion in the market of the brand 
new smartphone and tablet technologies in this field, i.e. a message about the necessity of protecting 
the consumers’ personal data and privacy299. 
The Fiscal Police discovered several law infringements regarding data retention and privacy, i.e. the 
violation of the retention period to store the customers’ data beyond the legal requirement (24 months 
for phone calls and SMS; 12 months for electronic communications, i.e. Internet services) and the 
violation of the principle of deleting the collected data at the end of the storage period; the lack of 
minimum standard security measures that should be adopted by the mobile companies and providers; 
the infringement of the DPA’s provision about the adoption of biometric measures, by which the data 
to be stored and those that should be deleted can be recognised 300. 
                                               
294 European Digital Rights, “Shadow evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC)”, 17 April 2011,  
295 The three main e-commerce associations in EU are Fevad (France); Netcomm (Italy) and Imrg (UK) 
296 http://lareteingabbia.net/tag/rete/page/8/  
297 http://lareteingabbia.net/tag/rete/page/8/  
298 D.L.gs 30 May 2008 n. 109, in G.U. 5 February 2008 n. 30 (implementation of the EU Directive 2006/24/EC); DPA’s 
General Provision of the 17 January 2008 
299 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, “Privacy: operazione ‘data retention’ . ispezione della Guardia di Finanza in 
tutta Italia sul rispetto delle norme per la conservazione dei dati di traffico telefonico e telematico”, Rome, 6 March 2013, 
www.garteprivacy.it; Federprivacy, “Privacy & Telecomunicazioni: ispezione della Guardia di Finanza in tutta Italia”,  
March 2013, http://www.federprivacy.it/news-mobile/805-privacy-a-telecomunicazioni-ispezioni-della-guardia-di-finanza-
in-tutta-italia.html  
300 Assodigitale, “Violazione dei dati personali e della privacy, brutte notizie dall’operaizione ‘data retention’ delle Fiamme 
gialle: codice violato in 9 casi su 11”, March 2013, http://www.assodigitale.it/2013/03/06/violazione-dei-dati-personali-e-
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At the end of the police inspection at a national level, two cases about the infringement of the data 
retention law and the violation of the legal period to store sensitive data were reported to the Minister 
of the Economy, and the DPA were informed about a case of crime against the minimum standard 
security measures. Consequently, the DPA will define the legal line between privacy and data 
retention rights within the next few months, on the basis of (private and public) security reasons, 
especially in cases of data transfer abroad301. 
 
Results for Austria 
As the Austrian government didn’t meet the deadline of the implementation of the Data retention 
directive (15th March 2009), the European Commission filed a complaint on the 10th July 2010. In 
order to circumvent the payment of a fine, the directive was finally implemented and became 
applicable on the 1st April 2012. The delay of the implementation was the consequence of a lack of 
support for the directive in the national government. Since the beginning of 2007, thus during the 
timeframe of the implementation, Austria has been governed by a grand coalition, consisting of the 
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Christian democratic and conservative party – the 
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). Only the ÖVP showed full support and was willing to implement the 
directive as it is. The SPÖ, in charge of the implementation, raised a lot of concerns, especially 
regarding data protection and thus postponed the implementation willingly to debate the directive on 
the European Level. This debate never happened and the SPÖ were forced to implement the directive, 
but did only the bare minimum, i.e. the storage of communication data during a period of 6 months. 
The access through a prosecutor is only possible by judicial decision in case of a ‘severe offence’, 
which is defined as a crime with a minimum sentence of 3 years; concretely listed are 32 types of 
offences. In case of imminent danger, the police have the possibility to access the data without a 
judicial decision. Every access has to be reported to a commissioner for legal protection.302  
On the opposition base, all the political parties were strictly against the Data retention directive, even 
the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), who voted in favour of the directive on the European 
Level as governing party in 2006. The concerns of the opposition parties were primarily due to the 
threat of people’s privacy and the conflict of the directive with the Art. 8 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights.  
In November 2012, a total of 188 accesses have been reported by the authorities, resulting in 19 solved 
cases. This reinforced the opposition in their criticism regarding the usefulness of the data retention, as 
none of the accesses has been triggered by a case of terrorism, which was the main reason for 
implementing the directive.303 
The main public debates and protests against the Data retention directive occurred around the 1st April 
2012, the time of the implementation in Austria. On the 31st March 2012 throughout Austria, 
demonstrations were organized, labelled with ‘farewell privacy’.304 Between 500 (according to the 
police) and 2000 (according to the organizers) people participated solely in Vienna, 9000 people were 
                                                                                                                                                  
della-privacy-brutte-notizie-dalloperazione-data-retention-delle-fiamme-gialle-codice-violato-in-9-casi-su-11/; Federprivacy, 
“Privacy & Telecomunicazioni: ispezione della Guardia di Finanza in tutta Italia”,  March 2013, 
http://www.federprivacy.it/news-mobile/805-privacy-a-telecomunicazioni-ispezioni-della-guardia-di-finanza-in-tutta-
italia.html 
301 Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, “Privacy: operazione ‘data retention’ . ispezione della Guardia di Finanza in 
tutta Italia sul rispetto delle norme per la conservazione dei dati di traffico telefonico e telematico”, Rome, 6th March 2013, 
www.garteprivacy.it; Federprivacy, “Privacy & Telecomunicazioni: ispezione della Guardia di Finanza in tutta Italia”,  
March 2013, http://www.federprivacy.it/news-mobile/805-privacy-a-telecomunicazioni-ispezioni-della-guardia-di-finanza-
in-tutta-italia.html 
302 http://www.akvorrat.at/sites/default/files/VDS_BIMEntwurf2009/BIM-Entwurf_TKG-Novelle_2010.pdf S14 
303 Der Standard 28.11.2012 Vorratsdaten: Bisher 188 Abfragen durch Behörden in Österreich  
http://derstandard.at/1353207614601/Vorratsdaten-Bisher-188-Abfragen-durch-Behoerden-in-Oesterreich 08.04.2013  
304 https://gegenvds.at/ 08.04.2013 
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expected by Anonymous Austria.305 In Linz, a total of 500 participants were recorded at the 
demonstration.306 Already in 2011 some minor demonstrations against the data retention were 
organized in Graz and Linz.307 
The working group ‘AK Vorrat’, in collaboration with the Green Party, filed a constitutional challenge 
signed by 11,139 supporters on the 15th June 2012, which is currently being treated by the 
Constitutional Court.308 Also the Freedom Party in Carinthia (FPK) filed a constitutional challenge 
against the Data retention directive on the 27th March 2012,309 aiming for a similar result as in 
Germany, where the directive has been classified as non-constitutional-conform by the Court and thus 
suspended the implementation. 
 
Results for Germany 
The implementation of the EU data retention directive in Germany is based on the precondition that 
there is a national data retention directive, following from the EU initiative. Thus the development will 
be described as one line of progress here. All discussions about the EU data retention directive in 
Germany are proxy discussions, i.e. it is through the German data retention directive that the issue has 
become a public issue in the first place. Discussions on the EU directive are academic and surface 
almost exclusively when the preconditions of the German directive are addressed.  
The law that implemented the EU directive on data retention has been approved by parliament on 9th 
November 2007. The protests began immediately and on different levels.  
- Civil society: As early as 2006 citizens began to organise against the EU data retention directive. In 
Germany the Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (AK Vorrat) was founded. It has since rallied 
against the directive and organised a set of very successful public protests, rallies and demonstrations. 
The biggest among them was in 2007 where 15,000 people walked the streets against the directive. In 
succeeding years further demonstrations followed. The motto under which they held their 
demonstrations and the discussion was „freedom, not fear“ (Freiheit statt Angst). The initiative 
networked successfully and also filed a constitutional lawsuit in 2007. All in all 34,939 people signed 
the lawsuit - the biggest in Germany to date.  
- Parliament / politics: The German directive was debated in parliament and support and opposition 
sometimes ran through a given party. Several members of the Bundestag filed separate constitutional 
lawsuits in addition to the AK Vorrat.  
On 11th March 2008 the constitutional court limited the German directive in several ways. Revealing 
data was made more difficult for the criminal justice systems, including the need to produce a 
reasonable suspicion to a court and to demonstrate that such data is the only way of investigating the 
crime or suspect. In 2010 the Verfassungsgericht ruled the German directive, which was a direct 
implementation of the EU directive, as unconstitutional. The EU was of a different opinion and 
claimed that it was not in the courts’ power to decide upon the implementation in German law. A new 
German directive is now under construction and has yet to be produced and brought to parliament. In 
2011 a new directive was presented but has not passed either house of parliament to date. The EU 
reprimanded Germany for not having implemented its directive in 2011. In 2012 the discussion has 
died down considerably. The Deutsche Juristentag now supports the implementation of the EU 
                                               
305 Der Standard 31st March 2012 Österreichweite Proteste gegen Vorratsdatenspeicherung 
http://derstandard.at/1333184930550/Farewell-Privacy-Oesterreichweite-Proteste-gegen-Vorratsdatenspeicherung 
08.04.2013 
306 ORF 1st April 2012 Demo gegen Vorratsdatenspeicherung http://ooe.orf.at/news/stories/2527248/ 08.04.2013 
307 Futurezone 20.04.2011 Staat behandelt Bürger wie Terroristen http://futurezone.at/netzpolitik/2768-staat-behandelt-
buerger-wie-terroristen.php 08.04.2013 
308 https://www.verfassungsklage.at/ 08.04.2013; Der Standard 15.06.2012 Scheibtruhenweise Klagen gegen die 
Vorratsdatenspeicherun http://derstandard.at/1339637967615/Scheibtruhenweise-Klagen-gegen-die-Vorratsdatenspeicherung 
08.04.2013 
309 Kleine Zeitung 27th March 2012 FPK bringt Verfassungsklage ein 
http://www.kleinezeitung.at/allgemein/multimedia/2981497/verfassungsklage-fpoe-ueber-kaerntner-landesregierung.story 
08.04.2013 
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directive and wants to have it approved as soon as possible. Some politicians want to even go further 
in the German directive and retain data in all cases, supporting a total surveillance of all 
communications just in case. Although the effectiveness of the directive and its measurements have 
yet to be proven, data retention is still seen as a key to crime prevention, crime fighting, especially 
terrorism, and finds large support among security oriented politicians and member of the security 
apparatus (police force and others).  
The civil society protests are still on-going and have indeed made an impact to date. A final 
implementation has yet to be achieved and it seems safe to say that any attempt to do so will give rise 
to new protests and new lawsuits. The discussion of the directive was covered by all major media in 
Germany throughout. Although it was controversial, the media seemed to favour an oppositional point 
not supporting the directive, quoting arguments that were critical and went beyond the „catch the 
terrorists“ lingo.  
 
Results for Slovakia 
There were no public protests and debates on the implementation of the directive. However, there was 
a considerable political and legal debate during the implementation of the directive in 2007 that was 
covered in the national media. Slovakia was one of the nine EU countries that did not ask to postpone 
the application of the 2006 directive. The directive was to be implemented through an amendment to 
the 2003 law on electronic communications with draft law, prepared by the Ministry of Transport, 
released in early 2007. During the consultation phase, where all relevant governmental ministries and 
agencies may propose their amendments and objections, the Interior Ministry, together with 
intelligence agencies, proposed several changes to the draft. In essence, they asked that police and 
intelligence agencies should have constant access to databases of telecommunication operators. The 
language of the proposal was very broad and suggested that the Interior Ministry asks for constant 
access to all data covered by the Article 5 of the directive. The critics, that included two smaller 
coalition parties, media, the Slovak DPA, but also mobile operators, pointed out to the fact that such 
general access is in direct opposition to the language of the directive suggesting that data are provided 
only "in specific cases". Also, especially national media pointed out the complicated history of 
information leaks in Slovakia and the role of intelligence agencies in these cases. As to "prove" the 
point, in May 2007, hundreds of protected phone numbers including phone numbers of the Interior 
Minister and around 700 phone numbers used by Slovak Information Service310 were listed in a free 
online phone book. The case was never successfully investigated.  After several delays the Slovak 
government approved the amendment in August 2007, without including proposals by the Interior 
Ministry. The coalition parties agreed that they would return to dismissed proposals when preparing 
new legislation that was going to overhaul the country's intelligence agencies. The legislation has not 
been prepared to date (May, 2013). The amendment that implemented the 2006 EU Directive on Data 
Retention was finally approved by the Slovak parliament in December 2007. The media declared a 
"defeat for Big Brother" and pointed out that the parliament also changed a proposed period for data 
retention from two years to six months for Internet communication and to 12 months for other forms 
covered by directive.311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
310 The leak was covered in all national media, see TV Markiza, V internetovom telefónnom zozname sa objavili čísla na 
viacerých členov vlády a zamestnancov SIS, 21/05/2007 
311 See for example: Daily Hospodarske Noviny, "Veľký brat musí prižmúriť jedno oko" (Big Brother Will Not See 
Everything), 14/12/2007, p. 5 
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9.1.2 Public debates on surveillance 
 
Guiding question: Can you identify any other topics/events with a focus on surveillance surfacing in 
public debates? 
 
Results for the UK 
In the UK there have been a number of surveillance-themes that have stimulated public debate. 
Examples include: CCTV surveillance in public places and its use at major events such as 
demonstrations and crowd control at sporting events; the growing use of social media sites for 
unintended purposes - such as the monitoring of the social activities of employees by employers or 
potential employers; the growing use of social media to incite others to riot; the use of social media 
and CCTV to identify rioters;312 the use of social media either openly or by ‘trolls’ to launch personal 
attacks on individuals; the growing acceptance of smart cards; the repeated attempts by the UK 
Government to use the Data Retention Directive Regulations as a means of requiring third party 
Communications Service Providers to collect and supply to the Government, various forms of 
communications data such as emails and mobile phone records (also colloquially referred to as the 
‘Snooper’s Charter’).313 However, in this section we concentrate on one ‘surveillance’ topic that 
produced a good degree of public debates – the unsuccessful attempt in the UK to introduce a national 
ID card scheme. The Identity Cards Act was passed by the Labour Government in 2006314 and 
immediately opposition to the act questioned its purposes, the necessity for every citizen to obtain one 
and the cost of buying a card and indeed the cost of the entire scheme. The Labour Government 
insisted the Act would help to secure the UK against potential acts of terrorism.315 The Government 
failed to win the public debate however, 
People do not want the state keeping information on its citizens for some ill-defined and unproven 
benefit. Fewer than 15,000 people have bought an ID card since last November – and around 3,000 of 
those were issued free to workers at Manchester and London City airports.316  
In 2010 the then new Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, as one of their first 
announcements, scrapped the legislation.  
The government began the process of scrapping identity cards by introducing the Identity Documents 
Bill to Parliament on 26 May 2010. The bill made provision for the cancellation of the UK National 
Identity Card, the Identification Card for EEA nationals and the destruction of the National Identity 
Register. 317 
Paradoxically, however, the coalition Government announced details in October 2012, to introduce 
another form of a national identity scheme, where citizens could use their mobile phone or other forms 
of social media as a means of gaining access to publically available services, 
‘People wishing to apply for services ranging from tax credits to fishing licences and passports will be 
asked to choose from a list of familiar online log-ins, including those they already use on social media 
sites, banks, large retailers such as supermarkets, to prove their identity.’ 318  
                                               
312 England riots: Police release first CCTV suspect images: BBC News,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-14462271, 
9.8.11, Accessed: 14.3.13 
313 Snooper's charter rests on 'pretty heroic assumptions', MI5 boss told MPs: The Guardian online, 5.2.13: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2013/feb/05/snoopers-charter-pretty-heroic-assumptions?INTCMP=SRCH 
Accessed: 14.3.13 
314 The UK National Identity Cards Scheme:  
 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/agencies-public-bodies/ips/about-us/suppliers/identity-cards/ Accessed: 14.3.13 
315 ID cards 'will not stop terrorism' The Guardian, 27.4.2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/27/september11.usa Accessed: 14.3.13 
316 ID cards: gone for good. The Guardian, Damian Green, 9.6.10. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jun/09/id-cards-damian-green Accessed: 14.3.13 
317 The UK National Identity Cards Scheme:  
 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/agencies-public-bodies/ips/about-us/suppliers/identity-cards/ Accessed: 14.3.13 
318 National 'virtual ID card' scheme set for launch (Is there anything that could possibly go wrong? Ian Burrell, The 
Independent, 4.10.12 
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It remains to be seen whether or not these latest proposals will be accepted by the UK public, which is 
arguably becoming increasingly ‘socialised’ in their apparent acceptance of the use of ‘smart’ cards in 
their business and social transactions. 
 
Results for Italy 
Beyond events focused on surveillance and/or resistance to specific surveillance practices, there are at 
least three topics that have emerged in public debates: 
- the growth of surveillance cameras (from the late 1990s until today), 
- Telecom Italia wiretapping scandal (2006), 
and, more recently,  
- financial surveillance (2012). 
Of the three above-mentioned topics, only for the first is it possible to identify relevant active NGOs, 
as described in section 4.5. Additionally, as far as surveillance cameras are concerned, the Italian DPA 
was the only relevant public stakeholder which, in a decade, issued a Decalogue and two provisions on 
video surveillance that helped, at least, to shed light on the growing number of cameras. In all cases, 
public involvement and reactions from NGOs were almost non-existent.  
Despite the “silent” growth of surveillance cameras in Italy319, the early growth of legal regulation of 
CCTV suggests that this was an issue of concern for the DPA and for the general public alike.  
Moreover, as described in section number 4.1, the use of surveillance cameras at specific locations, 
such as schools, fostered both public debate and reactions from the DPA. 
At the end of the 90s, a new approach to urban security fostered an increasing demand from the 
citizens to live in safer cities. While local governments and mayors gained power over policing, 
surveillance technologies, in particular CCTV, seemed to offer relatively rapid answers to new 
vulnerabilities such as migration flows. Moreover, the politics of fear towards the “other” was fuelled 
by movements, like the political party Northern League, who often called urban security into question 
and asked for “hard measures” to deal with security-related problems. 
In the late 90s and in the first decade of the new millennium, the approach to video surveillance was 
twofold: if, on the one hand, the DPA shed light on the right to the privacy of the citizens and pointed 
out potential social implications of this tool and the need for a less technologically driven approach to 
security, on the other, the new “security narrative” increasingly revolved around the right to live in 
safer cities. CCTV, thus, became a political argument used in electoral campaigns: security and video 
surveillance were often depicted as two sides of the same coin. The argument was framed in terms of a 
trade-off between surveillance and privacy and the topic of security and surveillance colonised the 
political debate until the elections in 2008320.  
The terrorist attacks in the USA and in Europe paved the way for security regimes, which relied more 
on the promises of visual technologies than on data pertaining to their effectiveness. The public 
debate, though, was characterized by a top-down approach: while, as mentioned, the President of the 
DPA raised concerns about the increasing number of cameras in Italian cities as early as 2000, 
politicians used the argument of video surveillance in order to show that they were trying to deal with 
security-related problems through the installation of more cameras. Therefore, the mainstream media 
touched upon this issue from perspectives that did not focus on perceptions of security and/or 
insecurity of the lay citizens but rather on what had or had not to be done to solve security 
problems321. 
In 2008 a short documentary on the relationship between video surveillance and the urban milieu 
                                                                                                                                                  
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/national-virtual-id-card-scheme-set-for-launch-is-there-anything-that-could-
possibly-go-wrong-8196543.html: Accessed: 14.3.13 
319 Fonio, Chiara, “The Silent Growth of Video Surveillance in Italy”, Information Polity, Vol. 16, Number 4/2011, pp. 379-
388. 
320 http://www.lastampa.it/2013/02/22/italia/politica/la-sicurezza-sparisce-dalle-elezioni-ma-la-criminalita-e-in-aumento-
I5I5jRDM4oowPDtKoNSHON/pagina.html, 22 February. 2013 
321 For instance: http://www.firenzepost.it/2013/02/20/piu-telecamere-per-la-sicurezza-a-firenze/ 
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entitled “Occhi su Roma” (Eyes on Rome) was released but it did not help to fuel the debate on the 
social costs of surveillance cameras despite the critical approach of the director.  
When the economic crisis hit the country, social economic insecurity became the main “hot topic” and 
it is still a crucial and unavoidable issue that minimizes the visibility of any other topics. Additionally, 
the public debate on, for instance, the installation of new surveillance cameras within specific urban 
contexts, seems to be more local than national as recently demonstrated by a massive surveillance-
camera project called “safe city”.  At the beginning of March 2013, the city council of Catanzaro 
(Calabria) announced that around 900 military Israeli surveillance cameras bought from Bunker Sec 
will be installed across the city322.  This massive surveillance project has not emerged in mainstream 
media yet, despite privacy concerns raised by associations and citizens. 
However, before the economic crisis, surveillance and privacy issues did become a hot topic when the 
Telecom wiretapping scandal was exposed in 2006 during the investigations on the Abu Omar 
extraordinary rendition case323.  The scandal entailed a massive illegal wiretapping and surveillance of 
telephone networks carried out by Telecom Italia over at least 10 years (mid 90s-mid 2000s). It is 
often referred to as the SISMI (Military Intelligence and Security Service) -Telecom scandal as the 
“surveillance program” was run by Marco Mancini, a high-ranking officer of the SISMI, arrested for 
the involvement in the kidnapping of Abu Omar, Giuliano Tavaroli, chief of security of Telecom Italia 
and Emanuele Cipriani, a private detective. 
More than 5,000 people were spied upon and thousands of dossiers documented that, while the target 
of surveillance was enormous, the aims were not always clear-cut. Dossiers on major Italian figures 
(e.g. politicians, managers, former ministers) could have been used to blackmail them and were 
collected through Cipriani, “one of the most significant providers of outside services to the Security 
Function” of Telecom Italia324. The complex and multi-layered patchwork that emerged from the 
spying scandal received a significant amount of national and international media coverage. The case 
drew the attention of the most important Italian newspapers, such as Corriere della Sera and La 
Repubblica which were also targets of surveillance. In particular, the computers of two reporters of La 
Repubblica, who had broken the so-called Yellowcake (Niger uranium) forgery story and the 
involvement of the SISMI in it, were hacked by the Tiger Team, namely a team of informatics and 
computer experts based at Telecom Italia.  
The “spy story”, thus, involved a wide range of surveillance technologies as well as the involvement 
of many people, institutions and private companies which played their role in collecting data and 
assembling illegal dossiers on prominent Italian figures. As pointed out by the EDRI (European 
Digital Rights Institute) “the telecom wiretapping scandal has shown that private companies and 
reporters in connection with SISMI were able to access information regarding Italian citizens, using 
the system in place for legal wiretapping”.325 Since 2005, in fact, the company has changed its 
structure and improved judicial authorities’ services, in particular, mandatory services for judicial 
authorities. However, at some point legal tapping and illegal tapping activities seemed to blur. 
Moreover, journalists from the weekly L’Espresso proved that a surveillance system called Radar was 
used by Telecom to spy on mobile phones without leaving any traces326. The Italian DPA also started 
an investigation into Telecom. 
Nevertheless, despite the media coverage, the wiretapping scandal did not lead to any direct 
involvement of lay citizens in public events against, for instance, illegal surveillance. This is perhaps 
                                               
322 http://www.corrieredellacalabria.it/stories/politica/13159_gli_occhi_israeliani_su_catanzaro/. 16 March 2013. 
323 The Milan imam Abu Omar was an Egyptian with a refugee status in Italy who was illegally arrested by CIA agents, 
transferred to Egypt where he was interrogated and tortured for more than one year (Mazza, Caterina, The Abu Omar Case 
and Extraordinary Rendition” , Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp. 134-
159.  
324 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/948642/000094864207000006/t6k070222n01.htm 
325 http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.15/italy 
326 http://www.adnkronos.com/Archivio/AdnAgenzia/2006/06/15/Economia/Telecomunicazioni/TELECOM-LESPRESSO-
RADAR-ERA-NOME-BANCA-DATI-PARALLELA-UTENTI-TIM_102449.php 
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due to the fact that the Telecom Italia scandal drew a picture, which emphasized that surveillance was 
carried out to spy on politicians, magistrates, journalists or well-known soccer players. The everyday 
lives of ordinary people were not the primary target of wiretapping.  
More recently, another surveillance-related topic has been covered by national media and has raised 
privacy concerns. In an effort to combat tax evasion, a tax compliance policy called “redditometro”, or 
income measure, was renewed in 2010 and the range of expenditure items examined significantly 
expanded in 2013. This measure aims to evaluate the consistency of the expenses of individuals to 
their income by examining expenditures in more than 100 categories, from food to leisure pursuits.  
Italian authorities, as reported also by the BBC, have been accused of “restoring police state-style 
tactics”327 as families spending patterns are scrutinised in order to find incongruities, namely if the tax 
payers’ spending appears to be more than 20 percent greater than the income declared.  
The well-known Italian columnist Piero Ostellino wrote, in an article published in Corriere della Sera, 
that the introduction of this tax compliance policy has restored a surveillance police state similar to the 
20th century totalitarian regimes328.  Privacy concerns were raised along with concerns related to the 
main logic behind this system, that is that if incongruities are found, taxpayers are guilty until proven 
otherwise. This is called “double-contradictory” for the alleged evaders: “the taxpayer put under 
observation will be entitled to give clarifications on any allegations made against him. If his 
explanations are not sufficient, he will then be called to discuss the survey results”. 329 
Additionally, uncertainties pertaining to the implementation arose in a trial in Naples in February 2013 
when a taxpayer demanded an ordinary judge be prevented, in absence of an intervention by the tax 
police, from checking and analysing the expenses since “otherwise the tax agency would become 
aware of all aspects of his/her daily life, thus hurting not only the right to privacy but also to 
individual freedom”330.  According to the taxpayer, the rights to privacy and to individual freedom 
were at stake and the judge, on the basis of an interpretation of the Constitution, ordered the agency 
not to gather information pertaining to the application of the income meter.  
As argued by The Economist, the redditometro can be described as big government who meets big 
data331 as it involves large databases and data matching through “huge computing power”. In particular 
through a software called “Serpico” or “fiscal big brother” used by the Italian Revenue Agency which 
analyses and matches 24,200 pieces of data per second directly from banks, insurances companies 
archives, etc. through 2000 servers332.  Therefore, the legal principle of bank secrecy has faded away 
in the name of fighting tax evasion. Although this is perhaps the surveillance measure within the 
national context, which is more controversial from a privacy standpoint, it seems that there is a lack of 
transparent public debate on fiscal surveillance. 
 
Results for Austria 
Besides the data retention directive in the recent past a group of activists providing citizens with fake 
loyalty cards for one of Austria’s biggest supermarket chains captured the attention of mainstream 
media. The website http://nocard.info hosted a platform in early 2014 generating loyalty cards for 
costumers who were upset about the tracking capacities of loyalty cards333, argued one of the 
anonymous hosts of norcard.info in a recent interview. Through Twitter and intensive media coverage 
in some of Austria’s most popular newspapers nocard.info became a popular service in early 2014 and 
                                               
327 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21064030 
328 http://www.corriere.it/editoriali/13_gennaio_06/Il-redditometro-del-dottor-stranamore_13f05832-57ea-11e2-9a31-
1eca72c52858.shtml. 6 January 2013 
329 http://www.thisisitaly-panorama.com/top-stories/redditometro-and-redditest-new-weapons-to-fight-tax-evasion-in-italy/. 
23 November 2012 
330 http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/english-version/2013-02-23/sterile-substitute-role-judges-043950.shtml?uuid=AbojoSXH. 
23 February 2013. 
331 http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/01/tax-evasion-italy . 8 January 2013 
332 www.inps.it/portale/image.aspx?iIDRassegna=4373  
333 http://futurezone.at/digital-life/nocard-kundenkarten-haben-sicherheitsproblem/47.137.900 20 January 2014 
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the loyalty cards were debated on a different level in the general public. In summer 2014 the platform 
was not available any more after the supermarket chain announced intentions to sue the anonymous 
operators of the platform because of attempted fraud. The impact of nocard.info can be described as 
fairly high as it was the first time since the introduction of loyalty cards in Austria that awareness for 
potential security risks and the infringement of private data was raised amongst the general public. 
 
Results for Germany 
In Germany, a big issue is and has always been the surveillance of workplaces respectively workers. 
In 2008, discount supermarket chain “Lidl” has been accused of spying extensively on their 
employees: “Who went to toilet at what time? Which employees may have a relationship with each 
other? Who did they talk to on the phone during a break? About what?” (Spiegel, 26.3.2008).  
Besides this, surveillance is a recurring topic after some specific types of crime have been reported:  
- Child abuse: There are on-going debates about how to surveil convicted or potential suspects of child 
abuse. In 2007 there were, though only little, thoughts about having an online mapping system, where 
the residency of persons who had been under suspicion could be tracked, corresponding to similar 
websites that existed in the US at that time. Politicians are engaged in these debates every time another 
crime is committed. The last incidence fuelled the debate about electronic tags.334 
 
- Brutal violence on the streets/terroristic attacks: After each occurrence of brutal violence in public 
places335, increased monitoring via CCTV is demanded by politicians. The day after the Boston 
bombing, current home secretary Friedrich was quoted as follows: “What happened in Boston shows 
again how important it is to have surveillance of public places, in order to solve crimes of the most 
violent types. This is why we are cooperating with railway companies to have more CCTV at 
stations.“ (Spiegel, 20.4.2013) 
CCTV in general has only recently become a bigger topic in political debates as well as in the media 
(see Q7). Between January and April 2013 there were 43 enquiries concerning CCTV in all kinds of 
political institutions, more than in other years during the same period. The enquiry concerning the 
situation in Bavaria for example showed a massive increase of CCTV cameras in operation. Since 
2008, the number of video cameras went up from 12.000 to about 17.000 in 2012. Politicians from the 
green party stated in this respect, that “proportionality is all gone” in this field (SZ, 27.2.2013). 
 
Results for Slovakia 
The topics connected to "new" surveillance surface only sporadically and are not usually followed for 
longer period of time by public and the media. One bigger case worth mentioning that was followed 
by the national media for a few weeks involved the national census in 2011, organized by the 
Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.336 A few days before census forms were distributed, a 
"blogger and security expert" (in his own words) pointed out to a potential misuse of census 
data because their anonymity was compromised by a unique numerical code used on every census 
form337.  The blogger involved a national TV channel and filed an official complaint against the 
Statistical Office with the Slovak DPA. The DPA released a press statement a couple days later (only 
a few days before the official start of the census), in which it asked the Statistical Office to fully 
"inform the residents of Slovakia that the data collected for the 2011 census is not anonymous and to 
cancel residents' obligation to place the numerical code on their respective census form." The 
                                               
334 http://www.tagblatt.de/Home/nachrichten/ueberregional/blick-in-die-welt_artikel,-Prozess-gegen-Sexualstraftaeter-loest-
Debatte-um-Ueberwachung-aus-_arid,199827.html 
335 See the paradigmatic case of Dominik Brunner (2009): http://spon.de/verVn, two cases in Berlin (2011): 
http://spon.de/veOPo and (2013): http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/nach-toedlicher-alexanderplatz-attacke-
innenminister-will-mehr-videoueberwachung-in-deutschen-staedten_aid_843028.html 
 
336 Slovak Spectator, 30/05/2011, Anonymity of census data questioned.  
337 Original blog post that started controversy, https://www.iseco.sk/scitanie-2011/, In Slovak 
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Statistical Office responded with its own statement, calling the DPA's release "manipulative" and 
accused the DPA of endangering the results of the census. After the intervention of the Prime Minister 
I. Radicova, the DPA softened its stance and later cancelled it after formal review by the Attorney 
General's Office. The controversy influenced returns of the census forms, especially in Bratislava, in 
which almost 20% of residents did not return their forms.338 
 
9.1.3 Stakeholders active in the public debates on surveillance and democracy 
 
Guiding question: Identify relevant stakeholders (individuals, CSOs NGOs etc.) involved in this 
debate.  
Results for the UK 
In the UK the two highest profile stakeholders highlighting surveillance issues, human rights and civil 
liberties are probably Statewatch and Liberty. Both of these organizations appear regularly in the UK 
media. 
 
Statewatch 
Statewatch is a voluntary group made up of lawyers, academics, journalists, researchers and activists. 
The group’s interests relate to the state, justice and home affairs, civil liberties, accountability and 
openness. One of their main modes of communication is their website, where they host investigative 
papers and articles. Members of the group also publish in national newspapers and make occasional 
television appearances. The group’s flagship publication is the ‘Statewatch Bulletin’. The bulletin is 
published quarterly. The Statewatch website also has a database of ‘more than 25,000 articles, 
references and documents’ referring to issue of state and civil liberties. 339  
 
Liberty 
Liberty is an organization concerned with civil and human rights and freedoms in the UK.  Liberty has 
more of a judicial background than Statewatch and the majority of its ‘public facing’ staff have 
experience or training in Law. The organization’s purpose is to ensure the protection of basic rights 
and freedoms in the UK ‘through the courts, in Parliament and in the wider community’. Highest 
profile of the Liberty staff is Director Shami Chakrabarti; she frequently appears in the UK media and 
is vocal and outspoken on issues relating to UK civil rights. Probably best known for her opposition to 
the Iraq War, she also champions infringements on human rights being affected by a host of new 
Governmental initiatives, for example, the Communications Bill. 
 
Privacy International (PI) is a non-profit company that promotes and preserves the right to privacy 
across the world.  PI based in London has organised campaigns and initiatives in numerous countries. 
PI’s work includes the monitoring of how surveillance technologies are being employed by the state, 
for instance one recent focus has been  "IMSI catchers" masts that look and act as standard mobile 
phone masts, but house malware – a software that can allows its operator to control a target's 
computer, while remaining undetected.340  
 
Big Brother Watch (BBW) illuminates policies, which may threaten privacy, freedoms and civil 
liberties – with an emphasis on questioning the motives and creation of a ‘surveillance state’. Central 
to their concerns is ‘exposing the erosion of civil liberties in the UK, looking at the dramatic 
expansion of surveillance powers, the growth of the database state and the misuse of personal 
                                               
338 For more on influence see, SME, http://www.sme.sk/tema/scitanie-obyvatelov-2011/, In Slovak 
339 See,  http://www.statewatch.org/ 
340 See, https://www.privacyinternational.org 
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information’. BBW campaigns to promote an increased awareness of the rights to personal data and 
for a greater public awareness of the implications and uses of personal data. The group is relatively 
unusual in that is has a distinctively central right political agenda – most NGOs of this nature in the 
UK are central-left. 341 
Open Rights Group (ORG) interests lie with issues of freedom of expression, privacy and consumer 
rights online. They state of their aims, ‘We campaign to change public policy whenever your rights are 
threatened, by talking to policy-makers, informing the public through the media, and mobilizing our 
supporters’. ORG is non-profit organization based in London and was founded in 2005 by digital 
activists. The NGO is voluntary staffed by campaigners and interns.342  
 
Links with other civil society actors 
It is difficult to establish if there are links to civil society actors and if there are established links 
between the NGOs. Presumably membership of organizations is not exclusive and there are many who 
have membership of a number of NGOs. However, what we would surmise is that there is a degree of 
competition between the NGOs as most are registered charities and reliant on their own subscriptions 
and donations. While most of the NGOs do on occasion link-up (for example, in opposition to the Iraq 
War) for the most part they tend to stick to their specialisms or area of interest. NGOs are vying for 
funding from the same pools of money – i.e. funding bodies, wealthy benefactors or donations. They 
do, however, have external links with for instance their or other international or regional branches, or 
on occasion links to International organisations with common interests. 
 
Results for Italy 
The Telecom wiretapping scandal and financial surveillance caught public attention but did not fuel 
critical reactions as such. However, in the first decade after the year 2000, it became apparent that the 
growth of video surveillance in Italian cities was of particular interest to left-wing social movements, 
which tried to raise awareness on video surveillance through resistance. Despite their critical 
approach, the general level of awareness remained limited and fragmented. However, it seems worth 
looking at two active social movements.  
Inventati/Autistici343, for instance, is a “collective” – as they defined themselves – started in 2001 that 
has been dealing with surveillance, technology and the right to privacy. One of their aims is to raise 
awareness on these issues and they did engage with video surveillance through a document on CCTV 
(“Videosorveglianza”) released in the early 2000s344. Data on surveillance cameras drew from 
“spialaspia” (spythespy) and Tactical Media Crew345 both active in the late 90s and at the beginning of 
the 2000s. In particular the website “spialaspia” was the first public attempt to map video surveillance 
in Italian cities. The above-mentioned document focuses on four main themes: a) video surveillance as 
“big brother”, b) news on CCTV in Italy, c) resistance to CCTV, in particular how to disable or 
destroy the cameras and d) how to map video surveillance. There are no descriptions of actions and/or 
events against surveillance cameras, but the idea of resistance against the electronic eyes through a 
detailed documentation of the location of CCTV has been carried on by other social actors. For 
instance, the project Anopticon346 has been, and is still, very active in mapping surveillance cameras in 
Venice. Moreover, a mobile app (Anopticon Mobile) for smartphones can be downloaded from the 
website. This app enables mapping of public surveillance cameras on Google maps and citizens have 
used this tool to map CCTV in many Italian cities.  
Currently, the Anopticon project is the most active within the national context. However, more than 
                                               
341 See, http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk 
342 See, http://www.openrightsgroup.org 
343 www.inventati.org 
344 http://www.inventati.org/reginazabo/videosorveglianza.pdf 
345 www.tacticalmediacrew.org 
346 www.tramaci.org 
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being involved in “events”, the main aim of Anopticon is raising awareness through either the 
mapping of all public surveillance cameras within urban contexts or through publishing relevant 
documents on surveillance on the website. Therefor, this specific stakeholder was not involved in 
events against surveillance but the project initiator took part in public debates focused on video 
surveillance such as e-privacy347 and freedom not fear348. Nevertheless, these events had a limited 
impact and media coverage was almost non-existent. For instance, in the last winter edition of freedom 
not fear held in Venice and focused against CCTV, very few people showed up and the event did not 
make national media.   
Another stakeholder who is involved in the surveillance debate, but only partly concerned with the 
above mentioned topics, is Anonymous Italy349. Like all Anonymous groups, the Italian group is also 
active against, inter alia, state surveillance and the massive use of surveillance technologies. In 2012, 
a campaign named #AntisecITA350 started. At the core of the so-called “operation police” lies the 
exposure of files held by law enforcement that deal with the wiretapping of activists, undercover 
activities and surveillance technologies. Anonymous retrieved 1.35 Gigabyte, 3,500 files, from the 
Italian State Police, among which there are also files about the Telecom Italia wiretapping351. This 
event or operation against the police and the use of surveillance technologies to monitor activists made 
national media but, once again, did not fuel public debates by lay citizens on the use on surveillance 
 
Results for Austria 
In Austria you won’t find well-established organisations as Statewatch or Liberty like in the UK but 
there are a number or similar (smaller) groups active in the public debate on privacy, data protection 
and fundamental rights with regards to the use of the Internet. All of them are in general concentrating 
their efforts on certain aspects of data protection and privacy protection (e.g. on data retention). 
 
AKVorrat (www.akvorrat.at) 
Was the most prominent actor in the public debate on privacy and fundamental human rights during 
the time that the data retention directive was actively used by Austria’s Law Enforcement Agencies. 
AKVorrat, a group of IT specialists and lawyers, filled several complaints to the higher court of justice 
against the data retention directive. Especially during 2012 AKVorrat was establishing itself as a 
citizens movement actively campaigning against the data retention directive. Since the Federal 
Constitutional Court suspended the directive in June 2014 it has become quieter again around the 
AKVorrat citizens movement.  
 
Netzfreiheit (www.netzfreiheit.org) 
The Article 5 (2) (b) Directive 2001/29/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights is at the 
moment (Summer 2014) highly debated in Austria. A group of Internet activists founded the platform 
www.netzfreiheit.org (net freedom) to campaign for a free and open Internet. The group filled several 
complaints against the Austrian Ministry of Justice and is prominently featured in the network policy 
columns of Austria’s high quality newspapers.  
Europe vs. Facebook (www.europe-v-facebook.org) 
The right to data protection is conceived as a fundamental right in the European Union. The platform 
www.europe-v-facebook.org is hosted by the Austrian Student Max Schrems who – through its 
activities (filling 22 complaints against Facebook in Ireland) – became an “Internet celebrity in 
Austria”. The group is frequently featured on the public youth radio station (www.fm4.at) promoting 
                                               
347 http://e-privacy.winstonsmith.org 
348 http://www.freedomnotfear.org 
349 http://anon-news.blogspot.it 
350 http://operation-police.blogspot.it 
351 http://www.par-anoia.net/releases2012.html#poliziadistato 
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their ideas and trying to raise awareness amongst the younger generation to be careful with what kind 
of information they share on social media platforms.  
 
Results for Germany 
Workplace surveillance is a topic only really taken up by the German labour union – no other 
institutional or individual actors represent citizens’ interests with much legitimacy and power.  
Child abuse:  German Ministery of Family Affairs promoted the idea of closing certain websites for 
German visitors (“Zugangserschwerungsgesetz”, 2009), which created massive protest from sides of 
the Internet community.  “The 13 Lies of Zensursula”352 were criticised harshly, and lots of protest 
was organised, e.g. a demonstration, which attracted ten thousand people in Berlin (September 2009). 
The “Zensursula”-Case created huge and sustained awareness about Internet restrictions. In 2012 the 
big demonstrations against ACTA built up on the already existing knowledge. Those were supported 
by the Pirate Party as well as lots of different (I)NGOs like Avaaz.org, Anonymous, “StopActa” as 
well as parts of the AK Vorratsdatenspeicherung.  CCTV Camera Surveillance is not so much an 
event-based phenomenon, but more a long term-development as described above. Therefore 
organizing single protest waves very much depends on finding concrete changes of practice in the area 
of CCTV, to launch protests. This has been the case with the European Union INDECT-Project that 
examines the possibilities of connecting data from different sources to then control and pilot mobile 
cameras. The first demonstrations against INDECT were organized by Anonymous and FoedBUD, 
together with the Pirate Party in 25 cities across the country.353 These however did not attract as many 
citizens as did the ACTA case, the last demonstration in Munich e.g. in March 2013 only attracted 
about 25 persons. 
 
Results for Slovakia 
The only "visible"354 NGO that deals with data protection, privacy and surveillance is EISI, (European 
Information Society Institute, http://eisionline.org/. The NGO focuses mostly on the overlap of 
technology, law & information society that includes Internet law and Intellectual Property Law. It was 
EISI that prepared a draft of a constitutional complaint against data retention that was adopted by a 
group of Slovak MPs. 
Governmental 
· The DPA ("Urad na ochranu osobných údajov), http://www.dataprotection.gov.sk 
· Intelligence agencies: Slovak Information Service, ("Slovenska Informacna Sluzba"),  
 http://www.sis.gov.sk; Military Intelligence, ("Vojenske spravodajstvo") 
· The Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic,  
 ("Ministerstvo dopravy, vystavby a regionalneho rozvoja"),  
 http://www.telecom.gov.sk/index/index.php?lang=en 
· Attorney General Office, "Generálna Prokuratúra SR",  
Business 
· Mobile operators: Orange Slovakia, http://orange.sk; Telekom, http://www.telekom.sk; 02  
 Slovakia, http://www.o2.sk 
· Cable Internet: UPC Slovakia, http://www.upc.sk 
NGOs 
· Aliancia Fair-Play, http://www.fair-play.sk 
· Transparency International Slovakia, http://www.transparency.sk 
· European Information Society Institute, EISI, http://eisionline.org 
                                               
352 https://netzpolitik.org/2009/die-dreizehn-luegen-der-zensursula/ 
353 The full lost of registered demonstration can be found here: http://www.stopp-indect.info/index.php/de/opindect 
354 However, EISI is widely known and it was featured in only few stories. Based on their website, it is also a very small 
NGO, composed only of two lawyers and one IT expert.  
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9.1.4 Role of the police in the national debate on surveillance 
 
Guiding question: What is the role of the police in the field of surveillance and crime fight? Do police 
authorities develop awareness for the problematic of surveillance? 
 
Results for the UK 
In the UK, there are 3 main territorial Police forces covering England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Additionally, there are specialist forces covering transport, civil nuclear sites, Ministry of 
Defence sites, some ports, parks, airports, and various localised branches with responsibility for 
tunnels, cathedrals and markets. The UK territorial Police, much like all police forces, rely on 
surveillance technologies and practices in combatting crime. Other surveillance ‘actors’ also 
participate in policing, from locally based neighbourhood watch volunteers, to Community Planning 
partnerships, to the Crown Prosecution Service (England and Wales), to the Home Office and to 
‘special’ constables.355 Nevertheless, we want to turn to CCTV in giving an understanding of 
surveillance and the interrelationships between the police, actors and technologies in the UK. 
 
CCTV, the Police and Criminal Investigations 
Since the early 1990s, when CCTV first started to be rolled-out across town and city centres356, it has 
become an increasingly important part of the UK Police ‘toolkit’. Within criminal investigations 
CCTV has achieved early ‘guilty’ pleas and has reduced time spent in court and preparing for court by 
the Police and the criminal justice officials.357 The importance of CCTV is stated in the standard 
‘Police Report’ issued by The Crown Prosecution Service (England and Wales), when officers 
interview suspects, they should note not just the availability of CCTV evidence, but the defendant’s 
‘response/reaction’ to it.358   
 
CCTV and the Influence of Other Actors 
It is also worthwhile noting the historical role which central government in the UK has played in the 
advancement of public space CCTV systems, and the importance of how its legacy influences the 
operational role which the Police play today in its use. From the early 1990’s onwards, successive 
central governments have invested heavily in the infrastructure of new CCTV systems, thus allowing 
them to have a major say in how local authorities would operate and deliver these new systems359. It 
became politically expedient to publically support CCTV and for politicians to be seen to be ‘tough on 
crime’360 with central government influencing operational guidance on the use of CCTV systems and 
establishing their role as the leading player in the creation of policy networks, thus influencing the role 
which the Police could play.361 In Scotland, for example, the Police are not in direct control of the vast 
majority of local authority controlled systems. The future of CCTV in Scotland concern the age of the 
systems, and the lack of available funds to replace these systems, coupled with a drive from the 
Scottish Government to have standardisation of systems across the country to allow the sharing of 
                                               
355 Special constables are trained volunteers who work with and support their local police. They wear the same uniform as the 
police but have lesser powers that Police Officers (they cannot arrest for instance) and are usually deployed to deal with 
minor incidences and to patrol streets.  
356 Webster, William, “CCTV Policy in the UK: Reconsidering the Evidence Base, Surveillance & Society, Vol. 6, No 
1(2009) pp. 10-22, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3400/3363  
357 Levesley, T., A. Martin, and G. Britain. Police Attitudes to and Use of CCTV, Home Office, 2005. 
358 http://www.cps.gov.uk/search.asp?mode=allwords&search=cctv&submit.x=0&submit.y=0 Accessed: 11.3.13 
359 Webster, William, “CCTV Policy in the UK: Reconsidering the Evidence Base” Surveillance & Society, Vol. 6, No 
1(2009). 
360 Fussey, P., "New Labour and New Surveillance: Theoretical and Political Ramifications of CCTV Implementation in the 
UK", Surveillance and Society 2, no. 2/3, 2004:pp. 251-269. 
Norris, C., and G. Armstrong. The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV, Berg Publishers, Oxford, 1999. 
361 Webster, William, “The Diffusion, Regulation and Governance of Closed-Circuit Television in the UK”, Surveillance & 
Society, Vol.2 (2/3) 2002. http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/3376/3339 
IRISS D 4.2. - DOING PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS WITH SURVEILLANCE 
 
199
information, ‘to allow the police service and other partners to respond on a strategic level to major 
emergencies and the threat of terrorism’.362  
 
The Police and Surveillance at the Local Level 
The Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, produced a Public Reassurance Strategy (2007) 
which recognises the value of, 
‘effective partnerships between the police, voluntary and community groups are a vital element in 
achieving meaningful improvements in the quality of life within communities. Organisations such as 
Neighbourhood Watch, which operates at national, regional and local levels, can provide a positive 
influence in creating safer communities.363 
The Public Reassurance Strategy also provides the chance for members of communities to volunteer 
for roles such as membership of the Key Individual Network, 
 By nature of their occupation or role within the community, some people are more sensitised to their 
environment and are more likely to notice changes in their neighbourhood. Examples of such people 
would be school janitors, shopkeepers and retired people. By regularly monitoring their views, the 
impact of police and partner interventions can accurately be assessed.364 
 
Clearly, the Police have invested time and resources in promoting and developing ‘soft’ surveillance 
networks at the local level, through a variety of different types of contacts, which include: community 
wardens, neighbourhood watch volunteers, the Key Individual Network and through close links with 
the widely publicised and successful Crimestoppers service365 which is a UK-wide charitable 
organisation providing a confidential and anonymous telephone service for people to report 
information about crime.  
 
Results for Italy 
In Italy there are various police forces each having both a specific status and structure. The most 
prominent forces are the State or National Police, which reports to the Ministry of the Interior, and the 
Carabinieri which reports to the Ministry of Defence and has a military structure. Moreover, there are 
other forces that deal with specific areas, such as the Financial Police, the Post and 
Telecommunication Police, the Border Police, Anti-Terrorism Police, Local and Mobile police units 
etc.  
Their role in the field of surveillance and crime fighting is crucial but the extent to which they use 
surveillance technologies obviously depends on the area of concern. Put simply, they use surveillance 
according to the aims of the specific police force. For instance, public video surveillance to prevent 
and deter crime within urban contexts is used by both the State and Local Police but it is also used by 
the Carabinieri, Mobile units and the Anti-Terrorism Police, while Internet surveillance is mainly – 
but not solely – carried out by the Post and Telecommunication police in order to fight, inter alia, 
child trafficking and child abuse. Furthermore, the role of law enforcement agencies varies either at a 
local or a regional basis thanks to the so-called “local security agreements” (“patti per la sicurezza”), 
namely agreements between the State and local authorities to deal with crime366.  
Pertaining to the debate on surveillance, there are at least two aspects that can shed light on the role of 
the police in the national debate: a) public events and b) communication with the public through their 
websites. As far as public events are concerned, law enforcement agencies do not seem to hold, for 
                                               
362Justice Analytical Services: Strategic Report on Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Public-Space CCTV in 
Scotland. 2009  
363 ACPOS, Public Reassurance Strategy, 2007, http://www.actiononviolence.co.uk/content/acpos-public-reassurance-
strategy-2007. Page 6 
364 ACPOS, Public Reassurance Strategy, 2007, http://www.actiononviolence.co.uk/content/acpos-public-reassurance-
strategy-2007. Page 6 
365 CRIMESTOPPERS: http://www.crimestoppers-uk.org/ Accessed 13.3.13 
366 The Constitutional Law no. 3 dated 18 October 2001 fully recognises self-government to local authorities.  
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instance, community meetings in order to explain how specific surveillance tools like surveillance 
cameras are used to enhance public safety before the system is operational. In other words, they do not 
promote “surveillance awareness debates” but rather the use of surveillance tools by police forces is 
not problematized and, more often than not, the efficacy of these tools is not even questioned. 
Generally, it is taken for granted that law enforcement agencies use surveillance for security reasons, 
thus other issues, like the progressive erosion of privacy, are not considered as crucial as the right to 
live in a safe place. There might be exceptions (i.e. community policing that organizes local events in 
order to promote neighbourhood watch and/or meet citizens to listen to their concerns and explain the 
role of surveillance technologies) but the overall approach is top-down. Moreover, if there are events 
focused on surveillance tools, they are not for the “lay citizen” as such, but rather for scholars and 
stakeholders active in the field of security367.  
Consequently, the communication with the public through their websites focuses more on surveillance 
tools in order to promote specific activities rather than trying to engage citizens in informed debates. 
For instance, on the National Police website368 there are references to intelligence, surveillance-related 
activities and law enforcement databases but the emphasis is mainly on the important role of these 
tools to enhance security. As far as public events are concerned, references are to events where the 
activities of various police forces are promoted 
 
Results for Austria 
CCTV is generally speaking often introduced as a reaction to increased crime rates in a certain area of 
a city. In Austria the role of the police with regards to the use of CCTV in public spaces can be 
described as rather restrained. In 2014 there are 18 places all over Austria (approx. 8 Mio inhabitants) 
that are put under CCTV operated by the police. All of them are considered as hotspots for crime and 
are located in city centres all across Austria. These numbers are quite moderate in comparison to the 
development in other European countries in the past 20 years but it is unclear how many CCTV 
cameras are operating in Austria. The AKvorrat (see 10.1.3) an activits group similar to Statewatch in 
the UK assumes that an estimated number of 100,000 CCTV cameras are operating in Austria without 
being registered at the national data protection authority.  
 
Results for Germany 
The role of the police in the field of surveillance is most interesting when concerning their role in the 
national debate. And when asking about the awareness for the problems of surveillance, it becomes 
clear that the police has an ambivalent role, which shall be addressed here.  
 
In general one can say that the police is eager to participate in new technological developments, which 
help them to do their work better. It is no surprise that the police and their lobbying agents were and 
are in favour of data retention to fight crime and terror; they are in general supportive of CCTV as 
they argue that it is a valuable means of crime prevention and helps them to convict suspects and 
eventually solve crimes. Debates around CCTV, data retention as well as the so-called Online-
Durchsuchung (online search of suspected computers by way of a spying software) show their 
involvement and role quite clearly. The police are in almost all cases in favour of measures and 
adjunct technologies, if they see that it may support their work or fits in their lines of argumentation to 
fight crime. Police authorities develop awareness in regards to surveillance when it comes to so-called 
cybercrime within their crime prevention schemes that they offer to citizens and the wider public (cf. 
http://www.polizei-beratung.de/). Among the themes that they address are “Danger on the Internet“ 
with subthemes such as phishing, viruses, trojan horse software, cybermobbing etc. One could argue 
this is where the police develops an awareness of surveillance and actually actively promotes 
                                               
367 For instance: http://italy.iir.es/Images/P5336_DEM.pdf 
368 www.poliziadistato.it 
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countermeasures in the context of crime prevention. On the other hand, on issues such as burglary, the 
police actively promote security measures that also involve surveillance technologies, such as video 
surveillance around the house. In the case of online issues, the police recently have sought after ways 
of using the social web for their fight in crimes. The surveillance of Facebook, and other social media 
to investigate and fight crime has become a new way as various official documents from local and 
federal parliaments in Germany show. 
 
Results for Slovakia 
Slovakian Police authorities are not very much involved in the national surveillance debate. For 
example the media debate surrounding use of CCTV in public in Slovakia is limited exclusively to 
their security and crime prevention role, without ever mentioning their effectiveness and privacy 
issues. Also, public CCTV’s are owned and operated by local police departments that are responsible 
to city/village councils and are not part of national police force. 
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9.2 ANNEX II – INTERVIEW DATA  
 
9.2.1 Interview guideline: questions  
Reinhard Kreissl, Alexander Neumann 
 
Initial Questions 
The Initial Questions shall help to establish a conversation, you might want to use these initial 
questions, but maybe you need to adjust your approach to other circumstances. After the initial 
questions you should continue with the topic that is most relevant for the person you’ve recruited via 
an specific entry point (e.g. if an interviewee was recruited over the police start with topic 1) crime 
prevention) 
 
Specific Entry point (Organisation, Venue, Event) Random control group 
 
-Why have you approached the organisation (insert group specific organisation 
e.g. 1) Police, 2) Labour Unions, 3) Consumer Associations, 4) NGOs)? 
 
-What were your concerns with ____ (insert topic 1) crime prevention, 2) 
workplace surveillance, 3) consumer advocacy, 4) data protection)  
 
-How did you come to know of the services offered?  
 
-What do you think about the activities of the organisation? (insert specific one). 
Please explain what they do and how they can help you? 
 
-Do you think your concern is something that is common or just a single issue? 
 
-if more common: Explain and give examples 
 
-if singe issue: Why do you think other people do not experience this problem? 
 
When interviewing 
a participant 
recruited randomly 
please start with the 
questions from one 
of the four major 
topics (Topic 1: 
crime prevention, 
Topic 2: workplace 
surveillance, Topic 
3: consumer 
advocacy or Topic 
4: Data protection). 
 
 
 
General Questions: Surveillance, Privacy and Control  
a. Do you know places in your city where CCTV is operating? 
b. What do you think about the use of CCTV in public space?  
c. What do you think about the use of CCTV in private spaces?  
d. What do you think is happening to the CCTV footage? 
 
e. What kind of measure should be allowed to prevent crime?  
f. What kind of measures should be allowed in order to catch criminals? Face recognition software, 
public photos of wanted persons (also online)). 
 
g. What do you know about Drones or UAVs? Are those operated by the state, by private companies 
or by law enforcement authorities? 
 
h. If you could decide: Which kind of persons or what kind of places should be monitored more 
frequently? Where should CCTV never be allowed to be used (and by whom)? 
 
i. What do you think, in society did we experienced an increase or a decrease in the use of 
surveillance technologies over the past few years. 
 
j. Have you ever heard about data retention, what is your opinion towards data retention? 
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a1. Roughly speaking: In general would you say that the life in the city you are living has become more or 
less secure over the past few years? 
 
a2.   What do you think, how many burglaries have been attempted in the last year in your city/village and 
how many violent offences have been reported to the police? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b1.   What measures have you personally taken to prevent crime (maybe specify: personal, house, burglary 
etc.?) 
 
b2.  What can you imagine to install to protect burglaries? 
 
b3.   Do you talk with your neighbours about these issues (or orient yourself at your neighbours activities in 
this matter)?  
 
b4.   Do you and your neighbours take turns in watching over each others house/apartment? 
 
b5.   Did you ever think about neighbourhood watch?  
If so --> why and with what result? 
If not ->> what do you think of it? 
 
b6.   Besides practical measures that you take (may they be of technical or organisational nature) does this 
topic have an impact on your own behaviour (to you avoid certain locations at certain times) -> If people do 
not take any measures to protect themselves than only ask the 2nd part of this question 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
c1.   “If you play with fire, you must expect to get your fingers burned” What do you think in connection 
with crime prevention about this saying? (This questions is intended to check whether people feel “it is ok” 
to take “hard measures” against criminals or not, even for “minor” offences like burglary) 
 
c2.   Is security an issue that one should take care about him/herself?  
 
c2.   How far is this (c1) true for your sphere of personal privacy (your home for example) and how far for 
public places like cinemas, shopping malls, the street etc.  
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a1.   What forms of workplace surveillance do you know? 
 
a2.   Which do you find acceptable? 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
b1.   Which forms of workplace surveillance have you experienced yourself? 
 
b2.   At your workplace, do they use any time tracking applications?  
(Considering also “low-tech” measures like a attendance time clock) 
 
b3.   Can you understand why these measures were implemented? 
 
b4.   Do you think these measures/systems infringe on your rights as an employee? 
 
b5.   Has any control measures affected your work? - How? 
 
b6.   Has any control measure affected your relation to your colleagues? How? 
--------------------------------- 
c1.   “Trust is good, control is better” In the context of modern working environment what do you think about 
this old saying?  
 
c.2.   What do you think about human resources departments collecting information about applicants on 
social networks (like Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 
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b1.   Do you own a loyalty card? If so, why? How many? Do you use them often? If not, why not? 
 
b2.   How do these cards work? What kind of benefits can consumers gain from the use of loyalty cards? 
What kind of benefits do companies gain from these cards? Do you know about any negative effects these 
cards might have for consumers? 
 
b4.   What data is collected through such technologies, e.g. loyalty cards or else? What kind of data is 
collected from the loyalty cards that you are using frequently? 
 
b5.   Where do you see the dangers behind such collections? 
 
b7.   Do consumers have a chance to resist? How? 
 
b8.   What do you know in this respect about the work of consumer protection authorities? 
 
b9.   Which shops do you visit frequently? Do these shops use CCTV? Do you know what’s happening with 
the pictures/videos taken with CCTV? 
 
b10. E-Commerce: Do you regularly buy something over the internet? What kind of shops, sites do you visit 
frequently for shopping purposes? Ebay? Amazon? Which method of payment do you choose regularly when 
you shop online? What data is collected while you are shopping online? 
 
b11.  Which e-mail provider do you use mostly? (Gmail, GMX, Yahoo Mail etc.?) Do you write/read your 
mails on- or offline? Which search engine do you use primarily?   
 
b13.  Have you ever heard about target marketing?  Do you know anything about the legal regulations 
regarding target marketing?  
--------------------------------- 
c1.   Have you ever heard about the term “glass costumer or transparent costumer”? What do you mean by 
this? 
        (for example: do you think it is in general problematic, that companies want to know as much as 
possible about their costumers?) 
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a1.   When you are thinking about the “data protection” what are the five terms/buzzwords that you think of 
first? 
 
a2.    Did you ever experience problems with your own data, misuse or false accusations? Or do you know 
somebody who has experienced these kind of problems? 
 
b1.   Do you use social networks, social media like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram etc.)? What kind of content 
do you share on these platforms? (Photos, Personal information, etc.) 
 
b2.  How do you choose what parts of your life you share online (like avoiding political debates on 
Facebook, or not sending private photos via e-mail or sharing them on social media networks/platforms, or 
sharing photos of your kids/family with persons you hardly don’t know in “real life”). 
 
b3.   Do you use cloud computing services like: iCloud, Dropbox, GoogleDrive, Mega? 
 
b4.   How do you protect your (personal) data? (e.g. anti-virus software, firewalls, etc.) 
 
b5.   Have you ever heard about any data protection authorities in your country? 
 
b6.    What do you know about the work of a DPA? Do you know the national data protection officer by 
name? 
 
c1.   Do you think that the general public is (well) informed about this topic? If not, why?  
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9.2.2 Guideline to synchronise data entry and coding  
Regina Berglez 
 
This compendium (of the essentially more detailed indication used within the process) is meant to 
illustrate how we actually transferred the ‘raw’ interview data (that consisted of taped records 
condensed into interview protocols) in a next step into our extensive database.   
  
1. Question 
Insert the actual question that you asked the interviewee: 
1. If it was indeed an open general question, the following form is sufficient: 
“General question on opinion on CCTV”  
2. Otherwise specify in brief what/how you asked:  
“What do you think about the use of CCTV in public space? “ 
3. And if you dig deeper into the context, again, specify briefly what you referred to: 
 “And just going back to George Orwell, the 1984 thing, what do you mean by that?” 
4. If the greater context would otherwise be lost, you can insert an additional hint in brackets:  
“Are you security conscious?” (= this is in reference to having had an e-mail account hacked 
and a bank card skimmed on more than one occasion) 
Don’t indicate the topic without any further context e.g. “crime prevention” or “surveillance practises 
and methods”. 
 
2. Quote 
Insert the translated story (=story/quote/statement) 
1. Whenever possible, insert in the interviewees first person narrative: 
 “I think you can’t live nowadays without leaving some traces unless you withdraw from 
society and become a recluse in the forests. What people should not do is to leave more traces 
than necessary. I am thinking of Twitter, Facebook and so on. That’s because I simply think 
many young people that leave traces – by doing fun things - nowadays will regret that in 5 or 
10 years because the traces persist, because they [the traces] might cause damage.”  
Or – in case it becomes complicated to insert the first person narrative – you can also paraphrase in 
third person:  
 “First, he said no. Then the participant remembered an experience from when he was visiting 
his parents in the countryside. After his mother told him several times about a sneaking thief 
who prowls around at his parents place, the participant lurked for the thief one night. Franz 
actually saw a stranger prowling around on their property that night….” 
 
However, the first person narrative is the preferred option in order to catch phrases and other specifics 
(compare next point) and will also simplify decisions on the role/s of the storyteller later on. 
 
2. Translate as verbatim as possible and necessary to grasp the content as  
 well as specifics (e.g. irony, jokes, country-specific references):  
Especially if you have chosen to paraphrase the story (compare point 1 above) make sure these 
specifics don’t get lost in the process.  
 “…Yes, and for instance since I know that Google is storing everything, everything can be 
tracked and found – well, I do not need to google Hitler all the time – but (excursus about the 
book “Mein Kampf” and what a horrible botch it is) I was curious if this book is available 
nowadays, so I googled that - and then I said to my friend, in jest, “Now they will think I’m a 
right-wing extremist”. Why aren’t I allowed to gain information without having ulterior 
motives, staying unmolested?” 
3. If necessary, insert an explanation [references/context/hint on excursus] in brackets: 
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„Back then [i.e. student milieu of the 70ies in Vienna], the personal freedom was at stake, 
personal freedom implies that you are not surveilled all the time, that I am not a model (…) 
there were a lot of fundamental rights that vanished after September 11th at the latest.” 
 
4. One story at a time; never insert the whole course of your conversation.  
We are going for condensed stories not for full transcriptions (compare underneath). 
Don’t: “IE No, I haven’t, really. No. I suppose we’re getting onto this, but I just accept that 
there’s no privacy. 
IV Okay, that’s interesting. 
 
5. There is no need for an exact transcription (pauses, filler words, repetitions etc.)  
 
We are planning for a database consisting of a great number of stories  
● which should grasp the original content (given the fact that they are to be translated – in most 
cases – into another language),  
● within the translation process it is important to mind specifics (e.g. irony) since that is 
important information for the later analysis,  
● but we are not going to conduct any depth interview analysis or the like, 
hence the wording/quotes can and should be condensed to what is to be seen as a story at a 
time (as in the given examples).  
 
3. Paraphrase 
Now you summarize the story: 
1. in short  
2. as a stand-alone (understandable without any other context) 
3. grasping the core proposition 
4. written in third person  
5. but without (your) interpretation.  
 
Good practise examples:  
“The storyteller complains about the lack of privacy and personal freedom when he moves on 
public places in Vienna or travels in the UK or US. He compares the circumstances to a 
dystopian novel by George Orwell.” 
 
“The participant reports an annoying security measure at a small American airport. He 
claims that social sorting happens at airport controls.“ 
 
“Respondent reflects on the pros and cons of loyalty cards. Raises ecological concerns. On 
the other hand he admits at the same time being receptive to the offers.” 
 
Don’t: “Crime prevention and neighbourhood watch in a small town” (no proposition) 
“You could resist but it would be probably pointless” (no context, still verbatim) 
 
4- Type of the Story 
Descriptive narrative:  
This is about a ‘real life story’ that had actually happened to the storyteller, to a friend of the 
storyteller or is referring closely to a real story that has been on the news etc.) 
 
  “I remember a car theft. It happened to a good friend in Praha. It probably was in the early 
90ies. He worked there……” 
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“Yes, in fact it was a conversation I'd had with the .... County Council and I'd felt that I'd been 
treated in a bad way on the phone and I wanted a recording of the conversation…” 
 
Normative account: 
This is about opinions, beliefs, theories etc. about society, surveillance, utopia…. 
 
 ”I think you can’t live nowadays without leaving some traces unless you withdraw from 
society and become a recluse in the forests. What people should not do is to leave more 
traces than necessary….” 
 
 “‘The participant thinks that it is important to inform the society. He thinks there was a phase 
in which the society was informed sufficiently via the media [news]. But that was only a 
phase…” 
 
5. Setting of the Story 
If a ‘real life story’ was told (=had happened to the storyteller, to a friend of the storyteller, referring 
closely to a real life story on the news etc.): 
Insert the actual place and (if possible) date of the story: 
“A small town between Milan and Turin” (in 2012) 
 “The storytellers flat in Vienna” (in the 1990s) 
Or even – if possible – more detailed: 
“The city of Prague in the early 90s at the end of the communist area in east/central Europe.” 
 
If it was about opinions, beliefs etc. the wider topic becomes the setting of the story, please insert, (if 
possible with information on the timeframe etc.): 
 “Air traveling in modern times.” 
“Use of social media after Snowden” 
Or even / if that abstract: 
„Living in a surveillance society” 
“Describing Utopia, where as the investment in human beings solves general problems.”  
Don’t “the Internet” (too wide, non-specific) 
 “Interview with member of NGO group” (=This is general interview information -> either 
referring to the recruiting topic and/or general information at the very end) 
 
Please remember to avoid cross-references between individual text input fields. Ideally every single 
entry should make sense without further context. 
 
Please note that all questions following from now on are referring to the ROLE OF THE 
STORYTELLER only in every very PARTICUAR story. 
 
6. ROLE OF THE STORYTELLER - Knowledge: 
Expert:  S/he is speaking from an informed position  
“I know where the cameras are here and they are not effective in terms of security. 
For instance, here local police patrolling the streets has been much more effective for 
bags snatching. This is prevention, not CCTV that can be useful only after something 
has occurred. 
Lay:  S/he is speaking from a less informed position  
“Until now, I haven’t found a reason why I should say: hey, this [data protection] is 
of real importance for me. Because I’m generally the opinion, that everything I do, if 
I’m leading a good life, that everything I do should be representable …””  
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7. ROLE OF THE STORYTELLER - Role: 
Most of the times the categories should be adequate, however, if in a normative story the role is 
impossible to determine, please tick the option Normative account  
 
Watcher: “I have worked for the federal ministry for agriculture and forestry and I have been a 
system administrator there. We knew exactly when somebody turned on a computer, 
what program he started first, that was all [accessible for us]…” 
Watched:  “In principal, you have become almost hundred percent transparent (glass citizen)” 
Detached observer: “In a time in which especially young people reveal everything – beginning 
with credit cards to some kind of striptease that they put on Facebook – one must not 
be surprised when everything is in some way public or publishable. I’ve never bought 
something on E-bay or Amazon but not because I am afraid of such things but simply 
because it is not my medium. …” 
Active observer: „If I want to participate, I need to be willing to expose certain parts of my  
  personal data. I myself determine where I disclose which data…” 
 
8. ROLE OF THE STORYTELLER – Level of attitude: e.g. 
 
Pro:  “To be honest, I don’t have any objections. When something happens, like stealing, 
then you can more or less immediately chase him [the thief] when a video surveillance 
is existent. I would not mind it at all…” 
Contra:  “I think my daughter is on Facebook, but I think that is the only one [social media 
site]. For me it is absolutely uninteresting, a waste of time, very roughly speaking. 
(…) what data protection meant in the 70ies, what disappeared in the last 30 years, 
and how you have become transparent [“glass citizen”] nowadays is in principle a 
catastrophe.”  
Uninformed:  “I think the main reason is that young people are very keen on expressing themselves. 
I don’t know. I’ve been told…” 
Ambivalent:  “Actually it’s hard to understand for me, but I’ll try, but I don’t have to participate on 
Facebook. Of course it’s fascinating what you can find there. I’m a curious person 
you know. I like to know something about other people. For example about former 
schoolmates.” 
 
9. ROLE OF THE STORYTELLER – Level of action: 
 
Active: “Last week on the radio there was a speaker talking about big companies that usually 
have a psychologist to manage the interview for selecting candidates and they also 
check the FB profile of the potential candidate, although I haven’t a big company, I 
agree with this system for profiling the person you are going to interview and 
potentially employ…” 
 
Passive: “I am not one who is aware of a lot of things [in the neighbourhood].  I know at most 
who lives in the houses. But we have one [guy] in the first house of the street who 
knows everything. There is nothing he is not aware of…” 
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9.2.3 Overview on the conducted interviews and  interviewees  
Regina Berglez     
 
 
 
 
 
46
21%
35
16%
39
18%
47
22%
50
23%
Austria
Germany
Italy
Slovakia
UK
Interviews conducted per country
N= 217
22
10%
54
25%
33
15%
26
12%
82
38%
Consumer
advocacy
Crime
prevention
Data protection
Workplace
surveillance
Random
control group
Interviews conducted per entry topic
N= 217
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· 3 missing 
·  
 
*18 missing 
 
31
14%
52
24%
38
18%
27
13%
22
10%
44
21% 18 to 24 years
25 to 34 years
35 to 44 years
45 to 54 years
55 to 64 years
65 years and
older
Age structure of the interviewees
N= 214* 
11
6%
70
35%
22
11%
30
15%
25
13%
29
15%
5
2%
7
3% PhD
University Degree
(MA)
University Degree (BA)
Secondary Degree (12
years)
Secondary Degree (10
years)
Vocational Degree
Other
No Certificate
Educational level of the interviewees
N= 199* 
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107
49%
55
25%
10
5%
8
4%
4
2%
33
15% married / living
together
single
divorced / living
apart
widowed
other
No answer
Civil status
N=217
13
6%
31
14%
11
5%
25
12%
45
21%
16
7%
76
35%
right
conservative
centre
liberal
left
other
No answer
Political preferences
N=217
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8
4%
34
15%
41
19%
19
9%2110%
94
43%
under 450 Euro
451 - 1500 Euro
1501 - 2500 Euro
2501 - 4000 Euro
more than 4000
Euro
No answer
Household income (in Euro)
N= 217
3
2%
55
25%
87
40%
13
6%
59
27%
poor
sufficient
middle class
affluent/rich
No answer
Income: self assessment
N=217
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9.3 ANNEX III – FOCUS GROUPS HANDBOOK: IRISS TASK 4.3 
Walter Peissl 
 
9.3.1 Introduction and Methodological Background 
 
The objective of this paper is i) to present the methodological background and aims of Focus Groups 
(FG) within the framework of IRISS WP4 and ii) to provide concrete organisational guidelines for 
conducting the FG within Task 4.3 “Informed Debate on Surveillance and Control”. 
 
The FG roots in experiments and experiences of American Sociology in the late 40ies of the 20th 
Century. Robert Merton together with Patricia Kendall (1946) published a fundamental article about 
“The Focused Interview”, which is deemed to be the “landmark paper” of this method. They based 
their findings on several years of experiences in studies of social and psychological effects of mass 
communications. Since then hundreds of thousands of FG have been conducted all over the world and 
a bulk of literature on the method was written. FG meanwhile is widely used and developed 
professionally. 
 
Definition 
Besides the above-presented US American development there was a parallel one in Germany. 
“Gruppendiskussion”/Group discussions were used in the 1950ies for researching political awareness 
of the Nazi past (Dürrenberger/Behringer 1999). From these different strands a variety of definitions 
evolved. They all have in common, that a Focus Group is a moderated group discussion, on a specific 
issue and used to research attitudes and values. Some of the definitions vary in the size of the groups, 
the amount of meetings and other details. A pragmatic all encompassing definition, which is working 
for IRISS too is given by Steyaert/Lisoir (2005): ”A focus group is a planned discussion among a 
small group (4-12 persons) of stakeholders facilitated by a skilled moderator. It is designed to obtain 
information about (various) people’s preferences and values pertaining to a defined topic and why 
these are held, by observing the structured discussion of an interactive group in a permissive, non-
threatening environment. Thus, a focus group can be seen as a combination between a focused 
interview and a discussion group.“  
 
Applications 
FG are mostly used in commercial marketing research for testing new products. In the 1980ies FG 
entered the arena of policy advice – testing political campaigns and programmes, medical planning – 
discussing health policy programmes and more generally the qualitative social sciences – investigating 
attitudes, preferences and values. 
 
Principles 
Summing up: a FG basically… 
· consists of 4-12 people, 
· needs a stimulus for triggering the discussion,  
· is a moderated discussion,  
· that needs an open climate and  
· is non-directive. 
 
The Focus Groups in IRISS 
One of the objectives of IRISS is to understand and reconstruct citizens’ views and understanding of 
surveillance and their options to exercise their democratic rights in surveillance societies. WP 4 is 
devoted to these citizen’s views and attitudes. Based on the experiences from former tasks in WP 4 it 
is the overall aim of task 4.3 to investigate whether there are differences of attitudes and lines of 
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argumentation towards surveillance and control “before” and “after” having reflected on the issue. 
Therefore task 4.3 will recruit their subjects partly from the pool of respondents/participants 
established in task 4.2 (already in touch with the issue) and partly new participants who have not been 
in contact with the issue at stake/the project before (“Control Group II”). These FG will be held in 5 
partner countries: Germany, Italy, Slovakia, the UK and Austria. 
The “informed debates” are focus group like moderated group discussions. The events will be 
recorded and partly transcribed. The goal of these focus groups is to gain a deeper understanding of 
the attitudes and opinions held by different groups of citizens in different countries and to test the 
stability of these opinions and attitudes when confronted with new information. By involving citizens 
in such an informed debate, we will be able to better understand how surveillance resonates with 
societal values held by different groups. 
 
9.3.2 Organisational Guidelines 
 
Before the FG - In short: what, who, when and where? 
 
What? 
In IRISS we are conducting a classical FG with introductory stimulus, provided by the moderator in 
the beginning. The introductory material (cases/quotes based on the database of the interviews round 1 
and 2) will be provided in English and has to be translated by partners in their respective language. 
 
Who? 
· Partners/organisers need a task leader, taking care of the whole process including recruitment, 
other organisational issues and the analysis. For the FG partners need at least two staffers: a 
moderator, leading the discussion in a non-directive way and an assistant, taking care of the 
technical stuff (recorders, paper, pens etc.) and supporting the moderator where ever 
necessary. In IRISS we’ve reserved 1,100 EUR extra budget (other direct costs) to cover the 
expenses of the FG. 
· The participants shall come from two different sources: “reflected” from interview round 1 
and newly recruited “newbies”. For details see 3.1.2 below.  
· In countries with more partners involved, the focus groups will be split between the partners 
with shared responsibilities (possibly one focus group conducted by each partner). 
 
When?  
The event shall be organised subsequent to the in-depth interviews of task 4.2 and will take about 2 
hours each. This actually means that the FGs should take place in January-February 2014. In order to 
do so recruitment may start immediately before/after Christmas. Start recruiting 2 weeks before the 
envisaged date at the latest! You can find details in 3.4 Timeline. 
 
How long?  
Each FG has an average duration of 2-3 hours maximum. This means you may conduct them in the 
late afternoon. Starting relatively late may attract people to come, because they don’t have to get off 
work too early. Schedule the FG according to your countries habits (in Austria we intend to go for 
Monday 17:00). 
 
Where? 
The venue should be an open, friendly, central place, which is easy to reach and big enough for a 
group of 10-12 people sitting around a table or in a circle. Especially important is that the venue is not 
manipulating. With regard to the issue at stake you should not conduct the FG in the Ministry of the 
Interior or at the premises of Privacy Advocacy NGOs etc. 
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WP4 Sampling overview 
It is aimed for two focus groups per country. The participants of both groups are by no means 
representative but a good mix with regard to socio-demographic factors (gender, age, education etc.) 
shall be aimed at. 
The table below shows the ideal sampling in all activities in WP4. With regard to Task 4.3 the last row 
is relevant. Partners should aim at finding two groups as similar as possible to the participants from 
round 1. Main criterion is still the “entry point”, which means participants should be recruited 
according to the list below. Secondary criteria with respect to similarity to the first round groups are 
socio-demographic variables as far as they played a role in the first round interviews. This means each 
partner should try to find as many male/female participants as in the first round interviews for both the 
“reflected” and the “newbie” group in their respective country. The same goes for equally distributed 
age samples and so on.  
Always bear in mind: try to come up with two groups as similar as possible to the participants in 
interview round 1, because the main objective of Task 4.3 is to find out whether there are differences 
between those already reflecting about surveillance and control and those who haven’t so far. 
 
Recruiting strategies 
For the “reflected” participants please have a look at your database and try to get in contact again with 
the interviewees and just ask whether or not they are willing to join a Focus Group. As soon as you 
obtain informal acceptance you may send a more formal personalised invitation letter (probably via 
mail/pdf attachment) with all the formalities (see Appendix). Basically you will know how the group 
will be best composed, as you know the people from the interviews. Try to make the group as 
different, interesting as possible. 
For the newbies just go ahead and try to find your “Control Group” participants out there at random. 
You may use your institutions website, Twitter, Social Media Platforms or classical telephone book 
like recruiting strategies. You can use a slightly changed “Invitation letter” for the broad advertising of 
the Focus Group events. Probably you may get more positive responses than you need participants (8-
10), so you have to select according to the targeted portfolio.  
The moderator should not know participants and participants should not know each other. This counts 
for both groups. 
 
During the FG 
Introductory input/stimulus  
In the beginning of any Focus Group you have to open up the field and give a short introduction to the 
issue at stake. This should rather be a short 5-10 minutes opening talk, not a comprehensive 
presentation. In the IRISS case we decided to take advantage of the international attention surveillance 
received through the disclosure by Edward Snowden. In order to introduce the issue we need a 
common language, but not necessary the exact same words. The following text is a kind of structured 
basket of modules that may be used by the facilitators according to their national needs. 
Besides the common definitions, explanations we also provide the participants with some potential 
reactions to the global surveillance scandal. In order to do so we looked at the IRISS database from the 
interviews and would like you to use some of the following quotes to illustrate attitudes that popped 
up during the interview series. Reactions to the Snowden/PRISM scandal – the “global surveillance 
disclosure” – can be: 
· Raised awareness 
· Neutralising 
· Ignoring 
· Ascribe political relevance 
In the introductory statement you should use quotes illustrating at least two of the above categories of 
potential reactions. Best would be to illustrate different kinds of reactions with most potential 
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difference: describe “raised awareness” by one quote and “ignoring” by another; or use a quote for 
“neutralising strategy” and another for “ascribing political relevance”. If you can come up with quotes 
for all categories it would be best. The more open the field for discussion is, the better, but be aware of 
not being too long with the introductory statement. The quotes are a kind of basic material to be used 
in your introductory statement – use one or a combination of two, just try to sketch a broad picture of 
possible ways to cope with the situation.  
With the quotes (see below) you will see from which country they are – if one of your participants in 
the “reflected” FG is the source of a respective quote you shall not use this one and take another 
instead. For easier comparison I would encourage you to use the same kind of introductory statement 
in both FG. 
 
Definitions/wording: 
The “global surveillance disclosure” refers to an on-going series of news reports in the international 
media that revealed operational details regarding the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and its 
international partners' mass surveillance of foreign nationals as well as U.S. citizens. The vast majority 
of reports emanated from a cache of top-secret documents leaked by ex-NSA contractor Edward 
Snowden. On June 6, 2013, the first of Snowden's documents were published simultaneously by The 
Washington Post and The Guardian, attracting considerable public attention. In summary, these media 
reports have shed light on the implications of several secret treaties signed by members of the UKUSA 
Agreement in their efforts to implement global surveillance. For example, Der Spiegel revealed how 
the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) transfers "massive amounts of intercepted data to the 
NSA", while Sveriges Television revealed that Sweden is continuously providing the NSA with data 
gathered from telecom cables intercepted by the FRA (Försvarets radioanstalt), under a secret treaty 
signed in 1954 for bilateral cooperation on surveillance.369 
PRISM is a clandestine mass electronic surveillance data mining program known to have been 
operated by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) since 2007. PRISM is a government 
code name for a data-collection effort known officially by the SIGAD US-984XN. The Prism program 
collects stored Internet communications based on demands made to Internet companies such as 
Google Inc. under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to turn over any data that match 
court-approved search terms. The NSA can use these Prism requests to target communications that 
were encrypted when they travelled across the Internet backbone, to focus on stored data that 
telecommunication filtering systems discarded earlier, and to get data that is easier to handle, among 
other things. Its existence was leaked 2013 by NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who warned that the 
extent of mass data collection was far greater than the public knew and included what he characterized 
as "dangerous" and "criminal" activities. The disclosures were published by The Guardian and The 
Washington Post on June 6, 2013. Subsequent documents have demonstrated a financial arrangement 
between NSA's Special Source Operations division (SSO) and PRISM partners in the region of 
millions of dollars.370 
 
Quotes from WP4 interviews 
 
Raised awareness 
GER Since the Edward Snowden thing I’m much more aware now that my 
location data could be accessed by the police if they wanted to 
access it but as I’m not a criminal I don’t really mind that I suppose.  
.....  there’s a huge amount of data on Google about me that if the 
Raised awareness: 
but nothing to 
hide, nothing to 
fear 
                                               
369  (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosure  (accessed 2013-12-17)) 
370  (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28surveillance_program%29, accessed 2013-12-17) 
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police could access it they could pretty much find out my whole life 
so, I was debating whether to delete it or not.  I’m not sure what to 
do yet because I then thought to myself, well as I’m not a criminal 
it’s quite good that I’ve got my location data on there because if 
someone accused me of doing something I didn’t do then I can say, 
well, look, log into my Google account and you can see exactly 
where I was on this date or time, to prove that I wasn’t there. 
 ... It’s made me think more carefully about how much data they do 
store on me because I’m just aware that all my searches I’ve ever 
done since 2006 probably will definitely impact on it, I’ve checked 
since the Edward Snowden thing. 
GER Yes we have Dropbox, only for professional reasons. And I must say: 
Even if the BND, the NSA or something gets this data: I don't care, 
this is no sensitive material, normal photos.  
Raised awareness: 
but nothing to 
hide, nothing to 
fear 
AUT Yes, I don’t feel comfortable about it. But I don’t know what they 
actually should do … It’s just a feeling when you put too much … 
You heard now a lot of all these scandals and so … It’s just a bad 
feeling. I don’t think the government is spying on me or something 
like this … It’s just that I think some things should be just private … 
private life … institutions shouldn’t have access to … Some things 
should be in the private sphere of individuals … not like in the US 
where everything is already monitored … like when they said, one 
week before … it was revealed that they (NSA, PRISM) check all the 
mail in the United States. That’s crazy because it’s a private part of 
the individual. I mean is it interesting to check all the post cards? 
Raised awareness 
 
Neutralising 
AUT Hm no... I rely a bit on my partner, he's an IT-Nerd and very much 
into that data protection thing too. When he uses all the stuff, also 
for sensitive data, Dropbox, cloud, the same email-provider then 
why should I worry? 
Neutralising:  
Rely on 
partner/friend  
GER No, I never believed that email-communication was a trustworthy, 
private, safe space. That "postcard"-metaphor, you know that 
everybody who's server is passed while sending the mail can read 
it... That's nothing new, I have friends working in the IT-Sector, they 
told me that years ago. 
Neutralising: 
nothing new 
 
Ignoring 
AUT Honestly, I don’t fully get all these discomposure about the NSA-
surveillance. That all these ‘checking everything out and collecting 
whatever is there’ especially on the internet is going on (quote 
interviewer ->he is deliberately? not using the term surveillance) 
was somehow clear for quite a while. What is possible to be peeked 
will somehow be peeked. 
Ignore:  
Nothing to do 
about it 
GER I am permissive with lots of data. I talk about my income, because I 
DO NOT think money is so important. yes. I talk about sexual 
Ignore:  
Nothing to 
hide, nothing to 
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preferences, not to everybody but yes among friends, because I DO 
NOT think it is so important. And if someone who I don't know and 
who doesn't know me reads this - I don't care. 
fear 
 
 
Ascribe political relevance 
UK What I can say is that the Snowden type of problem is real. And the 
Googles and the commercial enterprises of this world are obliged by 
law to hand over comms data. But there's a difference that people 
need to get into their heads between common data which is traffic 
analysis, who's talking to whom or which device is talking to which 
device, that doesn't guarantee who is talking to whom, useful though 
that is, otherwise they wouldn't do it, but that in itself is not the same 
as reading communications. So there is a difference between the 
traffic analysis and the interception pieces. And I think people are 
quite rightly worried about the interception bit but sometimes 
construe the two aspects. 
Differentiate 
between 
commercial 
and state 
surveillance 
AUT 
It's not strange, I get angry because people don't understand how 
important it is. Only yesterday I discussed this with a friend, and she 
said: Who cares if they read that I baked muffins today? And the 
point is: it is of interest. People just don't see that what they think is 
banal is still important enough to be recorded. 
Political 
Dimension:  
missing 
understanding 
for the 
importance of 
the NSA-case 
in the general 
public 
 
9.3.3 Guiding questions: “Informed Debate on Surveillance and Control” 
 
The guiding questions shall enable a free debate among participants on surveillance. By using the 
same template with both groups (informed/reflected and non-informed/newbies) and in all 
participating countries we will get inside into cultural/national peculiarities (as expected within task 
4.2 as well) and additionally whether the participation in the interview round one has influences on 
attitudes on surveillance. 
Questions in bold are supposed to be discussed by the participants. Subsequent to every question is a 
short note on the purpose of the question. 
To most of the questions there are some subordinated questions. These subordinated questions are 
inspirational, and can be used to support the discussion if necessary. The subordinated questions do 
not have to be raised if it is not necessary to inspire the debate. 
The question list below provides a flexible structure. So be aware of tackling all questions but not 
necessarily in the order provided here. Rather follow the group discussions own conversation process. 
 
1) What are your immediate thoughts about the stories heard? 
Purpose of the question: An open question to get the debate started and to give the participants the 
chance to present their immediate attitudes 
Subordinated question to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- What were the messages of the stories?  
 
2) What do you think about surveillance in general? 
Purpose of the question: An open question to get the debate focussed towards the issue at stake 
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Subordinated question to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- What kind of surveillance do you know – try to give some examples? 
 
3) What do you think are important positive potentials of surveillance? 
Purpose of the question: Make the participants focus on the positive potentials and get an impression 
of what they find is the most important gain of surveillance 
Subordinated questions to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- What can you gain with surveillance – try to give some examples? 
- What is the most important positive possibility? 
- Why is it important? 
 
4) What do you think are important negative potentials of surveillance?  
Purpose of the question: Make the participants focus on the negative side of surveillance, the threats, 
and get an impression of what they find is the biggest threat 
Subordinated questions to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- What negative effects of surveillance – try to give examples? 
- What is the most important negative effect of surveillance? 
- Why is it important? 
 
5) Do you see any difference in surveillance by public authorities or by private entities? 
Purpose of the question: To get the participants input on potentially different attitudes towards public 
or private surveillance 
Subordinated questions to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- What kind of public surveillance do you know – try to give examples? 
- What kind of private surveillance do you know – try to give examples? 
 
6) Who should be involved when deciding on implementing new surveillance measures? 
Purpose of the question: To get the participants input on the democratic perspective and importance 
of involving different interest groups when deciding on implementing new surveillance measures 
Subordinated questions to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- Which interest groups should be heard? (Citizens in general, civil rights organizations, security 
technology developers, politicians etc.) 
 
7) Do you have any suggestions about the regulation of implementation of surveillance 
measures? 
Purpose of the question: To get the participants input on how to manage development and 
implementation of surveillance measures 
Subordinated questions to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- Should governments implement every surveillance measure they find important or should there be 
some regulations – and if so what regulations? 
 
8) Has your participation in today’s event changed your attitude towards surveillance?  
If so: Why? 
Purpose of the question: To find out if information and debate about surveillance, security 
technologies and privacy have changed the participants attitudes toward the subject 
 
9) Do you have any final remarks, points or messages that you would like to add?  
(take a round) 
Purpose of the question: To give the participants a change to make a last statement before ending the 
interview meeting 
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Subordinated question to inspire the debate – only if necessary: 
- Have something made a special impression on you during the conversation? 
 
Rules of thumb 
These chapter provides you with some “Rules of thumb” and tips on how to carry out the FG in a good 
way. 
 
Introduction 
Start by presenting yourself, ”My name is … I’m from …, and I’m going to be the moderator at this 
group conversation. But you just talk and I will make a list of speakers if necessary. 
 
After that you do a presentation round where people say their name and why they have come to the FG 
 
After that the TAPE RECORDER IS STARTED !! This is done in a free-and-easy way and by an easy 
comment. It is important to create a light atmosphere and play down the seriousness to make sure that 
the participants are not oppressed by the situation. 
The first question is raised and the FG is on its way. 
The first question is always a “brainstorm” question, and a can affect a lot of immediate attitudes. It is 
important to give space, be open and listen in the beginning. 
 
On the way 
It is not important that all participants answer all questions, but the interviewer should have an 
impression of what they all think. 
If anyone is hiding, the interviewer can always ask “Do you agree, John, or what do you think?” 
 
There will be overlap in questions and answers. Skip questions if they have already been debated and 
answered 
Tick off on the way, when you think that a question have been debated 
 
It is important that all questions are debated. But questions that are more important to the participants 
than the ones in the interview guide can appear in the discussion and there should always be time to 
discuss these questions (as long as they are related to the security and privacy debate).  
 
If someone becomes too dominating, it is the moderators’ job to bring on the other participants. Ask 
e.g. ”What do the rest of you think?” Interrupt if necessary, it is important that everybody is heard.  
 
If the participants don’t say much at the FG, the moderator can “take a round” saying that “at the next 
question I would like to take a round where everybody gives an answer”. 
 
Ask for reasons and arguments, “How come you think that… / What is the reason for… 
 
Be aware of the participants’ reactions; do they feel comfortable, do they seem under pressure or 
uneasy etc. 
 
If you are through all the questions before time, you can go back to some of the questions that have 
not been debated that much on the way. 
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Closing 
When there is 7-8 minutes left, it is a good idea to take a round where everybody gets to make a final 
remark. The final remark can be things that they have not have the time to state already or points or 
messages they would like to underline. 
You can also ask if something has made a special impression during the conversation. 
 
After the FG 
Analyses 
· Discuss FG immediately after the FG with assistant(s). 
· Write down immediate impressions, reminders etc. 
· Listen to recordings. 
· Write a short „Country Report on FG“ (5-10 pages incl. material) 
· Translate most important results, quotes, arguments etc. 
· Send Country Report and English material to ITA. 
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9.4 ANNEX IV – THE FOCUS GROUPS 
 
Walter Peissl; Wolfgang Bonß, Alessia Ceresa, Daniel Fischer, Chiara Fonio, Martin Kovanič, 
Erik Láštic, Charles Leleux, Keith Spiller 
 
9.4.1 Introduction: Informed debate on surveillance and control 
Walter Peissl  
 
One of the objectives of IRISS is to understand and reconstruct citizens’ views and understanding of 
surveillance and their options to exercise their democratic rights in surveillance societies. Based on the 
experiences from former tasks in WP 4 it is the overall aim of Task 4.3 to investigate whether there 
are differences of attitudes and lines of argumentation towards surveillance and control “before” and 
“after” having reflected on the issue. Therefore task 4.3 established a series of Focus Groups (FG), 
which recruited their subjects partly from the pool of respondents/participants already interviewed in 
Task 4.2 and new participants, who have not been in contact with the project before. The FG were 
held in 5 partner countries: Austria, Germany, Italy, Slovakia and the UK. The “informed debates” 
were recorded and (partly) transcribed. The goal of these Focus Groups was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the attitudes and opinions held by different groups of citizens in different countries 
and to test the stability of these opinions and attitudes when confronted with new information. 
 
Methodology371 
 
The FG roots in experiments and experiences of American Sociology in the late 40ies of the 20th 
Century. Robert Merton and Patricia Kendall372 published a fundamental article about “The Focused 
Interview”, which is deemed to be the “landmark paper” of this method. They based their findings on 
several years of experience in studies of social and psychological effects of mass communication. 
Since then hundreds of thousands of FG have been conducted all over the world and a bulk of 
literature on the method has been written. Meanwhile the FG is widely used and developed 
professionally. 
Besides the US American development presented above, there was a parallel one in Germany. 
“Gruppendiskussion”/Group discussions were used in the 1950ies for researching political awareness 
of the Nazi past373. From these different strands a variety of definitions evolved. They all have in 
common, that a Focus Group is a moderated group discussion, on a specific issue and used to research 
attitudes and values. Some of the definitions vary in the size of the groups, the amount of meetings 
and other details. A pragmatic all-encompassing definition, which informs the work in IRISS is given 
by Steyaert/Lisoir374:  
“A focus group is a planned discussion among a small group (4-12 persons) of stakeholders 
facilitated by a skilled moderator. It is designed to obtain information about (various) people’s 
preferences and values pertaining to a defined topic and why these are held by observing the 
structured discussion of an interactive group in a permissive, non-threatening environment. Thus, a 
focus group can be seen as a combination between a focused interview and a discussion group.”  
 
                                               
371  More details of the FG in IRISS can be found in Annex 1 “Task 4.3. Handbook:  IRISS Task 4.3 
“Informed Debate on Surveillance and Control: Methodological basis and organisational Guidelines.” 
372  Merton, R. K. and P. L. Kendall, The Focused Interview. American Journal of Sociology, 1946, 51, pp. 541-557. 
373  DürrenbergerR, G. and  J: Behringer, Die Fokusgruppe, Stuttgart, 1999. 
374  Steyart, S. and and  H. Lisoir  (eds.) Participatory Methods Toolkit – A practitioner’s manual, Brussels: King 
Baudouin Foundation and the Flemish Institute for Science and Technology Assessment (viWTA), 2005.  
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Summing up: a FG basically… 
· consists of 4-12 people, 
· needs a stimulus for triggering the discussion,  
· is a moderated discussion,  
· that needs an open climate and  
· is non-directive. 
 
Settings in different countries 
The FG were held in the participating countries during February and March 2014. A Handbook375 with 
organisational guidelines was prepared by the task leader and sent to partners in December 2013. In 
order to get comparable results more easily a Template of Analysis376 was provided to the partners in 
February 2014. According to the Handbook participants in FG I and II were supposed to meet several 
criteria. First and above all participants in FG II should not previously have been in contact with the 
project. The “control group” was recruited randomly using different communication channels 
including social media as well as printed materials (flyers). Participants of FG I were recruited from 
the pool of interview partners from Task 4.2. Furthermore participants of the FG were supposed to 
meet certain very rough socio-demographic criteria e.g. gender (equal distribution), age (18-30, 31-60 
and 60+) and educational level (vocational training, secondary school or equivalent,, academics). It 
turned out that overall the recruitment of participants was much easier for FG II (the newly recruited 
ones) than for FG I (those who have been interviewed already by IRISS partners). This is reflected by 
a higher number of participants on average and a more equal gender balance achieved in FG II. With 
regard to age the distribution in both kind focus groups was more or less equal. Overall in both groups 
in all countries academics were overrepresented, whereas participants with vocational education were 
represented in two countries only. 
A full picture of the structure of the FG in the different partner countries can be found in the table 
below: 
 
 
 FG I Sum %   FG II Sum % 
  AT G IT SLO UK       AT G IT SLO UK     
Participants 3 4 7 6 5 25    8 6 6 7 8 35  Female 3 2 5 3 2 15 60%   4 3 3 3 4 17 49% 
Male - 2 2 3 3 10 40%   4 3 3 4 4 18 51% 
                 Age                 18-30 1 - 1 6 - 7 32%   1 - 2 7 1 11 31% 
31-60 2 2 6  4 15 56%   5 5 4  7 21 60% 60+ 1 2 -  1 4 16%   2 1 -   3 9% 
                 Education                 Vocational  2 2  - 4 16%   -  -   - 0% Secondary 
school 1 1 1 1 - 4 16%   3 3 4 3  13 37% 
Academic 2 1 4 5 5 17 68%   5 3 2 4 8 22 63% 
Table: socio-demographic structure of FG participants 
                                               
375  See Annex III “Task 4.3. Handbook: IRISS Task 4.3 “Informed Debate on Surveillance and Control” 
376  Ibid. 
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In the beginning of all FG a short introduction to the issue at stake was provided to the participants. 
This rather short, 5-10 minute, introduction opened up the theme and framed the following discussion. 
In the IRISS project we decided to take advantage of the international attention surveillance has 
received through the Edward Snowden revelations. In the handbook a text was provided, which was 
used by the facilitators according to their national needs. Besides the common definitions and 
explanations we also provided the participants with some possible reactions to the global surveillance 
scandal. The project team looked into the IRISS database and presented some quotes from the 
interviews to illustrate attitudes that emerged during the interview series. Reactions to the 
Snowden/PRISM scandal – the “global surveillance disclosure” could in our terms be categorized 
either as “raised awareness”, “neutralising”, “ignoring” or “ascribing political relevance” to the issue. 
Using some of these quotes, we built a common basis for the following discussion. 
All partners succeeded to organise the FG without major problems. Providing incentives like book- or 
fuel-vouchers up to € 30 per participant supported the recruitment. In UK vouchers for a local cinema 
or a bookstore were given after the FG as a token of appreciation. The FG were conducted and 
moderated by partners themselves or by external moderators.  
 
All partners analysed their respective FG and provided national reports to the task leader. These 
national reports are building blocks of the findings described later. 
 
Research questions  
Task 4.3’s main objective was to find out whether there are differences in attitudes, values and lines of 
argumentation between participants who were interviewed in depth and those who hadn’t had contact 
with the project before. One working hypothesis was that the previously interviewed participants had 
more time to reflect, that their awareness of the issue at stake had been raised by the in-depth 
interviews and therefore their way of arguing – in whatever way – may be more concrete and 
reflected.  
 
Conducting the FG in five European countries obviously raises the question of different attitudes in 
different countries, political cultures, broadly speaking – environments. It should however, by clearly 
stated that two focus groups with 4 to 8 people per country are by no means an instrument to gain 
insight into national or cultural differences. Nevertheless analysing the different discussions gives 
insight into different surveillance cultures377 that might have influenced the way discussions went in 
different countries. 
 
9.4.2 Findings from the national events 
 
In this section we provide an overview of the findings from the FG in the participating countries. This 
section is based entirely on the national reports provided by the partners. First there is a summary of 
the respective national events, followed by an in-depth analysis.  
Austria 
Walter Peissl 
 
Summary 
The Austrian FG I and II were quite different. First they were different in size: FG II consisted of eight 
participants and FG I of only three; FG II had an equal gender balance whereas FG I had only one 
female participant. The opinions in FG II were quite diverse with a slight tendency of being critical 
                                               
377  Lyon, David, Situating surveillance – History, Technology, Culture in Kees Boersma, Rosamunde van Brakel, Chiara 
Fonio, Pieter Wagenaar (Eds.) 2014, Histories of State Surveillance in Europe and Beyond, Routledge, 2014, pp. 32-46. 
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towards surveillance. Only two out of eight participants were explicitly in favour of surveillance, 
whereas the others were quite critical and only saw minor positive effects in state surveillance. 
Participants of FG I unanimously regarded surveillance as negative with only minor or questionable 
effects on security. Both FG experienced a positive atmosphere and lively discussions. Whereas the 
FG II spoke rather theoretically about surveillance and its probable effects, in FG I concrete examples, 
mostly from personal experiences, made the discussion much more concrete. In both groups the 
attitudes of individual participants did not change after the group discussion. All participants were 
satisfied with the atmosphere and thankful for having the opportunity to talk about an issue that affects 
their everyday lives. All expressed their gratitude to the others for having enriched their scope on the 
issue at stake. 
 
Comparison FG I and FG II 
Introductory story, reactions and surveillance in general 
In FG II the opinions on the stories and the Snowden revelations were quite diverse. The participants 
on the one hand stated that there has always been surveillance or questioned the issue as such – “Why 
do we do that? To increase security, but we actually don’t know what security means – it means 
different things to different people.” On the other hand there were legal-positivistic approaches: 
”What is evil is described in the criminal code.” and also statements that finding proportionality is an 
almost impossible task. At least two participants remarked that they turned from fatalism (“you cannot 
do anything about it”) towards more sensibility and interest in the political dimension of surveillance. 
The majority was sceptical of and against surveillance or were at least unclear what the real effects 
could be. Out of the eight participants from FG II only two made a clear statement pro surveillance. 
One argued from a security point of view and the other from a business perspective. A short 
discussion on Facebook showed that only few participants were active users, the pro surveillance 
participants just stated, “You have to know what you post” and “The world may know what I post”, 
demonstrating great confidence of being able to manage data on FB, but probably not fully aware of 
the mechanisms in the background. The non-Facebook-users were rather sceptical and essentially 
based their judgement on rumours. All together the discussion was more on a theoretical/vague level, 
whereas in FG I the participants immediately jumped into the discussion with concrete examples and 
clear ideas of potential consequences or groups of victims.  
The discussion rapidly moved on to the newly introduced electronic patients’ record system in Austria 
and the regulation that stipulates the installation of Smart Meters in 90% of private homes by 2019. 
This was seen as a precursor to surveillance. Besides this, one participant also mentioned individual 
concerns, besides the political societal aspect, and her ultimate aim to keep up informational self-
determination. 
 
Positive and or negative effects of surveillance 
In the discussion on positive and negative effects of surveillance in FG II, some participants neglected 
positive effects, whilst others saw potential in the increase of security, although this was also 
questioned. It was not clear how the efficacy of surveillance could be measured. “The bad guys 
always find a way to circumvent the surveillance.” Essentially, all participants more or less agreed that 
some surveillance is necessary for the sake of security but they also strongly argued for 
proportionality: “Do only as much surveillance as needed” (acknowledging that finding 
proportionality is a difficult task). They also discussed control mechanisms for watching (controlling) 
the watchers and made a clear distinction between spaces with (accepted) surveillance and spaces that 
should be left without. 
With regard to the negative effects of surveillance, the concern was about long-term consequences, 
which cannot yet be assessed and for which it might already be too late. From this point the discussion 
moved directly towards the distinction between public and private surveillance although participants 
showed more understanding for public surveillance (needed to gain security). Private surveillance with 
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loyalty cards, credit and debit cards etc. was seen as much more problematic. One participant 
highlighted the “voluntary character” of these kinds of data collection, although others counteracted 
this by arguing that it seems hard to resist these subtle methods of seduction. As could be shown the 
discussion in FG II was diverse with a slight trend of scepticism towards surveillance, although the 
discussion remained rather theoretic and “philosophical”. 
 
In contrast, in FG I the positive effects of surveillance were more or less neglected by all participants. 
They saw advantages only for the security industry and other suppliers. Potential positive effects are 
rapidly turned into negative ones by “the greedy nature of human beings”. There was a rather long 
discussion on the missing trust in the efficacy of surveillance measures. This was enriched with 
personal experiences of fingerprint systems at border controls. Furthermore it was discussed that e.g. 
CCTV may help in criminal prosecution but cannot prevent criminal actions. This was illustrated by a 
recent case of rape in the Viennese underground. On a more theoretical level the individual loss of 
control over one’s own life was seen as a negative effect of a “preventive” or “security” society. 
 
Discussing private versus public surveillance 
In FG II it was agreed that there is a difference in assessing public and private surveillance. The state 
should be in charge of providing security and for that reason surveillance may be accepted to a certain 
extent. At the same time it was acknowledged that boundaries are blurred and a strict distinction 
between public and private – even if desirable – is no longer realistic. Private in this context was 
discussed in different settings. On the one hand, even surveillance by public authorities, which is 
accepted, should respect “private” activities like email communications and rather focus on “open, 
public places” (implicitly thinking of CCTV systems). On the other hand, “private activities” – 
surveillance by firms via loyalty cards, location based data etc. – was deemed problematic. In this 
respect the group was divided into three groups: the majority was critical towards private surveillance, 
two participants were in favour and one participant felt confined by subtle mechanisms of seduction 
and direct economic pressure. The participants in favour of private surveillance activities referred to 
its voluntary nature and to legal mechanisms of protection. All together the participants expressed a 
high degree of trust towards the state, public institutions and the law (Data Protection Law etc.).  
 
Participants in FG I did not differentiate between public and private surveillance and both were 
rejected. Again concrete examples of disadvantages for consumers were discussed (e.g. ticket pricing 
using the order-history, which resulted in higher prices for frequent flyers – erasing cookies or 
changing computers made tickets cheaper again. Special attention was given to developments in 
technology-use in the family context and the issue of trust and control. Easy plug and play 
technologies deliver surveillance potential almost everywhere, which induces unreasonable suspicion. 
Finally the participants discussed “fear” as a cultural phenomenon tackled differently in various parts 
of the world.  
 
Who should participate in decision making on surveillance measures? 
Statements in FG II with regard to decision-making circled around capitalism, expert interests, 
politicians and science. Technology development is capital intensive and therefore economic interests 
dominate and push developments. The participants agreed that there seems to be no chance of 
revoking recent developments and they shared scepticism regarding awareness of politicians. One of 
the suggestions was to ask independent scientists (as in TA institutes) to give an overview of the state 
of art. Toward the end of the discussion, participants discussed and were broadly in favour of the idea 
of involving children in the decision-making process, as it is their future at stake. 
In FG I the participants argued for the involvement of all persons affected by surveillance 
technologies, although at the same time some concerns about direct democracy arose. However, 
participants raised the point that decision making with broad public involvement requires prior 
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education and information. Critical questions that arose in this context, related to who will do that and 
how this could be done in an objective way? Participants were in agreement about ethical issues 
surrounding technical developments and made the claim that “not everything that’s possible, should be 
done”. In contrast to FG II, in FG I a statement was made in favour of engaging the in decision-
making, due to their considerable experience. 
 
Did this FG change your mind? 
With regard to this question, there was no difference between participants of FG I and FG II. They 
were thankful for having had the opportunity to express themselves, to learn from others and to 
increase their knowledge on the issue at stake. Almost all participants stated that they did not alter 
their attitudes in the course of their involvement, but were satisfied by the quality of the discussion. 
One participant stated that he learned that “surveillance” can have also positive connotations: in the 
field of (intensive-)care and with regard to caring for children. 
 
 
Germany 
Daniel Fischer 
 
Summary 
The discussion in FG I can be summarized as follows: 
All participants contributed stories about what they had heard or experienced, to develop a common 
idea of surveillance. The discussion was very elaborate, as participants differentiated between data 
production, data analysis and decision-making based on the results of the analysis. De-contextualising 
data and using them out of context was considered problematic. All four participants agreed that 
surveillance is far too complex to be managed properly. A mother of a 9-year-old boy expressed the 
need to protect her son from ubiquitous and permanent efforts to influence his consumption. Another 
participant tried to draw a more relaxed picture of the situation: “In the end it’s me who decides what I 
buy, and as long as this is the case, that’s ok.” 
The last major topic was about institutional responses: This started with a spontaneous call for more 
transparency, although the group changed its opinion in the course of the discussion: Based on 
mistrust of government, “transparency” would hardly be accepted without significant doubts. It was 
also argued that transparency would probably be impossible to achieve due to the amount of 
information involved. One participant posed the question whether “knowing everything” might not 
frighten people more, than the current situation of “not knowing about most things”.  
The discussion ended with some concluding remarks, which can be summarized as follows: 
Circumstances are not easy to influence and change. This can lead to a) an even more desperate 
struggle against “it all”; b) to extremely time consuming discussions about the topics without having 
an effect, or c) to a relaxed state of personally not feeling surveilled. 
 
The discussion in FG II can be summarized in four parts: 
Participants were not in agreement. The elder participants were more concerned with privacy issues, 
whilst the younger participants presented themselves in a somewhat controversial manner: A mixture 
of being careless, resigned, incautious, and inconsistent. 
We then asked participants to talk about surveillance in all walks of life, and how they reacted to it. 
This conversation centred mainly on security related state surveillance. Although there were several 
different positions on the issues discussed, this did not lead to controversy, but rather to a 
neutralisation of experiences. Whenever a participant raised a concern, another participant tried to 
erase the concern by demonstrating the lack of alternatives; e.g. “why worry about things you can’t 
change?” 
“GPS tracking might be bad” -> “You can be tracked either way.” 
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“Encrypting mails might be a good thing” -> “It will get hacked either way/is it that important what 
you write” 
“Fighting terrorism might be worth all that.” – “There’ll always be terrorism.” 
“CCTV… well… of course there are pros, of course there are cons, leave me alone with it.” 
A mood of “Digging deeper here won’t bring us further” pervaded the discussion, there was a 
preference to leave things as they were.  
Participants were not really concerned about surveillance by private actors. All considered themselves 
quite prepared against being seduced to buy things they don’t want.  Again, the main thrust of the 
discussion was the lack of convenient alternatives to WhatsApp, Facebook etc… 
The dominant mode converged on a kind of fatalism: Yes this is problem when you really think about 
it – but I cannot think about it all the time.” 
 
Comparison FG I and FG II 
Differences  
The participants of FG I (informed) were ready and willing to identify with the topic and were very 
interested in the opinions and experiences of the other participants. They tried to synthesise all points 
raised to create a “bigger picture” of the direction in which surveillance society could go. There was 
an interest in developing a common opinion at least about the current situation. 
 
The participants of FG II appeared to be much less willing to identify with the topic. Although 
initially, participants uttered one or two standard statements, this did not lead to a committed debate. 
Everybody brought up their own experiences with surveillance, but nobody tried to create some sort of 
“common destiny” out of which a demand for action might arise. Although some participants shared 
similar experiences, this was largely considered to indicate normality rather than being questioned. 
 
The participants of FG I were either looking for ways to avoid surveillance (more civil engagement, 
fewer cameras, not giving away data if it isn’t urgent, using secure technologies). Arguments to voice 
protest against surveillance were raised. This process of “looking for alternatives” however, proved to 
be more than frustrating, since new insecurities kept arising. Toward the end of the discussion, 
participants delegated responsibility “back to the government”, despite a natural distrust of 
government authorities. 
 
In contrast, participants of FG II were much more sceptical about real options. They did not have any 
utopian ideals about a surveillance-free society. Although they acknowledged that things probably go 
wrong, in the end they came to the same “conclusion” as participants in FG I, although discussions 
were considerably shorter: delegate final responsibility to the government. FG II participants stated 
that it is beyond their capabilities to act appropriately in relation to surveillance. Overall, participants 
of FG II remained much more relaxed and focused on their daily routines than participants of FG I and 
simply accepted the status quo:  
· They envisaged surveillance as something normal that has always existed and will change and 
develop parallel to society, 
· and they accepted economic and political interests and the possibility of manipulation based 
on intelligence/data  
 
In both groups arguments and attitudes did not differ on the basis of gender, although there were 
generational conflicts in FG II, which did not surface in FG I. In FG II, the two elder participants had 
more concerns about any surveillance related (online) communication activities than the younger 
participants, although the elderly were less affected by it (as they spend much less time e.g. in the 
Internet than others). 
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Similarities 
· All participants were pretty well informed about surveillance in general. 
· Participants were particularly knowledgeable about CCTV, which played a central role in the 
discussions in both groups. Cameras still serve as the classic symbol of surveillance and views 
toward them are ambivalent (care and control/security vs. freedom).  
· In both groups, surveillance was perceived as a collectivizing phenomenon. Participants did 
not feel monitored individually, but rather that “society” is under surveillance. FG I 
participants argued that “society” should be motivated to resist surveillance in some way, 
whereas FG II participants, tried not to deal with this topic any more than necessary. 
 
 
Italy 
Chiara Fonio, Alessia Ceresa 
 
Summary 
The motivations of various participants from FG I were as follows: 
“The individual interview has stimulated my curiosity and I want to look into this issue in more depth, 
as I didn’t know about this and usually, due to laziness, we avoid looking for more information on 
something we don’t know anything about and we don’t really think about the importance of this 
issue.” 
“It’s a topic that involves our everyday life, but we really don’t think about it and we don’t have much 
information on surveillance and CCTV systems (…)” 
“I’m already very sensitive about this issue (…) as I’m annoyed about loyalty cards, since I feel spied 
on whilst I am shopping or by the electronic register at school, etc….therefore, I accepted the chance 
to be interviewed immediately and to attend the FG now (…)” 
 
In contrast, participants from FG II indicated curiosity as their primary motivation for attending: 
“I’m interested in the issue”, “I’m curious about this particular experience”, “I’m interested in 
exchanging and getting information on this issue” and “I’m curious to experience a FG and I’m 
interested in technological devices.” 
 
The two Focus Groups have demonstrated that the perception of the “surveillance” issue is 
increasingly becoming a global phenomenon, i.e. it goes beyond national frontiers and it is a trans-
generational problem as well, since it involves citizens of all generations within a certain society. 
 
The perception that surveillance has to be analysed from a supra-national perspective is due to 
different factors. On the one hand, globalization, referred to as an economic and financial phenomenon 
in this instance, increasingly plays a role, covering ever more aspects of our everyday lives, including 
surveillance practices. On the other hand, the rapid evolution of new technologies and the 
implementation of technological devices have led to a general perception that the two terms, i.e. 
surveillance and technology, are complementary and, in certain cases, even overlap each other.  
Participants deemed both surveillance and security to be international phenomena that have to be dealt 
with by the “International Community”. 
 
A further issue, involving both the discussion groups, is the problem of lack of information 
(considering also information overload and disinformation), since citizens often perceive themselves 
to be “victims” of “surveillance” even if they are not familiar with the topic of surveillance. This is on 
the one hand due to a general lack of active involvement in public debates. The lack of information is 
crucial as well, i.e. information received by citizens from the public sector (institutions, entities, 
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agencies, etc.), the private sector (companies, corporates, etc.) and mass media (newspapers, TV, 
radio, as well as the Internet, social networks, blogs, etc.). 
It is interesting to note that this aspect is directly related to a more general “lack of awareness” which 
emerged specifically from FG I. In fact, the level of information, both from a qualitative and 
quantitative perspective, can function as a trigger in order to develop a higher level of awareness 
among citizens within “society”. 
 
Comparison FG I and FG II 
A comparative analysis of the results of the two Focus Groups, from a question-by-question 
perspective, reveals that there are substantial differences and commonalities between the discussions. 
 
In general terms, a comparison between the two groups reveals that FG I, attended by people who 
experienced the individual interview, had a clearer idea of surveillance, demonstrated by bringing in 
concrete examples from their everyday lives. In contrast, the second group had more problems 
providing effective stories experienced during their daily lives. 
Furthermore, while participants attending FG I were able to talk about surveillance from a pragmatic 
perspective, suggesting concrete solutions to the problem, the second group, for the most part, was 
only able to talk about the topic in more theoretical terms, perceived as an issue we are used to reading 
about in the newspapers and which is difficult to detect in our everyday life. 
 
Similarities 
An in-depth analysis of the two groups, in fact, reveals that there were more differences than 
commonalities between FG I and FG II in terms of opinions and suggestions.  
The commonalities can be expressed as follows: 
 
· What do you think about surveillance in general?  
Both FG I and FG II perceived the issue of “surveillance” in terms of a trade-off between 
“Surveillance vs. Security”: i.e. we need to renounce some of our freedoms and tolerate some 
surveillance practices in order to live a safe/secure life 
· Who should be involved when deciding on implementing new surveillance measures?  
Both groups were more tolerant towards public, as opposed to private surveillance, because of 
the idea that public entities manage surveillance practices in a more responsible way, since 
their aim is the protection of citizens (i.e. safety/security.) 
· Has your participation in today’s event changed your attitude towards surveillance? If so: 
Why?  
The participants in both FG, in the end, noted that the experience of the discussion group did 
not change their original opinions, but it helped in highlighting some aspects on surveillance 
they would not otherwise have thought about. The FG were an opportunity to collect and 
exchange ideas, as public discussions on the issue are very rare. 
 
Differences 
The following differences emerged from a comparison between the two discussion groups: 
· What are your immediate thoughts about the stories heard?  
The two quotes (i.e. “Edward Snowden case”) used to open the discussion were interpreted in 
different ways: FG I commented on it from a practical perspective (i.e. concrete examples), 
while FG II perceived the two opinions from more of an abstract point of view. 
· What do you think about surveillance in general?  
FG I defined “surveillance” as something concrete that influences everyday life, while FG II 
couldn’t provide a clear definition of the issue, as they perceived it more from a theoretical 
perspective. 
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· What do you think are important positive or negative potentials of surveillance?  
Positive aspects of surveillance for FG I were crime suppression and the facilitator factor in 
law enforcement. FG II was reluctant to find positive aspects of surveillance. Negative aspects 
for FG I were identified a priori with the necessity to define a concrete motivation for 
surveillance practice, while FG II identified the negative aspect of surveillance as the “misuse 
of personal data”. 
· Who should be involved when deciding on implementing new surveillance measures?  
Whilst FG I thought that citizen should be addressed through a referendum, FG II preferred to 
involve citizens through an indirect channel, such as via NGOs or associations. 
· Do you have any suggestions about the regulation of implementation of surveillance 
measures?  
FG I suggested implementing regulations, organizing more public debates and developing the 
“culture of security” among citizens and considered the implementation of “ethical codes” 
from the (public/private) entities perspective a necessity. FG II limited suggestions to the 
generic implementation of ad hoc laws. Both FG I and FG II underlined the necessity to act on 
an international level (i.e. “globalization effect”). 
· Do you have any final remarks, points or messages that you would like to add?  
Although both FG I and FG II underlined the “lack of information” about surveillance in our 
society, FG I noticed that the “level of awareness” is directly proportional to the information 
provided.  
·  
General terms of comparison 
In general terms, a comparative analysis between the two Focus Groups reveals that the individuals 
attending FG I and FG II in Italy can be classified, as far as profile and behaviour goes, within two 
basic categories: i.e. experts and lay participants: 
· Expert: an individual who, on the basis of his/her education/profession/personal interests, is 
familiar with the surveillance issue in general and/or is familiar with technological devices, 
intended to be the most diffused means for surveillance practices, 
· Lay: an individual who experiences surveillance as an ordinary citizen in his/her everyday 
life, with a basic technological knowledge or no ICT knowledge at all. 
 
These descriptions show that the positions taken by individuals from the two categories are 
substantially different, although it is interesting to underline that this aspect is more evident in 
participants attending the second Focus Group. In fact, the lack of interviews with researches has been 
crucial in influencing both the behaviour and the results of the people attending the FG. 
 
Experts perceived surveillance practices as something to be taken for granted. Lay participants can be 
divided into two sub-groups: i.e. individuals who were shocked and scared about the issue, which, 
although they perceive as always present, they know little about; and individuals who are getting used 
to and accept surveillance, at the same time, exploiting opportunities that have emerged from this 
practice, i.e. technological devices. 
 
It is also important to consider age as a factor that influences approaches towards surveillance: In fact, 
younger and older participants perceived this issue from different points of view. Put concisely, young 
people are more accustomed to technological devices as they consider them a part of their everyday 
lives, without considering potential dangers, in spite of the “surveillance factor” being strongly related 
to the technology issue. The older people, on the contrary, use the technological devices with a more 
critical approach as they are frightened about the potential dangers and they consider increasing 
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surveillance in our society as a consequence of the rapid evolution of new technologies, largely 
diffused in the wider market. 
In order to define the various attitudes towards the issues under discussion, it is necessary to develop a 
model in which the behaviour of participants from both FG is classified. It is possible to create the 
following typologies on the basis of two attitudes representing a dichotomy: 
· Interested Active or Pro-Active / Passive: attitude towards surveillance in everyday life. 
Interested Active are individuals interested in surveillance, who don’t take action for/against 
surveillance; Pro-Active are individuals interested in surveillance, who take action for/against 
surveillance; Passive are individuals who are not interested in the surveillance issue at all. 
· Resistant / Open to change opinion: attitude towards surveillance after the FG experience. 
 
It is possible to draw a diagram of the “categories of individuals” (i.e. Expert / Lay) and the 
“typologies of behaviours” pertaining to the participants of FG I and FG II (Interested Active or Pro-
Active / Passive; Resistant / Open to change opinion), as follows: 
 
FG I: 7 participants out of 8 
Individual’s profile: 
Gender and Age 
Expert / Lay Interested Active or 
Pro-Active / Passive 
Resistant / Open to 
change opinion 
(after FG experience) 
 
Female, 52 Lay Passive Open to change opinion 
Female, 40 Lay Pro-Active Open to change opinion 
Female, 45 Lay Pro-Active Open to change opinion 
Male, 42 Expert Pro-Active Open to change opinion 
Female, 52 Lay Passive Resistant 
Male, 24 Lay Interested Active Open to change opinion 
Female,50 Lay Interested Active Resistant 
Female, 75 
 
(did not attend FG) - - 
 
FG II: 6 participants out of 8 
Individual’s 
profile: 
Gender and Age 
Expert/Lay Interested Active 
or Pro-Active / 
Passive 
Resistant/Open to 
change opinion 
(after FG experience) 
 
Female, 23 Lay Passive Resistant 
Male, 24 Lay Passive Resistant 
Male, 53 Expert Passive Open to change opinion 
Female, 60 Lay Interested Active Resistant 
Male, 35 Expert Pro-Active Open to change opinion 
Female, 52 Lay Passive Resistant 
Female, 49 
 
(did not attend FG) - - 
Female, 26 
 
(did not attend FG) - - 
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In conclusion, a comparative analysis of both diagrams reveals the main difference between FG I and 
FG II: namely, the “rigid” (i.e. “resistant”) behaviour of the participants in FG II due to a generally 
“passive” attitude towards surveillance, due to an a priori lack of information on the topic which 
hampered the development of awareness of, behaviour toward and opinions on the issue. On the other 
hand, FG I is more “active”, since the a priori experience of the interview, as mentioned by all 
participants, contributed to an increase in their level of information, as well as their level of 
knowledge on surveillance, as this stimulated them to collect more information on the issue.  
 
 
Slovakia 
Erik Láštic, Martin Kovanič  
 
Summary 
The discussion about the quotes started with an opinion, that we should not be surprised by what the 
Snowden leaks brought to light and that this was to be expected. In general, surveillance was not seen 
as something negative, rather as something that can protect us. Respondents agreed that intelligence 
agencies are not interested in our communications and that they are barely interested in the broader 
picture (aggregated meta-data). Only one respondent voiced a concern, that something like this could 
possibly be misused in the future and drew a parallel to communist security services archives. 
 
When talking about surveillance in general, a big discussion about the online environment and social 
networks developed. In this context respondents spoke about the problem of the use of information 
found online, for various purposes (e.g. employers screening their potential or current employees). 
Here respondents highlighted the fact that when working with such information, it should be taken 
into account that information found represents just a fragment of the individual person and needs to be 
understood in a certain context (e.g. age, social situation in which the picture was taken).  
The positive aspects of surveillance identified, are mostly in connection to the use of CCTV for crime 
prevention. In terms of private entities, use of loyalty cards and gathering of data about consumer 
behaviour was also seen as advantageous for consumers, since it helps improve products and services. 
 When it comes to negative aspects, the only thing mentioned was the problem of sharing data that an 
individual agrees to disclose to a company, with third parties. This is also something that should be 
regulated in some way. 
 
Implementation of surveillance measures should not be the subject of too much public deliberation 
(since it is a complex problem and it would be too complicated). Respondents agreed that standard 
representative tools are sufficient, if they work properly. What is important is information and 
education in these areas, especially when it comes to digital literacy and this is something that should 
be implemented in elementary schools.  
 
The discussion started with reactions towards the quotes concerning the Snowden leaks. Respondents 
predominantly endorsed the “nothing to fear, nothing to hide” approach, although the opinion, that 
these practices are worrying was also voiced. The Snowden leaks themselves were not discussed. It 
was agreed that individual citizens cannot do much about these practices, although it is important to 
talk about them and spread knowledge on these issues. 
 
When talking about surveillance itself, respondents mentioned a wide variety of practices, with the 
most focus placed on online surveillance and CCTV – something that was discussed quite extensively 
in the interviews. CCTV surveillance is seen as contradictory, with arguments both for and against 
presented. Online surveillance was seen as having the most possibilities and as a practice, which can 
generate the most data. 
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The positive effects of surveillance can be divided into three broad categories. Protection, either by 
public authorities (CCTV) or by citizens themselves; commerce and the improvement of services, 
which can be achieved if producers and vendors have enough data about their customers; and an 
aspect connected with the work environment – higher employee productivity can be achieved, if 
surveillance mechanisms are in place. The latter aspect was contested by one respondent who saw too 
much surveillance at the workplace as counter-productive and an invasion of privacy.  
 
When it comes to the negative effects, the possible misuse of data was seen as the biggest threat. 
Another negative is the use of incomplete data about a person (data doubles) as a source of 
information for companies in the hiring process. Some opposition towards CCTV cameras was voiced 
as well, based on the personal experiences of one of the respondents.  
 
What is interesting is the fact, that the focus group agreed that state surveillance is less trustworthy 
than private surveillance, which is underlined by general distrust of the state in Slovakia.  
 
Decisions about the implementation of surveillance mechanisms should be left to representative 
bodies; the focus group did not really see any bigger role for the public in the decision-making 
process. However they did call for a bigger role of experts and academics, and more data-based 
approaches in this process. 
 
When talking about regulation, respondents did not come up with any specific mechanisms; however 
they suggested more transparency on the functioning of these various mechanisms. Also the option of 
opting-out of some surveillance practices was mentioned. 
 
All of the respondents agreed, that previous experience with IRISS had an impact on their thinking 
about these issues and in some cases it even influenced the behaviour of some respondents. In the last 
round, the possibility of connecting the issues of surveillance with the growing popularity of 
conspiracy theories was raised.  
 
Comparison FG I and FG II 
The two focus groups allowed us to identify differences on the topics discussed, as well as on opinions 
towards surveillance between informed and uninformed participants. It should be mentioned, that FG I 
lasted slightly than FG II, which can be attributed to the fact that respondents knew a little more about 
the issues and thought more about the related problems. Problems were to some extent voiced by FG I 
respondents as well, who mentioned that their previous involvement in IRISS had helped shaped their 
opinions about surveillance. 
 
Comparison by issues discussed 
Concerning the discussion of Snowden leaks and quotes from previous interviews, both groups agreed 
that this is something that should be expected. Both groups endorsed the “nothing to fear, nothing to 
hide” approach. The main difference was in fact, that FG I voiced some concerns. Participants found 
these revelations (and practices) disturbing to some extent, however, they all agreed that there is little 
one can do to avoid it. FG II was more focused on the benefits of such practices, such as provision of 
security. They highlighted the fact that most likely nobody is interested in their data and the focus is 
on meta-data. 
 
When it comes to the topic of surveillance in general, both groups discussed a variety of topics and 
came up with a number of examples. FG I concentrated more on the issues that were discussed in the 
interviews. FG II touched on a slightly bigger variety of topics, although in a less detailed manner. FG 
I discussed CCTV surveillance and online surveillance in most detail. CCTV surveillance was seen as 
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contradictory, with arguments both for and against presented. Online surveillance was seen as having 
the most possibilities and as a practice, which can generate the most data. FG II focused most on the 
online environment, social media and workplace surveillance, since these were the topics with which 
they had been in most contact with themselves.  
 
Both groups were able to identify several positive effects of surveillance. FG I identified three groups 
of positive effects: Protection, either by public authorities (CCTV) or citizens themselves, although 
CCTV surveillance was seen as ambiguous and the positive view was challenged by one of the 
respondents; commerce and the improvement of services, which can be achieved if producers and 
retailers have enough data about their customers; and the work environment – higher employees 
productivity can be achieved, if surveillance mechanisms are in place. FG II identified two broad 
effects – which overlap with the effects identified by FG I. Crime prevention potential (use of CCTV) 
and improvement of services by the private sector (such as collecting data from loyalty cards). 
 
FG I discussed negative effects in more detail. The most prominent issue was the possible misuse of 
data. Another negative effect highlighted, was the use of incomplete data about a person (data 
doubles) as a source of information for companies in the hiring process. As has been previously 
mentioned, some opposition towards CCTV cameras was voiced as well, based on the personal 
experiences of one of the respondents. FG II mentioned only the problem of sharing personal data with 
third parties, without the consent of the individual in question. In general, both groups saw more 
positive sides of surveillance, than negative. 
 
When discussing the difference between public and private surveillance, both groups mentioned issues 
that can be classified as distrust towards the state and its ability to govern effectively. This was more 
prominent in FG I, who agreed that in general state surveillance is less trustworthy than private 
surveillance. On the other hand FG II inclined more towards trust in public (state) surveillance, stating 
that state surveillance has certain, meaningful goals and is regulated. In contrast, private surveillance 
is interested in profit and one cannot be sure, what is done with the data collected. 
 
Both groups showed a rather high level of distrust towards direct democracy procedures, such as 
involving the public in discussions about the implementation of various surveillance measures. FG I 
claimed that decisions about the implementation of such mechanisms should be left to representative 
bodies; participants did not really see any bigger role of public in the process. However they did call 
for a bigger role of experts and academics, and a more data-based approach in this process. FG II also 
stressed the importance of educating citizens about such practices. According to FG II it is important 
to inform and educate in these areas, especially when it comes to digital literacy. 
 
When talking about regulation, FG I did not come up with any specific mechanisms. They only 
suggested more transparency in the functioning of these mechanisms. Also the possibility of opting-
out of some surveillance practices was mentioned. Similar suggestions – more transparency in the 
functioning of surveillance, and the problem of data retention were also mentioned. 
 
 
United Kingdom 
Charles Leleux, Keith Spiller, 
 
Summary 
This report has documented some of the discussions held at two focus groups in the UK. The 
comparisons and differences we have highlighted in the following sections have been intended to give 
some perspective on a group with previous exposure to our research project and one with no exposure. 
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The geographical distance of over 300 miles between where the groups took place and were recruited 
from, may give some insight into their views on surveillance and how they are understood in the UK. 
FG I was more inclined to acknowledge the benefits of data collection and analysis, whereas FG II had 
a more critical outlook. This may seem surprising, as FG II had no previous dealings with the research 
project. A number of factors may have produced this outcome: for example, 1) the questions asked in 
the previous round of interviews may have promoted personal reflection that resulted in participants 
being satisfied with surveillance and its influence on their lives; 2) participants in FG I may have 
political or technological leanings that favour the expansion and benefits of data collection, or 3) the 
propensity of participants ‘new’ to discussions of surveillance is to presume a negative or suspicious 
outlook. Our observations are of course prefaced by the fact that we are discussing a limited number 
of participants and only two focus groups. 
 
Distinctive in our findings however have been some of the similarities and differences held by the 
groups. Notable, to us, has been the language used by participants and the topics discussed. 
Particularly evident in the differences between the groups were sceptical notions of trust in various 
data collecting systems, especially social media, as well as calls for the increased use of surveillance 
and concepts such as joining up more data dots. These comments we found interesting, mainly in 
relation to events such as the Snowden revelations and to some degree the attention paid to 
campaigners such as Julian Assange and WikiLeaks. While it is certainly true that elements of trust 
did feature in FG I, what we drew upon in this instance was the driver of conversations - for FG II is 
was a pressing and important issue that was discussed at length and in detail. The same priorities were 
not expressed in FG I. Again, it is hard to estimate the reasoning behind this, but it does go some way 
in documenting differing opinions held by the groups. 
 
Noteworthy behaviour in reviewing the similarities expressed are feelings of safety, where the 
presence of CCTV, as the example most widely used, is understood in terms of reassurance and 
protection. There is also an interesting dichotomy here as cameras are viewed positively in public 
environments, whereas, monitoring behaviours in private settings produces altogether more 
troublesome sensations and behaviours. Nevertheless, a strong consensus remained that UK streets 
with cameras created safer environments and participants were more inclined to use streets which had 
cameras. In drawing attention to these examples our intention has been to give a concise overview of 
the issues and topics discussed in the UK focus groups and to also draw upon a select number of the 
similarities and differences expressed by participants. In doing so we reason that the report gives a 
strong impression of the opinions and behaviours of those in the groups and a ‘snapshot’ of how 
surveillance is viewed by citizens in the UK. 
 
Comparison FG I and FG II 
In general, FG I was more accepting of surveillance and quicker to point out the benefits of data 
collection and analysis, particularly to catch the ‘baddies’. Whereas FG II, were more resistant to 
surveillance-type issues and while they did not seem to be actively resisting surveillance they certainly 
had a more critical outlook. 
 
Similarities 
 
Potentials or the ‘what if’ scenarios 
There was much discussion about political change or the potential dangers of the information 
generated through surveillance, and its future use for indeterminate purposes - a deep unease with 
future implications of surveillance was detected with many references to ‘Big Brother.’ 
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FG I 
‘Well, I think one difficult thing is, that you could have, as you referred to it, a change in government 
to a totalitarian state, which could then use this information against people, that’s one point.  
Secondly, there is something inherently sinister about government looking at areas of our private 
experience or what we do, and perhaps we don’t know that’s happening.  So I suppose I don’t like it, 
but then I can see the sense of, you know, we don’t want to be blown up by a terrorist cell and we want 
that to be prevented by any possible means.  I mean, I sometimes think of the situation with Chile, and 
that awful man, Pinochet [unclear] he got a list of the doctors who had and haven’t striked, was it 
Allende who was there before, and those who had not protested against Allende, in other words, were 
sympathetic to Allende, Pinochet got them arrested and treated abominably and all the rest of it.  So 
that was a case of using data that perhaps wouldn’t have been expected to be used in that way’. 
 
FG II 
‘Well I think the issue is ‘who is going to get the data on me and what are they going to use it for?’ So 
it’s OK if I have an alibi from a crime etc. but the problem then is: are there other people besides the 
police getting access to the data. And secondly, well, what happens if the police want to use it for a 
particular objective, such as, you were talking about trade unions earlier on, I’m a trade unionist, is 
that a legitimate thing to be tracing somebody who’s a member of a political party or a trade union or 
whatever. And so, what could it be used for besides legitimate crime prevention or crime detection? 
 
Monetization of data 
Both groups raised issues around the ‘cost of free data’ or the monetization of data. Most examples 
revolved around pop-up ads or how participants were aware that they were giving their information 
away, albeit to Google, Amazon or other large organisations. Participants seemed happy or accepting 
of the need to trade their information for access to services. 
 
FG I  
‘At the moment it’s all rosy [providing information that the Government may have access to], at that 
point does it become monetised, that data?  At what point do we become units of currency that can be 
exchanged for our data, further data rather.  Sorry, you must think I’m being very paranoid here, but I 
do think of these things as being potentially destructive. 
 
FG II 
‘I’d like to add to this point. In my view the second statement has been on the same side however more 
in the corporate side of it. Because, as we have spoken before, whether I am cooking something or 
watching a TV programme could be useful information in corporate terms. And then again, going to a 
social networking and email services, it is a matter of reading the terms and conditions because pretty 
much everything is written there and the reason they are free is because they can use the information. 
Like Facebook we, by clicking ‘I agree with the terms and conditions’, we give the rights to use our 
interests, our comments, our writings to generate information which could be sold to companies who 
want to sell services or products.’ 
 
Feeling Safer 
There appears to be a widely held belief that CCTV and other devices provide a ‘comfort blanket’ of 
sorts. Although a participant in FG II does voice their concerns as to whether or not there is evidence 
to support this, nevertheless the underlying tone is certainly one of supporting CCTV in the context of 
personal safety and crime detection.  
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FG I 
‘I mean having all that information, and it can be used for good as well as bad things couldn’t it?  I 
mean, knowing that a percentage of the population are, you know, there’s things you can find out that 
might help with, I can think of illness or disease or patterns in society that might tell us things about 
the way society is developing, those kinds of things, which could be of use and interest, and CCTV 
camera makes me feel safer.  I’m glad that they can trace people much better now, if they’ve 
committed previous crimes or whatever.  Although you know, I know there’s the danger that police 
can, or police can manipulate that.  I also know that for me it’s a good thing, because if, you know, 
something happens I want to know that they can find the person.’ 
 
FG II 
‘Well I think personally, it does make me feel a bit safer on the street. Because I think if something 
does happen, it’s being monitored in some way. Not just me personally but in general, with crime, I 
just think there is more likelihood of catching a perpetrator. So I feel that’s a positive aspect of certain 
street surveillance.’ 
 
Cautious of Control 
Evident in both groups was cautiousness about what is going on regarding surveillance in participants’ 
lives, as well as ambivalence. While most participants freely accepted they have to live their lives with 
surveillance, they also have a slight uneasiness with how things operate – possibly Snowden induced, 
as his name seems to arise more frequently in FG II. 
 
FG I 
‘I do worry about the dark side, but I also can see lots of benefits to it too.  I find that people sort of 
mysteriously talk about how bad it is, what a bad thing it is, but I’m never really clear about why it’s a 
bad thing and I can also see that there might be lots of good things.  I’m scared of things like mistaken 
identity, you know, identity theft and all those kinds of things, but I can also see that there’s a lot of 
good to it as well.  We’ve always collected data historically, looking at history and your job and 
everything, you know, it would be fascinating information to be able to look at our generation of 
people, these people that exist now.  So I don’ know, I’m sort of in the middle and trying to move 
about within it.   
So I can’t help feel that yes, there are all these wonderful, I don’t disagree with … there are fantastic 
benefits, and yet, I can’t help seeing, underneath the stone, how can it be, how can it be manipulated.  
Perhaps too much Bladerunner as a small kid makes me think of these things, but I can’t embrace it 
wholeheartedly as a wholly positive thing.’ 
 
FG II 
‘It was Big Data. I mean at the moment now, even with this Snowdon etc. you’ve got to search for the 
information. But I think when you’ve Big Data and you can actually analyse (it) in real terms and 
know so much about you and then influence your behaviour. Because the thing is they offer you this 
‘free cinema’ and all of that but they are actually monitoring your behaviour. And this is what really 
does worry me; the sheer ability in real time to process information about you and then to try to alter 
your behaviour and you think of all sorts of different ways it can try to do that.’ 
 
Differences 
While each of the topics that follow are not unusual in themselves – they are topics widely discussed 
in relation to surveillance in the UK – what strikes us here is the fact that only one group seems to 
have discussed the matters we highlight below: 
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Government and private differences 
It appears there is a deep-seated ambivalence in the following quote; it is ok to track my online 
behaviour, but NHS data (and one can presume bank details and other sensitive information) is 
sacrosanct. Once again nothing unusual in this statement, but the clear division of data and its worth 
are notable. 
FG I 
‘I still think there’s a difference there between the millions, the billions that Google make, because I 
think they must have the most data, they’ve certainly got the most data on me, and the most valuable 
data, about shopping and interests and whatever, where I go, and then the NHS selling off our data.  
To me that’s just a massively different situation, whereas one needs to be regulated very seriously, and 
it would be outrageous if that data was sold off, with Google you know that’s what’s going on.’ 
 
Powerlessness 
There is a very real resignation here in the participants’ comments. They are powerless to do anything. 
This sense of resignation we felt was less pressing in FG II. Although as the FG II comment below 
suggests there is a nuanced appreciation that citizens are relatively powerless and everyone is now 
seen as ‘guilty’. 
  
FG I 
‘Perhaps didn’t think about it enough, but now, whatever you engage with, your computer or if you’re 
just surfing, you just see that you’re constantly, somebody’s kind of using everything, you know, 
you’ve ever done, to try and target you.  So yes, I’m much more aware of it, but I’m not sure what I 
can do about it.’ 
 
FG II 
‘I just want to say on the surveillance, I thought the law was innocent until proven guilty, and I just 
find surveillance treats everybody as being guilty. Because if you talk about criminality and criminal 
acts, that’s what it’s there doing. So it’s assuming there’s going to be a criminal act and somebody’s 
going to perform it. But in the meantime, everybody else has to be watched before that criminal act 
can take place. And that’s what I object to.’ 
 
Altering behaviour 
A very interesting point is raised here and one that refers to the idea of being watched and how even in 
everyday terms if we do some menial task it often becomes harder when we know we are being 
watched.  The second comment refers to the fact that most people do not care what they do online – is 
this because they are not aware of being monitored? Nevertheless we think the point is pressing in 
understanding our attitudes and behaviours in relation to what we do online and in other activities. 
 
FG II 
‘I think if you’re being watched you do behave differently. And I think also if you’re in a group you 
behave much more differently if you think you’re being watched. And that doesn’t need to be a positive 
the different behaviour, it could be very negative.’ 
 
‘I would respectfully disagree with both of you because just think about behaviour online. We now 
post-Snowden know, even those of us who weren’t as well informed, and people behave as recklessly 
as they like online. Nobody is careful about - I mean there is no idea of digital citizenship: it’s still 
quite a ‘Wild West’, people are using the internet not thinking.’  
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Needs more dot joining  
This point concentrates on the need to join-the-dots and to some degree to increase the inter-
connectivity of organisations. Here there is a call for greater exchange of data and ‘Big Data’. The 
notion of inter-connectivity we found interesting and were surprised that others did not voice this 
point. 
 
FG I 
‘Well, very often when they bring up a case, there was one today, child abuse I think, where both the 
parents had abuse histories, and somebody should have been able to, they should have been flagged 
up somewhere.  The joining up of data between agencies is very poor, they don’t talk to each other, 
and there’s no mechanisms for getting it, and it comes up all over the place, when people say, oh well 
if only the agencies would talk together and the police didn’t know that there had been a threat made 
against her or whatever, so that would seem like an easier thing to do, if you’d got this database.  It 
seems like a good idea, but you’ve got to have a way of protecting it, and I don’t know, I think that’s 
difficult to do once you’ve got… if you’ve got sort of multiple databases and try and join them 
together, I think that is probably quite difficult to do, so I don’t know how you would go about it.’ 
 
Displacement of crime 
This point speaks to some of the work of Sewell and Barker 378 and how crime and other activities re-
emerge or re-fashion themselves. There is recognition here on behalf of the participant that crime is 
going to happen and there is little that can be done, to stop it, including provision of CCTV. The 
person seems to be suggesting we are all being misled in a belief that we are safer because of 
increased technology/security. 
 
FG II 
‘I think the thing about displacement is if a lot of crime is opportunistic then there could be 
displacement elsewhere. But another one is speed cameras. There’s a huge case about that. Speed 
cameras are a form of surveillance that is triggered off by a particular event. Although there is a huge 
debate as to whether they are effective or not. I think one other thing is what’s the objective? If the 
objective is to cut crime. There may be another objective which is simply to reduce people’s fear of 
crime. Because generally a lot of the social surveys show fear of crime is far, far higher than actual 
crime. I mean you were talking about Neighbourhood Watch and so on. Often what you’re doing is 
reducing, well, there may be social function as well, but you may be just reducing the fear of crime 
which could be a positive outcome. So people feel safer even though in fact they're not any safer but it 
doesn’t really matter because you’re actually reducing their fear of crime. So I think there’s multiple 
objectives. It’s a bit like George Orwell in 1984 where they always had war because you always had a 
war to keep people in control. So the idea was perpetual war to keep the fear up!’ 
 
Social media impacts 
This is a significant story that we felt should be included in this section. Evident are the abuses that 
can, and do, relate to comments placed on social media websites. For a ‘Vice Consul’ or a government 
official to call a person/visitor/visa seeker to account for expressing an opinion, which could be 
viewed as problematic – the penalties for complaining become plain to see. This seems to be 
highlighting the negative impacts of life online and the consequences of online actions. This was not 
covered in any great depth in FG I. 
 
 
                                               
378 Sewell, G., and Barker, J. R. Coercion versus care: Using irony to make sense of organizational surveillance. Academy of 
Management Review, 31(4), 2006, pp. 934-961. 
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FG II 
‘I think something that’s interesting about surveillance is it’s a question of level of agency. So I think 
whether something is surveillance or not is kind of contingent on how much agency you have in that 
recording of information. But I had an interesting incident happen which I suppose is to do with 
Facebook surveillance but it’s also to do with crossing state lines online. So I’m a British citizen and I 
need a visa to go back to India. And I complained about the service of the Indian consulate on a 
Facebook public group page. Because there is now this understanding that if you complain on social 
media it will have a positive impact. I was called in to talk to the Vice Consul and was chastised for an 
hour! And was told that social media plays a very different role in the Indian government. And this is 
very true because the Indian foreign minister was sacked after he made - not even defamatory but kind 
of anti-government statements on Twitter. So it’s kind of interesting that despite, say in a country like 
India with stakes in technology and its contribution to technology and its advancement, the kind of 
idea of social media as being a public space which should not be under surveillance is something that 
they’re completely not comfortable with. And obviously there are countries that have deeper problems 
with social networks. Which brings what you were saying about Snowdon etc, that it’s often to do with 
the kind of idea of a country that they want to portray. So, you know, America wants to be portrayed 
as doing good, that might not necessarily be the truth.’ 
 
Trust in Social Media Providers and Technology 
FG I was slightly more trusting of social media providers and the technology. The issue of trust arises 
over the relationship between social media providers and the users i.e. can the users trust the social 
media provider not to share their digital records with other agencies including the state, or is the state 
or other agencies going to collect the information in any event. Clearly, the Snowden revelations point 
to the latter, being the case, so in a sense any information, which now has a digital footprint is capable 
of being monitored and mediated.     
 
FG I 
‘Yes, and you sort of trust the company that you are giving the data to, to look after.  But the problem 
has come about more recently, because that trust has been broken by the governmental organisations, 
who’ve been snooping on the data, it’s not been the companies themselves.  I think Google do a 
reasonable job of being responsible with the data.’ 
 
‘I do remember sort of finishing Keith’s interview and then sort of feeling I was quite naïve.  I still sort 
of think that, but I also, I kind of think it’s okay, I really, I feel there’s some sinister elements that I 
don’t feel engaged with, and I still think Google provide us with useful tools, and we need to pay them 
something.  I think they’re probably getting a bit too much money, but yes…’ 
 
FG II 
‘What does worry me is, yes they can check your text messages etc. etc. But in the old days you had to 
get physically listen to your phone now it’s got software. And what really worries me in the next ten 
years is if the software develops to such an extent that they can actually check - and will check - in 
real time. Instead of checking one in a million now they can actually check one in one. That really 
does worry me. So I think the fundamental, what we mean by ‘surveillance’ is changing because of 
technology.’ 
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9.4.3 Findings: The overall perspective 
Walter Peissl 
 
Below we list themes that emerged during FG in different countries. They illustrate the variety of 
perspectives on surveillance and control. By highlighting similarities as well as differences between 
the different FG in the respective countries we test the working hypotheses. Furthermore some of the 
themes below were expressed during both FG I and FG II in specific countries. We therefore show 
some country specific overlaps or differences. 
 
Regarding the general attitude towards surveillance we found similar patterns in the Austrian, Italian 
and German FG I groups: they were much more critical towards surveillance than the members in the 
respective FG II. Members of FG I in Austria, Italy and Slovakia were also more concrete in their 
argumentation, negotiated in more detail, brought examples from personal experience and had a clear 
understanding of “surveillance”, which was probably based on the higher awareness of the issue, due 
to the engagement in the in-depth interviews in Task 4.2, whereas the FG II in Italy had a more 
superficial idea of surveillance. This was similar in the Austrian and German FG II, which both had a 
more abstract discussion and spoke rather theoretically about surveillance. In Slovakia both groups 
endorsed the “nothing to fear, nothing to hide” approach, with a tendency to see surveillance in 
general more positively than negatively. In FG II participants touched on a slightly bigger variety of 
topics, however in a less detailed manner. In the UK participants in both FG seemed to freely accept 
being part of the system or certainly living their lives with surveillance. However they also had a 
slight unease with how things operate. FG I (UK) was more inclined to promote the benefits of data 
collection and analysis. The members of FG II in general, did not see it as something negative, but 
rather as something that could protect them. 
 
A theme that framed discussions in all FG in all countries was the surveillance vs. security trade-off. 
These debates included a claim for proportionality and clear limits to surveillance. 
Like the Austrian FG II, all mostly agreed that for the sake of security some surveillance is necessary. 
The Italian FG I found surveillance acceptable for crime prevention but with strict limits in the 
individual sphere (e.g. email communication etc.). Both Austrian FG argued strongly for 
proportionality (“do only as much surveillance as needed”), acknowledging that finding the 
proportional approach is a difficult task.  
 
Together with the security issue the question of public (state) surveillance was discussed. In Slovakia 
FG II, participants found positive aspects of surveillance mostly in connection with the use of CCTV 
and crime prevention. They were more inclined towards trust in public (state) surveillance. They 
mentioned that state surveillance has certain goals and meaning and is regulated. In contrast, private 
surveillance is employed for profit and one cannot be sure, what is done with the data. Interestingly, 
even a member of the essentially positive UK FG I showed a deep-seated ambivalence, as expressed in 
the following quote: “it is ok to track my online behaviour, but NHS data (and one can presume bank 
details and other sensitive information) is sacrosanct”. Both UK groups were essentially positive 
towards surveillance, however monitoring behaviours in private settings produced altogether more 
negative responses and behaviours, due to the personal nature of the data or images involved. This 
shows that even in less critical groups there are certain limits that are deemed “intimate” or “really 
private”.  
 
(Mis-)Trust in public authorities was a driving force behind discussions in both FG in Austria, 
Germany, Italy and Slovakia. In Italy both groups were more tolerant towards public, as opposed to 
private surveillance. This also holds true for FG II in Italy and Austria, where members showed more 
understanding for public surveillance (need to gain security). Private surveillance with loyalty cards, 
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credit and debit cards etc. was seen as much more problematic. The more critical participants of FG I 
in Austria made no distinction between public and private surveillance, and refused both. In Germany 
participants of FG I also stated some mistrust in political institutions and the government, although 
this attitude seems to be considerably stronger in Slovakia. According to the discussions in FG I in 
Slovakia state surveillance is less trustworthy than private surveillance. Additionally private entities, 
use of loyalty cards and gathering of data about consumer behaviour are seen as advantageous for 
consumers as well (FG II). FG II in Germany also stated that people don’t really care much about 
surveillance by private actors. Private surveillance is deemed more convenient and less critical. At the 
same time FG II participants in Austria and Italy and participants in both Slovakian FG acknowledged 
the blurring boundaries between public and private data collection. 
 
These blurring boundaries may be one of the reasons that in three out of five countries (Germany, 
Slovakia and UK) the participants of the FG expressed their concerns that individuals can’t do much 
about it. The potentials of surveillance are too huge to be mastered properly (FG I, Germany), there 
was a feeling of powerlessness (FG I, UK) and that there is little one can do to avoid it (both FG, 
SLO) 
 
Part of all narratives in the FG in the five countries was the iconic character of CCTV for surveillance. 
This was expressed literally in all four FG in Germany and Italy and indirectly by taking up the 
discussion on the efficacy of CCTV in FG I in Austria, Italy and the UK. Most discussions revolved 
around the statement that CCTV is insufficient in preventing, but maybe helpful in solving crime (FG 
I Germany) and therefore positive effects of surveillance derive from CCTV as a facilitating factor in 
law enforcement (FG I, Italy). The only critical appraisal in this respect came from FG I in Austria. 
Here participants expressed missing trust in the efficacy of surveillance measures in general and 
CCTV in particular. In Slovakia (both FG) the crime preventing potential of CCTV was highlighted 
and in the UK (both FG) cameras are viewed positively when they are situated in public environments. 
There is also a strong consensus, that UK streets with cameras created safer environments. 
 
This “feeling safe” was expressed in both UK FG and in both Slovakian groups. Even in the critical 
FG II in Germany the female participants stated that in certain circumstances women feel safer under 
CCTV. 
 
More differences emerged during the assessment of the influence of economy on surveillance 
practices. The more critical FG I in Austria and Germany referred to the greedy culture of companies 
or the greedy nature of human beings. Additionally in Austria participants saw advantages in 
surveillance only for the security industry and other suppliers. In FG II the Austrian participants 
understood that technology developments are capital intensive and therefore economic interests 
dominate and are pushing developments. With regard to the economically induced private 
surveillance, FG I in Italy recognized that commercial surveillance cannot be avoided and that there 
are costs of anonymity. That seemed not to pose a problem in the UK, as participants accepted the 
monetization of data, and they seemed to accept the need to trade their personal information for access 
to free services. Indeed, participants of the Slovakian FG I saw positive effects of private surveillance 
in commerce and the improvement of services. 
 
In Italy, Slovakia and the UK the participants in all FG underlined the importance of information, 
knowledge and awareness. A lack of information on surveillance practices in the respective countries 
was expressed in all groups. Austrian participants articulated their gratitude to the organisers for 
providing a setting to talk about these practices that affect citizens’ everyday lives, and which enriched 
their perspectives on the issues at stake. 
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Age played a fundamental role in the debates in different FG. Different generations deal differently 
with new media and the accompanying surveillance practices. The elder participants were more 
concerned with privacy issues than the younger ones (FG II in Germany and both Italian FG). The 
younger participants presented themselves in a somewhat controversial manner: A mixture of being 
careless, resigned, incautious, and inconsistent. (FG II, Germany). In Austria FG I promoted the idea 
of engaging the elderly in decision-making on surveillance measures because of their life experience. 
In contrast FG II participants in Austria appreciated the idea of involving children in decision-making, 
because decisions on societal level affect their future lives. 
 
The idea of involving the elderly and children in decision-making on surveillance measures, 
demonstrated openness toward broad public debate and participation from the Austrian participants. In 
contrast the Slovakian participants expressed a rather high level of distrust towards direct democracy 
procedures in both FG. They rather called for a bigger role for experts and academics, which had also 
been expressed in FG II in Austria. The Italian participants preferred the use of indirect channels of 
participation, via NGOs or associations. However the process should be accompanied by a broad 
public debate involving experts and laypeople. 
 
9.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The overview in this chapter shows widely discussed themes that emerged from different FG in 
different countries. In the following conclusions we will outline the findings with regard to the 
research questions and other results from the text analysis. 
 
The main conclusions to be drawn are: 
Differences between participants in FG I and FG II could be found. 
· Discussions in FG I in four out of the five countries have been much more concrete. 
· Discussions in FG I tended to be more critical towards surveillance. 
These findings reinforce the working hypothesis that people who have been engaged in the in-depth 
interviews on surveillance and control, have a clearer picture. Gaining more awareness, they tended to 
be more critical towards the issue at stake. 
However, specific findings show that these results cannot be generalized. 
· In the UK FG I was rather positive towards surveillance while FG II was slightly more critical 
– in contrast to the groups in the other countries. 
· In the Slovakian FG the overall attitude towards surveillance was much more positive than in 
the FG in the other countries. 
 
These two findings lead to the second research question: are there different surveillance cultures that 
influence attitudes towards surveillance? Indeed the participants in the Slovakian FG as well as the 
UK groups included a higher proportion of academics than the other countries and the Slovakian 
group was much younger on average than the others. As we found the age criterion to be a 
differentiating criterion in other groups (Italy and Austria) too, we could assume that these criteria 
together form a specific culture of surveillance. This is underlined by the importance of 
age/generation in the discussions of different FG, where elder participants tended to be more critical 
and cautious, whereas younger people are more used to the utilisation of new technologies and tend to 
be less worried about surveillance and control. 
 
Additionally the UK and Slovakia are “special” in a specific sense: the UK may be seen as the 
“pioneer” with regard to surveillance measures. Consequentially, people are probably more 
accustomed to and, meanwhile more accommodating of surveillance than in other countries. Slovakia 
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is a CEE country, in post-communist era. This could be one of the reasons for a broad acceptance of 
neo-liberal capitalist attitudes, rating individual economic advantages very highly. At the same time 
these attitudes could lead to a “less critical” appraisal of new technologies. If so, this may account at 
least for attitudes toward private surveillance activities and the acceptance of collection of data for the 
purpose of improving services, offering discounts and so on, which were mentioned quite extensively 
in the FG. A capitalist, entrepreneurial attitude striving for modernisation may therefore be 
constitutive for the specific surveillance culture. However, the reasons for a rather positive acceptance 
of public surveillance - such as CCTV remain unclear and could be the subject of further research. 
 
Trust in public institutions was an issue raised in all countries. Distrust of public authorities A was 
expressed directly in the German and Slovakian cases. This corresponds with the attitudes towards 
public vs. private surveillance. The Austrian, Italian and UK groups tended to be more trustful of 
public authorities, using surveillance measures. The rationale was that public surveillance is for a 
societal good (security) and proper regulation is in place. This was challenged only in the UK and by 
the Austrian FG II. These participants asked “who watches the watchers?” Private surveillance was 
considered rather uncritically in Germany and even advantageous in Slovakia. 
 
The most striking results were the security/surveillance trade-off that emerged in all countries and the 
iconic character of CCTV for surveillance.  
 
In general these FG illustrate, that dealing with an issue can raise awareness, may induce participants 
to gather further information and promote (critical) thinking. Results from this task far from being 
representative for European citizens; however, they showed the strong influence different surveillance 
cultures may have on attitudes towards surveillance and control. The differences between the groups 
in the UK and Slovakia on the one hand and those in Austria, Germany and Italy on the other, seemed 
to be more significant than the differences between FG I and II in the respective countries.  
 
 
